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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: metals refining. Company profile →
Heraeus is a privately (family-)held German technology and materials group headquartered in Hanau, active in precious-metals refining/trading/recycling, high-purity quartz glass, electronic materials, medical technology and sensors. Its precious-metals arm (Heraeus Precious Metals) is one of the world's largest processors of gold, silver and platinum-group metals across mining, industrial-scrap and catalyst recycling — including Argor-Heraeus (Mendrisio, Switzerland), an LBMA-accredited gold/silver refinery Heraeus has fully owned since 2017. Its quartz-glass arm (Heraeus Covantics) makes ultra-high-purity fused quartz and fused silica components used to build semiconductor wafer-processing equipment.
Its electronics arm (Heraeus Electronics) supplies bonding wire and solder materials for chip packaging and power electronics,. Its photovoltaics silver-paste unit (Heraeus Photovoltaics, Shanghai/Singapore) was sold to China's Haitian Group; the deal closed 2025-04-13 (pv-magazine, 2025-01-06).
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Heraeus produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Silicon — Heraeus Covantics's fused quartz/silica ingots, plates and rods are structural/process materials for the equipment that fabricates silicon wafers (boats, susceptors, wafer carriers, etch chamber components). This is an upstream-tooling link to the silicon-wafer supply chain, not a claim that Heraeus itself produces silicon metal — but…
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
Tin — Heraeus Electronics manufactures tin-based solder wire and solder paste for chip packaging and power-electronics assembly; tin supply is geographically concentrated (Indonesia, DRC, China) and subject to conflict-minerals sourcing rules that flow through to Heraeus's own solder supply chain.
Silver — core to the group: Heraeus Precious Metals refines, trades and recycles silver at scale; Heraeus Electronics sells silver bonding wire for semiconductor packaging. Heraeus exited PV silver paste in 2025 (sold to Haitian Group), so solar-cell paste is no longer a Heraeus exposure.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
PE · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · touches silver · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 115d pending
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mining concessions for first time in Peruvian law history, making concessions revocable by administrative authority; introduces higher annual fees and stronger production/investment requirements; threatens legal certainty for Peru's undeveloped copper and silver project pipeline — Peru = #2 copper, #4 silver, #1 lead, #2 zinc globally
source ↗Silver — core to the group: Heraeus Precious Metals refines, trades and recycles silver at scale; Heraeus Electronics sells silver bonding wire for semiconductor packaging. Heraeus exited PV silver paste in 2025 (sold to Haitian Group), so solar-cell paste is no longer a Heraeus exposure.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
silver — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
BO · stage draft-published → moderate likelihood · touches tinsilver · flagged 17 Jun 2026, 112d pending
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12. 5% impuesto adicional IUE-RM on extraordinary commodity-price gains; retains 25% company profits tax (IUE) and 5% royalty; streamlines licensing from current 9–15 years to international norms; enables association contracts between private companies and cooperatives; coordinated with a forthcoming general investment law incorporating fiscal and non-fiscal incentives; framed around reversing 15+ years of investment drought; backing from World Bank; bill to be presented to Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional after Mining Summit (May 18–20, 2026); target: executive submission late July 2026
source ↗Tin — Heraeus Electronics manufactures tin-based solder wire and solder paste for chip packaging and power-electronics assembly; tin supply is geographically concentrated (Indonesia, DRC, China) and subject to conflict-minerals sourcing rules that flow through to Heraeus's own solder supply chain.
Silver — core to the group: Heraeus Precious Metals refines, trades and recycles silver at scale; Heraeus Electronics sells silver bonding wire for semiconductor packaging. Heraeus exited PV silver paste in 2025 (sold to Haitian Group), so solar-cell paste is no longer a Heraeus exposure.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
silver — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches silicon · flagged 28 Jun 2026, 101d pending
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever is higher" on exports of quartz minerals (HS 25. 06) and feldspar (HS 2529. 10. 00) via amendment to the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196 — a distinct beneficiation-forcing EXPORT-TAX instrument that pushes raw quartz/feldspar exporters toward in-country value-addition. 196), and neither existing entry mentions it; (2) material-relevant — quartz HS 25. 06 covers high-purity/silica quartz feeding the silicon→semiconductor/solar value chain, so a Tanzanian export tax re-prices a raw-silica supply node; the same "rocks to riches" beneficiation logic Tanzania applies elsewhere; (3) part of the wider African raw-mineral-export-tax wave (cf. Zimbabwe 10% lithium-concentrate levy, Namibia unprocessed-mineral ban, Guinea bauxite reference price).
source ↗Silicon — Heraeus Covantics's fused quartz/silica ingots, plates and rods are structural/process materials for the equipment that fabricates silicon wafers (boats, susceptors, wafer carriers, etch chamber components). This is an upstream-tooling link to the silicon-wafer supply chain, not a claim that Heraeus itself produces silicon metal — but…
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid TZ entirely: silicon supply outside TZ is 🇨🇳 CN 86%, 🇧🇷 BR 3.9%, 🇳🇴 NO 2.8% (shares renormalised after removing TZ).
NG · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches tin · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 115d pending
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all foreign-invested mining JVs; builds on existing eMC+ digital cadastre and mandatory value-addition plans introduced Nov 2024; could force processing-plant investment or suspension of raw mineral shipments from Africa's most populous economy; RMRDC = Raw Materials Research and Development Council (the sponsoring agency)
source ↗Tin — Heraeus Electronics manufactures tin-based solder wire and solder paste for chip packaging and power-electronics assembly; tin supply is geographically concentrated (Indonesia, DRC, China) and subject to conflict-minerals sourcing rules that flow through to Heraeus's own solder supply chain.
This changes the form of what Nigeria exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Nigeria-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Nigeria processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Nigeria entirely: tin supply outside NG is 🇨🇳 CN 26%, 🇮🇩 ID 23%, 🇵🇪 PE 12% (shares renormalised after removing NG).
ZW · stage announced → low likelihood · touches platinum palladium · flagged 4 Oct 2026, 3d pending
VP Constantino Chiwenga announced at the Zimbabwe-China Business Forum (Hangzhou) that Zimbabwe will no longer issue new mining licences for operations that extract only one mineral from a deposit — future licensees must demonstrate capacity to identify, separate and process the full mineral suite present, or be barred from operating. Framed as beneficiation policy, layered on Zimbabwe's Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed). Raises the entry bar specifically for Great Dyke chrome/PGM claims, which are frequently single-mineral operations — a licensing-stage chokepoint action, distinct instrument type from the export-ban actions already in the register.
source ↗platinum palladium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Zimbabwe stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Zimbabwe processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
platinum palladium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
Indonesia = ~20% of global refined tin exports (Bangka Belitung); a ban on refined-tin exports would force downstream solder/semiconductor-packaging manufacturing domestically; disrupts global electr…
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
2 of 45 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 2 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in critical minerals — read via the graph's critical minerals processing node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-07), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
This company sits on the supply side of platinum palladium. Restrictions by 🇿🇦 ZA push buyers toward ex-ZA producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the platinum palladium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of silver. Restrictions by 🇲🇽 MX push buyers toward ex-MX producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the silver chokepoint page and the watchlist.
+10 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.