Home / Companies / Wallbox N.V. / Outlook

Wallbox N.V. — policy outlook

What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: electronics. Company profile →

18upcoming at elevated+Forward outlook39 in pipeline90 in force (sev ≥ 3)4 tracked materials0 customer sectors

1 · What they make

Wallbox N.V. (NYSE: WBX) is a Barcelona-headquartered manufacturer of electric-vehicle charging hardware and energy-management software.

Rest of the descriptionShow

Its product line spans home/workplace AC chargers (Pulsar Plus, Commander 2, Copper), the Quasar and Quasar 2 bidirectional (V2H/V2G) DC home chargers, and the Supernova DC fast-charging line for commercial and fleet sites. It also co-offers a scalable Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) built on partner Pramac's battery packs, paired with its DC fast chargers. Per its FY2025 20-F, Wallbox manufactures chargers in Barcelona (Zona Franca, ~389k/yr capacity), Arlington, Texas (~241k/yr) and Lauf an der Pegnitz, Germany (~56k/yr), with component plants in Tangier, Morocco and Sant Boi de Llobregat (PCBs). Shanghai is an office.

Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.

2 · Where it operates — production footprint

3production countries in its dossier · approx. output shares

This is where Wallbox N.V. produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.

🇪🇸 Spain≈57%

🇺🇸 United States≈35%

🇩🇪 Germany≈8.0%

3 · Composition — the materials that matter

4tracked critical materials

Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.

siliconbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply77

Silicon — structural component. The fast-switching power stages in the bidirectional Quasar/Quasar 2 and the Supernova DC fast chargers rely on silicon and wide-bandgap (silicon-carbide/GaN) power semiconductors for the AC-DC and DC-DC inverter stages — foundry-dependent components with concentrated supply.

lithiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply72

Lithium — trace, indirect exposure. Wallbox's BESS product is a partnered offering built on Pramac's battery packs (chemistry not stated), packs, not cells Wallbox manufactures itself; the lithium exposure sits in a co-branded storage product rather than Wallbox's core charger bill-of-materials.

copperbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply68

Copper — bulk input. Charger hardware carries AC/DC charging current through copper windings, high-current busbars, and heavy-copper PCB power planes; copper is the largest metal input by mass across the charger range.

tinbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply66

Tin — trace additive. PCB assembly solder (typically a tin-silver-copper alloy) is used throughout the charger's control and power-electronics boards — small by mass but present in every unit.

Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.

4 · Threats & opportunities — in the pipeline

39proposed measures matching its inputs or sector · top 5 ranked by imminence × relevance · 18 at elevated+ likelihood

The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.

#1🇨🇩 DRC — Interministerial Arrêté Banning Export of Unprocessed Copper and Cobalt Concentrates (29 June 2026, replaces 4 August 2023 framework)highSupply restriction

1 · If this passes

CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 56d pending

On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.

DR Congo supplies 14% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.

Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇨🇱 CL 31% · 🇵🇪 PE 16% · 🇨🇳 CN 10% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.7% — shares renormalised after removing CD.

Tradable names in those ex-CD countries, deployable-now first:

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

domestic subsidy

🇵🇪 Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.deployable nowProducing today — “operating gold and polymetallic mines”.

liberalising at home

#2🇨🇳 China — MOFCOM/GACC suspension of ordinary industrial & smelter-byproduct sulfuric acid exports (in force from 1 May 2026)highSupply restriction

1 · If this passes

CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 73d pending

Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

China supplies 7.8% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.

Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇨🇱 CL 29% · 🇨🇩 CD 17% · 🇵🇪 PE 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.1% — shares renormalised after removing CN.

Tradable names in those ex-CN countries, deployable-now first:

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

domestic subsidy

🇵🇪 Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.deployable nowProducing today — “operating gold and polymetallic mines”.

liberalising at home

#3🇧🇷 Brazil PNMCE — Política Nacional de Minerais Críticos e Estratégicos (PL 2780/2024)highBeneficiation / form change

1 · If this passes

BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches lithium copper · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 109d pending

First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.

Brazil supplies 4.1% of world lithium mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.

Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: lithium supply outside BR is 🇦🇺 AU 34%, 🇨🇳 CN 22%, 🇨🇱 CL 20% (shares renormalised after removing BR); copper supply outside BR is 🇨🇱 CL 26%, 🇨🇩 CD 16%, 🇵🇪 PE 13% (shares renormalised after removing BR).

#4🇿🇲 Zambia SI No. 43 of 2026 — Customs and Excise (Suspension) (Copper Concentrates) (No. 2) Regulations, 2026highBeneficiation / form change

1 · If this passes

ZM · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 31 Jul 2026, 67d pending

Minister of Finance, acting under s. 89 of the Customs and Excise Act, cut the copper-concentrate export duty to ZERO for tariff headings 2603. 00. 21 / 2603. 00. 22 / 2603. 00. 23 / 2603. 00. 29, capped at 271,742 t, effective 1 June 2026 with automatic lapse 30 September 2026, with per-entity tonnage caps and (per one secondary) a requirement that exempt shipments channel through Industrial Resources Limited. This is a SUPPLY-RELIEF (liberalising) action — a net EASING of a copper/cobalt chokepoint for ~4 months, explicitly to clear stockpiled unprocessed concentrate while Zambia's major smelters are down for extended maintenance. It is the "(No. 2)" successor instrument to the already-filed 2026-03-05-zambia-si-15-2026-copper-concentrates-export-duty-suspension (a distinct SI with its own number, tonnage cap and validity window). Severity ~2 expected.

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

This changes the form of what ZM exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your ZM-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a ZM processing partner, not a supplier switch.

ZM supplies 4.1% of world copper mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.

Secondary — only if you need to avoid ZM entirely: copper supply outside ZM is 🇨🇱 CL 27%, 🇨🇩 CD 17%, 🇵🇪 PE 14% (shares renormalised after removing ZM).

#5🇳🇬 Nigeria RMRDC 30% Value Addition Bill — mandatory 30% local processing of ALL raw materials before exporthighBeneficiation / form change

1 · If this passes

NG · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches lithium tin · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 114d pending

Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all foreign-invested mining JVs; builds on existing eMC+ digital cadastre and mandatory value-addition plans introduced Nov 2024; could force processing-plant investment or suspension of raw mineral shipments from Africa's most populous economy; RMRDC = Raw Materials Research and Development Council (the sponsoring agency)

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

This changes the form of what Nigeria exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Nigeria-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Nigeria processing partner, not a supplier switch.

Secondary — only if you need to avoid Nigeria entirely: lithium supply outside NG is 🇦🇺 AU 32%, 🇨🇳 CN 21%, 🇨🇱 CL 19% (shares renormalised after removing NG); tin supply outside NG is 🇨🇳 CN 26%, 🇮🇩 ID 23%, 🇵🇪 PE 12% (shares renormalised after removing NG).

34 more in the pipelineShow

🇲🇼 Malawi — Presidential Executive Order banning export of all raw/unprocessed minerals (effective 21 Oct 2025)highSupply restriction

stage passed-vote → high · touches copper · flagged 13 Aug 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed mine…

🇰🇿 Kazakhstan Subsoil Code 2026 amendments — domestic-content rise to 70% (incl. uranium), geological-data digitisation, e-auctions, strategic-investor priority righthighUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-vote → high · touches copper · flagged 29 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.

🇹🇿 Tanzania Finance Bill 2026/27 — Parliament-passed June 23, 2026; mining: Mineral Research Fund (10% gross mineral revenue), Income Tax Act & VAT Framework Agreement exemptionshighUnclassified · inferred

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches copper · flagged 26 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax…

🇨🇩 DRC Strategic Mineral Reclassification Decree — 6 new minerals (lithium, tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REEs) elevated to strategic tier, royalty 3.5%→10%highUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-vote → high · touches lithium · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…

🇧🇴 Bolivia nueva Ley de Minería — comprehensive replacement of the 2014 Ley 535 de Minería y MetalurgiamoderateUnclassified · inferred

stage draft-published → moderate · touches lithium, tin, copper · flagged 17 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.

🇹🇿 Tanzania Finance Bill 2026/27 — NEW raw-mineral EXPORT LEVY on quartz (HS 25.06) and feldspar (HS 2529.10.00) under the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196highBeneficiation / form change

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches silicon · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever…

🇨🇳 Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt — US$210M acquisition of Atlantic Lithium (control of the Ewoyaa lithium project, Ghana) via Australian scheme of arrangementhighInvestment control

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches lithium · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.

🇪🇺 EU CRMA Art. 22 Commission Implementing Decision — Strategic Raw Material Stock BenchmarkshighCompliance obligation

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches lithium, silicon · flagged 15 Jun 2026 · an obligation on you — audit and file; it prohibits importing from nowhere, so no supplier change is implied and we list none

Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…

🇺🇸 US BOEM Proposed Rule — Administrative Revisions to OCS Hard Minerals Regulations (FR Doc. 2026-03690)elevatedUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-committee → elevated · touches copper · flagged 23 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…

🇬🇭 Ghana Minerals and Mining Act overhaul (Act 703 replacement) + new National Mining PolicyelevatedUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-committee → elevated · touches lithium · flagged 17 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…

🇵🇪 Peru Ley General de Minería Amendment — Mining Concession Regime ReformelevatedUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-committee → elevated · touches copper · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…

🇲🇳 Mongolia Minerals Law Comprehensive Amendment 2026 — ~40% of 2006 law revised; exploration-licence term cut, statutory critical-minerals definition, downstream-beneficiation licensingmoderateUnclassified · inferred

stage draft-published → moderate · touches copper, lithium · flagged 27 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…

🇪🇺 EU European Critical Raw Materials (CRM) Centre — establishing instrumentelevatedSupport / opportunity

stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated · touches lithium, copper · flagged 30 Jul 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…

🇨🇿 Czech Republic — €360M Government Grant for Cinovec Lithium Project (European Metals Holdings / CEZ JV)highSupport / opportunity

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches lithium · flagged 19 Sept 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…

🇨🇱 Chile — outgoing Boric government's fast-tracked batch of 5 additional CEOL lithium salt flats (Ascotán, Quillagua Sur, Hilaricos, Piedra Parada, Agua Amarga) submitted to the Contraloría for toma de razónhighSupport / opportunity

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches lithium · flagged 14 Jul 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…

🇨🇮 Côte d'Ivoire — Revision of the 2014 Code Minier (Loi n° 2014-138)moderateUnclassified · inferred

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium · flagged 9 Sept 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…

🇲🇦 Morocco Mining Code Amendment — National Commission for Strategic and Critical Minerals + strategic-minerals designation listmoderateUnclassified · inferred

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium · flagged 4 Sept 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.

🇳🇦 Namibia new Minerals Bill (Minerals Prospecting and Mining Act overhaul)moderateUnclassified · inferred

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…

🇮🇩 Indonesia Tin Export Ban — Downstreaming InitiativelowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches tin · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

Indonesia = ~20% of global refined tin exports (Bangka Belitung); a ban on refined-tin exports would force downstream solder/semiconductor-packaging manufacturing domestically; disrupts global electr…

🇹🇿 Tanzania Critical & Strategic Minerals Strategy + statutory critical/strategic minerals LIST (Ministry of Minerals, Mavunde) — beneficiation-mandate licensing instrumentmoderateBeneficiation / form change

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium · flagged 29 Jun 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…

🇺🇸 USTR Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Critical MineralsmoderateSupport / opportunity

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium, copper · flagged 18 Jun 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…

🇪🇺 EU CRMA Strategic Projects — Second Designation RoundmoderateSupport / opportunity

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium, silicon · flagged 15 Jun 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Second wave of CRMA Art.

🇺🇬 Uganda Mining and Minerals (Amendment) Bill 2026moderateBeneficiation / form change

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches tin · flagged 13 Jun 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…

African Union / AfDB — continental harmonisation of mining legislation toward a ban on unprocessed critical-mineral ore exports (Abidjan Ministerial Forum outcome)lowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches copper, lithium · flagged 31 Jul 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…

🇮🇩 Indonesia PP 19/2025 Mining Royalty Rate Hike — Implementation Postponed Indefinitely (May 2026)lowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches copper, tin · flagged 16 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…

🇨🇩 DRC Mines Minister Circular — 5% Worker Equity Enforcement (Articles 71 bis + 144 bis), January 30 2026lowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 23 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…

🇶🇦 Qatar Mining Company (QMSD) recommits US$800M to resume Jebel Ohier copper-gold project, SudanlowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 4 Oct 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…

🇨🇳 Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt — USD 210m acquisition of Atlantic Lithium Ltd (Ewoyaa Lithium Project, Ghana)lowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches lithium · flagged 9 Sept 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.

🇨🇦 Canada — Attorney General Federal Court enforcement application vs. Gator Capital Ltd re: Investment Canada Act s.40 (first-ever ICA divestiture enforcement litigation)lowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches lithium · flagged 6 Sept 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.

🇸🇦 Manara Minerals (Saudi PIF / Ma'aden JV) — 15-20% stake acquisition in First Quantum Minerals' Zambian copper-nickel assetslowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.

🇸🇦 Manara Minerals (Saudi PIF/Ma'aden JV) — 10–20% stake in Pakistan's Reko Diq copper-gold projectlowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…

🇸🇦 Manara Minerals (Saudi PIF / Ma'aden JV) — 10-20% stake acquisition in Pakistan's Reko Diq copper-gold projectlowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 27 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…

🇮🇳 India SASCI Mining Sector Reforms Component FY2026-27 — ₹5,000 crore incentive scheme to accelerate mine auction-to-production pipelinelowSupport / opportunity

stage announced → low · touches lithium, copper · flagged 26 Jun 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…

🇵🇬 Papua New Guinea Mining Bill 2025 — parliamentary enactment (replacement of Mining Act 1992)lowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 18 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…

4b · Already in force

90in-force restrictions (severity ≥ 3) on its tracked materials

5 of 90 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.

US-China Economic and Trade Arrangement (Busan Summit) — one-year mutual suspension of reciprocal tariff escalation, China rare-earth/critical-minerals export controls, and US affiliates rule; soybean and agricultural purchase commitments🇺🇸 Tariff · lithiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Section 232 Copper Tariff (Proclamation 10962): 50% on semi-finished + derivative copper🇺🇸 Tariff · coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

US One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21): accelerated repeal of IRA clean-energy credits and FEOC restrictions on §45Y/§48E/§45X🇺🇸 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 5

87 more in-force restrictionsShow

Bolivia YLB–Hong Kong CBC USD 1.0bn lithium-carbonate services contract (Salar de Uyuni, 35kt/yr DLE)🇧🇴 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Mali Décret 2024-0396/PT-RM implementing 2023 Code Minier (Loi 2023-040)🇲🇱 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Panama Supreme Court declares Law 406/2023 (Minera Panamá / Cobre Panamá concession) unconstitutional🇵🇦 Regulatory · coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe SI 5 of 2023 — Base Minerals Export Control (Unbeneficiated Base Mineral Ores) Order, 2023🇿🇼 Export control · lithium, coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Mexico nationalizes lithium: Ley Minera reform bars private concessions, creates state agency Litio para México (LitioMx)🇲🇽 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

CMOC acquires 80% of Tenke Fungurume, world's second-largest cobalt mine🇨🇳 Industrial policy · coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774) — parent industrial-mobilization and domestic-capacity statute🇺🇸 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce Preliminary Affirmative Antidumping Determination: Tin Mill Products from China (September 2026)🇺🇸 Tariff · tinsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Tin Mill Products from China (September 2026)🇺🇸 Tariff · tinsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM Preliminary Anti-Dumping Ruling on Japanese Dichlorosilane (DCS) Imports🇨🇳 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

BIS DPAS Directive Allocation Order — 100% domestic-sale mandate for black mass and tungsten waste/scrap🇺🇸 Export control · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce Preliminary Antidumping Determinations — Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells from India, Indonesia, and Laos🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determinations — Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells from India, Indonesia, and Laos🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe Ministry of Mines suspends all raw-mineral and lithium-concentrate exports indefinitely🇿🇼 Export control · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Turkey 2026 Import Regime — Cumhurbaşkanı Kararı No. 10790 (cross-sectoral surveillance + additional duties up to 48% on non-EU)🇹🇷 Tariff · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Kazakhstan amends Subsoil Code to grant Kazatomprom statutory priority over uranium blocks and reorganises subsoil-use governance🇰🇿 Industrial policy · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

DRC Arrêté 00964/2025 — Immediate suspension of all artisanal copper-cobalt processing and marketing entities🇨🇩 Regulatory · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Bolivia DS 5503 — Economic/Financial/Energy/Social Emergency Declaration and Comprehensive Stabilization Package🇧🇴 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia Permen ESDM 17/2025 — RKAB annual cycle and MinerbaOne quota system🇮🇩 Regulatory · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

India DGFT Notification 31/2025-26 — SCOMET Category 7 emerging-technologies export controls🇮🇳 Export control · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Australia Net Zero Plan 2050 and Six Sector Emissions Reduction Plans🇦🇺 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Vietnam Decree 193/2025/ND-CP: Comprehensive Implementing Decree for the Law on Geology and Minerals🇻🇳 Regulatory · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce preliminary countervailing duty on silicon metal from Laos, Australia, Norway, Thailand🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce final antidumping duty orders on silicon metal from Angola and Laos🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

CMOC acquires Ecuador's largest gold deposit via Lumina Gold takeover and signs $1.7B exploitation contract🇨🇳 Industrial policy · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia PP 19/2025 — Tiered Minerba Royalty Regulation🇮🇩 Industrial policy · copper, tinsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Steel and Metals Action Plan — COM(2025) 122 final🇪🇺 Industrial policy · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

India Cabinet approves National Critical Mineral Mission with ₹34,300 cr seven-year outlay covering 30 minerals🇮🇳 Industrial policy · silicon, lithium, copper, tinsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU imposes definitive countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles🇪🇺 Tariff · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia Permen ESDM 6/2024: MEMR smelter-completion framework for copper, iron, lead and zinc concentrate exports🇮🇩 Regulatory · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia bans copper concentrate and anode sludge exports under Permendag 10/2024🇮🇩 Export control · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Section 301 tariff hikes on Chinese EVs, batteries, semis, solar, steel🇺🇸 Tariff · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Treasury (OFAC) Bans Import of Russian-Origin Aluminum, Copper and Nickel; Bars Exchange/Derivative Servicing🇺🇸 Sanction · coppersev 4

Panama Ley 407 — Indefinite moratorium on metallic mining concessions nationwide🇵🇦 Industrial policy · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

China imposes export licensing on graphite products🇨🇳 Export control · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Myanmar (Wa State) Comprehensive Tin Mining Suspension — Wa Jing Zi No. 2023-06🇲🇲 Export control · tinsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Korea K-Chips Act: semiconductor facility investment tax credit raised to 15/25%🇰🇷 Subsidy · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe SI 213 of 2022 — Base Minerals Export Control (Lithium Bearing Ores and Unbeneficiated Lithium) Order, 2022🇿🇼 Export control · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Canada ISED orders three Chinese mining companies to divest critical mineral investments (Nov 2022)🇨🇦 FDI screening · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce preliminary countervailing duty determination on silicon metal from Kazakhstan🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

DRC Loi n° 18/001 — Revised Mining Code: strategic-mineral royalties, state carry doubled, stability curtailed🇨🇩 Regulatory · lithium, coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US BIS temporary final rule restricting polysilicon stockpiling ahead of Proclamation 11052 Section 232 tariffs and minimum import prices🇺🇸 Regulatory · siliconsev 3

US Commerce continues antidumping duty orders (Bosnia, Iceland, Malaysia) and countervailing duty order (Kazakhstan) on silicon metal after five-year sunset review🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US USTR Section 301 Determination — Proposed 25% Tariff on All Brazilian Goods🇺🇸 Tariff · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa: Industrial Development Strategy 2026 — Permit-Conditioned Beneficiation Mandate for Critical Minerals🇿🇦 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US USTR Section 301 Forced Labor Findings and Proposed Action — 60 Economies🇺🇸 Tariff · silicon, lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

DRC Ministerial Suspension of All Mining in Mwenga and Shabunda (South Kivu)🇨🇩 Regulatory · tinsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US OFAC April 30 2026 — designation of former DRC President Joseph Kabila under EO 13413/13671 for material support to M23 and Congo River Alliance (AFC)🇺🇸 Sanction · copper, tinsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Egypt PM Decree No. 1440/2026 — Executive Regulations of Mineral Resources Law 198/2014🇪🇬 Regulatory · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China Customs Tariff Commission — Zero-Tariff Treatment for All 53 African Diplomatic Partners (May 2026–April 2028)🇨🇳 Tariff · lithium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026 — Nickel Ore Multi-Element HPM Benchmark Price Reform🇮🇩 Industrial policy · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia Permendag 5/2026 — fourth amendment to Permendag 23/2023: export licensing digitalisation, ilmenite/rutile IUP/IUPK restriction, tin ET elimination🇮🇩 Regulatory · tinsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Mexico SCJN rules lithium nationalisation constitutional (Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 78/2022)🇲🇽 Regulatory · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Ghana Minerals Commission revokes 300+ small-scale mining licences and launches sector-wide local content reform package🇬🇭 Regulatory · lithiumsev 3

Zambia: Government/ZEMA conclude Sino-Metals Leach Zambia spillage investigation, opening remediation and compensation process🇿🇲 Regulatory · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Ecuador Decreto Ejecutivo 273 — Reforma al Reglamento General a la Ley de Minería (sliding 3-8% royalty, 100% self-power mandate, tightened exploration timelines)🇪🇨 Regulatory · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US DOI / USGS Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals — 60-mineral statutory designation under the Energy Act of 2020🇺🇸 Regulatory · silicon, lithium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Malawi Presidential Executive Order — Prohibition on Export of Raw Unprocessed Minerals (October 2025)🇲🇼 Export control · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM + MOST Announcement No. 28 (2025) — Revision of Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited/Restricted from Export (Battery Cathode, Lithium, Gallium Processing)🇨🇳 Export control · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Chemicals Industry Action Plan (COM(2025) 530 final)🇪🇺 Industrial policy · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025 — provincial law centralising Balochistan mineral control under federal SIFC, establishing Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority (MIFA)🇵🇰 Industrial policy · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Lao PDR PM Order No. 06/PM — Permanent Alluvial Gold Ban and Metallic Mineral Project Moratorium🇱🇦 Regulatory · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

DRC Ministry of Mines Arrêté — Red Zone Classification of 38 Coltan and Cassiterite Mining Sites in Masisi (North Kivu) and Kalehe (South Kivu)🇨🇩 Regulatory · tinsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa adds base-metal tariff headings (iron, steel, copper, aluminium, lead, zinc, tin) to ITAC export-permit list🇿🇦 Export control · copper, tinsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Myanmar (Wa State) Man Maw Tin Mining Restart — New Three-Year Licensing Regime + 30% Tax-in-Kind Export Levy (2025)🇲🇲 Export control · tinsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Forced Labour Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 — first binding EU-wide prohibition on products made with forced labour🇪🇺 Regulatory · silicon, lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Tanzania Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Act, 2024 — Mining Act critical/strategic minerals classification + USD 5m mining-licence capital floor🇹🇿 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Bolivia YLB–Uranium One Group USD 970M DLE lithium-carbonate plant contract (Salar de Uyuni, court-suspended May 2025)🇧🇴 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Rwanda enacts Law n° 056/2024 establishing tax on minerals, restructuring royalty and export-tax rates to incentivise value-addition over raw-mineral exports🇷🇼 Industrial policy · tinsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Ghana Minerals Commission issues local-beneficiation requirement: export ban on unprocessed bauxite, lithium, iron ore, and manganese🇬🇭 Export control · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

UK bans acquisition and import of Russian-origin metals (Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, SI 2023/1364)🇬🇧 Export control · copper, tinsev 3

Zijin Mining / COMINIERE — Manono Northeast Lithium JV: DRC Exploration and Mining Licence🇨🇳 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Jordan National Mining Sector Strategy 2023-2033 — 10-year MEMR framework targeting JD 2.1bn sector GDP and expanded phosphate, potash, REE, uranium, and copper investment🇯🇴 Industrial policy · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Nigeria 7-Point Agenda for Solid Minerals & ETCM Roadmap🇳🇬 Industrial policy · lithium, tinsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Philippines Maharlika Investment Fund Act (RA 11954) — first national sovereign wealth fund with PHP 500bn target capital🇵🇭 Industrial policy · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Poland: Geological and Mining Law Amendment — Strategic Deposit Framework (Dz.U. 2023 poz. 2029)🇵🇱 Industrial policy · lithium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Namibia Cabinet 8th Meeting — Prohibition on Export of Unprocessed Critical Minerals🇳🇦 Export control · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe SI 57 of 2023 — Base Minerals Export Control (Unbeneficiated Base Mineral Ores) (Amendment) Order, 2023 (No. 1)🇿🇼 Export control · lithium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

OFAC Burma: Myanmar Mining Enterprise No. 1 and No. 2 Designated as SDNs🇺🇸 Sanction · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zambia Mines and Minerals Development (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2022 — Copper Mineral Royalty Sliding Scale🇿🇲 Tariff · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa imposes 6-month export ban on ferrous/non-ferrous scrap metal, new export and import permits (Notices R.2801-R.2804)🇿🇦 Export control · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Uganda Mining and Minerals Act 2022🇺🇬 Industrial policy · copper, tinsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Sinomine acquires Bikita lithium mine (Zimbabwe) for USD 180 million, commits USD 300 million expansion🇨🇳 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China — State Council Tariff Commission 2022 Tariff Adjustment Plan (税委会〔2021〕18号): ferrochrome export tariff doubled to 40%, ferrosilicon held at 25%🇨🇳 Tariff · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

BIS Entity List: Four Burma-Based Entities Supporting SAC Military Coup🇺🇸 Export control · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

BIS Entity List: Five Xinjiang Solar and Polysilicon Producers Designated for Uyghur Forced Labor🇺🇸 Export control · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce preliminary antidumping duty determinations on silicon metal from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iceland🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

5 · Impact — upstream (material inputs)

4scored materials

For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).

silicon🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 3 upcoming · 18 in force77

lithium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 21 upcoming · 35 in force72

copper🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 22 upcoming · 40 in force68

The other 1 materialsShow

tin🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 5 upcoming · 15 in force66

5b · Impact — downstream (its customers)

Its sector (electronics) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.

6 · Solution / strategy — the moves available

44 bought materials with a tradable substitute bench

For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-06), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.

silicon3 tradable ex-🇮🇳IN producers · 20 tracked total

🇲🇽 Compañía Minera Autlán, S.A.B. de C.V.deployable nowProducing today — “largest producer of manganese and”.

🇬🇧 Ferroglobedeployable nowProducing today — “largest Western (ex-China) producers of silicon metal and silicon- and manganese-based specialty al”.

🇷🇺 United Company RUSALdeployable nowProducing today — “largest refined-silicon producer”.

Full substitution matrix →

lithium30 tradable ex-🇿🇼ZW producers · 99 tracked total

🇺🇸 Albemarle Corporationdeployable nowProducing today — “largest Western lithium producer”. Capacity partly committed — “2bn government offtake floor for AU-produced critical minerals; Greenbushes spodumene + Kemerton LiOH structurally firs…”

🇯🇵 DOWA Holdings Co., Ltd.deployable nowProducing today — “largest zinc smelter”.

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇫🇷 Eramet SAdeployable nowProducing today — “leading producer of high-grade manganese ore, ~25% of global supply”. Capacity partly committed — “| | 2025-12-03 | [EU ResourceEU Action Plan COM(2025) 945](/actions/2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945)…”

+26 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

copper60 tradable ex-🇺🇸US producers · 225 tracked total

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

🇬🇧 Anglo American plcdeployable nowProducing today — “commercial production since 2022”.

🇬🇧 Antofagasta plcdeployable nowProducing today — “operating mines”.

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

+56 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

tin14 tradable ex-🇲🇲MM producers · 34 tracked total

🇨🇦 Almonty Industriesdeployable nowProducing today — “operating since 1896”. Capacity partly committed — “** Almonty is also developing a molybdenum project on the Sangdong deposit, with a life-of-mine offtake agreement signe…”

🇨🇩 Alphamin Resources Corp.deployable nowProducing today — “operating tin mines”.

🇸🇪 Boliden ABdeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

🇯🇵 DOWA Holdings Co., Ltd.deployable nowProducing today — “largest zinc smelter”.

+10 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

How these claims are derived (method)Show

Likelihood bands are derived deterministically from the legislative stage — announced → low; draft-published → moderate; in-consultation → moderate; consultation-closed → elevated; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote → high; awaiting-signature → high. We never publish a point probability: no honest per-jurisdiction bill-passage base rate exists.
Upcoming measures come from our forward intake queue, matched to this company's scored materials and sector. Each carries the date we first flagged it and a public source.
Transmission classes are derived from what each instrument does, on explicit signals in its own text (with the taxonomy in lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.
The top-5 ranking is mechanical, not editorial: score = classWeight × (likelihood-band rank + 1) × (1 + Σ touched-material weights), where a material this company produces weighs 2 and one it buys weighs 1, and classWeight reflects severity of effect: supply restriction 4 / 3 / 2 (issuer's production share of a touched material ≥5% / measurable / unmeasured), beneficiation 3 / 2.5 / 1.5 on the same gates, import cost and unclassified 2, investment control 1.5, compliance and support 1. A reporting obligation can therefore never outrank a live supply restriction on a material this company depends on merely by name-checking many materials. Sector-only matches carry the base relevance. Ties break to the higher band, then the most recently flagged.
Issuer production shares come from the USGS-based production-share table (lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.
Each chain card is assembled, never authored: step 1 quotes the measure's own expected-impact text (any date shown, including a compliance deadline, comes verbatim from that text or its source — we never synthesize one); step 2 quotes this company's own dossier bullet for the touched material verbatim, and says so plainly when the exposure is only sector-derived; step 3 is derived from the transmission class — for supply restrictions the tradable names shown are alternatives-map entries filtered to the ex-issuer production countries, where a tariff chip means a live register tariff entry by ES or the EU explicitly targets that material and supplier country (rate shown only when recorded), a subsidy/liberalising chip means a support measure by the supplier's own government on that material, and the EU/domestic chip is derived from the EU membership list. Every chip links to its register entry; no chip means no register signal, not "no risk".
In-force restrictions are register entries (stage in-force, effective severity ≥ 3) tagging its materials — every row links to the entry and its primary source.
Upstream scores are the footprint-adjusted, buyer-relative material scores from the company risk engine.
Customer sectors come from a hand-authored supply-chain adjacency graph (analyst judgement, weighted 0–1), the same graph the register's downstream-impact views propagate through. Where the company's sector label has no node of its own, the nearest equivalent node is used and labelled as such. The demand-support / demand-risk tag is a mechanical read of each measure's type and polarity, not a per-company judgement.
Alternatives are the alternatives-map slice (derived 2026-10-06): ex-controller-bloc producers tracked in the corpus, with tradability inherited from the verified listing layer.
Alternative viability is gated, not decorative (lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.

How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.

Home / Companies / Wallbox N.V. / Outlook

[5]Company ↑ Market