Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

Poland's Centre for EU Transport Projects (CUPT), acting under State aid scheme SA.114259 cleared by the European Commission on 8 October 2024, signed co-financing agreements worth EUR 47.2 million (part of a PLN 482 million / ~85%-intensity aid envelope) to install ERTMS Baseline 3 Release 2-or-higher train-control equipment on new and modernised railway rolling stock. The scheme is financed under Poland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (KPO) and covers up to 85% of eligible ERTMS equipment and retrofit costs for rail vehicle owners/operators bringing rolling stock into line with EU rail-interoperability rules.

Poland's Sejm adopted on 25 July 2025 — and the President signed on 5 August 2025 (Dz.U. 2025 poz. 1080, in force 7 September 2025) — a Special Act on Strategic Investments in the Field of National Defence and Public Security that creates an accelerated authorisation track for defence and public- security infrastructure projects: a single combined administrative decision issued within 90 days of application, simplified notification regime inside closed military zones, replacement of full environmental and water-law assessments with targeted mitigation, and an exemption from the Public Procurement Law for Ministry-of-National-Defence-cleared unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned weapon platforms and counter-drone systems. The statute is the procedural backbone for Poland's PLN 187bn 2025 defence budget (≈4.7% of GDP, the highest share in NATO) and dovetails with Poland's €43.7bn EU SAFE defence-loan allocation signed in May 2026.

The Polish Sejm passed the Act of 9 July 2025 amending the Act of 24 July 2015 on the Control of Certain Investments, signed by the President on 21 July 2025 and effective 24 July 2025. The amendment removes the time-limited "Specialised Rules" tier (introduced in 2020 under the Anti-COVID Shield) and makes Poland's FDI screening regime permanent. Review competence is transferred from the President of UOKiK (the competition authority) to the minister responsible for economic affairs (currently the Minister of Finance and Economy), and a new trigger covering "an international situation distorting the market or competition" is added alongside the existing public-order, security and health grounds.

Poland's Ministry of Climate and Environment published draft Act UC83 on 14 April 2025, the national implementing legislation for EU Regulation 2024/1252 (Critical Raw Materials Act). The draft establishes a single contact point for strategic projects, a registry of strategic projects, a National Programme for Searching Critical Raw Materials, and a supply-chain risk monitoring system obligating the Council of Ministers to maintain and update a State Raw Materials Policy. As of March 2026 the act remains in pre-adoption draft status (version 3.0 published 4 March 2026); planned Council of Ministers adoption was Q4 2025 and has slipped.

Poland's Ministry of Digital Affairs published the final "Polska w grze o przyszłość — polityka dla sektora półprzewodników 2025+" (Poland in the Game for the Future — Semiconductor Sector Policy 2025+) in mid-June 2025 following public consultations (6 February – 4 March 2025, 38 entities, 356 proposals reviewed). The seven-pillar national strategic framework targets 2–3 large industrial semiconductor investments by 2030 with added value €300–600 M each, focused on back-end production (assembly, test, packaging) and materials. Three specialised semiconductor parks are proposed: Mazovia (chip design), Lower Silesia (materials manufacturing), and Pomerania (sensor technologies). The policy operationalises Poland's positioning as a back-end semiconductor destination and materials-supply hub within the EU Chips Act ecosystem, sitting inside the broader "National Framework for Supporting Strategic Semiconductor Investments" programme (>PLN 7 bn through 2026, adopted December 2023).

Poland's Minister of Development and Technology, Waldemar Buda, established a temporary compulsory administrator (tymczasowy zarządca przymusowy) over the Grupa Azoty S.A. shares held by sanctioned Russian oligarch Vyacheslav Kantor through three holding vehicles — Norica Holding S.à r.l. (Luxembourg), Opansa Enterprises Limited and Rainbee Holdings Limited (both Cyprus) — which together controlled 19.82% of the state-linked fertiliser and chemicals group, worth over PLN 0.5bn. The ministry cited Kantor's inclusion on Poland's sanctions list and the protection of the country's economic and energy security, and stated its intent to find a buyer for the stake and compensate Kantor. The Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw (WSA) later overturned the decision establishing the administration; the ministry did not appeal, and the ruling became final around 30 July 2024, ending the administrator's mandate — though the underlying EU/Polish sanctions on Kantor continue to freeze his ability to exercise any rights attached to the shares.