Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 23 December 2024 the US Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule (89 FR 104408; FR Doc 2024-30425; RIN 0694-AJ83) amending the Export Administration Regulations to implement decisions adopted at the Australia Group's 2023 and 2024 plenary meetings. The rule adds new ECCN 2B352.k controlling instruments for the automated chemical synthesis of peptides that are partly or entirely automated and capable of generating peptides at a system-synthesis scale of 1 mmol or greater, finalising the April 2023 BIS proposed rule. It also adds dipropylamine to ECCN 1C350.d.11, neosaxitoxin to ECCN 1C351.d.12, revises the 1C351.d.3 entry from "botulinum toxins" to "botulinum neurotoxins" to capture all serotypes, adds a "minimum detection limit" definition for toxic-gas monitors in 2B351.a, and explicitly captures single-use centrifugal separators in 2B352.c. License requirements (CB, AT, CW where applicable) apply for export to non-Australia-Group destinations; the rule is effective on publication.

The U.S. Department of Commerce, through the International Trade Administration's Enforcement and Compliance unit, issued a final rule revising the annexes to 19 CFR Part 351 to modernize the forms, certifications, and instructions used by parties to antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) proceedings. The modernization updates legacy paperwork (entries-of-appearance, questionnaire certifications, scope-application templates, service lists) for the electronic ACCESS filing era and aligns the annexes with Commerce's 2024 substantive AD/CVD rulemakings. A correcting amendment published 31 March 2025 (FR Doc. 2025-05482) fixed inadvertent date and regulatory-language errors in the December rule but left its substantive content unchanged.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a final rule on 19 December 2024 amending 32 parts of 31 CFR chapter V to modernize the general licenses authorizing payments for legal services from funds originating outside the United States. The rule replaces the annual reporting requirement that had applied to such payments with a 10-year recordkeeping requirement, aligning the legal-services general licenses with the new 10-year statute of limitations for IEEPA/TWEA violations and OFAC's parallel 5→10-year recordkeeping extension (31 CFR 501). The rule also standardises legal-services general-license language across programs — removing legacy letter-of-engagement prerequisites in certain parts (e.g., 31 CFR 594, 597), updating 31 CFR 549 (Lebanon) and 31 CFR 576 (Iraq Stabilization and Insurgency) to remove the requirement that payments for authorised legal services be separately specifically licensed, and harmonising the 31 CFR 591 (Venezuela-related) authorisation language. The rule was effective 19 December 2024 with an applicability date of 12 March 2025.

The U.S. Department of Commerce, through the International Trade Administration's Enforcement and Compliance unit, issued a final rule amending 19 CFR Part 351 to enhance the administration of the antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) trade-remedy laws. The final rule (FR Doc. 2024-29245, 89 FR effective 15 Jan 2025) operationalises the proposals in the July 2024 NPRM (89 FR 57286), tightening procedures for cash-deposit and liquidation instructions, scope determinations, certifications, and treatment of non-market-economy and particular-market- situation findings — areas central to the second Biden-Trump hand-off in trade-remedy enforcement. A correcting amendment (FR Doc. 2025-05481, effective 31 Mar 2025) restored inadvertently deleted CFR language and fixed punctuation/spelling errors without changing substantive scope.

The U.S. Department of Commerce, through the International Trade Administration's Enforcement and Compliance unit, published a technical correction to its 31 January 2024 final rule ("Procedures and Rules for Article 10.12 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement", 89 FR 6011) that established the binational-panel and extraordinary-challenge-committee procedures replacing the legacy NAFTA Article 1904 framework. The correction removes erroneously duplicated regulatory text in 19 CFR § 356.8(b)(2) — language that had been inadvertently copied from § 356.8(b)(1) in the prior rulemaking — and is effective on publication. The fix is non-substantive and does not alter any rights, obligations, or procedural requirements for parties to USMCA Chapter 10 binational-panel reviews of US antidumping and countervailing duty determinations involving Canadian or Mexican merchandise.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 8 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Burma (2), China (2), and Russia (4), citing actions contrary to US foreign-policy interests, primarily enabling human-rights violations through aerial attacks on civilians (Burma), Uyghur surveillance (China), and facial-recognition targeting of protesters (Russia). All designated entities require licenses for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption of denial. The rule was effective immediately on publication, December 11, 2024.

China's Ministry of Commerce announced on 3 December 2024 (MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2024) a formal ban on dual-use exports to the United States of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials including diamond and cubic boron nitride. The measure also imposed strict end-use review on graphite exports to the US, with extra scrutiny of military end-uses. It came one day after BIS issued a major export- control package on 2 December 2024 expanding controls on Chinese semiconductor equipment and adding 140 entities to the Entity List, and was framed by MOFCOM as a national- security countermeasure.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued its largest single export-control package targeting China's semiconductor industry on 2 December 2024, with three layered measures (final rules published in the Federal Register 5 December 2024). First, controls on high-bandwidth memory (HBM) above set performance thresholds — blocking the memory architecture that is foundational to AI training. Second, additions of 24 semiconductor manufacturing equipment item types to the Commerce Control List, covering deposition, etch, ion- implant, advanced packaging, and metrology categories. Third, Entity List designations for 140+ entities, the bulk Chinese semiconductor companies + equipment makers + investment vehicles, including major Chinese fab tooling firms. The package triggered MOFCOM's same-day-following retaliation (filed: 2024-12-03-china-mofcom-ge-ga-sb-export-ban-us).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations to impose a new "Regional Stability – Pakistan" (RS-PAK) licence requirement on exports, reexports, and in-country transfers to Pakistan of items classified under six previously-uncontrolled-for-Pakistan ECCNs: 1B999, 2A992, 2B999 (excluding 2B999.h.2), 3A992, 3A999, and 6A996. The covered items — process-control equipment, high-pressure piping and valves, oscilloscopes, electronic test equipment, magnetometers, and related dual-use industrial gear — are associated with unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile end-uses. Licence applications are reviewed case-by-case to assess diversion risk to Pakistan's nuclear weapons or ballistic missile programmes, and to entities already on the Entity List or front companies acting on their behalf. Issued as a final rule under ECRA §1762(a) (no notice-and-comment); originally effective 25 November 2024 with the corresponding amendatory instructions, with the substantive licence requirement effective 26 December 2024 (post C1-2024-27648 correction published 29 November 2024).

BIS published a notice (FR Doc 2024-26886; 89 FR 91251) extending the public-comment deadline on its 23 October 2024 interim final rule "Revisions to Space-Related Export Controls" (89 FR 84770; RIN 0694-AJ87; docket BIS-2024-0031). Comments originally due 22 November 2024 are now due 23 December 2024. BIS cited the need to give commenters additional time and to incorporate input from public-outreach sessions. The underlying IFR eases controls on ECCNs 9A004 and 9A515 by shifting reasons for control from NS1/RS1 to NS2/RS2, eliminating licensing requirements for exports of covered space items to roughly 40 countries.

Government of Russia Resolution No. 1544, signed by Prime Minister Mishustin on 14 November 2024 and published 15 November 2024, amends Resolution No. 313 of 9 March 2022 (the framework counter-sanctions list of goods restricted for export to "unfriendly" jurisdictions) by adding HS code 2844 20 — uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds — to Annex 2. The amendment imposes a temporary export ban on enriched uranium to the United States and to legal entities incorporated in US jurisdiction, in force from 16 November 2024 through 31 December 2025. Exports are permitted only under one-off licences issued by the Russian Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC). The measure is an explicit tit-for-tat response to the US Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (Public Law 118-50, 13 May 2024).

BIS published a Federal Register notice (FR Doc 2024-25663; 89 FR 87783) announcing a public briefing on 6 November 2024 (1:00-3:00 p.m. EST) on its space-related export-control rulemaking package of 23 October 2024. The notice covered three companion rules: the interim final rule "Revisions to Space-Related Export Controls" (FR Doc 2024-23958), the final rule "Removal of License Requirements for Certain Spacecraft and Related Items for Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom" (FR Doc 2024-23932), and a parallel proposed rule contemplating a new License Exception Commercial Space Activities (CSA). The briefing was a procedural stakeholder outreach event; it did not create or modify any substantive controls. Written questions were due by 5 p.m. EST on 4 November 2024.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 87261; FR Doc 2024-25411) added 40 entities under 42 entries plus four addresses to the Entity List under the destinations China (11), India (5), Malaysia (2), Russia (13), Singapore (1), and Turkey (14), and modified 52 existing entries across China, Estonia, Finland, India, Turkey, the UAE and the UK. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish, Indian, Malaysian and Singaporean entities listed for transshipping controlled US-origin items to Russian defense end users; the 13 Russia entries cover chemical and biological warfare R&D and defense procurement networks. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy/presumption of denial; four China addresses get the narrower "CCL + EAR99 supp. 7" scope. Effective on publication 2024-11-01.

Final rule (RIN 0694-AJ93, FR Doc 2024-25445, 89 FR 87279) under which BIS expands the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions of the Export Administration Regulations to cover an enumerated list of chemical precursors used in the synthesis of chloropicrin and riot-control agents (CS, CN, CR), and adds associated technical clarifications. The action is the export- control complement to the US Department of State's annual report to Congress on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, which determined that Russia had used riot-control agents as a method of warfare against Ukrainian forces in violation of the CWC. Effective on publication, 1 November 2024.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 84460, Doc 2024-24562) adding 26 entities to the Entity List across four destinations: six in China (aviation simulation for PLA modernisation; procurement for Iran WMD/UAV programs; evasive conduct), one in Egypt and three in the UAE (acquiring US civil aircraft parts for Russian buyers post-Ukraine invasion), and sixteen in Pakistan (nine front companies of Advanced Engineering Research Organization for Pakistan's cruise-missile and strategic-UAV programs, plus seven contributing to Pakistan's ballistic- missile program). The rule also removes two existing entries. All additions are licensed under a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items.

In a final rule published at 89 FR 84766 (FR Doc 2024-23932), the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove BIS licence requirements on certain spacecraft and related items — including remote-sensing spacecraft and on-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (OSAM) items — for exports and reexports to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The rule is effective immediately on publication (23 October 2024) and is part of a three-rule package modernising the US space-related export-control regime (companion IFR 2024-23958 broadens controls relief for ~40 additional destinations; companion proposed rule 2024-23975 floats a new License Exception Commercial Space Activities). The AU/CA/UK carve-out builds on the trilateral National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) framework.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published in the Federal Register (89 FR 84472–84474, FR Doc 2024-24524) three general licenses issued under the Western Balkans Stabilization Regulations (31 CFR Part 588): GL 3A, GL 4, and GL 5. All three were originally issued on 18 June 2024 concurrent with OFAC's expansion of Republika Srpska / Dodik-network designations; the 23 October 2024 Federal Register notice formalises them per the Administrative Procedure Act notice requirements. GL 3A (which superseded GL 3 of 16 November 2023) authorises transactions involving certain WBSR-blocked entities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the exportation or re-exportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components, software updates, or activities involving medical prevention, diagnosis, treatment, or clinical trials. GL 4 authorises wind-down transactions with entities blocked on 18 June 2024 through a defined cutoff. GL 5 authorises transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the manufacture, distribution, operation, installation, or maintenance/repair of drinking-water pumps manufactured or distributed by the WBSR-blocked Bosnian Serb entity Kaldera Company EL PGP d.o.o. (and 50%-or-more-owned subsidiaries), preserving municipal water supply continuity.

FinCEN published a final rule (FR Doc 2024-23920, 89 FR 83782, effective on publication October 18, 2024) clarifying the public-utility exemption to the Corporate Transparency Act's beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting rule. The amendment to 31 CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(xv) corrects a drafting cross-reference so the exemption explicitly covers any regulated public utility under 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(33)(A) *or* (D) that provides telecommunications services, electrical power, natural gas, or water and sewer services within the United States. The change codifies FinCEN's June 10, 2024 telecommunications-provider guidance and is effective immediately upon publication; it neither expands nor restricts the underlying universe of reporting companies beyond aligning the rule text with the CTA statute.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a clerical correction to its 16 September 2024 final rule "Administrative and Enforcement Provisions" (RIN 0694-AJ84, 89 FR 75477). The original final rule's instruction No. 2 erroneously stated that 15 CFR 764.5 paragraph (b) was to be revised; BIS clarifies that only paragraphs (a) and (c) through (f) were revised and paragraph (g) added, while paragraph (b) was not intended to be amended. The correction is purely typographical and has no substantive effect on the underlying enforcement procedural changes.

In an interim final rule (IFR) published at 89 FR 84770 (FR Doc 2024-23958), the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to revise controls on spacecraft and related items. The rule shifts the reasons for control on "specially designed" parts, components, accessories, and attachments under ECCNs 9A004.x and 9A515.x from National Security Column 1 / Regional Stability Column 1 (NS1/RS1) to NS2/RS2 — eliminating BIS licensing requirements for roughly 40 destinations that only face NS2/RS2 controls on the Commerce Country Chart. The IFR also broadens License Exception STA-related provisions and expands support for NASA cooperative programmes. It is one of three companion rules (with FR Doc 2024-23932 and a parallel proposed rule on a new License Exception Commercial Space Activities) issued the same day to modernise the US space-related export-control regime.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule on 16 October 2024 revising paragraph (c) of 15 CFR § 740.24 (License Exception Implemented Export Controls, "IEC") to update the version date of the IEC Eligible Items and Destinations table incorporated by reference and to replace the long URL pointing to that table with the simpler address www.bis.gov/IEC. The underlying table update — posted to the BIS website on 17 September 2024 — adds Denmark and Finland as IEC-eligible destinations and modifies the entries for Japan. License Exception IEC is the mechanism by which BIS authorises shipments of the September 2024 plurilateral export-control items (advanced semiconductor, quantum, and additive-manufacturing technologies) to destinations whose governments have implemented substantially equivalent controls.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 8 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 2. Of the 8 additions, 3 are under China, 2 under Germany, 1 under Pakistan, and 2 under Türkiye. Of the 2 removals, 1 is under Saudi Arabia and 1 under China. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 16 October 2024 (89 FR 83428, FR Doc 2024-23638).

On 11 October 2024, the Secretary of the Treasury — acting in consultation with the Secretary of State and pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13902 — determined that the petroleum and petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy are sectors of strategic concern, exposing non-US persons that operate in or knowingly facilitate significant transactions with those sectors to secondary sanctions and SDN-listing risk. The determination was issued in response to Iran's 1 October 2024 ballistic- missile attack on Israeli targets and was formally published in the Federal Register on 19 November 2024 (FR Doc 2024-26800). Concurrent with the determination, OFAC designated an international network — including Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars — that had shipped millions of barrels of Iranian crude on behalf of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff to the People's Republic of China.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a final rule on 8 October 2024 amending the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (RPPR) at 31 CFR Part 501. The rule finalises portions of OFAC's 10 May 2024 interim final rule and adds three exceptions to the requirement to file a report with OFAC concerning blocked property that is unblocked or transferred. It also implements other technical clarifications to OFAC's reporting framework. The rule takes effect on 7 November 2024.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (89 FR 80064; FR doc 2024-22587) amending the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR 748.15) to expand the Validated End User (VEU) program with a new "Data Center VEU Authorization" pathway. The rule lets BIS pre-authorize specified data-center operators in third countries to receive advanced computing integrated circuits (ECCNs 3A090, 4A090 and related) and related technology without individual export licenses, conditional on vetted security plans, end-use monitoring, and reporting. Country Group D:5 destinations — China, Russia, Iran, Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba and 17 other arms-embargoed states — are categorically excluded. Eligible destinations include Egypt, Laos, Moldova, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and the UAE — extending the US chip-equipment perimeter into a managed trusted-data-center channel for Gulf, MENA, and Central Asian AI build-out.

FinCEN issued a final order, published in the Federal Register on 11 October 2024 (signed 26 September 2024), prohibiting US covered financial institutions from engaging in transmittals of funds to or from PM2BTC, a virtual-currency exchange operating outside the United States and identified as a primary money-laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance. The order is the first use of FinCEN's special- measure authority under Section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, as amended by the FY 2022 NDAA (codified at 31 U.S.C. 5323). The action was coordinated with same-day OFAC SDN designations of related entities (Cryptex) and individuals (Sergey Sergeevich Ivanov of Taleon Holdings).

The US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a final rule amending 35 parts of 31 CFR chapter V to clarify the procedures OFAC follows when it issues orders that block — or identify as blocked — specific property or interests in property, and orders that impose other prohibitions short of full blocking. The rule clarifies that Federal Register publication of names blocked pending investigation will not necessarily occur for property-specific blocking actions, and expands notes explaining unblocking and administrative-reconsideration procedures available to affected persons. Effective on publication, 17 September 2024.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule (RIN 0694-AJ84; 89 FR 75477) amending 15 CFR Parts 764 and 766 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to restructure administrative enforcement procedures. The rule revamps the voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) process under 15 CFR 764.5, abolishes prior penalty caps, amends the penalty guidelines in Supplement No. 1 to Part 766, and establishes that a deliberate decision not to disclose a "significant apparent violation" of the EAR will be treated as an aggravating factor when BIS calibrates administrative sanctions. The rule is effective on publication (16 September 2024).

BIS published a Code of Federal Regulations technical correction restoring two entries to supplement no. 4 to 15 CFR part 744 (the Entity List) that had been inadvertently omitted from the most recent annual CFR revision. The restored entries are Kapil Raj Arora under the destination of the Netherlands and Orion Eleven Pvt. Ltd. under the destination of Pakistan. Both entries carry the previously imposed license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption of denial. The rule is editorial and does not impose new substantive restrictions.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule on 5 September 2024 (effective 6 September 2024, published in the Federal Register on the same day as 89 FR 73285) establishing multilateral export controls on four categories of emerging technologies: (1) quantum computing items including quantum computers, related cryogenic / control / measurement systems, and certain quantum software; (2) gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET) production technology — the next-node semiconductor architecture beyond FinFET; (3) advanced additive-manufacturing equipment for metals + alloys; (4) certain biotech-related items added in a parallel rule on 12 September 2024. The rule operates without country exceptions for some categories, with multilateral coordination via Wassenaar + Australia Group + Nuclear Suppliers Group frameworks.

FinCEN issued a final rule (89 FR 70258, FR Doc 2024-19198) requiring certain real-estate-closing and settlement professionals to file a new "Real Estate Report" and maintain records on non-financed (i.e., all-cash) transfers of U.S. residential real property to specified legal entities and trusts, on a nationwide basis. The rule uses a "reporting cascade" to designate one filer per transaction (settlement agent, title-insurance underwriter, escrow agent, or attorney, depending on which is present), replacing the long-running geographic-targeting-order (GTO) regime with a permanent nationwide framework. The original effective date of December 1, 2025 was subsequently postponed to March 1, 2026 via a FinCEN exemptive-relief order issued September 30, 2025.

FinCEN issued a final rule (published September 4, 2024 at 89 FR 72156; FR Doc 2024-19260) including most SEC-registered investment advisers (RIAs) and Exempt Reporting Advisers (ERAs) within the Bank Secrecy Act definition of "financial institution." Covered firms must implement a risk-based AML/CFT compliance program, appoint a compliance officer, train staff, obtain independent testing, file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), and participate in §314(a)/(b) information sharing. The original compliance date was January 1, 2026; FinCEN subsequently delayed the effective date to January 1, 2028 by final rule published 2026-01-02 (FR Doc 2025-24184).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-19132, 89 FR 68539, published 27 August 2024) expanding the Russia/Belarus-Military End User (MEU) Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) rule under the Export Administration Regulations so that it also applies to transactions involving Entity List entries posing a significant diversion risk to Russia's and Belarus's defense industry or intelligence services — the rule is renamed accordingly. The rule also imposes new export, reexport, and in-country transfer controls on software for the operation of computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools destined for Russia or Belarus, and makes corrections eliminating obsolete cross- references introduced by the BIS 25 January 2024 and 18 June 2024 Russia/Belarus final rules. Effective 27 August 2024, except amendatory instruction 11 effective 16 September 2024.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a final rule amending three sanctions programs. The rule adds a new general license at 31 CFR § 525.512 to the Burma Sanctions Regulations authorizing the provision of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, and software updates for medical devices to individuals whose property and interests in property are blocked. It also updates the authorities section of the Burma Sanctions Regulations to reflect recent legislation, replaces "the Office of Foreign Assets Control" / "the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control" with the acronym "OFAC" in three sections of the Sudan Stabilization Sanctions Regulations, and corrects a cross-reference in the Ukraine-/Russia- Related Sanctions Regulations. The rule is effective on publication.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule expanding the scope of the Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the "No Technology for Terror Act" (Public Law 118-50, Division N), signed by President Biden on April 24, 2024. The expanded rule extends EAR jurisdiction to additional foreign-produced items destined for Iran — including a broader set of items derived from U.S.-origin technology or software, or produced by plants/components that are themselves direct products of U.S.-origin technology — and requires a BIS license for their export, reexport, or in-country transfer to Iran. The rule also provides specified exclusions from the otherwise-applicable license requirements. The rule became effective on July 23, 2024 (publication July 26, 2024).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a technical-corrections rule fixing language in the July 18, 2024 interim final rule on "Standards-Related Activities and the Export Administration Regulations" (FR Doc. 2024-15810). The July 18 rule inadvertently revised text related to recent Entity List modifications; this 2024-07-25 corrections document restores the prior Entity List language. The corrections are administrative and do not change substantive export-control policy or add/remove any Entity List parties. Both rules touch 15 CFR Part 744.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published in the Federal Register reporting instructions implementing Section 104(a) of the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Act (P.L. 118-50, Division F, enacted April 24, 2024). All US financial institutions at which Russian sovereign assets are located — or that know or should know of such assets, including in correspondent or payable-through accounts — must report those holdings to OFAC using Form TD-F 93.09. Initial reports were due by August 2, 2024, with rolling reports required within 10 days of detecting newly identified Russian sovereign assets. The notice is the predicate step for any future US seizure or transfer of frozen Russian central bank, National Wealth Fund, or Russian Ministry of Finance assets to benefit Ukraine.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) finalized amendments to its Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) regulation at 15 CFR Part 700, originally proposed February 7, 2024. The final rule clarifies long-standing standards and procedures by which BIS provides Special Priorities Assistance (SPA) under the Defense Production Act of 1950, revises Schedule I to delineate Department of Commerce DPAS jurisdiction from other agencies' priority-rating authorities, and applies non-substantive technical edits reflecting updates since the regulation was last amended in 2014. The rule takes effect August 21, 2024.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (FR Doc. 2024-15810) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) so that certain "releases" of technology and software during "standards-related activities" are no longer subject to the EAR. The rule revises 15 CFR §734.10 and consolidates the patchwork of prior carve-outs (May 2019 Huawei 5G TGL, June 2020 IFR, September 2022 Entity-List-wide IFR) into a single activity-based exclusion. The change enables US firms to participate in international standards bodies (IEEE, 3GPP, ITU, ISO, IEC) alongside Entity-Listed parties — most consequentially Huawei — without licence exposure. Comments were due September 16, 2024.

The Department of Commerce published a final rule redesignating the regulations implementing Executive Order 13873 (Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain) from 15 CFR subtitle A, part 7 (Office of the Secretary of Commerce) to 15 CFR subtitle B, chapter VII, part 791, under the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The redesignation reflects the formal transfer of ICTS-transaction review authority from the Secretary of Commerce to BIS's new Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS). The rule is non-substantive — it relocates the existing regulatory text without altering the scope of covered ICTS transactions, the foreign-adversary list, the review procedures, or any substantive obligations on parties. Effective on publication (18 July 2024) without notice and comment because it is an internal agency reorganization.

President Lukashenko signed Decree No. 278 on 10 July 2024, extending the prohibitive import customs duty regime established under Decree No. 16 (12 January 2024) through 30 June 2025, preventing its lapse at year-end 2024. The decree also expands the commodity list subject to elevated import duty rates. The measure explicitly frames the duties as retaliatory, targeting goods originating from states designated as "unfriendly" to Belarus — principally EU member states, the US, UK, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and other sanctioning jurisdictions. Co-ordinated with Russia's EAEU parallel-import framework (Resolution No. 506), the regime affects the cost arithmetic for sanctioned-goods routing through EAEU customs-union channels and signals continued institutionalisation of Belarus's counter-sanctions architecture.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 55033; FR Doc 2024-14635) added six entries to the Entity List under the destinations of the People's Republic of China (2), South Africa (1), the United Arab Emirates (2), and the United Kingdom (1). The two PRC-based entries (Global Training Solutions Limited; Smartech Future Limited) were added for ties to an existing Entity List party and for training elements of the PRC military. The two UAE-based entries (Mega Fast Cargo LLC; Mega Technique General Trading) were added for repeated dilatory or evasive conduct during BIS end-use checks, including the provision of false, misleading, or incomplete information. The South Africa and United Kingdom entries were added for shipping or attempting to ship US export-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy of presumption of denial. The rule is effective on publication, 2024-07-03.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 8. Additions are under five destinations: China (8), Türkiye (2), Cyprus (1), Kyrgyzstan (1), and the United Arab Emirates (1). Removals span China (6), UAE (1) and Russia (1). The single Russian entry (EFO Ltd.) was removed from the UVL because BIS simultaneously moved it to the Entity List, allowing BIS to delete Russia entirely as a UVL destination. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting items subject to the EAR. Published and effective the same day, 3 July 2024 (89 FR 55036, FR Doc 2024-14642).

FinCEN issued a final rule under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (31 U.S.C. § 5318A) prohibiting US covered financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent account for, or on behalf of, Iraq-based Al-Huda Bank, a foreign financial institution found to be of primary money-laundering concern. Treasury determined that Al-Huda Bank exploited its access to US dollars to support designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations including Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-Quds Force, as well as Iran-aligned Iraqi militias Kata'ib Hizballah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. The rule also imposes a special-due-diligence requirement on US covered institutions to guard against indirect access via foreign correspondent accounts. Published in the Federal Register on July 3, 2024; effective August 2, 2024.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding three Kaspersky entities to the Entity List under End-User Review Committee (ERC) determinations — AO Kaspersky Lab (Moscow), OOO Kaspersky Group (Moscow), and Kaspersky Labs Limited (London). All three are designated for cooperation with Russian military and intelligence authorities in support of Russian government cyber-intelligence objectives. Exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of all items subject to the EAR to the three entities now require a BIS licence reviewed under a policy of presumption of denial, with no licence exceptions available. The action is paired with a same-week Commerce ICTS final determination prohibiting Kaspersky cybersecurity and anti-virus software transactions in the United States.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-13148, 89 FR 51644, RIN 0694-AJ87) expanding the Export Administration Regulations' Russia and Belarus sanctions architecture. Effective 12 June 2024 (most provisions) and 16 September 2024 (the EAR99 enterprise-software paragraph at §746.8(a)(8)), the rule introduces a new licence requirement for thirteen named categories of EAR99 enterprise software (ERP, CRM, BI, SCM, EDW, CMMS, project management, PLM, BIM, CAD, CAM, ETO) destined for Russia or Belarus; permits address-only Entity List designations to capture high-diversion addresses; adds eight Hong Kong addresses to the Entity List; and refines the Russia/Belarus Industry Sector Sanctions and Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule. Released the day before the G7 Italy summit alongside coordinated OFAC, State, and Treasury actions that together designated 300+ persons and entities.

OFAC final rule (FR Doc 2024-11618, 89 FR 46518) amending the Cuban Assets Control Regulations at 31 CFR Part 515 to further implement the May 2022 Biden administration policy of expanded support for the Cuban people. The rule reinstates the "U-turn" general license (authorizing US banks to process funds transfers that originate and terminate outside the US, neither originator nor beneficiary a US person); replaces "self-employed individual" with the broader "independent private sector entrepreneur" (covering Cuban private businesses up to 100 employees, including private cooperatives); authorizes Cuban nationals in the private sector and located in Cuba to open and operate accounts at US financial institutions (including via online/mobile banking); and expands authorizations for internet-based services to support Cuban civil society and private-sector entrepreneurs. Effective 29 May 2024.

Presidential Decree No. 442 of 23 May 2024 establishes a special judicial-administrative procedure by which the Russian Federation or the Central Bank of the Russian Federation can claim, before a Russian court, that an "unjustified deprivation" of Russian sovereign property has been effected by a state body or judicial authority of the United States — and, on a court finding to that effect, receive equivalent-value US-affiliated property located in Russia (real assets, securities issued by Russian companies, cash held in Russian bank accounts, and other property rights) by way of compensation. The mechanism is an explicit reciprocal counter-instrument to the US REPO for Ukrainians Act (Title II of H.R.815, signed 24 April 2024) authorising US executive confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets in US jurisdiction. The decree is structurally extensible: by separate presidential decision, the same procedure may be applied to any other state Russia designates as "unfriendly". Implementing procedural acts and amendments to Russian legislation were required to be adopted by 23 September 2024.

The Bureau of Industry and Security finalized a rule (BIS-2024-0035; 89 FR 43740) amending the administrative exclusion-request process under the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs originally imposed in 2018. The rule removes 12 General Approved Exclusions (six for steel, six for aluminum) that had been in place since the December 2020 GAE rule and modifies procedures across five prior BIS interim final rules implementing the exclusion process. The changes were published on May 20, 2024 and take effect July 1, 2024, tightening the channel by which US importers can obtain product-level relief from the underlying 25% steel / 10% aluminum duties.