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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: critical minerals processing. Company profile →
AMG Critical Materials N.V. (AMG.
AS, Euronext Amsterdam, headquartered Amsterdam; rebranded from "AMG Advanced Metallurgical Group" in May 2022) is the only listed European pure-play critical-materials processor — its revenue base sits almost entirely inside the 17-material CRMA strategic list (lithium, vanadium, silicon, tantalum, antimony, chromium, graphite), with no defence-prime, no construction-aggregates, and no consumer-products diversification softening the policy-cycle beta. Three reporting segments since the FY2024 segment realignment (per AMG FY2024 Annual Report, published 12 March 2025 — corrected 2026-08-22; AMG's own press release (amg-nv.com/investors/press-release/amg-critical-materials-n-v-publishes-2024-annual-report/) dates the Annual Report to 12 March 2025, not 18 February 2025 as previously stated here; the FY2024 preliminary earnings release was 26 February 2025, a different document): 1. AMG Lithium — Mibra spodumene mine (Minas Gerais, Brazil) operated by AMG Brasil, producing spodumene concentrate and tantalum / niobium byproduct; LIVA-1 lithium hydroxide monohydrate refinery in Bitterfeld, Germany (first crystals produced March 2024 per AMG press release; first commercial cell-grade qualification batches 2024-25; Phase-1 nameplate 20kt LiOH/year). AMG Lithium GmbH was the project vehicle until 2024 IPO discussion; Bitterfeld is the only operational merchant-market LiOH refinery on EU soil. 2. AMG Vanadium — spent-petroleum-catalyst recycling at Cambridge, Ohio (FeV + V₂O₅; the largest spent-catalyst V recycler in the western hemisphere per AMG investor day disclosure 2024); ferro-vanadium primary production at AMG Brasil (Mibra co-product); Saudi vanadium JV with Ma'aden (Saudi Arabian Mining Company) — announced March 2022, Project "Saudi Recycle" / SARCO with $300M+ envelope, designed to recycle spent catalyst from Aramco/SABIC refineries (status: construction phase per FY2024 Annual Report). 3. AMG Technologies — silicon metal at Hauzenberg, Germany (Silicon Metallurgy GmbH; ferrosilicon + silicon metal for chemical-grade, electronics-grade precursor, and aluminium alloy use); chromium metal (electrolytic, Cambridge OH); antimony (byproduct from Cambridge OH spent-catalyst stream); titanium-aluminides + advanced ceramics (Aerospace Materials); engineering systems (vacuum-induction-melting furnaces sold to alloy-makers globally). AMG is structurally unusual in three respects: (a) its vanadium business is dominated by spent-catalyst recycling, not primary mining — the upstream supply is a waste stream from refineries and petrochemicals, which insulates the economics from primary-V price cycles and converts oil-refining decarbonisation pressure into a structural feedstock- availability question; (b) the Bitterfeld LiOH refinery is the only EU-located lithium hydroxide refinery currently operational (Albemarle Frankfurt is closed; Eramet-Tsingshan Argentina-Indonesia is downstream- located; British Lithium / Imerys is permitting; Vulcan Energy Insheim is demo-scale; Talga Luleå is graphite not lithium) — Bitterfeld sits inside the EU's most exposed CRMA "≥40% processing by 2030" gap with no peer-set comparable; (c) the Maaden-Saudi vanadium JV plugs AMG into the US-Saudi Strategic Framework on Critical Minerals Supply Chains (18 Nov 2025) architecture as one of the named industrial vehicles. Major shareholders (corrected 2026-08-22 — MarketScreener shareholder registry, checked against the previous claim's Norges Bank/Janus Henderson/ BlackRock/Schroders ~3% figures, which have drifted): Van Eck Associates Corporation ~4%, Heinz Schimmelbusch (Executive Chairman & co-founder) ~3.9%, Norges Bank Investment Management ~2.5%, BlackRock ~2.5%, Janus Henderson ~1.9%; Schroders no longer appears among current top holders. The prior "no anchor strategic / industrial shareholder" framing was itself inaccurate independent of the drift — Schimmelbusch's near-4% insider/founder stake is exactly that kind of anchor holder, alongside otherwise-diffuse institutional ownership (~35% held by the top ten institutional investors combined).
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where AMG Critical Materials N.V. produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches lithiumtantalum · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 115d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗lithium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
tantalum is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
tantalum — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 110d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗lithium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
ZA · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
If enacted, chrome ore export tax and/or quota would disrupt South Africa's ~2. 4 Mt/yr chrome ore export stream (≈45% of global seaborne supply); beneficiation licensing conditions attached to mineral rights allocations would require FTSE/JSE-listed chrome miners (Samancor/Merafe, Assore, Glencore) to build local ferrochrome and stainless-steel capacity before new rights are allocated; PGMs and other minerals may follow chrome as the test-case model, expanding scope to the full South African mining portfolio
source ↗chromium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
This changes the form of what South Africa exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your South Africa-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a South Africa processing partner, not a supplier switch.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches tantalum · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 55d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗tantalum is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
tantalum — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
KZ · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 100d pending
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No. 125-VI ZRK): (1) raises the mandatory local (domestic) content share in works and services from 50% to 70% during exploration and extraction of solid minerals INCLUDING URANIUM — a material new in-country-value obligation on the world's #1 uranium producer (Kazatomprom) and its JV partners (Cameco, Orano, CGN/CNNC, Uranium One); (2) digitises geological data and expands electronic auctions for granting subsoil-use rights; (3) grants strategic investors implementing large industrial/innovation projects (>14. 5M MCI) a priority right to explore and extract solid minerals. Re-prices the cost base and access regime for Kazakh uranium, copper, chromium and the country's emerging rare-earth deposits.
source ↗chromium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel S…
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever…
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
VP Constantino Chiwenga announced at the Zimbabwe-China Business Forum (Hangzhou) that Zimbabwe will no longer issue new mining licences for operations that extract only one mineral from a deposit —…
Zimbabwean officials have signalled intent ("raw chrome exports obsolete") to expand the 25-Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed) to cover chrome CONCENTRATE specifically — conc…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
4 of 71 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 6 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in critical minerals. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of silicon. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the silicon chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of lithium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the lithium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of vanadium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the vanadium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of antimony. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the antimony chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of tantalum. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tantalum chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of chromium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the chromium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.