Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

The New Development Bank (NDB), the multilateral development bank founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, approved an RMB 1.4 billion (approximately USD 196.9 million / BRL 1.07 billion) non-sovereign loan to China Three Gorges Brasil Energia S.A. (CTG Brasil) to finance construction of the Serra da Palmeira wind power project, a 648 MW facility with 108 turbines across the State of Paraíba, northeastern Brazil. The project, whose total cost is approximately BRL 4.33 billion, uses turbines supplied by China's Goldwind Science & Technology. NDB development-bank financing at preferential rates functions as a below-market subsidy to CTG Brasil's Brazilian renewable-generation buildout.

On 17 September 2025 the US Department of Commerce, through BIS, published an interim final rule (90 FR 44767, FR Doc 2025-18015) formally adopting the procedures by which additional automobile parts articles may be added to the scope of the Section 232 25% tariff on automobiles and automobile parts originally imposed by Proclamation 10908 (26 March 2025). The rule, required by the Proclamation to be established within 90 days, codifies four recurring two-week submission windows each year (opening on the first day of January, April, July and October) for inclusion petitions, and obliges the International Trade Administration to issue a public determination memorandum within 60 days of the close of each window. Comments on the interim final rule were due by 3 November 2025; the first inclusions window under the rule opened on 1 April 2026.

Republic Act 12253, signed by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. on 4 September 2025, replaces the Philippines' long-standing flat-royalty regime for large-scale metallic mining with a five-tier margin-based royalty (1–5% on income from mines outside mineral reservations; 5% retained inside reservations) layered on a five-tier windfall-profits tax (1–10% on profits above a 30% margin), and ring-fences each mining agreement as a separate taxable entity. The law amends the National Internal Revenue Code (RA 8424) and is projected to raise an additional PHP 25.08 bn over 2026–2029. The new fiscal regime became operative on 17 February 2026, 150 days after effectivity, with DOF-issued IRR.

On 29 August 2025 Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced a five-part support package for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and suppliers affected by the discontinuation of vehicle production at Nissan's Oppama plant (Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture). The package establishes special consultation windows across Kanagawa financial and business-support institutions, relaxes eligibility for government safety-net loans and loan guarantees for affected firms, extends advisory/matching support to auto-parts suppliers via the "Mikata Project," and grants priority review for affected applicants to two existing subsidy schemes (Monozukuri and New Business Expansion subsidies). No aggregate budget or per-firm monetary cap is disclosed in the primary release.

Argentina's Ministry of Economy issued Resolución 1254/2025 (Boletín Oficial, 27 August 2025) approving the adhesion of Generación Eléctrica Argentina Renovable I SA's dedicated branch ("GEAR I SDE") to the Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones (RIGI) under Law 27.742, for the 180 MW "P.E. Olavarría" wind farm in Olavarría, Buenos Aires province. The declared total investment is USD 275.59 million (USD 255.11 million in computable assets), granting the project RIGI's 30-year tax, customs and FX-stability package. GEAR I SDE's accession dates to 25 July 2025; it must reach 40% of the minimum qualifying investment within two years and complete the minimum by 30 November 2027. The plant is designed to supply ArcelorMittal Acindar's Argentine steel plants directly rather than to export power, substituting an estimated 20% of national electricity consumption equivalent for the offtaker and qualifying for import-tariff relief on capital goods under Law 27.742 Article 190.

On 27 August 2025 the Royal Government of Cambodia issued Sub-Decree No. 161, amending Annex II (List of Categorization of Investment Activities) of Sub-Decree No. 139 of 26 June 2023 — the principal implementing decree of the 2021 Law on Investment (Royal Kram NS/RKM/1021/014). The amendment reclassifies investment activities in the production of electricity generated from renewable energy from Group 2 (medium-technology investment activities) to Group 1 (priority-sector investment activities), the highest-tier category under Cambodia's CDC-administered Qualified Investment Project (QIP) route. Group 1 elevation entitles qualifying RE-generation projects to a nine-year corporate income tax holiday (the maximum under the Annex IV incentive matrix), full customs-duty exemption on imports of construction materials, production equipment, and production inputs, priority-sector premiums, accelerated CDC investment-licence processing, and Special Economic Zone overlays where applicable. The reclassification reflects Cambodia's Cambodia Power Development Master Plan 2022-2040, which targets 70% renewable energy in the national power mix by 2030. Sub-Decree 161 is the foundational KH-issuer post-2021 Investment Law implementing decree for the RE sector, providing the regulatory anchor for project bankability assessments under Cambodia's evolving competitive-auction (post-feed-in-tariff) pricing regime being structured by the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Electricity Authority of Cambodia (EAC). It brings Cambodia into alignment with parallel ASEAN investment-incentive-amendment instruments in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

FinCEN published an order amending the three June 25, 2025 special-measure orders (as previously amended by the July 11, 2025 order, FR doc 2025-12973) prohibiting US covered financial institutions from transmitting funds to or from CIBanco S.A., Intercam Banco S.A., and Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. — three Mexican institutions designated of primary money-laundering concern in connection with illicit-opioid trafficking under Section 2313a of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. The amendment extends the effective date of all three prohibitions from September 4, 2025 to October 20, 2025, granting US covered institutions an additional ~46 days to wind down correspondent exposures. The underlying primary-money-laundering-concern findings remain intact — only the implementation deadline shifts.

Banque des Territoires, acting on behalf of the French State under the France 2030 programme, launched a EUR 500 million fund-of-funds called "Global Tech Coté" on 7 August 2025. The vehicle takes minority stakes (EUR 15 million minimum, capped at 10% of a target fund's subscribed capital) in privately-managed investment funds that in turn back publicly-listed French technology companies with strong growth potential, aiming to build up domestic asset-management capacity alongside the state's stated goal of channelling capital into equities. The selection window for management companies runs until 31 December 2026 or until the EUR 500 million envelope is exhausted, whichever comes first.

The European Commission approved an EUR 11 billion French State aid scheme to support the construction and operation of three floating offshore wind farms with a combined capacity of roughly 1.5 GW — one off the coast of Southern Brittany and two in the Mediterranean Sea. The scheme, cleared under the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF) adopted by the Commission in June 2025, will run for 20 years and forms part of France's push to meet its offshore wind build-out targets under the Clean Industrial Deal. Support is delivered via a contracts-for-difference mechanism that guarantees generators a strike price against wholesale power prices.

The California Energy Commission, via its Clean Transportation Program and the state's Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, opened a USD 55 million incentive window under the California Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Project (CALeVIP) "Fast Charge California Project." The program funds up to 100% of direct-current fast-charger installation costs statewide, at USD 55,000 per port for 150-274.99 kW chargers and USD 100,000 per port for chargers over 275 kW, with priority given to tribal, disadvantaged, and low-income communities. Applications closed October 29, 2025; the window built on the CALeVIP program's first Fast Charge California window, which had already awarded roughly USD 54 million toward more than 1,200 fast-charging ports across 35 counties.

On 31 July 2025 Israel's Investment and Industrial and Economic Development Authority (part of the Ministry of Economy and Industry) published Director General's Order 4.82, opening an ILS ~300 million (~$81m) grant channel to help industrial facilities convert fuel/electricity consumption systems and improve energy efficiency, in order to cut greenhouse-gas emissions. Support covers up to 40% of qualifying investment (50% for small applicants), with a bonus for projects that also handle regulated refrigerants during equipment scrapping. The application window closed 15 September 2025.

On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

KfW IPEX-Bank, the project- and export-finance arm of Germany's state-owned development bank KfW, announced on 17 July 2025 that it is acting as sole lender for a EUR 69 million financing package for two onshore wind farms (126 MW combined) developed by Turkish independent power producer Eksim Enerji in the Karaman and Yozgat regions, under Türkiye's YEKA-3 renewable-energy auction. The 18 wind turbines are supplied and installed by German manufacturer Nordex, and the loan is covered by the German government via export credit agency Euler Hermes. Global Trade Alert separately logs the transaction as an "amber"-flagged local-value-added-incentive intervention (state act 92701 / intervention 147849).

On 15 July 2025 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated a Section 301 investigation into six categories of Brazilian "acts, policies, and practices" alleged to be unreasonable or discriminatory and to burden US commerce: (1) digital trade and electronic payment services (specifically the Banco Central do Brasil's operation of the Pix instant-payments system, alleged to disadvantage US payment providers); (2) unfair, preferential tariffs (Brazil's preferential tariff treatment for selected partners that excludes US exports); (3) anti-corruption enforcement (alleged interference with US-linked enforcement matters); (4) intellectual property protection (insufficient enforcement against piracy and counterfeiting); (5) ethanol market access (Brazil's reversal of near-zero ethanol tariffs imposed during the 2017-2024 window); and (6) illegal deforestation (the trade-distorting effect of unenforced environmental rules on Brazilian commodity exports). The Federal Register notice (USTR-2025-0043, FR doc 2025-13498) published on 18 July 2025 set written-comment and hearing-request deadlines for 18 August 2025 and a public hearing for 3 September 2025 at the US International Trade Commission. A determination on whether Brazil's practices are actionable, and what remedies (including retaliatory tariffs, withdrawal of trade concessions, or formal WTO action) USTR will pursue, is statutorily due within 12 months of initiation — i.e. by 15 July 2026.

Argentina's Ministry of Economy issued Resolución 938/2025, amending Resolución 256/2000, the import-duty regime for capital goods that constitute large industrial investment projects. The amendment adds electric-energy-generation projects to the regime's eligible activities (previously limited to production lines), cuts the mandatory local-content purchase requirement to 10% of imports' total FOB value, extends the compliance window to one year after project approval, shortens the mandatory asset-holding period to 12 months after startup (or until guarantee release, whichever is first), and pushes the accounting/closeout deadline for pre-Dec-18-2024 pending projects to December 31, 2026. The measure took effect the day after its July 11, 2025 publication in the Boletín Oficial.

UK Export Finance (UKEF) issued a EUR 146 million (USD ~170m) Buyer Credit Guarantee to support Orsted's Greater Changhua 2 offshore wind farm off Taiwan (632 MW capacity), co-financed alongside export credit agencies from Denmark, Norway, South Korea and Taiwan and a 25-bank commercial syndicate led by Credit Agricole CIB. The guarantee is conditioned on the project procuring specialised services and components from named UK exporters (Cadeler, CRP Subsea, Ordtek, Cathie), making it a local-value-added-linked export-credit instrument rather than untied project finance.

FinCEN published an order amending the three June 25, 2025 special-measure orders (FR docs 2025-11991, 2025-11993, 2025-11990; 90 FR 27770 et seq.) prohibiting US covered financial institutions from transmitting funds to or from CIBanco S.A., Intercam Banco S.A., and Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. — three Mexican institutions designated of primary money-laundering concern in connection with illicit-opioid trafficking under Section 2313a of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. This first extension shifts the effective date of all three prohibitions from July 21, 2025 to September 4, 2025 (a 45-day delay), giving US covered institutions additional time to wind down correspondent exposures. The underlying primary-money-laundering- concern findings remain unchanged — only the implementation deadline shifts.

On 2025-07-08 President Trump issued a Section 721 (Defense Production Act) order retroactively prohibiting Hong Kong-based Suirui International Co., Ltd.'s 2020 acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC, a US video-wall and audio-visual technology maker, from Foxconn. CFIUS found the transaction posed a national security risk because a Chinese military company holds an indirect interest in Suirui Group and can appoint one of its directors, creating a risk that Jupiter's products — used in military and critical- infrastructure environments — could be compromised. The order requires Suirui to fully divest all interests and rights in Jupiter within 120 days of the order (extendable at CFIUS's discretion) and bars Jupiter from holding interests in Suirui-linked Asian subsidiaries formed after the 2020 deal.

Vietnam's government issued Decree 199/2025/NĐ-CP on 8 July 2025, amending Decree 26/2023/NĐ-CP's Export Tariff and Preferential Import Tariff Schedules. The headline change is a staged export-tax increase on yellow phosphorus, from 5% currently to 10% effective 1 January 2026 and 15% effective 1 January 2027 — a resource-nationalism measure to discourage raw export of an input used in electronics, agrochemical, and specialty- chemical production. The decree also narrows the 0% preferential import tariff window for tin-mill blackplate (TMBP) steel to end-August 2025 and adjusts minimum-production-volume conditions for the auto-parts tariff incentive programme covering electric, hybrid, and fuel-cell vehicle manufacturing/assembly.

H.R.1, the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" (Public Law 119-21), was signed into law by President Trump on 4 July 2025. The budget-reconciliation statute is the single largest reversal of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) industrial-policy framework: it accelerates the termination of IRA-era clean- energy tax credits and overlays a new "Foreign Entity of Concern" (FEOC) / "Prohibited Foreign Entity" (PFE) regime on the credits that survive. The §25E used-EV credit, the §30D new clean-vehicle credit, the §45W commercial clean-vehicle credit, and the §30C alternative-fuel-refueling-property credit terminate for vehicles or property placed in service after 30 September 2025. The §25C energy-efficient home improvement credit and the §25D residential clean-energy credit terminate for property placed in service after 31 December 2025. The §45Y clean-electricity production credit and §48E clean-electricity investment credit are eliminated for wind and solar facilities placed in service after 31 December 2027, with a safe harbour for projects whose construction begins on or before 4 July 2026. From 1 January 2026, projects beginning construction must satisfy "material assistance" thresholds limiting the share of components, subcomponents and critical minerals sourced from prohibited foreign entities (PRC, Russia, Iran, DPRK and entities controlled by them). For §45Y/§48E facilities the threshold starts at 40% non-PFE content in 2026 and steps up by 5 percentage points per year through 2030; for §45X advanced manufacturing PTC the analogous schedule begins at 50% in 2026 and rises through the decade. CBO scored the package's energy-credit terminations as generating roughly USD 280bn of revenue (gross), of which USD 77.4bn from §25D termination, USD 21.2bn from §25C, USD 77.8bn from §30D, USD 104.5bn from §45W, and USD 2bn from §30C, partially offsetting the bill's other tax cuts. The bill simultaneously re-authorises and broadens the §48D advanced manufacturing investment tax credit for semiconductor fabs, raising the credit rate from 25% to 35% for property placed in service after 31 December 2025 (preserving the CHIPS Act-aligned semiconductor leg of the IRA-era stack). The OBBBA therefore reshapes the IRA from a broad-based clean-energy + EV + manufacturing pull-through into a narrower, China-decoupling industrial policy concentrated on semiconductors and (residually) §45X battery / critical- mineral processing.

On June 27, 2025, the Government of Canada, by the Governor in Council, ordered Hikvision Canada Inc. — the Canadian subsidiary of Chinese video-surveillance manufacturer Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co. — to wind up its Canadian business and cease all operations within 120 days, following a national security review under the Investment Canada Act. The order requires Hikvision Canada to immediately stop sales, marketing and after-sales support, and to terminate staff and contracts within the wind-up window. Alongside the order, the government prohibited federal departments, agencies and Crown corporations from purchasing or using Hikvision products and directed audits to remove existing installations from federal facilities.

South African Cabinet on 25 June 2025 approved a three-part package to revitalise the domestic ferrochrome sector: (i) placement of chrome ore under export control via the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) under the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002, requiring an export permit prior to dispatch; (ii) initiation of work on a chrome ore export tax (rate not finalised; market reporting cites 25%); (iii) expanded SEZ incentives for ferrochrome smelters and a negotiated electricity- tariff relief mechanism. The DTIC notice formally placing chrome ore under export control was published in Government Gazette No. 53477 General Notice 6712 on 3 October 2025 with a 30-day public-comment window closing 31 October 2025; the final permit regime takes effect upon subsequent ministerial gazette notice. South Africa accounts for >70% of seaborne chrome ore exports, so the regime is globally material to stainless-steel supply chains.

The Canada Infrastructure Bank committed CAD 108.3 million (approx. USD 78.9 million) to the 102.2-megawatt Mesgi'g Ugju's'n 2 (MU2) wind farm in the Gespe'gewa'gi (Gaspesie-Iles-de-la-Madeleine) region of Quebec. The financing comprises a CAD 15.8 million equity loan to the Mi'gmawei Mawiomi Business Corporation (MMBC) — CIB's first Indigenous equity loan in Quebec — and a CAD 92.5 million construction loan for the project as a whole. MU2 is a partnership between MMBC, representing the Gesgapegiag, Gespeg and Listuguj Mi'gmaq communities, and Innergex Renewable Energy Inc., with a 30-year power purchase agreement with Hydro-Quebec.

The Canada Infrastructure Bank closed a CAD 97 million (approx. USD 70.7 million) loan to finance the 84-megawatt Wedgeport Wind project in the Municipal District of Argyle, Nova Scotia. The project is a partnership between Elemental Energy, Stevens Wind and Sipekne'katik First Nation (SFN), and comprises 12 Nordex seven-megawatt turbines built under Nova Scotia's Rate Based Procurement process. It is CIB's second partnership with Elemental Energy and SFN following an earlier Nova Scotia wind deal.

UK Export Finance (UKEF) approved export credit support with a maximum liability of approximately GBP 245 million (USD ~333m) for Cathay Wind Power Co Ltd, borrower for the Greater Changhua 4 (Northwest) offshore wind farm off Taiwan's western coast (42 x 14MW turbines, 583MW grid capacity; project company Greater Changhua Offshore Wind Farm NW Ltd, jointly owned by Orsted Wind Power TW Holdings A/S and Cathay Wind Power Co Ltd). The support covers construction services and equipment, with UK content supplied by Seajacks (installation vessel charter) and CRP Subsea (cabling), making it a local-value-added-linked export-credit instrument rather than untied project finance.

On 30 May 2025, South Africa's Minister of Electricity and Energy, Dr Kgosientsho Ramokgopa, announced five preferred bidders under Bid Window 3 of the Battery Energy Storage Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (BESIPPPP), covering up to 616 MW/2,464 MWh of battery storage capacity across five sites in the Free State supply area, representing R9.5 billion in investment. Award of preferred-bidder status is conditioned on binding local-content and economic-empowerment requirements: minimum 40% black shareholding in each IPP project company, up to 30% black shareholding by construction contractors (up to 42% in operations), over R3.7 billion in local content spend during construction and operations, and R184 million ring-fenced for supplier development and skills training. Reuters/industry reporting identifies Mulilo (four sites) and Scatec of Norway (one site) as the winning IPPs.

Brazil's Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Gecex) approved Resolução nº 736, de 28 de maio de 2025, published in the Diário Oficial da União (Edição 100, 29 May 2025, Seção 1, página 7), amending Annexes II, V and VI of the base tariff-nomenclature resolution (Gecex nº 272/2021). The measure raises the import tariff on wind turbines (NCM 8502.31.00) and modifies an existing tariff-rate quota, while also adjusting duty treatment for x-ray machines and other product lines under the same annexes. It took effect 1 January 2026. Global Trade Alert identifies China and the United States as the principal trading partners affected based on historical import-origin patterns for the covered lines.

On 23 May 2025, the European Investment Bank (EIB) signed an agreement to provide EUR 700 million (EUR 350 million per project) for the construction of the Bałtyk 2 and Bałtyk 3 offshore wind farms in the Polish Baltic Sea, developed by a joint venture between Norway's Equinor and Poland's Polenergia. The twin fixed-bottom farms, located roughly 30 km off Ustka and Łeba, will have a combined capacity of 1.44 GW (100 turbines of 14.4 MW each) and are expected online in 2028, producing enough power for two million households. The EIB is the largest of roughly 30 lenders in the financing package and describes it as its third major renewables investment in Poland in 2025 and third Baltic Sea offshore-wind financing overall. Global Trade Alert logs the loan as a "red" state-loan intervention on the grounds that EIB multilateral financing to a named commercial joint venture constitutes below-market state-linked support.

The Asian Development Bank signed a USD 55 million (CNY-equivalent) loan with Huaneng Tiancheng Financial Leasing Co Ltd (HTFL), a PRC financial leasing subsidiary of the Huaneng Group specializing in renewable-energy asset finance, to expand leasing capacity for distributed wind energy (DWE) developers across China. Global Trade Alert logs the transaction as a "red" (certainly harmful) state-linked lending-support intervention on the standard grounds that below-market multilateral development-bank financing to a named PRC commercial lessor is a potential trade- and competition-distorting subsidy. ADB frames the loan around China's "dual carbon" goals (peak emissions before 2030, carbon neutrality by 2060), targeting the financing gap private DWE developers face in securing long-term capital for smaller, localized wind projects closer to demand centers rather than large grid-scale wind farms.

South African Cabinet on 20 May 2025 approved the publication of the Draft Mineral Resources Development Bill (MRDB) 2025, gazetted by Minister of Mineral and Petroleum Resources Gwede Mantashe to amend the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA). The Bill streamlines mining-rights administration by aligning with NEMA and the National Water Act, introduces a new licensing regime for artisanal and small-scale mining, and acts as the legislative implementing instrument for the Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy approved at the same Cabinet sitting. Public-comment window ran through 13 August 2025; the Bill has not yet been enacted.

The Bureau of Industry and Security issued an interim final rule ("Adoption and Procedures of the Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariff Inclusions Process," 90 FR 18780, RIN 0694-AK13) adopting the procedural framework directed by Proclamations 10895 and 10896 of 10 February 2025 for adding derivative steel and aluminum articles to the scope of the 25% Section 232 duties. Eligible US producers and industry associations may submit inclusion requests during three two-week windows per year (opening in May, September and January); BIS evaluates each request on a sixty-day clock and publishes a determination memorandum granting or denying inclusion. The rule replaces the legacy product-exclusions architecture with a domestic-producer-driven inclusions architecture, structurally expanding the perimeter of covered tariff lines over time.

Hydrom launched Round 3 of Oman's green hydrogen land auction on 30 April 2025, offering a flexible Duqm land block of up to 300 km² with a minimum project footprint of 100 km². A 9-month preparation window runs from the RFQ release (30 April 2025) to proposal submission in early 2026, with project awards to follow. Developers may explore selling surplus renewable electricity to the national grid, and will access the planned 2,000-km hydrogen pipeline and a liquid hydrogen export corridor linking Duqm to the Netherlands and Germany. Round 3 is an implementing-auction instrument within the umbrella 2024 Oman Green Hydrogen Strategy; the two prior rounds have already secured USD 49 bn in investment commitments and more than 1 Mtpa of green hydrogen production capacity by 2030 from more than 30 GW of dedicated renewables.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs announced on 4 April 2025 export licensing requirements on seven medium and heavy rare-earth elements: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium. Exporters must apply for individual licences citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The announcement came two days after the 2 April Trump reciprocal-tariff package and was widely interpreted as a proportional response. Unlike the December 2024 Ga/Ge/Sb ban this is not US-specific on its face — but in practice licence approvals through April-June 2025 were heavily skewed away from US-bound shipments.

Ghana's Parliament passed the Ghana Gold Board Act, 2025 (Act 1140) on 29 March 2025; presidential assent followed on 2 April 2025, with full operational effect from 1 May 2025. The Act repeals PNDCL 219 (1989) and establishes the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) as the sole statutory licensor and exclusive primary buyer, seller, assayer, grader, weigher and exporter of all gold produced by the country's licensed Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) sector. Large-scale mining operations remain outside the monopsony. Effective 1 May 2025, no person other than GoldBod may export ASM gold from Ghana, and all gold trading and marketing businesses must hold a GoldBod licence (application window for Ghanaian-owned firms opened 22 April 2025). Proceeds from all ASM gold exports settle through the Bank of Ghana, channelling foreign-exchange flows from roughly 30% of national gold output — Ghana is the world's #6 producer and Africa's largest — into formal central-bank reserves. The stated objectives are to combat smuggling, capture the smuggling-loss premium for the state, support Bank of Ghana gold-reserves accumulation, and generate foreign exchange. The Act sits alongside the Bank of Ghana's Domestic Gold Purchase Programme as the legal infrastructure for Ghana's gold-as-reserve-asset strategy.

Norway's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet) submitted Meld. St. 16 (2024-2025) — "The Norwegian industry – competitiveness for a new time" — to the Storting on 28 March 2025 under Minister Cecilie Myrseth. The White Paper is Norway's first comprehensive industrial-policy framework in over a decade and sets out six political priorities: (i) access to clean and affordable energy via hydropower, offshore wind and green hydrogen; (ii) high-quality workforce with dual apprenticeship and digital-skills tracks; (iii) accelerating innovation and technology through R&D investment and stronger research-institute-to-business linkages; (iv) emission reduction across industrial sectors; (v) expanding international market access and reshaping Norway's position in the extended European value chain; and (vi) strategic and critical value-chain mapping, paralleled by a simultaneously launched cross-government mapping initiative. The White Paper is a non-binding policy framework but is the framing instrument under which sector-specific measures (CRMA-aligned mineral support, hydrogen funding, offshore-wind capacity build-out) will be sequenced.

OFSI imposed a £465,000 civil monetary penalty on Herbert Smith Freehills CIS LLP (the firm's Moscow subsidiary, "HSF Moscow") for six payments totalling £3,932,392.10 made to three Russia-designated persons — Alfa-Bank JSC, PJSC Sovcombank, and PJSC Sberbank — during the wind-down of the Moscow office in May 2022, in breach of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The penalty is the first OFSI enforcement action against the legal-services sector and the first against a Big Law firm; OFSI signalled further professional-services enforcement is in the pipeline. HSF London's voluntary disclosure and full cooperation secured a 50% penalty reduction from an initial £930,000 basis.

The European Commission adopted Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/501 on 18 March 2025, imposing definitive five-year anti-dumping duties on imports of continuous filament glass fibre yarns originating in China, published in the OJ on 19 March 2025. Duty rates are differentiated by Chinese exporter across the range 26.3%–56.1%, covering CN codes ex 7019 13 00 and ex 7019 19 00 (TARIC level). The measure follows a DG TRADE investigation finding dumped Chinese imports causing material injury to EU producers, directly protecting an estimated 1,200 EU jobs in the glass fibre sector.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 of 14 April 2025, adopted under Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 (the EU enforcement regulation for international trade rights), reinstates the EU's 2018 and 2020 commercial rebalancing measures against the United States and adds new countermeasures in response to the second Trump administration's 10 February 2025 Section 232 proclamations, which restored a universal 25% tariff on steel imports and raised the aluminium tariff to 25% effective 12 March 2025 (filed as 2025-02-11-us-section-232-steel-aluminum-global-tariff-reinstatement). The combined package targets approximately €26 billion of EU imports from the United States — matching the scope of US measures affecting EU exports — and combines the reinstatement of pre-existing duties on a first tranche of products (steel, aluminium, agricultural goods, motorcycles, and other industrial items originally subject to the 2018 and 2020 lists) with new duties on roughly €18 billion of additional US-origin goods spanning poultry, beef, certain seafood, nuts, eggs, dairy, sugar and vegetables on the agricultural side, and steel, aluminium, textiles, leather, appliances, plastics and wood products on the industrial side. Tariff rates layer onto MFN duties at up to 50% for some products, mirroring the structure of the 2018 measures. On the same day the Commission published Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/786, which suspends application of Articles 2 and 3 of 2025/778 for 90 days, until 14 July 2025, to allow space for bilateral negotiations following the US 9 April 2025 announcement of a 90-day pause on its own reciprocal-tariff regime (2025-04-02-us-trump-reciprocal-tariff-regime). The legal scaffolding therefore exists and is in force, but no duties were collected during the suspension window. This is the first standalone EU rebalancing instrument adopted against the United States in the second Trump administration and the first major use of Reg 654/2014 since the 2018-2020 Section 232 episode.

On 26 February 2025 the European Commission adopted the "Clean Industrial Deal" (CID), Communication COM(2025) 85 final, framed as a joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation. The CID bundles state-aid simplification, energy-cost relief, lead-market creation, capital mobilisation and circular-economy mandates into a single industrial strategy targeting both energy-intensive industries (steel, metals, chemicals, cement) and clean-tech manufacturing (batteries, solar, wind, heat pumps, electrolyzers). The Commission claims the package will mobilise more than €100 billion of public-and-private financing for EU-made clean manufacturing through a strengthened Innovation Fund, amendments to the InvestEU Regulation (up to €50bn additional guarantee capacity) and a proposed Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. CID directly precedes the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF, adopted 25 June 2025) and seeds legislative work on an Industrial Accelerator Act, a Circular Economy Act, and a strengthened CBAM. Severity 4 on mixed basis: explicit €100bn+ quant headline plus qualitative breadth across the EU industrial perimeter, formally re-anchoring the von der Leyen II mandate around competitiveness rather than pure decarbonisation.

On 22 February 2025 the Authority for the Regulation and Control of Strategic Mineral Substance Markets (ARECOMS) of the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued Decision No. 001/ARECOMS/2025 imposing a four-month suspension of all cobalt exports — industrial and artisanal — in response to a multi-year cobalt price collapse driven by structural oversupply from CMOC's Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. The DRC accounts for roughly 70-76% of global mined cobalt, so the ban removed the dominant source of feedstock from the seaborne market. The ban was extended in late June 2025 by another three months, then on 10 October 2025 ARECOMS issued Decision No. 005/ARECOMS/2025 lifting the outright suspension and replacing it with a hard annual export quota: 18,125 t for the November-December 2025 transition window, then 96,600 t per year for 2026 and 2027. The annual ceiling consists of an 87,000 t "base quota" distributed pro-rata using each producer's January 2022 - December 2024 historical export volumes, plus a 9,600 t "strategic quota" allocated at ARECOMS' sole discretion to projects of national strategic importance. Allocations for Q4 2025 went disproportionately to the largest incumbents: CMOC received 6,500 t (Tenke Fungurume + Kisanfu), Glencore 3,925 t (Kamoto + Mutanda), and Eurasian Resources Group 2,125 t (Metalkol). CMOC's award is far below its ~115 kt 2024 production rate, structurally capping the world's top cobalt producer below 30% of its operating capacity. Exporters must obtain a Quota Verification Certificate (AVQ) from ARECOMS, submit to joint sampling, weighing, sealing and physical inspection by multiple government agencies, and prepay the 10% mining royalty within 48 hours of declaring origin and sale. ARECOMS reserves the right to revise quotas quarterly in case of "significant imbalance in the cobalt market," and explicitly retained discretion to re-set 2027 volumes. The measure is the EM resource-nationalism complement to Indonesia's nickel-ore ban template, applied to the single material where one country has the most concentrated global supply share.

Mauritania promulgated Loi n° 2025-006 on 19 February 2025, comprehensively replacing the 2012 Investment Code (Loi n° 2012-052) with a three-tier incentive architecture — a Base Regime (SME + intermediate categories), a Development Poles Regime (designated geographic zones), and a Structuring Investments Regime (large-scale strategic projects above 200M MRU). The law was drafted with IFC/World Bank technical assistance, codifies national-treatment equality between domestic and foreign investors, provides fiscal-customs stability guarantees of up to 20 years, and establishes APIM as a digital single-window authority with ICSID/UNCITRAL arbitration pathways. As of July 2025, 19 projects (≈USD 120M declared investment, 939 estimated direct jobs) had been approved under the new framework.

On 1 February 2025, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced the National Manufacturing Mission (NMM) in the Union Budget 2025-26 as a horizontal umbrella framework extending the 2014 "Make in India" architecture across small, medium and large industries. The mission rests on five focal areas: (i) ease and cost of doing business; (ii) a future-ready workforce for in-demand jobs; (iii) a vibrant and dynamic MSME sector; (iv) availability of technology; and (v) quality manufacturing. It will deliver policy support, execution roadmaps, and a governance/monitoring framework binding central ministries with states. NMM specifically commits to building a clean-tech manufacturing ecosystem with explicit coverage of solar PV cells, EV batteries, motors and controllers, electrolysers, wind turbines, very-high-voltage transmission equipment, and grid-scale batteries — i.e., the full hardware stack for India's Panchamrit (500 GW non-fossil by 2030), FAME-III EV ramp, and National Green Hydrogen Mission. NMM is the first horizontal Indian manufacturing-mission instrument in the IPTM register; existing IND entries are sector-specific PLIs (electronics, batteries, steel, semiconductors) and the National Critical Mineral Mission. Operational rollout flows through subsequent Cabinet-level scheme approvals (e.g. Biopharma SHAKTI ₹10,000 cr, Chemical Parks ₹600 cr in BE 2026-27); the mission itself does not carry a single headline outlay because it is the framework rather than an instrument.

Naalakkersuisut (Government of Greenland), via the Mineral Resources Authority under Minister Naaja H. Nathanielsen, published the Mineral Resources Strategy 2025-2029 in January 2025. The strategy succeeds the 2020-2024 strategy and sets the operational priorities, licensing pipeline and investor-engagement framework for Greenland's mineral sector across the 2025-2029 window. Headline tracks: sustainability (social/environmental/ economic), targeted international marketing and export-import-bank cooperation to mobilise project finance, formal critical-minerals partnerships with the EU and the US (and Nordic regional cooperation), a certification system for small-scale licensees, and expanded geoscientific data availability. The 2021 Inatsisartut Act prohibiting uranium-bearing exploration and exploitation above 100 ppm is preserved.

On 29 January 2025 the Union Cabinet of India approved the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), a seven-year programme running FY2024-25 through FY2030-31 with a headline financial envelope of ₹34,300 crore (≈USD 4.0 bn). The structure is split: ₹16,300 crore of direct government outlay administered by the Ministry of Mines, plus an expected ₹18,000 crore of investment by central public-sector undertakings (PSUs) and other stakeholders. The mission was first announced by the Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2024-25 (23 July 2024) and the Cabinet approval gave it formal sanction. The NCMM covers the full critical-minerals value chain: domestic exploration, mining, beneficiation, processing, recycling from end-of-life products, and acquisition of overseas mineral assets. The Geological Survey of India (GSI) is tasked with executing 1,200 exploration projects over the seven-year window (vs. 368 projects over the prior three years), expanded to offshore polymetallic-nodule provinces containing cobalt, REE, nickel and manganese. More than 100 critical-mineral blocks are slated for auction. Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) — the JV of NALCO, HCL and MECL — is the designated vehicle for overseas acquisitions, with active Argentina lithium (CAMYEN SE, 15,703 ha) and Australia lithium/cobalt off-take pipelines. India's official critical-minerals list contains 30 commodities, of which 24 are inscribed in Part D of Schedule I of the MMDR Act 1957 (after the 2023 amendment), reserving central-government auction authority over them. The NCMM sets an explicit recycling target of 15-20% of domestic critical-mineral demand met from secondary sources (e-waste, battery scrap, industrial waste) by 2035. The mission also funds a National Centre of Excellence for Critical Minerals and offers customs-duty waivers on 25 critical minerals (announced in the same FY24-25 budget) to lower import costs while domestic capacity scales. NCMM is India's pull-side complement to the US IRA, EU Critical Raw Materials Act, Canada Critical Minerals Strategy and Australia Critical Minerals Strategy — a coordinated allied response to Chinese dominance over refined cobalt, REE, graphite and gallium/germanium. For India specifically it is framed as the supply-chain underpinning for FAME-III (EV adoption), the Semicon India programme (gallium/germanium/silicon), and the National Solar Mission (silicon, indium, tellurium, gallium for thin-film PV).

Nepal's Federal Parliament ratified an omnibus statute on 20–31 March 2025 converting the 13 January 2025 Presidential Ordinance into permanent law, comprehensively amending 11 Acts including the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act 2019 (FITTA), the Industrial Enterprises Act 2020, and the Special Economic Zone Act 2016. The statute expands the scope of permissible foreign investment (replacing the positive-list "any industry" with the broader "any industry other than those in the Schedule"), broadens the "technology transfer" definition to include management/technical services, IT, marketing, finance, engineering, and digital-data-processing, mandates prior Department of Industry approval for foreign investor equity transfers to domestic parties, and for the first time authorises Nepali companies to invest abroad using income earned from technology exports. Repatriation approval windows are compressed to 7 days (15 days for appeals), and foreign investment in Specialised Investment Fund (SIF) units is enabled via SEBON approval.

On January 10, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting jointly with the Department of State, designated PJSC Gazprom Neft and PJSC Surgutneftegas as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under Executive Orders 13662 and 14024, alongside more than 180 oil-carrying vessels (the bulk of Russia's "shadow fleet"), dozens of opaque oil traders, two major Russia-based oilfield service providers, marine insurance companies, and senior Russian energy-sector officials. The package included a new EO 14024 sectoral determination authorizing future designations against any person operating in the Russian energy sector, plus a new EO 14071 determination prohibiting the provision of US petroleum services (extraction, drilling, production support) to persons located in the Russian Federation, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on February 27, 2025. OFAC simultaneously issued General Licenses 117 (wind-down of transactions with the newly blocked entities) and 118 (debt/equity/derivatives wind-down), both expiring February 27, 2025. The action was the largest single Russia energy-sector designation since the 2022 invasion regime began and was coordinated with parallel UK OFSI shadow-fleet designations issued the same week. The action was finalized in the closing days of the Biden administration as a deliberate tightening of the oil-revenue and shadow-fleet vectors before the January 20 transition. Subsequent enforcement and any rollback decisions fell to the incoming Trump administration.

China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement 2025 No. 3 on 9 January 2025, the Final Determination of its Trade and Investment Barrier (TIB) investigation into the European Commission's enforcement practices under the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR). MOFCOM concluded that EC practices in FSR investigations targeting Chinese enterprises in rail transport, photovoltaics, wind energy, and security-equipment public procurement constitute trade and investment barriers under Article 3 of China's Rules on Trade and Investment Barrier Investigations (对外贸易壁垒调查规则). The determination documents €20.88 billion in estimated economic losses — including €10.18 billion from abandoned bids — and finds de-facto discrimination against Chinese SOEs relative to investors from other jurisdictions. MOFCOM committed to taking "necessary measures" including bilateral consultations, multilateral dispute settlement, or "other appropriate measures" to safeguard Chinese enterprises' legitimate rights and interests.

Regulation (EU) 2025/40, published in the Official Journal on 22 January 2025 and entering into force on 11 February 2025, replaces the 1994 Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive 94/62/EC with a directly-applicable Regulation. It mandates binding recycled-content targets for plastic packaging (by polymer and format, reaching 30–65% by 2030 with higher targets by 2040), minimum reusable-packaging shares for beverages and transport, recyclability standards for all packaging placed on the EU market from 2030, deposit-return-scheme obligations for beverage containers from 2029, and bans on specified single-use plastic packaging formats. General application begins 12 August 2026, with staggered compliance windows extending to 2030 and beyond, affecting all non-EU exporters shipping consumer goods, beverages, or e-commerce fulfilment into the EU single market.

On 16 December 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3192 amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014, the 15th package of restrictive measures against Russia. The package adds 84 asset-freeze listings (54 individuals and 30 entities) under Regulation 269/2014 — for the first time including fully-fledged designations of seven Chinese individuals and entities supplying drone components, machine tools, and dual-use goods to the Russian military-industrial complex. It expands the EU shadow-fleet vessel- ban list by 52 tankers (total 79), activates the standalone EU hybrid- threats sanctions regime with its first 16-individual / 3-entity designations, extends the wind-down derogation for divestment from Russian subsidiaries to 31 December 2025, and reinforces anti- circumvention contractual clauses on EU exporters of dual-use goods.

Tunisia's Finance Law for 2025 (Loi n° 2024-48, signed 9 December 2024, published in JORT n° 149 on 10 December 2024) institutes under Article 38 a one-year Contribution Conjoncturelle — a cyclical windfall-style fiscal levy — applicable to all enterprises subject to the standard 15% corporate income tax rate whose 2023 turnover exceeded 20 million dinars (excluding VAT). The contribution is set at 2% of the taxable profits for fiscal year 2025, with a minimum floor of 1,000 dinars, and is explicitly non-deductible from the corporate income tax base. The measure is a budget-financing instrument adopted in the context of the stalled IMF Extended Fund Facility programme (suspended since 2023) and constitutes the IPTM register's second Tunisia-issuer action, extending the LF-year-on-year Tunisian fiscal-policy arc established by LF2024 Art. 33.