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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
TdVib, LLC (Ames, Iowa) develops and manufactures the giant magnetostrictive materials Terfenol-D and Galfenol, supplied in custom shapes and sizes, plus devices built on them: ultrasonic and sonic actuators, Galfenol actuators and slotted-cylinder transducers, broadband transducers, energy harvesters and the STARS™ marine vibrators. TdVib bought all of ETREMA Products, Inc.'s assets in November 2016.
ETREMA was founded in 1987 to commercialise Terfenol-D, using technology transferred from the DOE's Ames Laboratory. TdVib is listed as an industry team member of the DOE Critical Materials Innovation Hub led by Ames National Laboratory.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇺🇸 United States, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Dysprosium: bulk input. This is the "-D" in Terfenol-D. It was added to lower the magnetic field needed to drive the response.
Terbium: bulk input. TdVib's own product page says Terfenol-D is "an alloy comprised of Terbium, Dysprosium and Iron", and the name comes from TERbium + FE + NOL. Terbium is a principal constituent of the alloy, not a dopant.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 1 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
EU · stage announced → low likelihood · touches dysprosiumterbium · flagged 27 Jun 2026, 102d pending
Under the RESourceEU action plan (COM(2025) 945, adopted 3 Dec 2025 and already filed as 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945), the European Commission committed to PROPOSE, by Q2 2026, restrictions on the export of scraps and waste of permanent magnets — an essential feedstock for European NdFeB recyclers that is increasingly shipped abroad (notably to China). Recycling could meet ~20% of the EU's ~20,000 t/yr permanent-magnet demand, so retaining end-of-life and pre-consumer magnet scrap in the EU is framed as a supply-security measure to reduce China dependence. Accompanying measures: a new EU-level Combined Nomenclature sub-code + European Waste Catalogue entry to identify/track permanent magnets and EoL products containing them, plus a targeted CRMA amendment on product-labelling and pre-consumer-waste recycling. If enacted as a binding export restriction this would be the EU's first outbound control on a critical-mineral waste stream — directly relevant to anyone in the EU/China REE-magnet recycling loop, and a mirror-image to China's REE/magnet export controls (re-prices intra-bloc vs ex-bloc scrap flows). The European recycling industry (BIR) has publicly warned the measure risks market distortion, so adoption/scope is contested.
source ↗Dysprosium: bulk input. This is the "-D" in Terfenol-D. It was added to lower the magnetic field needed to drive the response.
Terbium: bulk input. TdVib's own product page says Terfenol-D is "an alloy comprised of Terbium, Dysprosium and Iron", and the name comes from TERbium + FE + NOL. Terbium is a principal constituent of the alloy, not a dopant.
dysprosium — European Union holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇪🇺 EU: 🇨🇳 CN 63% · 🇲🇲 MM 34% · 🇱🇦 LA 3.1% — shares renormalised after removing EU.
terbium — European Union holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇪🇺 EU: 🇨🇳 CN 63% · 🇲🇲 MM 34% · 🇱🇦 LA 3.1% — shares renormalised after removing EU.
2 of 44 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-07), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+15 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+14 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.