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6 critical materials scored · binding chokepoint: Platinum-palladium (🇿🇦 ZA 54% of mining) · 69 restrictive government measures on record
Jiangxi Copper Corporation produces 6 of the 6 scored materials above (Platinum-palladium, Silver, Copper, Tellurium, Bismuth, Sulfur). For those, a supply restriction by the controlling country is a tailwind, not a headwind — the exposure is to disruption of a market this company supplies, not to a chokepoint it depends on. Every scored material here sits on its output side, so the Moderate · 51/100 band should be read as chokepoint salience, not as buyer vulnerability, and the Art. 24 input-side duties below are qualified accordingly.
Role from an explicit dossier role: tag or the producer-sector classifier behind the /minerals alternatives bench (one classifier on disk, generated 2026-10-05) — the same source the company page uses. A material the classifier has no entry for defaults to a buyer dependency, which can understate a producer's output side. Descriptive classification only: it enters no score.
The binding exposure is Platinum-palladium — 🇿🇦 ZA controls 54% of global mining. On this company's production footprint that scores 62/100 (neutral exposure; global 62). The register holds 69 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · Platinum-palladium Jiangxi Copper Corporation is the 70th-most-exposed of the 120 named companies we track on 🇿🇦 ZA's Platinum-palladium chokepoint; the most-exposed is Magna Steyr (Magna International — Graz operations) (62/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
Jiangxi Copper Corporation ranks 82nd of 98 verified metals refining companies, tied with 1 other at 51.
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 39 further metals refining companies are tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Company supply-risk index 51/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 6 scored materials. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (CN 93% · ZM 5% · KZ 2%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
Disclosed production sites
Named plants and what they make, from the company's disclosures. Descriptive detail — the buyer score above is still driven by country-level footprint weights, not per-site material intensity.
> The exposure report this dossier powers is at > /intelligence/dossiers/jiangxi-copper/report.
Jiangxi Copper Corporation (HKEX: 0358; SSE: 600362), headquartered in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, China, is China's largest integrated copper producer — vertically integrated from ore mining (Dexing Copper Mine, one of China's largest open-pit copper mines) through smelting/refining (Guixi Smelter, one of the world's largest single-site copper smelters, >1 Mt/yr capacity) to fabricated copper products (cathode, rod, wire, foil). Its Jiangxi Jiangtong Yates Copper Foil joint venture (with US-based Yates Copper Foil, est. 2003) also makes standard and lithium-battery-grade copper foil, with a further ~¥11.4bn (~US$1.8B) expansion announced for 100,000 t/yr of lithium-battery copper-foil capacity.
Jiangxi Copper is an upstream miner/smelter, not a downstream consumer — the exposures below are a supply position (materials it mines, smelts, or recovers), not a purchasing dependency.
itself: mined at Dexing, smelted at Guixi, and fabricated into cathode/rod/wire/foil, including lithium-battery-grade copper foil for EV cells. Exposure runs through Chinese domestic ore policy and Dexing's own reserve/grade trajectory rather than an external chokepoint — Jiangxi Copper is itself one of the world's largest copper producers.
Recovered at scale during copper anode-slime processing: group silver output was 1,383.18 t in FY2025 (+13.9%) and 749.78 t in H1-2026 (FY2025 annual report p.15; H1-2026 report p.13). Subsidiary Hengbang alone is cited at 1,000 t/yr silver capacity in the FY2025 report and 1,200 t/yr in the H1-2026 report (plus ~98.3 t/yr gold, not a scored material here).
Reported production line: 148.17 t in FY2025 (+18.5%) and 80.20 t in H1-2026 (+28.1% y/y) (FY2025 report p.15; H1-2026 report p.13). An earlier revision of this dossier called it a gram/kilogram-scale stream — the filing's own production table contradicts that.
Bismuth is named in the filings' product list (硒、碲、铼、铋, FY2025 report p.11); platinum and palladium are named on the company's own site among metals recovered from anode slime. Neither appears in the production table, so no tonnage is asserted — real but incidental to the copper business.
Guixi and JCC's other smelters capture SO2 from copper smelting into sulfuric acid and sell iron-pyrites/sulfur concentrate commercially at industrial volume — a captured output of the copper process, not a mined or purchased input.
Source for this entire section: Jiangxi Copper Corporation (江西铜业) FY2025 annual report, filed with the Shanghai Stock Exchange via cninfo 2026-03-27 — static.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2026-03-27/1225034758.PDF (§(7) 主要销售客户及主要供应商情况, p.21-22). Reporting period: FY2025 (year ended 2025-12-31). Confidence: primary-source (audited annual report). Do not present these as "current" — they are the FY2025 position.
Unlike every other A-share filer worked in this corpus so far (Yunnan Tin, Huayou Cobalt, JL MAG), JCC's filing states the related-party share of both top-5 tables is zero — "前五名客户销售额中关联方销售额0万元" and "前五名 供应商采购额中关联方采购额0万元". Every name below is the filing's own disclosed genuine third-party counterparty; there is no intra-group roll-up to correct for and no arm's-length residual to compute. That itself is a structural finding: JCC's commercial book runs through the open market and exchange channels rather than a captive group-internal trading layer.
| Named customer | FY2025 sales | % of annual sales |
|---|---|---|
| 上海黄金交易所 — Shanghai Gold Exchange | ¥8.837bn | 16.23% |
| 华铜（海南）国际供应链有限公司 — Huatong (Hainan) International Supply Chain Co., Ltd. | ¥1.379bn | 2.53% |
| 宁波金田铜业（集团）股份有限公司 — Ningbo Jintian Copper (Group) Co., Ltd. | ¥1.254bn | 2.30% |
| 宝胜科技创新股份有限公司 — Baosheng Science & Technology Innovation Co., Ltd. (SSE: 600973) | ¥874.4m | 1.61% |
| HITENT METALS TRADING PTE. LTD. | ¥683.5m | 1.26% |
| Total | ¥13.027bn | 23.93% |
The Shanghai Gold Exchange alone is 16.23 points of the 23.93% total — this is exchange-delivered physical copper, so the "customer" is the exchange mechanism rather than a single identifiable end-user, and the remaining four names are the genuinely identifiable commercial buyers (7.7 points combined). Ningbo Jintian and Baosheng are themselves domestic copper-products fabricators (rod/wire/cable), i.e. this table is largely intra-industry midstream trade, not disclosure of JCC's ultimate end-use customers.
| Named supplier | FY2025 purchases | % of annual procurement |
|---|---|---|
| 金川集团股份有限公司 — Jinchuan Group Co., Ltd. | ¥2.212bn | 4.25% |
| TRAFIGURA PTE LTD | ¥1.735bn | 3.33% |
| 中铜国际贸易集团有限公司 — China Copper International Trade Group Co., Ltd. | ¥1.326bn | 2.55% |
| 铜陵有色金属集团控股有限公司 — Tongling Nonferrous Metals Group Holdings Co., Ltd. | ¥1.214bn | 2.33% |
| 富冶集团有限公司 — Fuye Group Co., Ltd. | ¥1.174bn | 2.25% |
| Total | ¥7.660bn | 14.71% |
This side is the more chokepoint-relevant one: three of the five named suppliers are themselves large copper/nickel producers or traders already tracked elsewhere in this corpus — Jinchuan Group (jinchuan-group-international, China's largest nickel producer), Trafigura (trafigura, a top-3 global metals trading house), and Tongling Nonferrous (tongling-nonferrous-metals, a peer Chinese smelter). China Copper International Trade is the trading subsidiary of China Copper (中国铜业), Chinalco Group's copper-consolidation platform — booked here as non-related-party because the filing's same-controller merge test explicitly excludes entities that share only a common state-asset regulator, not a direct ownership chain. Net picture: JCC's top-5 procurement is inter-SOE and inter-trader feedstock/blister/concentrate flow among China's largest copper-adjacent producers, not a dependency on any single mine or foreign chokepoint supplier — consistent with JCC being itself one of the two or three largest integrated copper producers globally.
Source: H1-2026 semi-annual report, filed 2026-08-26 — static.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2026-08-26/1225505938.PDF (unaudited). An A-share interim carries no top-5 sales/procurement table (only the annual does), so this vintage adds no new concentration percentages; what it does carry is the related-party transaction table (p.33-36), the other-receivables top-5 (p.120) and the litigation table (p.32).
FY2025 top-5 table does not show it. 江铜集团 sold JCC silver worth ¥4.122bn in FY2025 (21.09% of same-class transactions, FY2025 report p.63) and ¥4.021bn in H1-2026 (21.47%, p.33). Against that, the FY2025 supplier top-5 states 0% related-party purchases and its largest named supplier (Jinchuan) is only ¥2.212bn. So either the top-5 table excludes related parties by construction or it is defined differently from the related-party table — the filings do not say which.* Read the "arm's-length top five" above as the named top-5 excluding the group*, not as JCC's procurement being free of captive supply. Do not compute a corrected concentration until the definition is resolved.
cathode/nickel/blister supply and a wider sales list, sized by annual caps only (see the structured row); a Chinese-defence-group trading arm is now a contracted, capped counterparty of the world's largest integrated copper chain in China.
old, 81% provided against, tied to a litigation JCC International Trade has won on appeal but is still enforcing.
--semi-annual pull resolved 600362 unambiguously; the 216-page PDF text-extracted cleanly; 临2026-004 fetched directly from cninfo. The other-receivables top-5 also names 金瑞期货, Marex Financial, 物产中大期货 and the Shanghai Gold Exchange as futures-margin holders — brokerage/exchange counterparties, deliberately not filed as buyers/suppliers.
From the company’s own filings and dated disclosures — top-5 concentration and related-party tables where the filer’s regime compels them, named supply and offtake agreements where it does not. This is a disclosure, not a netting: a named supplier concentration is shown beside the exposure score and never adjusts it. Figures are the fiscal years labelled, not a current snapshot.
Unlike most of this corpus, JCC's filing states related-party share of both top-5 tables is 0 — every named row below is the filing's own disclosed genuine arm's-length counterparty, not an intra-group roll-up needing an arm's-length correction.
FY2025 · FY2025 annual report p.63 related-party table (关联交易, 购买商品/白银): RMB 4,122,965,846 = 21.09% of 占同类交易金额的比例. Filed under the controlling shareholder as 江铜集团. NOT in the top-5 supplier table (which states 0 related-party purchases) — see prose section 'H1-2026 update' for the unresolved gap.source ↗
H1-2026 · H1-2026 semi-annual report p.33 (关联交易, 购买商品/白银): RMB 4,021,475,216 = 21.47% of 占同类交易金额的比例 (denominator not restated in the filing). Half-year figure vs full-year FY2025 comparator — the share is comparable, the RMB amounts are not (H1 alone is 97.5% of FY2025's full-year silver purchase from the group). Also sells cathode/rod/silver-concentrate back to JCC (H1: ¥634.7m cathode, ¥425.9m rod/wire, ¥83.1m silver concentrate).source ↗
China's largest nickel producer and a major copper/cobalt producer in its own right — also tracked in this corpus as jinchuan-group-international. JCC's
Global commodities trading house — also tracked in this corpus as trafigura. JCC's
Trading arm of China Copper (中国铜业), the copper-business consolidation platform under Chinalco Group. The filing's same-controller merge rule explicitly excludes entities that share only a common state-owned-assets regulator, which is why this books as non-related-party despite both being centrally-SASAC-linked SOEs.
Also tracked in this corpus as tongling-nonferrous-metals — a peer Chinese copper smelter supplying feedstock/cathode into JCC rather than the reverse.
UNQUANTIFIED AS ACTUAL FLOWS — these are annual CAPS in a non-exclusive 合作框架协议 (临2026-004, 2026-01-20; term 2026-01-01 to 2028-12-31), not disclosed transactions. Related because 兵工物资 holds 29.52% of subsidiary 江铜国际贸易有限公司 (HKEX 14A subsidiary-level connected person). Supply TO JCC (caps/yr): ex-China cathode US$600m, Guangdong cathode RMB2.5bn, blister RMB600m, ex-China electrolytic nickel US$50m. Sales BY JCC (caps/yr): cathode RMB5.8bn, rod RMB500m, aluminium RMB700m, nickel RMB1.5bn, zinc RMB700m, tin RMB30m, precious/PGM/rhenium/molybdenum RMB500m. Cross-dossier: parent group tracked as norinco.
UNQUANTIFIED AS A SHARE. Named in the H1-2026 report's other-receivables top-5 (p.120) as 尚未收回的预付货款 (goods prepayment not recovered), RMB 930,651,612, aged 3+ years, provision RMB 752,561,608 — a failed-supplier exposure, not a revenue/procurement share. Same entity is the defendant in the 江铜国际贸易 litigation (p.32; announcement 临2019-031): retrial-appeal judgment 2025-06-18 upheld ¥598.83m principal plus funding cost; execution filed 2025-07-04, enforcement against a guarantor's Shagang shares in progress as of 2026-06.
FQM's Q1 2025 results release: 'the Company supplemented the sale of copper to Jiangxi Copper Company in return for an additional $500 million prepayment...for the delivery of an additional 50,000 tonnes of Zambian copper anode per annum payable at market prices over the three year period' — stacking on the original Feb-2024 three-year prepay for 50,000 t/yr of Kansanshi (Zambia) copper anode, for 100,000 t/yr combined. Distinct from JCC's ~18.5% equity stake in FQM already noted in this dossier's production_footprint.
Exchange-delivered physical copper — the exchange is the counterparty of record, not a single commercial end-buyer.
Singapore-domiciled metals trading house — one of two foreign-domiciled counterparties named in this filing (the other is TRAFIGURA PTE LTD, on the supplier side).
UNQUANTIFIED AS ACTUAL FLOWS — these are annual CAPS in a non-exclusive 合作框架协议 (临2026-004, 2026-01-20; term 2026-01-01 to 2028-12-31), not disclosed transactions. Related because 兵工物资 holds 29.52% of subsidiary 江铜国际贸易有限公司 (HKEX 14A subsidiary-level connected person). Supply TO JCC (caps/yr): ex-China cathode US$600m, Guangdong cathode RMB2.5bn, blister RMB600m, ex-China electrolytic nickel US$50m. Sales BY JCC (caps/yr): cathode RMB5.8bn, rod RMB500m, aluminium RMB700m, nickel RMB1.5bn, zinc RMB700m, tin RMB30m, precious/PGM/rhenium/molybdenum RMB500m. Cross-dossier: parent group tracked as norinco.
Alternative track — a counterparty read from primary filings, never merged into the exposure score. Absence of a name is not absence of a relationship: Filers name only the counterparties their regime compels them to name, and several of this company’s largest are disclosed by size with no name at all. · section source filing ↗
Ranked by buyer-relative risk, highest first.
1 of 3 of your scored CRMA-strategic materials breach the EU’s own Art. 5 65% single-third-country ceiling (global-production proxy).
| Material | Controlled by | You | Global | Band | Art. 5 | Input share | Substitute | Laws | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platinum-palladium | 🇿🇦 ZA 54% mining | 62 | 62 | Elevated | within 54% | — | limited | 12 | ▲ rising |
| Silver | 🇲🇽 MX 24% mining | 43 | 43 | Moderate | — | High | some | 5 | ▲ rising |
| Copper | 🇨🇳 CN 48% refining | 34 | 59 | Low | within 48% | High | limited | 52 | ▲ rising |
| Tellurium | 🇨🇳 CN 80% refining | 28 | 62 | Low | — | High | ready | 2 | ▬ stable |
| Bismuth | 🇨🇳 CN 88% refining | 26 | 54 | Low | EXCEEDS 88% | — | some | 2 | ▬ stable |
| Sulfur | 🇨🇳 CN 23% mining | 20 | 34 | Low | — | High | hard | 3 | ▲ rising |
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
| Material | Geopolitical | Concentration | Price / market | Substitutability | Import reliance | Logistics · ESG · Supplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platinum-palladium | 4 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | company input |
| Silver | 3 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 3 | company input |
| Copper | 4 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 3 | company input |
| Tellurium | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 5 | company input |
| Bismuth | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | – | company input |
| Sulfur | 3 | 2 | – | 4 | 3 | company input |
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
Restrictive government measures on this company's materials, newest first — each links to its primary government source.
+ 54 more in the register.
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
Under the 🇿🇦 ZA shock, your disclosed plant carries the binding Platinum-palladium exposure:
| Type | Scenario | Today | Stressed | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy | Platinum-palladium — 🇿🇦 ZA escalates platinum-palladium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 62 | 67 | +5 |
| Concentration | Platinum-palladium — 🇿🇦 ZA becomes the single source for platinum-palladium — the second source is lost (full 54%+ monopoly) | 62 | 83 | +21 |
| Policy | Silver — 🇲🇽 MX escalates silver controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 43 | 52 | +9 |
| Concentration | Silver — 🇲🇽 MX becomes the single source for silver — the second source is lost (full 24%+ monopoly) | 43 | 73 | +30 |
| Policy | Copper — 🇨🇳 CN escalates copper controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 34 | 35 | +1 |
| Concentration | Copper — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for copper — the second source is lost (full 48%+ monopoly) | 34 | 43 | +9 |
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
No material crosses the significant-vulnerability threshold on the input side — every scored material here is one Jiangxi Copper Corporation produces, and Art. 24 addresses the use of a strategic raw material as an input. The Art. 24(4) mitigation duty is not triggered on the public-source evidence; the mitigations below are precautionary.
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the 0 materials this company buys (the 6 it produces are excluded from the test and listed above). The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Proposed, announced or draft regulation that is not yet in force but would touch this company's at-risk materials if it passes. Forward-looking early-warning — the likelihood shown is an honest band derived from the legislative stage, not a forecast or a fabricated probability. Kept separate from the enacted register above: nothing here is law yet.
Bills at introduction (pre-committee) in US historically become law ~5% of the time (n=37,132, GovTrack — 117th–118th Congresses) — a base rate for comparable bills, not a forecast for this one. source ↗
Bills at out of committee in US historically become law ~21% of the time (n=1,687, GovTrack — 117th Congress (2021–2023)) — a base rate for comparable bills, not a forecast for this one. source ↗
Likelihood band is derived deterministically from the legislative stage (announced → low; draft-published / in-consultation → moderate; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote / awaiting-signature → high) — a reproducible, source-traceable proxy, not a probability estimate. Where shown, the modelled impact-if-passed re-uses the same buyer-relative stress engine as the enacted scenarios above: it holds this company's production footprint fixed and escalates the proposed measure to a full export-licensing / control regime — the conservative upper bound for a measure that may pass only as a partial cap. The delta is the move from today's score to that stressed score; companies with no modelled production footprint show no delta.
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
Every scored material here is one Jiangxi Copper Corporation produces, so the Art. 24(4) buyer levers — qualify an alternative supplier, re-source, substitute the input — do not apply to this company. The output-side items below are what a concentrated producer's risk office actually acts on. We render them rather than a generic diversification list because a prescription addressed to the wrong side of the market is worse than none.
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
| CRMA provision | Obligation | Where addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 24(1) | Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology). | Scope & applicability |
| Art. 24(2)(a) | Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled. | Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis |
| Art. 24(2)(b) | Analyse the factors that might affect supply. | Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it |
| Art. 24(2)(c) | Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions. | Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion |
| Art. 24(3) | Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources. | This report's basis — see Methodology & sources |
| Art. 24(4) | Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting. | Significant-vulnerability conclusion + Priority mitigations |
| Art. 24(5)–(6) | Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board. | This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable |
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
| Threshold test | This assessment |
|---|---|
| Average employees (last FY) > 500 | company input |
| Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M | company input |
| Uses a strategic raw material as an input | company input — all 6 scored SRMs here are ones this company produces, not buys; input use is not evidenced by this assessment |
| Manufactures a listed strategic technology | metals-refining (confirm against Annex) |
| Formally identified by a Member State authority | company input |
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2026-09-30; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
MACROLENS · CICONIALABS · GEOPOLITICAL SUPPLY-RISK REPORT (EU CRMA ART. 20–25) · report generated 2026-10-05
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.