Loading…
Loading…
Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
China's State Council Tariff Commission published its annual "2023 Tariff Adjustment Plan" (税委会公告2022年第11号) on 28 December 2022, effective 1 January 2023. Alongside routine import-side changes (provisional-rate cancellations reverting some goods to MFN rates, and an eighth-step MFN cut on 62 information-technology products from 1 July 2023), the plan raises export tariffs on aluminum and aluminum alloy to support "transformation, upgrading and high-quality development" of the domestic industry. Global Trade Alert logs this export-tax increase as the "certainly harmful" intervention within the bundled state act; a separate import-tariff cut is logged as liberalising.
Indonesia banned the export of raw bauxite ore (including washed bauxite) effective 10 June 2023, extending the "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) doctrine that previously prohibited nickel-ore exports (effective 1 January 2020) to the country's second-largest mineral export. The ban is implemented through the existing Mining Law framework (UU 3/2020 amending UU 4/2009) and operationalised via Ministry of Trade Regulation Permendag 18/2022 on Provisions for Mining-Product Exports. President Joko Widodo formally announced the bauxite-export-ban schedule on 21 December 2022, citing forecast revenue uplift from IDR 21 trillion to IDR 62 trillion (~USD 1.35bn → ~USD 3.9bn) once domestic alumina/ aluminium refining ramps.
OFAC published an interim final rule creating 31 CFR Part 599 to implement Executive Order 14059 (December 15, 2021), which declared a national emergency regarding the unusual and extraordinary threat posed by the global illicit drug trade, including fentanyl and synthetic opioid trafficking. The regulations establish blocking prohibitions, SDN List designation procedures, and enforcement mechanisms targeting foreign persons who materially contribute to international drug proliferation. OFAC stated it would supplement this interim rule with more comprehensive final regulations covering licensing, reporting, and penalty procedures.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed nine Russian persons from the Unverified List (UVL) and simultaneously added them to the Entity List after the Russian government failed to facilitate end-use checks for more than 60 days — the first application of BIS's October 2022 escalation policy. All nine entities are subject to a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a policy of denial and no license exceptions available. The list spans electronics traders, state maritime infrastructure, defense R&D, microelectronics, and industrial equipment manufacturers.
Natural Resources Canada published Canada's Critical Minerals Strategy on 8 December 2022, committing $3.8 billion CAD over eight years (drawn from Budget 2022 and the Fall Economic Statement 2022) to develop Canada's position across the critical-minerals value chain. The strategy designates 31 priority minerals, sets six strategic pillars (data and geoscience, investment and trade, indigenous participation, workforce development, regulatory environment, and sustainability), and explicitly positions Canada as the preferred FTA-partner supplier for the US Inflation Reduction Act's domestic-content requirements under CUSMA/USMCA.
Tanzania's Parliament passed Act No. 10 of 2022, the Tanzania Investment Act, 2022, on 2 December 2022, repealing the Tanzania Investment Act 1997 (Cap. 38 / Act No. 26 of 1997) — the first major overhaul of the country's foreign-investment legal framework in 25 years. The new Act restructures the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) into a One-Stop Facilitation Centre with an integrated electronic system, introduces Strategic and Major Investment Certificates (with capital thresholds of USD 50m foreign / USD 20m local plus minimum 1,000 local jobs and 50% export-uplift requirements), reduces the minimum capital threshold for ordinary local investors from USD 100,000 to USD 50,000, and codifies dispute-resolution access via local arbitration, ICSID, and bilateral/multilateral investment protection agreements. The Act was operationalised by Government Notice No. 94 of 17 February 2023.
South Africa's Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, acting under sections 5 and 6 of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002, published Government Gazette Notices R.2801-R.2804 (Gazette No. 47627, 30 November 2022). The notices impose a temporary six-month export ban (30 November 2022 - 30 May 2023) on ferrous and non-ferrous waste and scrap metal, suspend ITAC's Price Preference System for scrap metal for the same period, and introduce new export permit requirements on semi-finished metal products and import permit requirements on furnaces and scrap-melting machinery. The measure was framed as an emergency response to copper and scrap-metal theft from public infrastructure, estimated at roughly R47 billion a year.
On 16 October 2022, Jordan promulgated Investment Environment Law No. 21 of 2022, published in Official Gazette No. 5821, entering into force 90 days later on approximately 14 January 2023. The law replaces the 2014 Investment Law No. 30 and restructures Jordan's entire FDI-promotion architecture: it establishes the Ministry of Investment (MOIN) and the Investment Council as apex bodies, codifies Development Zones, Free Zones, and Special Economic Zones (including the Aqaba Special Economic Zone — gateway for Jordan's phosphate exports via JPMC, the world's second-largest phosphate producer), and enshrines national-treatment guarantees with customs exemptions, zero-rated sales tax incentives, and investor-state dispute-settlement provisions for qualifying protected FDI. The law is the foundational parent statute for Jordan's IMF Extended Fund Facility-conditioned reform agenda and positions the country within the IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Corridor) trade-investment integration architecture.
Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1903 amends Regulation (EU) 2022/263 so that its import ban and export restrictions, previously limited to the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, also cover the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine's Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. It was adopted on 6 October 2022 alongside the eighth Russia sanctions package and entered into force the day after publication in the Official Journal.
Government Decree 53/2022/ND-CP, signed 15 August 2022 and effective 1 October 2022, implements Article 26 of Vietnam's 2018 Law on Cybersecurity. It mandates in-country storage of three categories of data — personal data of users in Vietnam, user-generated data, and user-relationship data — for both domestic and foreign cyberspace- service providers, with a minimum 24-month retention period. Foreign enterprises providing telecoms, data storage, domain names, e-commerce, online payments, social networks, online video games, or messaging services to users in Vietnam must establish a Vietnamese branch or representative office within 12 months of a Minister of Public Security written request. The decree closes a four-year implementation gap on the 2018 Cybersecurity Law and is the principal Vietnamese digital-trade barrier alongside Decree 13/2023/ND-CP (Personal Data Protection).
The Subsidy Control Act 2022 (Royal Assent 28 April 2022; in force 4 January 2023) replaced EU state-aid rules as the UK's domestic subsidy-control framework, fulfilling an obligation under the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). It establishes a principles-based self-assessment regime administered by a new Subsidy Advice Unit (SAU) at the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), allowing UK public authorities to grant subsidies without prior Commission approval while remaining compliant with WTO subsidy disciplines and TCA obligations.
On 21 April 2022 the UK announced import bans on Russian silver, wood products and other high-value goods (incl. caviar), alongside a 35-point tariff increase on selected Russian and Belarusian goods. The ban was legislated by the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 10) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/689, made 20 June, in force 23 June 2022), which inserted a new Schedule 3D ("revenue generating goods") and prohibitions 46T-46W: import of Schedule 3D goods originating in or consigned from Russia, their acquisition, supply/delivery into the UK and related technical assistance are prohibited, subject to Part 7 exceptions and licences. Schedule 3D covers all of HS chapter 44 (wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal), HS 7106 silver, plus e.g. caviar, cement, potassium chloride and NPK fertilisers, pulp and kraft paper, glass, and aluminium plate.
METI committed 476 billion yen (~$3.3bn) in direct subsidies covering approximately half the construction cost of Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing K.K. (JASM), a purpose-built joint venture fab at Kikuyo Town, Kumamoto Prefecture. JASM shareholders are TSMC (86.5%), Sony Semiconductor Solutions (6%), Denso (6%), and Toyota Motor (1.5 %). The fab manufactures 12nm, 16nm, 22nm, and 28nm mature-node chips targeting automotive-grade, industrial, and IoT applications. A groundbreaking ceremony was held on 13 April 2022; the facility officially opened on 24 February 2024 and reached commercial production in December 2024. JASM represents Japan's first new leading-edge wafer fab in decades and the largest single foreign direct investment in Japanese manufacturing history.
On 4 April 2022 Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs registered the Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods—Russia) Amendment (No.1) Designation 2022, made under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. It amended the existing Export Sanctioned Goods—Russia designation to add further categories of goods to the list of items whose export, supply or transfer to Russia is prohibited, extending an export-ban regime introduced in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It took effect on registration.
Russian Government Resolution No. 506 of 29 March 2022, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and effective 30 March 2022, authorises the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg) to designate categories of goods exempt from articles 1252(4), 1359(6) and 1487 of the Russian Civil Code on national/regional exhaustion of trademark and other intellectual- property rights. Followed by Minpromtorg Order No. 1532 of 19 April 2022 publishing an initial list of 55 goods categories and named brands — including pharmaceuticals, electronics, automotive parts, mineral fuels, industrial chemicals, paper, textiles, base metals, and consumer goods — for which parallel (grey-market) imports without IP-holder consent are legalised. Designed as a sanctions-circumvention and supply-substitution instrument after the Western corporate exodus of March 2022; extended annually and most recently re-authorised through 31 December 2026.
SARS amended South Africa's Prohibited and Restricted Imports and Exports list on 2022-03-23 to add both import and export licensing requirements — administered with the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy — covering uranium ores and concentrates (HS 2612.10), molybdenum ores and concentrates (HS 2613.10), depleted-uranium transport containers and isotope projectors (HS 2844.10/20/30/40, 9022.19), nuclear-grade graphite, graphite blocks and graphite electrodes (HS 8545.11/19). Both directions of trade in these items now require a permit rather than moving freely across South African borders.
Australia designated aluminium ores (including bauxite), alumina and aluminium hydroxide as "export sanctioned goods" for Russia under the Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods -- Russia) Designation 2022, banning their export from Australia to Russia effective 20 March 2022. Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced the measure a day earlier as part of Australia's response to the invasion of Ukraine, framing it as an attack on Russia's aluminium industry, which sourced roughly 20% of its alumina from Australian supply. Rusal, Russia's dominant aluminium producer, was identified as the primary target.
On 16 March 2022 the Swiss Federal Council adopted a total revision of the Ordinance on Measures against Belarus (SR 946.231.116.9), aligning Switzerland's autonomous sanctions with the EU's Belarus regime. It bans imports of Belarusian petroleum products, potassium chloride ("potash"), wood, iron and steel, and cement and rubber products; bans exports of goods used to manufacture or process tobacco products, weapons, surveillance equipment, and goods usable for Belarus's military or security development; and imposes financial sanctions including a ban on public financing for trade with or investment in Belarus, restrictions on securities/loans/ deposits, a prohibition on transactions with the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, and exclusion of listed Belarusian banks from SWIFT. The ordinance entered into force on the day it was adopted.
On 6 March 2022, the South Korean government determined that Belarus had materially supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine and announced it would extend the export-control measures already applied to Russia to Belarus as well. Effective 7 March 2022, Korea designated two Belarusian entities (Belarus's Ministry of Defence and a second entity) to its "parties of concern" list, triggering a case-by-case licensing requirement for strategic items under Korea's multilateral export-control regime, and tightened review of non-strategic dual-use items destined for Belarus.
On 28 February 2022, South Korea's government condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and announced it would strengthen export control review to block strategic items -- microelectronics, telecommunications equipment, sensors, navigation equipment, avionics, marine equipment, and aircraft components -- from reaching Russia. The statement also committed Korea to joining the exclusion of designated Russian banks from the SWIFT international payments system, with implementation details to follow through interagency consultation, alongside plans to release strategic petroleum reserves and divert LNG cargoes to Europe.
On 24 February 2022 (25 February NZ time) the New Zealand Government announced its first measures after Russia's invasion of Ukraine: targeted travel bans on Russian Government officials and individuals associated with the invasion, a prohibition on exporting goods to Russian military and security forces, and suspension of bilateral foreign-ministry consultations. The export prohibition is end-user based; the announcement does not itemise products or give a trade value. GTA tags cereals, vegetables and fruit-and-nuts sectors for this intervention; the primary release reviewed does not mention them.
The Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Ukraine Regions) Regulations 2022 (F2022L00179) apply to the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk the autonomous sanctions measures already in place for Crimea and Sevastopol, commencing 28 March 2022. DFAT describes the measures as prohibiting trade in the transport, energy, telecommunications, and oil, gas and minerals sectors of those regions. Foreign Minister Marise Payne announced Australia's response on 24 February 2022, alongside listings of Russian individuals and banks.
OFAC codified the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Sanctions Regulations at 31 CFR Part 586, implementing Executive Order 13959 (November 12, 2020) as amended by Executive Order 14032 (June 3, 2021). The regulations prohibit US persons from purchasing or selling publicly traded securities of entities designated on OFAC's Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) List, which identifies firms determined to support the People's Liberation Army or Chinese surveillance-technology programs. A divestment deadline of June 3, 2022 applied to entities named in the original EO 13959 annexes; future additions carry a one-year divestment window from the date of designation.