Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On 26 May 2026 the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), part of HM Treasury, imposed a £1,000,920.59 monetary penalty on Sabre Global Technologies Limited (SGTL), a UK-registered travel-technology firm, for repeated breaches of UK financial sanctions. SGTL continued to provide Russian carrier Ural Airlines access to its Global Distribution System (GDS) service for seven months after Ural Airlines was designated by the UK in May 2022, and during July–August 2022 actively explored routing payments through a US bank account to avoid detection by its UK bank — the conduct that makes this the **first OFSI penalty issued for a circumvention offence**. At £1,000,921 this is also OFSI's **largest financial-sanctions penalty since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine**, surpassing the prior record (HSF £465k).

Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy extended its ban on the export of petroleum products — including gasoline, diesel, aviation kerosene, gasoil, toluene, xylene, bitumen, and LPG — for a further six months from May 21 to November 21, 2026. The restrictions apply to exports by road and rail, including shipments to fellow EAEU member states. The measure continues a rolling domestic-price-stabilisation regime that has been renewed since at least 2024; the prior extension ran to May 20, 2026.

On 2026-02-06 Chongqing municipality launched the "Aerospace-Finance (Chongqing) Aerospace Information Low-Altitude Economy Industry Fund" (航天工融（重庆）空天信息低空经济产业基金), a CNY 2 billion (~USD 288 million) state-guided investment vehicle jointly capitalized by ICBC Investment (工银投资), Aerospace Investment Holdings (航天投资控股), the Chongqing Industrial Mother Fund, and the Liangjiang Fund. It follows a "government guidance + market-based operation" model and is directed at the aerospace-information (satellite/space-tech) and low-altitude economy (drones, eVTOL, general aviation) sectors, building on Chongqing's November 2025 low-altitude-economy state-aid package.

NIB, the multilateral development bank owned by the eight Nordic and Baltic member states, signed a EUR 11.4 million 10-year loan with Metrosert AS, Estonia's national testing, calibration and certification body, to finance a new Drone Technology Unit within Metrosert's Applied Research Centre in Tallinn. The unit will house nine laboratories to develop, validate and industrialise unmanned aerial, ground and maritime systems, with most planned activity explicitly defence-related, covering unmanned aviation, communications, navigation, flight physics and hardware security. NIB financing at preferential development-bank rates functions as a below-market state-backed subsidy to a strategic dual-use research facility; the unit is targeted to be fully operational by summer 2027 as part of a EUR 42.9 million total Applied Research Centre build-out.

On 16 January 2026 the Yunnan Provincial People's Government issued Yunzhengfa [2026] No. 2, a package of 34 policy measures (effective through 2030) to support high-quality development of the Central Yunnan New Area (滇中新区), a national-level new area centred on Kunming. The measures span industrial upgrading, innovation, opening-up and fiscal/land support: transformation of traditional petrochemical and metallurgy industries into "hundred-billion-yuan" clusters, development of semiconductor materials/equipment, new-energy battery materials and non-ferrous/rare-precious-metals manufacturing using Yunnan's mineral and plateau-agriculture resources, and cultivation of low-altitude economy, biomanufacturing and new-materials industries. It also seeks to establish a South/Southeast Asia aircraft-delivery centre and one-stop aviation-maintenance base in the new area.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and entities in Venezuela and Iran on 30 December 2025 for facilitating Iran's proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic-missile inputs. Venezuela-based Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA (EANSA) and its chair, Jose Jesus Urdaneta Gonzalez, were designated for negotiating directly with Iran's Qods Aviation Industries (QAI) and overseeing local assembly of QAI's Mohajer-series UAVs, re-branded in Venezuela as the ANSU series — an arrangement OFAC states has run since 2006. Separately, three Iran-based persons were designated for procuring sodium perchlorate, sebacic acid and nitrocellulose — precursor chemicals for ballistic-missile propellant and warhead production — on behalf of Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), a unit of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO). The action was taken under Executive Order 13382 (WMD proliferators and supporters) and Executive Order 13949 (Iran conventional-arms activities), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2.

China's State Council Tariff Commission published its annual "2026 Tariff Adjustment Plan" (税委会公告2025年第11号) on 29 December 2025, effective 1 January 2026. The plan sets provisional import tariff rates below MFN levels on 935 products, while cancelling provisional rates on certain other products (reverting them to standard MFN rates). It adds new national tariff subheadings for intelligent bionic robots, bio-aviation kerosene, forest-grown ginseng, and other items, bringing the total tariff schedule to 8,972 lines. The government frames the provisional-rate cuts — covering key components and advanced materials such as CNC hydraulic air cushions for stamping presses, recycled "black powder" (黑粉) lithium-ion battery feedstock, artificial blood vessels and infectious-disease diagnostic kits — as support for "high-level sci-tech self-reliance" and modernisation of the industrial system. China also continues zero-tariff treatment on 100% of tariff lines for the 43 least-developed countries with diplomatic relations with China, and continues Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement preferential rates for Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.

On 27 November 2025, Brazil's Gecex (the executive committee of the Foreign Trade Chamber, Camex) approved a new credit product allowing Brazilian airlines to use the Export Guarantee Fund (Fundo de Garantia às Exportações, FGE) as collateral for domestic bank financing of aviation-kerosene (QAV) purchases, unlocking up to BRL 2 billion (~USD 370 million) in government-backed credit. In exchange for the below-market-rate financing, airlines must take on one of three sustainable-aviation-fuel (SAF) counterparts: buy domestically produced SAF, invest in domestic SAF production plants, or contribute to the National Fund for Industrial and Technological Development (FNDIT) for SAF-related projects. Global Trade Alert logs the measure as both a loan-guarantee intervention and a separate "local content incentive" intervention tied to the SAF counterpart requirement.

On 26 November 2025, Scotland's Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Economy and Gaelic, Kate Forbes MSP, wrote to the Scottish Parliament's Economy and Fair Work Committee confirming that the preferred bidder for Glasgow Prestwick Airport had withdrawn from the sale process after a "robust commercial deal" had been negotiated. The letter discloses that the proposed acquisition was subject to mandatory notification to the UK Government under the National Security and Investment Act 2021, a reserved matter on which Scottish Ministers cannot comment. Media reporting (Global Trade Alert; Daily Business) identifies the withdrawn bidder as Turkish conglomerate Limak Holding and attributes the collapse directly to the UK national-security review process ("Westminster officials opening an investigation"). The airport, which employs over 500 people directly and anchors an Ayrshire aerospace cluster, remains in Scottish Government public ownership.

The Chongqing Municipal Government General Office issued Notice 渝府办发〔2025〕58号 on 2025-11-22, promulgating "Several Policy Measures to Promote High-Quality Development of the Low-Altitude Economy," effective immediately through 2027-12-31. The package comprises eight capped-percentage subsidy tracks covering low-altitude public-service procurement, logistics route operating subsidies (up to RMB 150,000 per route), demonstration projects (up to RMB 20 million), test-flight infrastructure (20% of investment, capped at RMB 5 million), manufacturing R&D and first-of-kind equipment support (up to 30% of receipts, capped at RMB 5 million), national innovation/manufacturing centres (up to RMB 20 million), ground-station infrastructure (20% of investment, capped at RMB 10 million), private-equity fund-manager incentives (1% of invested capital, capped at RMB 10 million cumulative), and AI-compute subsidies (20% of service cost, up to RMB 1 million/year). Global Trade Alert classifies all eight interventions as state aid with a "certainly harmful" (Red) rating.

On October 31, 2025, Bulgaria's National Assembly voted 135-4 (42 abstentions) to adopt a decision introducing a temporary measure restricting the export and intra-EU supply of petroleum products — chiefly diesel and aviation fuel — to all destinations, including fellow EU member states. The measure took effect around November 1, 2025 upon publication. Gasoline was excluded because domestic production exceeds internal demand. The ban is a direct domestic-supply-security response to US OFAC's October 22, 2025 SDN designation of Lukoil (see responds_to), whose Burgas refinery supplies roughly 80% of Bulgaria's fuel market; lawmakers cited the risk that sanctions exposure could disrupt Lukoil's export activity and drain the volumes needed to cover domestic demand. Exemptions cover refuelling of ships and aircraft and deliveries to NATO and EU member-state armed forces under the common defence policy.

On 30 October 2025, Brazil's National Monetary Council (CMN) approved a resolution regulating the use of up to BRL 4 billion (~USD 746 million) from the National Civil Aviation Fund (Fundo Nacional de Aviação Civil, FNAC) for below-market-rate loans to scheduled air-transport providers. The program comprises six credit lines — covering sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) purchases, aircraft and engine maintenance, aircraft acquisition and advance payment, and logistics infrastructure — at interest rates of 6.5-7.5% per year, with disbursement formalised via a BNDES contract in December 2025. Airlines drawing on the funds must accept counterpart obligations: an accelerated SAF blending trajectory (1 percentage point per year toward a 10% target, ahead of the legal mandate), a 30% increase in regional flights to the Legal Amazon and Northeast versus 2024 levels, and a freeze on shareholder dividend distributions during the loan grace period.

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan's state export-credit institution, signed a guarantee agreement on 2025-10-20 covering approximately JPY 37.4 billion (~USD 248 million) of loans from a consortium of eleven private Japanese financial institutions to ANA HOLDINGS INC. for the import of two Boeing 787-10 aircraft from the United States. JBIC frames the guarantee as supporting ANA Group's fleet-decarbonization transition strategy and maintaining the international competitiveness of the Japanese aviation industry.

The Guangzhou Huadu District government (Guangdong Province) issued "Several Measures to Promote the High-Quality Development of the Aviation Industry" (Huafu Ban Gui [2025] No. 9), effective from the date of issuance through 31 December 2027. The measures are framed around Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport's role in stabilizing domestic and international supply chains, and combine per-flight/passenger-throughput cash rewards for air carriers, a discounted land-transfer floor price (70% of appraised market value) for qualifying aviation-industry projects, R&D support for sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) producers, and inclusion of aviation-sector workers in the district's high-level talent programme. Global Trade Alert classifies the underlying interventions (production subsidies and unspecified state aid) as "certainly harmful" (Red).

On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.

On 26 September 2025, Japan's Minister of Finance Katsunobu Kato announced the establishment of the Japan Strategic Investment Facility, a JBIC-administered financing vehicle operationalising the USD 550bn investment pledge from the July 2025 US-Japan tariff and investment agreement. The facility launched 1 October 2025 and runs through March 2029, supporting the overseas expansion of Japanese companies across nine economic-security sectors: semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, steel, shipbuilding, critical minerals, aviation, energy, automobiles, and AI/quantum technology. Funding draws on three sources — dollar-denominated JBIC bonds, yen-denominated Japanese government loans to JBIC, and a "supplemental" transfer from Japan's USD 1.324tn foreign-currency reserves — with private-sector loans and NEXI-backed loan guarantees supplementing JBIC's own financing.

On 24 July 2025 the European Investment Bank (EIB) and Italian energy major Eni signed a EUR 500 million (approx. USD 587.8 million) 15-year finance contract to support conversion of Eni's Livorno refinery in Tuscany into a biorefinery. The project adds a biogenic pre-treatment unit and a 500,000-tonne/year Ecofining(TM) plant able to produce HVO diesel, HVO naphtha and bio-LPG from waste and plant-residue feedstocks, with future flexibility to shift output toward sustainable aviation fuel (SAF). It is Eni's third domestic biorefinery conversion (after Venice and Gela) and part of Enilive's plan to reach 5+ million tonnes/year of biorefinery capacity by 2030. Global Trade Alert logged the financing as a "Red" (trade/investment-distorting) state loan.

The New Development Bank (NDB) Board of Directors approved a RMB 1.448 billion (~CNY 1.45 billion, ~USD 200 million) sovereign loan to the People's Republic of China on 14 July 2025 to finance the Shanxi Taiyuan Wusu Zero-Carbon Airport Project. The project will convert Taiyuan Wusu International Airport into China's first zero-carbon airport via over 100 MW of installed solar capacity, a pilot PV-Energy Storage-Direct Current-Flexible Loads (PEDF) system, and 100% renewable-based heating and cooling — a first among China's regional hub-scale airports. Shanxi Aviation Industry New Energy Company (SAINE), a joint venture of Shanxi Aviation Industry Group (SAIG) and two government-owned geological-engineering and industrial-construction enterprises, will implement the project between 2025 and 2029. NDB below-market development-bank pricing functions as an indirect state-adjacent subsidy for the build-out.

China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 35 of 2025 on 9 July 2025, adding 8 Taiwan-based entities to its Dual-Use Items Export Control List under the Export Control Law and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items. The listed firms — spanning aerospace/aviation, unmanned systems, and shipbuilding — are barred from receiving dual-use item exports from China; ongoing export activity to them must cease immediately, with exceptions only via case-by-case MOFCOM approval. The measure took effect the same day it was published.

On 17 June 2025, at the Paris Air Show, the UK Department for Business and Trade announced over £250 million in joint government-and-industry funding for green aerospace research and technology projects, drawn from a £975 million allocation to the Aerospace Technology Institute (ATI) Programme for 2025-2030. The tranche covers 11 major projects plus 18 smaller initiatives, led by Airbus, Rolls-Royce and Intelligent Energy, targeting hydrogen propulsion, additive manufacturing and engine-efficiency technologies aimed at net-zero aviation.

China Chengtong Holdings Group, a SASAC-supervised central state capital operation company, completed business registration of the "Chengtong Science and Technology Innovation Investment Fund (Beijing) Limited Partnership" in late May/early June 2025, jointly capitalised with Sinopec, China Aviation Oil, and the Haidian District Government of Beijing. The fund has a total planned scale of CNY 30 billion (~USD 4.2 billion) with a first-phase scale of CNY 10 billion (~USD 1.4 billion) and a 15-year term. It prioritises "early-stage, small-scale, long-term, hard-technology" equity investment across new materials, advanced manufacturing, and next-generation information technology, targeting industry-leading tech firms, "little giant" specialised-and-innovative enterprises, technology-transfer projects, and upstream/downstream suppliers in central-SOE industrial chains.

Spain's state development bank, Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO), granted a loan of up to EUR 65 million directly to ITP Aero, a Zamudio (Vizcaya)-headquartered global leader in aircraft-engine design, development, manufacturing and maintenance. The facility partially finances ITP Aero's 2025-2033 Investment Plan, which is centred on decarbonisation R&D — electrification, hydrogen propulsion, and sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) — as the company targets net-zero climate impact by 2050. ICO states ITP Aero engines power 40% of all annual commercial aircraft engine deliveries and that over 5,000 of its engines are currently in service.

India's Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) revoked, with immediate effect, the security clearance of Celebi Airport Services India Pvt Ltd and its associated Celebi group companies, citing national-security grounds. The clearance — originally granted by the Director General, BCAS on 21 November 2022 under the Ground Handling Agency category — had authorised Celebi to provide ground-handling, cargo, and passenger-services operations at nine major Indian airports (Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Chennai, Ahmedabad, Goa, Cochin, and Kannur). The revocation followed days after Turkiye publicly backed Pakistan and criticised India's Operation Sindoor strikes, and Celebi is a Turkiye-headquartered aviation-services group. The Ministry of Civil Aviation stated it was coordinating with airport operators to maintain seamless passenger and cargo handling during the transition.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 18 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 5. Of the 18 additions, 5 are under China, 6 under Finland, 3 under Türkiye, 2 under Kazakhstan, 1 under Italy, and 1 under the United Kingdom — a geographic distribution dominated by Russia-adjacent diversion corridors. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends use of EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 25 April 2025 (90 FR 17339).

On 21 April 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed Presidential Resolution No. PP-145 "On the Privatization of Large Enterprises with State Participation on International Markets," establishing the 2025–2028 roadmap for selling minority equity stakes (10–25%) in 12 major state-owned enterprises via IPO/SPO on international and domestic exchanges, and full/near-full stakes in 29 further enterprises through competitive public tenders. The resolution introduced a three-tier asset-segmentation framework — large SOEs (IPO/SPO with international advisor mandates), medium SOEs (domestic stock-exchange sale), and small assets/real estate (e-platform sale) — and mandated engagement of international investment banks and a State Privatization Commission to oversee implementation. It was issued the same day as the sister Presidential Decree UP-70 "On the Privatization Program for 2025," which approved a 2025 annual program targeting 30 trillion UZS (~USD 2.4 bn) in state-asset disposals across 115 companies, 659 real-estate properties, and 6,100 hectares of land.

France updated its 2020 National Low-Carbon Hydrogen Strategy at the Comité interministériel de l'Innovation on 10 April 2025, releasing SNH II under the direction of the Prime Minister and Industry Minister Marc Ferracci. The 2025 actualisation revises capacity targets to 6.5 GW of low-carbon hydrogen production by 2030 and 10 GW by 2035, funded within the France 2030 plan's €9 billion hydrogen envelope (€4 bn for electrolysers, €1.5 bn for end-uses, €2 bn for IPCEI Hy2Tech/Hy2Use French share). A new €4 billion price-support mechanism guarantees low-carbon hydrogen competitiveness against fossil hydrogen for 15 years; the strategy aligns France's "décarboné" taxonomy to include both nuclear-electricity-based and renewable-electricity-based hydrogen, distinct from EU RFNBO additionality rules.

On 24 February 2025, the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted the 16th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 amending Regulation 833/2014 and a cluster of associated regulations (2025/389, 2025/390, 2025/392, 2025/398, 2025/401). The package introduces the EU's first import ban on Russian primary aluminium (CN 7601) under a 275 kt transition quota (~80% of 2024 volumes), expels 13 additional Russian banks from the SWIFT financial-messaging system, adds 74 vessels (153 total) to the shadow-fleet port-access and services ban, prohibits any temporary storage of Russian crude and petroleum products in EU ports, bans transactions with major Russian airports (Moscow Vnukovo, Zhukovsky) and ports (Astrakhan, Makhachkala, Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk) used for sanctions circumvention, extends flight-ban coverage to 25 third-country airlines operating domestic Russian routes, and adds 83 asset-freeze listings (48 individuals, 35 entities) under Regulation 269/2014. Parallel measures cover Belarus and the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine. Entry into force on 25 February 2025.

The European Commission published Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/261 in the Official Journal on 10 February 2025, imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of biodiesel (fatty-acid mono-alkyl esters / FAME and paraffinic gasoils from synthesis or hydro-treatment of non-fossil origin / HVO) originating in China. Duties range from 10.0% (EcoCeres, an individually-examined producer) to 21.7%–35.6% for other exporters, applied on top of the MFN import duty, covering an estimated €1.4 billion of annual EU-bound Chinese biodiesel flows. The regulation supersedes provisional duties imposed under CR (EU) 2024/2163 and explicitly excludes Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) from the AD scope while introducing mandatory SAF import-registration tracking.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 8 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Burma (2), China (2), and Russia (4), citing actions contrary to US foreign-policy interests, primarily enabling human-rights violations through aerial attacks on civilians (Burma), Uyghur surveillance (China), and facial-recognition targeting of protesters (Russia). All designated entities require licenses for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption of denial. The rule was effective immediately on publication, December 11, 2024.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 84460, Doc 2024-24562) adding 26 entities to the Entity List across four destinations: six in China (aviation simulation for PLA modernisation; procurement for Iran WMD/UAV programs; evasive conduct), one in Egypt and three in the UAE (acquiring US civil aircraft parts for Russian buyers post-Ukraine invasion), and sixteen in Pakistan (nine front companies of Advanced Engineering Research Organization for Pakistan's cruise-missile and strategic-UAV programs, plus seven contributing to Pakistan's ballistic- missile program). The rule also removes two existing entries. All additions are licensed under a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 8 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 2. Of the 8 additions, 3 are under China, 2 under Germany, 1 under Pakistan, and 2 under Türkiye. Of the 2 removals, 1 is under Saudi Arabia and 1 under China. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 16 October 2024 (89 FR 83428, FR Doc 2024-23638).

The Council of the EU adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2697, implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The listing adds 7 individuals and 7 legal entities to the EU asset freeze. The entities include three Iranian state and private airlines (Saha Airlines, Mahan Air, Iran Air) named as repeat carriers of Iranian-made UAVs and related technology to Russia, a UAV-procurement network (Basamad Electronic Pouya Engineering Co., Teyf Tadbir Engineering Company) run through EU-listed businessman Hossein Hatefi Ardakani, and two entities tied to Iran's ballistic-missile programme: Iran Alumina Company (IAC), Iran's sole producer of alumina powder used in solid rocket-fuel propellant, and Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center, a missile R&D subsidiary of the EU-listed Shahid Hemmat Industries Group. All funds and economic resources of the listed parties are frozen within the EU, and EU persons/entities are barred from making funds available to them.

The Diet enacted on 31 May 2024 (promulgated 7 June 2024 as Law No. 45 of 2024) the "Act on Partially Amending the Act on Strengthening Industrial Competitiveness and Other Acts to Create New Business and Encourage Investment in Industries". The provisions establishing Japan's first US IRA-style production-and-sales-linked tax credit took effect 2 September 2024 per METI's press release of the same date. Eligible enterprises with a METI-certified business plan can claim tax deductions tied to domestic production-and-sales volume of five designated strategic products: electric vehicles, green steel, green chemicals, sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), and semiconductors. The credit is available for ten years from certification (certifications must be issued by 31 March 2027), with an annual cap of 40% of corporate tax liability (20% for semiconductors) and a 4-year carry-forward. Eligibility is conditional on meeting wage-growth or capital-investment thresholds in each fiscal year.

A joint advisory issued January 26, 2024 by six US agencies (USTR, State, Treasury, Commerce, DHS, and Labor) updating businesses on supply-chain risks associated with Burma's post-coup military regime (SAC). The advisory warns of reputational, economic, and legal exposure for entities operating in or sourcing from Burma and specifically flags heightened due-diligence requirements for metal importers, the SAC's opaque network of corporate affiliates in Thailand, Singapore, India, and the UAE that complicate traceability, and cross-border reporting gaps for goods and funds transfers. Targeted sectors include rare earths (dysprosium, terbium), base metals and gold mining, timber, aviation services and jet fuel, computer chips and ICT equipment, and small arms components.

Signed by President Javier Milei and the entire cabinet on 20 December 2023 and published in the Boletín Oficial extraordinario on 21 December 2023, Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia 70/2023 declares a public emergency across economic, financial, fiscal, administrative, pension, tariff, sanitary, and social matters until 31 December 2025 (Article 1) and enacts 366 articles across 16 titles that fundamentally restructure Argentina's regulatory framework. The DNU repeals or amends dozens of statutes to deregulate foreign trade (repealing the Compre Nacional buy-preference law Ley 18.875 and the price-control framework Ley 27.345), opens privatisation of state enterprises (Aerolíneas Argentinas, ENARSA, Banco Nación, Correo Argentino, Trenes Argentinos), dismantles the Ley de Abastecimiento price-control regime, liberalises civil aviation cabotage to foreign carriers, deregulates hydrocarbons export and mining permitting, and replaces the severance-pay regime with a capitalisation-fund system. It is the foundational enabling framework for all subsequent Milei-administration deregulatory instruments filed on the IPTM register, including RIGI (Law 27.742), Decreto 38/2025, Decreto 449/2025, and Decreto 563/2025.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 42 entities under 44 entries to the Entity List, effective December 7, 2023. The majority — 28 entities in Russia — are sanctioned for procuring or contracting on behalf of Russia's defense sector, including avionics, military-grade drones, and military electronics. Fourteen additional entities across Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, China, and the UAE were added for operating diversion and transshipment networks that supply U.S.-origin items to Russian military end-users. All listed entities face a license requirement for all EAR-controlled items with a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule (FR Doc 2023-18772; 88 FR 59927) amending 15 CFR 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to create an additional option for the renewal of Temporary Denial Orders (TDOs). Under the new provision, BIS may request the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement renew a TDO for up to one year — rather than the standard maximum of 180 days — where the record demonstrates a pattern of repeated, ongoing, and/or continuous apparent violations. The rule was motivated by the sustained TDO enforcement campaign against Russian and Belarusian civil aviation entities that began in April 2022 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a determination pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 14014 identifying the jet fuel sector of the Burmese economy as a sanctions-eligible sector. The determination means that foreign persons who operate in Burma's jet fuel sector — including activities related to importation, exportation, reexportation, sale, supply, or transport of jet fuel in or involving Burma — may be designated and sanctioned by OFAC. Issued on the OFAC website on August 23, 2023 and formally published in the Federal Register on September 25, 2023 (FR Doc 2023-20713), the action was accompanied by concurrent SDN designations targeting key figures in the SAC junta's jet-fuel supply network.

BIS issued a correcting amendment to the EAR Entity List to add China Aviation Development Harbin Bearing Co., Ltd. — an AVIC subsidiary and specialist precision-bearing manufacturer — that was included in the preamble of the June 14, 2023 final rule (88 FR 38739) but inadvertently omitted from the regulatory text. The entity was designated for acquiring and attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of China's military modernization, including hypersonic weapons development, air-to-air missiles, and weapon lifecycle management using Western software. All EAR-subject items require a licence with a presumption of denial; retroactive effective date of June 16, 2023.

BIS published a final rule adding 43 entities under 50 entries to the EAR Entity List and removing one entity (Fiber Optic Solutions, Latvia), effective June 12, 2023. The additions span ten countries — China (31 entities), UAE (5), Pakistan (4), South Africa (3), UK (2), and one each in Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand — targeting four principal threat clusters: China's military modernization and hypersonic-weapons supply chain, an international network of flight-training academies (TFASA and affiliates) providing Western pilot training to Chinese military personnel, Pakistan-linked procurement for unsafeguarded ballistic-missile programs, and UAE/South Africa-based dual-use diversion networks. All listed entities require a BIS licence, with most subject to a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eleven entities across Burma, China, Nicaragua, and Russia to the Entity List, effective March 28, 2023, under a human rights foreign policy rationale. Three Burmese trading companies and two Russian aviation-parts suppliers were designated for selling, procuring, and servicing military equipment enabling the Burmese military regime's attacks on civilians; five Xinjiang-based electronics manufacturers were added for activities contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests; and the Nicaraguan National Police was designated for serious human rights abuses. The rule simultaneously codified in the EAR that protection of human rights worldwide is an explicit basis for Entity List designations — a precedent-setting regulatory amendment extending the existing national-security and foreign-policy framework.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 32 persons across 13 countries to the Unverified List (UVL) on the basis that BIS was unable to verify their bona fides through end-use checks. The largest concentration is in China (14 entities), followed by the UAE (5) and Turkey (4), with single entries in Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, and Singapore. UVL placement suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement and file Electronic Export Information in the Automated Export System before shipping any item subject to the EAR. Published 24 March 2023 (88 FR 17706, FR Doc 2023-06171); effective 24 March 2023.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 76 Russian entities to the Entity List effective February 24, 2023, spanning three rationale categories: (1) biometric surveillance technology enabling Russian filtration operations in occupied Ukraine; (2) illicit acquisition of U.S.-origin controlled items; and (3) the Russian military-industrial complex encompassing missiles, aviation, shipbuilding, semiconductors, telecom, and defense electronics. All 76 entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption of denial; 66 entities receive footnote-3 designation as Russian military end-users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus Military End-User Foreign Direct Product Rule under §734.9(g). Four existing Entity List entries were simultaneously revised with additional aliases and tightened to a policy of denial. Notable designations include KAMAZ, the Skolkovo Foundation, Skoltech, Ilyushin Aviation Complex, and the State Missile Center Named After Akademika V.P. Makeyev.

The Bureau of Industry and Security expanded EAR sanctions against Russia and Belarus effective 24 February 2023, adding 322 HTS-6 industrial items to Supplement No. 4 to Part 746 (oil-and-gas equipment, flat-rolled steel, pumps, turbines, marine and aviation engines) and 276 luxury goods to Supplement No. 5. Supplement No. 6 was amended to add biological and chemical-synthesis equipment including bioreactors, peptide synthesizers, and nucleotide reagents, targeting Russia's biodefence and dual-use procurement pathway. The rule also migrated Supplement No. 2 from Schedule B to HTS-6 identifiers to align with allied partner frameworks, added Taiwan to the list of countries excluded from licence requirements, and extended Section 744.7 end-use restrictions to cover in-country transfers inside Russia and Belarus.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding seven Iranian entities to the Entity List effective 31 January 2023, for contributing to Russia's military and defense industrial base through the production and transfer of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used by Russia in Ukraine. The entities — including Shahed Aviation Industries, Qods Aviation Industry, and arms of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — are subject to a license requirement with a presumption of denial for all EAR-jurisdiction items. The rule applies the Russia/Belarus Military End User Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule to all seven entities, extending its reach to foreign-produced items destined for or routed through these Iranian UAV producers.

On 8 December 2022 the Thai Board of Investment issued Announcement No. 8/2565 "Policies and Criteria for Investment Promotion", setting Thailand's five-year (2023-2027) horizontal investment-promotion strategy. The Announcement entered into force from 8:30 a.m. on 3 January 2023 and applies to all investment-promotion applications filed with the BOI from that date. The strategy reorients Thailand's investment regime around three core concepts — (i) innovation, technology and creativity, (ii) competitiveness and rapid adaptability, and (iii) inclusiveness, including environmental and social sustainability — and is operationalised through seven pillars: industrial transition to BCG (Bio-Circular-Green) / smart industries, regional-hub positioning (EV, electronics, food, medical, aviation, automation), supply-chain strengthening, technology upgrading, SME competitiveness, sustainable development, and BCG-economy alignment. Incentives are structured into Group A (corporate-income-tax exemption for 3-13 years, with Group A1+ activities — frontier-technology semiconductors, advanced biotech, certain EV components — receiving up to 10-13 years CIT exemption with no cap) and Group B (non-tax incentives only). Fundamental eligibility criteria carried over from prior regimes: minimum THB 1 million investment, new-machinery requirement, 20% annual revenue-growth projection, and a 3:1 debt-to-equity threshold. The 8 December 2022 release was accompanied by 16 additional implementing announcements (Announcements 9/2565 to 24/2565) covering specific activity lists and merit-based incentives. This is the umbrella framework under which Thailand's subsequent sector-specific BOI instruments operate — the EV 3.5 package (2023-12-19, effective 2024-01-01), the EV Board HEV manufacturing excise incentives (2024-07-26), and the National Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Industry Strategy (2026-01-07) all sit inside this 2023-2027 investment-promotion regime.