Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2662 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 8 May 2026 the US Department of Commerce and South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIR) signed the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Initiative (KUSPI) MOU, establishing a standing bilateral platform covering commercial shipbuilding cooperation, workforce development, industrial modernisation, and maritime manufacturing investment. The agreement creates the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center in Washington D.C. (expected operational later in 2026) as the permanent coordination mechanism for technical exchanges, shipyard productivity improvement projects, FDI into the US maritime industrial base, and joint workforce training. KUSPI operationalises the $150 bn Korean investment sub-pledge to US shipbuilding — itself a tranche of the broader $350 bn / $20 bn-annual-cap commitment under the December 2025 US-Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal — and structurally positions the US-ROK allied axis as the coordinated civilian shipbuilding counterweight to China's dominant global shipyard share.

South Korea's National Assembly passed the Special Act for Korea-US Strategic Investment Management (한미 전략적 투자 관리를 위한 특별법) on 12 March 2026 by a bipartisan vote of 226-8-8, authorising a sovereign-backed US$350bn (~KRW 517tn) investment commitment to the United States over an annual US$20bn cap. The act creates the Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Corporation (한미전략투자공사), a new state-run entity with KRW 2tn (~US$1.36bn) government-financed paid-in capital, as the institutional vehicle to execute the bilateral investment MOU. Article 3 Clause 3 permits investment decisions to proceed despite insufficient commercial viability when national-security or supply-chain-stability grounds exist, subject to prior consent of the relevant National Assembly Standing Committee, operationalising the December 2025 Korea-US Strategic Trade and Investment Deal investment-pledge tranche.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14387 on 18 February 2026, invoking Section 101 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to ensure an adequate domestic supply of elemental phosphorus and glyphosate-based herbicides. The order delegates DPA §101 priority-allocation and contract- direction authority to the Secretary of Agriculture, authorises USDA to direct the production and distribution of these inputs for national-defense purposes, and grants legal immunity to domestic producers acting in compliance with USDA directives. The EO is the first DPA invocation specifically targeting the phosphorus supply chain, reflecting the concentration of global white/yellow phosphorus production in China (~75% share) and the existence of only a single operating US producer.

On 17 February 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney launched Canada's first standalone Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), introducing the "Build–Partner–Buy" framework as the central guiding principle of Canadian defence procurement. The strategy mobilises over half a trillion CAD across the next decade — including ~CAD 180 bn in defence procurement opportunities, ~CAD 290 bn in defence-related capital investment, and ~CAD 125 bn in anticipated downstream economic benefit by 2035 — and targets 125,000 new high-paying jobs. Operationally, the DIS introduces Canadian Content Value (CCV) requirements with a proposed Canadian Company Boost for firms meeting 70–100% domestic-content thresholds, sets a 10-year goal of awarding 70% of defence procurements to Canadian firms, and signals willingness to invoke the national security exception to set aside trade-agreement obligations and exclude foreign bidders for "sovereign capability" contracts. It is the first standalone industrial-strategy document covering the Canadian defence-industrial base, distinct from prior DPA-narrow filings.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Decree No. 8/2026 on 3 January 2026, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 95 individuals and 70 legal entities, the large majority of them Russian citizens, residents, and companies. The designees manufacture or supply communications equipment, radio-electronic warfare (REB) systems, and microelectronics for Russia's defense-industrial complex, alongside chemical, mining, metallurgical, and fuel-and-energy-sector entities and their managers. The decree entered into force on 6 January 2026, the date of official publication.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), signed into law on 18 December 2025, expands the Department of Defense's existing "covered materials" domestic- sourcing restriction (which already barred DoD contracting for SmCo/NdFeB magnets, tantalum and tungsten sourced from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea) to add gallium, germanium and molybdenum under Section 844. Restrictions on materials "melted or produced" in a covered nation take effect 31 December 2026, widening on 1 January 2027 to also cover materials "mined, refined, or separated" in a covered nation; the gallium/germanium additions specifically phase in on 18 December 2027. The same NDAA bundles two related supply-chain provisions: Section 867 gives DoD broader authority (contracts, grants, other-transaction agreements, equity-style investments, and anti-market-manipulation subsidies) to invest in the domestic industrial base for critical minerals, microelectronics, machine tools and other defense-relevant capacity, and Section 842 bars DoD from procuring advanced batteries whose cells or key components are owned, sourced, refined or produced by a foreign entity of concern, phased in 2028-2031.

On 17 December 2025, the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC), a federal Crown corporation, introduced a Defence Platform to deploy up to CAD 4 billion in financing, advisory services and investment solutions for Canadian companies in the defence and national-security sector. Of this, CAD 3.5 billion is financing and advisory support to help firms scale, diversify and enter defence supply chains, and CAD 500 million is investment capital deployed via the StrongNorth Fund, the Catalyst Innovation Fund, and targeted indirect investments in private funds aligned with Canada's defence and sovereignty priorities. The platform is anchored on a new CAD 1 billion capital injection into BDC announced in the 4 November 2025 federal budget.

Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden), MP Materials Corp., and the US Department of Defense signed a binding term sheet on November 19, 2025 to establish a joint venture that will build and operate a rare earth refining and separation facility in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ma'aden holds a minimum 51% controlling stake; MP Materials and the DoD together hold the remaining 49%. The facility will process rare earth feedstock from Saudi and global sources to produce separated light and heavy rare earth oxides, with a validity window to commercial agreement extending through March 31, 2027.

ECOFIN on 12 December 2025 adopted a Council Implementing Decision approving the 4th amendment to Poland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (Krajowy Plan Odbudowy, KPO), following Commission proposal C(2025) 7998 final of 19 November 2025. The amendment modifies 80 measures within the plan while keeping Poland's total financial contribution under the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) unchanged at EUR 25,276,853,716 in grants, alongside an estimated EUR 20.6 bn REPowerEU chapter envelope. Adopted in parallel with amendments for Austria, Cyprus, Czechia, France, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia, this amendment continues the structural pivot — first opened by the May 2025 third amendment — that allows Poland to redirect post-COVID recovery funds toward defence-industrial and dual-use spending given the NATO eastern-flank context.

On 31 October 2025, Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson announced — on the sidelines of the G7 Energy & Environment Ministers' Meeting in Toronto — that the federal government will leverage the Defence Production Act (DPA) to designate critical minerals as defence supplies and build a strategic stockpile, with the Crown acting as buyer of last resort and setting confidential minimum prices to insulate Canadian producers from Chinese price suppression. The announcement was paired with an initial round of 26 investments, partnerships and measures totalling C$6.4 billion in unlocked critical-mineral capital (~C$120m direct federal spend plus up to ~C$1.2 bn in offtake agreements, expressions of interest and export guarantees) and aligned with nine allied countries. It is the first time Canada has invoked DPA stockpiling and priority-procurement powers for non-traditional defence inputs (lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, rare earths, graphite, uranium) and repositions Canada as an allied-aligned strategic supplier parallel to US DPA Title III action under EO 14241.

The US Department of War announced a USD 43.4 million Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III award to Alaska Range Resources, LLC — a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nova Minerals Limited — to fund the initial phase of an integrated domestic antimony supply chain at the Estelle Gold and Critical Minerals Project, roughly 150 km northwest of Anchorage, Alaska. The award funds extraction, concentration and refining of stibnite ore into military-grade antimony trisulfide, used in munitions primer production and case hardening. It follows China's December 2024 ban on antimony exports to the US and is intended to establish a "full spectrum" domestic antimony mining and refining hub to reduce reliance on Chinese-controlled supply.

On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.

Spain's Council of Ministers approved Royal Decree 768/2025 (published in BOE no. 212, 3 September 2025), establishing the regulatory basis for a direct state loan of up to EUR 1,011,850,000 to Hisdesat Servicios Estratégicos SA to develop the PAZ 2 radar Earth-observation satellite program (two SAR satellites plus ground segment), replacing the PAZ 1 satellite whose service life ends around 2030-2031. The program runs 2025-2032 and is designed to maintain Ministry of Defence access to synthetic-aperture-radar imagery for national-security purposes, with Hisdesat providing observation capacity to the Ministry of Defence for an initial 10-year period per satellite once operational.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14269 on 9 April 2025 (FR publication 15 April 2025), launching the first whole-of-government US shipbuilding and maritime industrial-policy instrument since the 1996 Maritime Security Program. The order directs development of an America's Maritime Action Plan (MAP) under APNSA leadership within 210 days (released 13 February 2026) and tasks DoD, DoT, DHS, Commerce, USTR, and OMB with a sequenced set of reviews covering deregulation of the domestic commercial maritime fleet, expansion of the Maritime Industrial Base, mariner workforce development, Maritime Prosperity Zones, and Office of Strategic Capital loan deployment to commercial shipyards. The EO is the cross-government industrial-policy umbrella; the simultaneously-developed USTR Section 301 China Maritime/Logistics/Shipbuilding action (filed 17 April 2025) is the China-specific tariff-track instrument.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14241 on 20 March 2025 (Federal Register publication 25 March 2025) invoking Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III sections 301, 302, and 303 — and selected Title VII authorities — for domestic critical-mineral production, and delegated those authorities to the Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The order operationalises the "national energy emergency" declared by EO 14156 (Jan 2025) to waive certain DPA §303 congressional-notification thresholds, designates "mineral production" as an Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program priority, expands the EO definition of "critical minerals" to include uranium, copper, potash, gold (and any further item designated by the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council), and directs the Departments of the Interior, Energy, Treasury, and EXIM Bank to mobilise federal lands, permitting, and financing to expand US upstream and midstream capacity. EO 14241 is the cross-cutting domestic-mineral umbrella authority of the second Trump administration, paired with FY2025 supplemental appropriations (USD 2bn National Defense Stockpile, USD 5bn Industrial Base Fund) and complemented by the 24 April 2025 follow-on EO on offshore minerals and the 8 April 2025 coal amendment.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 14385; FR Doc 2024-03969; Docket 240215-0050; RIN 0694-AJ54) added 93 entities under 95 entries to the Entity List, effective 23 February 2024, with destinations Russia (63), Turkey (16), China (8), UAE (4), Kyrgyzstan (2), India (1), and South Korea (1). The dominant rationale is enforcement of Russia-diversion controls: 46 Russian defense manufacturers are designated as military end users acquiring US-origin items for Russia's armed forces, five Chinese entities (including Dennex Enterprises Limited and Shenzhen Speed Industrial Materials Co.) are cited for facilitating diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia, and 16 Turkish firms are cited as procurement hubs obtaining US-origin items of importance to Russia's war effort. Four UAE entities are designated for transshipment networks serving both Russia and Iran. All entities are subject to a presumption of denial for EAR-controlled items; Russian military end users are additionally subject to the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (15 CFR 734.9(g)).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed nine Russian persons from the Unverified List (UVL) and simultaneously added them to the Entity List after the Russian government failed to facilitate end-use checks for more than 60 days — the first application of BIS's October 2022 escalation policy. All nine entities are subject to a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a policy of denial and no license exceptions available. The list spans electronics traders, state maritime infrastructure, defense R&D, microelectronics, and industrial equipment manufacturers.

The Council of the EU adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 of 3 June 2022, implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The regulation adds 65 individuals and 18 legal entities to Annex I, subjecting them to an EU-wide asset freeze and a prohibition on EU persons or entities making funds or economic resources available to them. The listed entities span Russia's defense-industrial base, military-linked vehicle and tyre manufacturing, and financial-market infrastructure.

On 1 February 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense announced a USD 30.4 million Defense Production Act Title III technology investment agreement with Lynas USA LLC, the U.S. subsidiary of Australia's Lynas Rare Earths Ltd, to establish domestic light rare earth element (LREE) separation capacity in Hondo, Texas. DOD framed the award as reducing reliance on China for rare earth oxides used in defense and commercial applications; the department projected that, if the Texas facility and Lynas's Malaysian operations are completed as planned, Lynas would supply roughly 25% of world rare earth oxide demand outside China.