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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: electronics. Company profile →
Sharp Corporation (6753.T), majority-owned by Hon Hai/Foxconn since 2016, is organized into five segments: Smart Life & Energy (white goods and solar), Display Device (small/mid-size LCD panels for smartphones, tablets and notebooks), Electronic Devices (camera modules, CMOS/CCD sensors, laser diodes), Smart Office, and Universal Network. Sharp exited large-panel TV LCD manufacturing when its Sakai Display Products Gen-10 plant (Sakai, Osaka) ceased large-panel production in 2024 — Japan's last domestic large-panel TV LCD line.
Correction (2026-08-29 recheck): the dossier previously attributed this exit to "Kameyama No. 2 plant halted 2026" citing the Nikkei source below; that source is actually about the Sakai plant, not Kameyama. Kameyama No. 2 is a separate plant (operating since 2006; formerly TV panels, now supplying oxide-backplane panels for IT devices per TrendForce via MacRumors, 2026-02-11 — the earlier "automotive" label was unsupported) whose planned sale fell through in early 2026, triggering voluntary retirements there — a distinct, later event not about large-panel TV exit. Sharp remains a supplier of small/mid-size IT panels, and retains an active solar cell/module business spanning mainstream terrestrial crystalline silicon PV and a niche space-qualified compound solar cell line supplied to JAXA (used on the 2024 SLIM lunar lander). *Solar-segment detail merged from sharp-corporation.md (2026-08-14):* Sharp was the first company to commercialise photovoltaics, having started solar-cell R&D in 1959. Its Energy Solutions business sells monocrystalline- silicon rooftop modules (the BLACKSOLAR line) and, through a five-decade-old space business, triple-junction compound cells reaching roughly 31% conversion efficiency. In February 2025 Sharp announced its own perovskite-silicon tandem development program. Correction (2026-08-29 recheck): the previous text here additionally claimed "its Sakai crystalline-silicon [solar] line is being sold to Sekisui Chemical for conversion into a perovskite factory," citing the pv-magazine article below — that article does not mention Sekisui at all, and the underlying fact is different from what was written: Sekisui Chemical acquired Sharp's former Sakai Display Products *LCD panel* plant building (the large-panel TV LCD line that ceased production in 2024, see "What they do" above), not a crystalline-silicon *solar* line — Sharp's earlier solar cell manufacturing at that Sakai site had already been inactive since 2019. Sekisui is building its own new perovskite venture (Sekisui Solar Film, ~JPY90bn, targeting 2027) in the acquired building; this is a separate company's project, not evidence that Sharp's current BLACKSOLAR c-Si module production is shrinking or relocating. Where Sharp currently manufactures BLACKSOLAR modules could not be verified in this pass and is left unstated rather than guessed. Overseas solar lines at Wrexham (UK) and Memphis (US) were shut in 2014, which is why all remaining PV/space-cell production is Japan-only.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Sharp Corporation produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Gallium — same IGZO display backplane role as indium above (**trace/structural additive**), and the same space-qualified triple-junction solar cell structures (GaAs, InGaP layers), where it is a **structural component**.
Silicon — the primary substrate/absorber material in Sharp's mainstream terrestrial crystalline-silicon PV cells and modules (mono-crystalline, bifacial, PERC), and in a lower-cost silicon variant of its space cell line. **Bulk input** — the dominant material by mass in the solar cell itself.
Indium — used in the IGZO (indium-gallium-zinc-oxide) oxide-semiconductor TFT backplane of Sharp's small/mid-size LCD panels (smartphones, tablets, notebooks); Sharp was first to mass-produce this technology. **Trace/structural additive** — a thin semiconductor alloy layer, not a bulk input.
Copper — *structural component, solar line only (merged from sharp-corporation.md 2026-08-14).
Germanium — substrate/bottom-junction layer in Sharp's germanium-based triple-junction space solar cells (InGaP/GaAs/Ge structure), shipped for satellite use since 2002. **Structural component**, but confined to the low-volume space-cell line, not Sharp's mainstream terrestrial products.
Aluminium — *structural component, solar line only (merged from sharp-corporation.md 2026-08-14).
Silver — *trace additive, solar line only (merged from sharp-corporation.md 2026-08-14).
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Copper — *structural component, solar line only (merged from sharp-corporation.md 2026-08-14).
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
DR Congo supplies 14% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇨🇱 CL 31% · 🇵🇪 PE 16% · 🇨🇳 CN 10% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.7% — shares renormalised after removing CD.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 72d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Copper — *structural component, solar line only (merged from sharp-corporation.md 2026-08-14).
China supplies 7.8% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇨🇱 CL 29% · 🇨🇩 CD 17% · 🇵🇪 PE 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.1% — shares renormalised after removing CN.
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copperaluminium · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Copper — *structural component, solar line only (merged from sharp-corporation.md 2026-08-14).
Aluminium — *structural component, solar line only (merged from sharp-corporation.md 2026-08-14).
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
copper — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇱 CL 26% · 🇨🇩 CD 16% · 🇵🇪 PE 13% · 🇨🇳 CN 8.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
aluminium — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇬🇳 GN 35% · 🇦🇺 AU 23% · 🇨🇳 CN 21% · 🇧🇷 BR 7.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
ZM · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 31 Jul 2026, 66d pending
Minister of Finance, acting under s. 89 of the Customs and Excise Act, cut the copper-concentrate export duty to ZERO for tariff headings 2603. 00. 21 / 2603. 00. 22 / 2603. 00. 23 / 2603. 00. 29, capped at 271,742 t, effective 1 June 2026 with automatic lapse 30 September 2026, with per-entity tonnage caps and (per one secondary) a requirement that exempt shipments channel through Industrial Resources Limited. This is a SUPPLY-RELIEF (liberalising) action — a net EASING of a copper/cobalt chokepoint for ~4 months, explicitly to clear stockpiled unprocessed concentrate while Zambia's major smelters are down for extended maintenance. It is the "(No. 2)" successor instrument to the already-filed 2026-03-05-zambia-si-15-2026-copper-concentrates-export-duty-suspension (a distinct SI with its own number, tonnage cap and validity window). Severity ~2 expected.
source ↗Copper — *structural component, solar line only (merged from sharp-corporation.md 2026-08-14).
This changes the form of what ZM exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your ZM-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a ZM processing partner, not a supplier switch.
ZM supplies 4.1% of world copper mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid ZM entirely: copper supply outside ZM is 🇨🇱 CL 27%, 🇨🇩 CD 17%, 🇵🇪 PE 14% (shares renormalised after removing ZM).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches galliumsiliconindiumgermanium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Gallium — same IGZO display backplane role as indium above (**trace/structural additive**), and the same space-qualified triple-junction solar cell structures (GaAs, InGaP layers), where it is a **structural component**.
Silicon — the primary substrate/absorber material in Sharp's mainstream terrestrial crystalline-silicon PV cells and modules (mono-crystalline, bifacial, PERC), and in a lower-cost silicon variant of its space cell line. **Bulk input** — the dominant material by mass in the solar cell itself.
Indium — used in the IGZO (indium-gallium-zinc-oxide) oxide-semiconductor TFT backplane of Sharp's small/mid-size LCD panels (smartphones, tablets, notebooks); Sharp was first to mass-produce this technology. **Trace/structural additive** — a thin semiconductor alloy layer, not a bulk input.
+1 more touched material — see the composition section (3) above.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
On 6 August 2026, at a ceremony at the Petit Palais of the Presidency chaired by Djiba Diakité (Minister Chief of Staff, chair of the Simandou 2040 Strategic Committee), Guinea's wholly state-owned N…
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax…
Guinea = world's #2 bauxite producer (183 Mt exported in 2025, ~45% of China's bauxite imports); Mines Minister Bouna Sylla confirmed in March 2026 that export volume curbs will be applied by early A…
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever…
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0.
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Council's general approach expands the Commission's proposed downstream scope further (more products than Commission proposed); mandates annual Commission review for future scope additions; adds anti…
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
Gold mining royalties rise from 3-5% to 9-12% sliding-scale (price-indexed); mining lease maximum cut 30→15 years with renewals limited to 2×10-year additional terms; Development Agreements and Inves…
~25% reduction in Guinea's annual bauxite shipments to China (150 Mt target vs.
Extends the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism from the existing Regulation (EU) 2023/956 sectors (steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, electricity) to approximately 180 downstream produc…
On 18 March 2026 Guinea's Minister of Mines Bouna Sylla told Reuters that Guinea — the world's top bauxite exporter (~40% of global seaborne supply, 2025 exports ~183 Mt, +25% y/y) — would reduce exp…
Guinea — the world's largest bauxite exporter (~single-largest feed to China's alumina/aluminium chain) — is preparing a sector-wide measure to CAP/reduce bauxite exports to stabilise falling prices…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 7 September 2026 Guinea's state-owned Nimba Mining Company and Glencore signed a five-year pre-financing agreement, announced by the government and Glencore on 10 September 2026, worth over USD 30…
Supersedes 2022 bauxite reference price arrêté; establishes real-time FOB benchmark for all Guinea bauxite exports (~182 Mt/yr, world's largest supplier); estimated >$1bn/yr additional government rev…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
Guinea's CNRD junta gives Societe Minière de Boke (SMB, China-linked, ~50% of Guinea's bauxite output) and Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG, joint venture: Halco Mining/Alcoa/Rio Tinto/Dadco) 10…
GN ≈ 60% global seaborne bauxite; a ~150 Mt/yr cap (vs 183 Mt 2025) tightens the alumina→aluminium chain — direct hit to EU aluminium-vertical names
State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
VP declared no new large-scale mining agreement will be concluded without a binding value-addition commitment; Mines Minister referenced Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, and Malawi precedents for raw-miner…
On 16 November 2025 Brazil's national development bank BNDES signed a BRL 221 million (~USD 41.
4 of 88 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (electronics) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+5 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
+56 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+1 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+9 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+35 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.