Loading…
Loading…
Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 18 September 2026 the U.S. Department of State published an interim final rule amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to remove certain uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) from U.S. Munitions List Category XX(a), effective 19 October 2026. Vessels removed from the scope of Category XX(a)(10) that are not separately described elsewhere on the USML become subject to the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations (EAR) instead — a reclassification from the stricter State Department license regime to Commerce jurisdiction, not a full decontrol. The Department states the removed vessels "do not warrant control under the ITAR" and is separately soliciting comments on further refining UUV controls and license exemptions.
On 9 September 2026 the UK Export Control Joint Unit published Notice to Exporters 2026/19, revoking and replacing the Open General Licence (Global Combat Air Programme) and issuing a new Open General Export Licence for "de minimis" exports under the UK-France-Germany-Spain Agreement on Defence Export Controls (published 10 December 2025). The new OGEL implements the Agreement's de-minimis principle: where UK-origin content does not exceed 20% of the value of a final defence system integrated by France, Germany or Spain, re-export/re-transfer authorisation is granted without case-by-case licensing, subject to a national-security carve-out. Both licences remove individual application requirements for a defined category of collaborative defence-programme exports rather than introducing new restrictions.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14415 on 20 July 2026, tightening the 10 U.S.C. 4872(c)(1) "specialty metals" waiver process for defense contractors: from 1 January 2027, waivers will be granted only under approved mitigation plans showing "exhaustive efforts" to source compliant materials and a documented timeline for removing non-compliant content. The order requires the Secretary of War to develop, within 180 days, a supply-chain mapping policy compelling contractors to trace covered materials to raw-material origin ("indentured Bill of Materials"), with final implementing regulations due 90 days after that, and a source-qualification acceleration strategy for domestic and allied alternatives to "unreliable foreign suppliers" due within 90 days. Mandatory progress reporting runs at 6-month intervals through 1 January 2028. The order explicitly preserves the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve ("Project Vault") and Export-Import Bank-financed or government-backed sourcing arrangements from its restrictions.
On 8 May 2026 the US Department of Commerce and South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIR) signed the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Initiative (KUSPI) MOU, establishing a standing bilateral platform covering commercial shipbuilding cooperation, workforce development, industrial modernisation, and maritime manufacturing investment. The agreement creates the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center in Washington D.C. (expected operational later in 2026) as the permanent coordination mechanism for technical exchanges, shipyard productivity improvement projects, FDI into the US maritime industrial base, and joint workforce training. KUSPI operationalises the $150 bn Korean investment sub-pledge to US shipbuilding — itself a tranche of the broader $350 bn / $20 bn-annual-cap commitment under the December 2025 US-Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal — and structurally positions the US-ROK allied axis as the coordinated civilian shipbuilding counterweight to China's dominant global shipyard share.
South Korea's National Assembly passed the Special Act for Korea-US Strategic Investment Management (한미 전략적 투자 관리를 위한 특별법) on 12 March 2026 by a bipartisan vote of 226-8-8, authorising a sovereign-backed US$350bn (~KRW 517tn) investment commitment to the United States over an annual US$20bn cap. The act creates the Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Corporation (한미전략투자공사), a new state-run entity with KRW 2tn (~US$1.36bn) government-financed paid-in capital, as the institutional vehicle to execute the bilateral investment MOU. Article 3 Clause 3 permits investment decisions to proceed despite insufficient commercial viability when national-security or supply-chain-stability grounds exist, subject to prior consent of the relevant National Assembly Standing Committee, operationalising the December 2025 Korea-US Strategic Trade and Investment Deal investment-pledge tranche.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14387 on 18 February 2026, invoking Section 101 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to ensure an adequate domestic supply of elemental phosphorus and glyphosate-based herbicides. The order delegates DPA §101 priority-allocation and contract- direction authority to the Secretary of Agriculture, authorises USDA to direct the production and distribution of these inputs for national-defense purposes, and grants legal immunity to domestic producers acting in compliance with USDA directives. The EO is the first DPA invocation specifically targeting the phosphorus supply chain, reflecting the concentration of global white/yellow phosphorus production in China (~75% share) and the existence of only a single operating US producer.
On 17 February 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney launched Canada's first standalone Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), introducing the "Build–Partner–Buy" framework as the central guiding principle of Canadian defence procurement. The strategy mobilises over half a trillion CAD across the next decade — including ~CAD 180 bn in defence procurement opportunities, ~CAD 290 bn in defence-related capital investment, and ~CAD 125 bn in anticipated downstream economic benefit by 2035 — and targets 125,000 new high-paying jobs. Operationally, the DIS introduces Canadian Content Value (CCV) requirements with a proposed Canadian Company Boost for firms meeting 70–100% domestic-content thresholds, sets a 10-year goal of awarding 70% of defence procurements to Canadian firms, and signals willingness to invoke the national security exception to set aside trade-agreement obligations and exclude foreign bidders for "sovereign capability" contracts. It is the first standalone industrial-strategy document covering the Canadian defence-industrial base, distinct from prior DPA-narrow filings.
The US Department of War awarded 5N Plus Inc. (Montreal-headquartered, TSX: VNP) an USD 18.1 million Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III grant to expand germanium recovery and refining capacity at its St. George, Utah facility. The award, announced 30 January 2026 under the "Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production" executive order, funds a roughly sevenfold expansion of zone-refining capacity to more than 20 metric tons of high-purity germanium per year over 48 months, sourced from industrial residues and mining by-products. The germanium feeds optical and solar-cell germanium crystal supply chains used in defense applications.
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Decree No. 8/2026 on 3 January 2026, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 95 individuals and 70 legal entities, the large majority of them Russian citizens, residents, and companies. The designees manufacture or supply communications equipment, radio-electronic warfare (REB) systems, and microelectronics for Russia's defense-industrial complex, alongside chemical, mining, metallurgical, and fuel-and-energy-sector entities and their managers. The decree entered into force on 6 January 2026, the date of official publication.
The US Department of War announced two Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III investments totaling USD 32.7 million to expand the domestic solid rocket motor (SRM) industrial base: USD 27.7 million to R.E. Darling Co., Inc. (REDAR, Tucson, Arizona) to build modernized manufacturing capacity for SRM case insulation materials, and USD 5.0 million to Systima Technologies Inc. (Mukilteo, Washington) to add a dedicated SRM nozzle production line and an optimized cell for complex nozzles. The awards were approved on 30 September 2025 but the public announcement was delayed to 23 December 2025 due to the federal government shutdown. They bring cumulative DPA Title III funding under the related Defense Industrial Base Consortium Other Transaction Agreement solicitation to USD 120.0 million across eight recipients.
The US Department of War announced an USD 18.5 million Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III investment in Lattice Materials (Bozeman, Montana) to expand its capacity to produce optical-grade germanium and silicon crystals and to establish a new capability to recover germanium metal from recycled scrap. The award, funded from the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022, was approved on 26 September 2025 but public announcement was delayed to 22 December 2025 by the federal government shutdown. Lattice is a leading US manufacturer of germanium and silicon infrared optical lenses, windows and mirrors used in defense surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting systems.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), signed into law on 18 December 2025, expands the Department of Defense's existing "covered materials" domestic- sourcing restriction (which already barred DoD contracting for SmCo/NdFeB magnets, tantalum and tungsten sourced from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea) to add gallium, germanium and molybdenum under Section 844. Restrictions on materials "melted or produced" in a covered nation take effect 31 December 2026, widening on 1 January 2027 to also cover materials "mined, refined, or separated" in a covered nation; the gallium/germanium additions specifically phase in on 18 December 2027. The same NDAA bundles two related supply-chain provisions: Section 867 gives DoD broader authority (contracts, grants, other-transaction agreements, equity-style investments, and anti-market-manipulation subsidies) to invest in the domestic industrial base for critical minerals, microelectronics, machine tools and other defense-relevant capacity, and Section 842 bars DoD from procuring advanced batteries whose cells or key components are owned, sourced, refined or produced by a foreign entity of concern, phased in 2028-2031.
On 17 December 2025, the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC), a federal Crown corporation, introduced a Defence Platform to deploy up to CAD 4 billion in financing, advisory services and investment solutions for Canadian companies in the defence and national-security sector. Of this, CAD 3.5 billion is financing and advisory support to help firms scale, diversify and enter defence supply chains, and CAD 500 million is investment capital deployed via the StrongNorth Fund, the Catalyst Innovation Fund, and targeted indirect investments in private funds aligned with Canada's defence and sovereignty priorities. The platform is anchored on a new CAD 1 billion capital injection into BDC announced in the 4 November 2025 federal budget.
The US Department of War announced a USD 29.9 million Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III award to ElementUS Minerals, LLC (doing business as ElementUSA) to construct a demonstration facility in Gramercy, Louisiana extracting gallium and scandium (and other critical minerals) from bauxite residue, a byproduct of alumina refining. The company holds proprietary extraction technology and access to over 30 million tons of bauxite residue feedstock, and the award is intended to establish one of the first domestic US producers of both gallium and scandium. Secondary development work occurs at the company's "Critical Resource Accelerator" in Cedar Park, Texas.
Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Ma'aden), MP Materials Corp., and the US Department of Defense signed a binding term sheet on November 19, 2025 to establish a joint venture that will build and operate a rare earth refining and separation facility in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ma'aden holds a minimum 51% controlling stake; MP Materials and the DoD together hold the remaining 49%. The facility will process rare earth feedstock from Saudi and global sources to produce separated light and heavy rare earth oxides, with a validity window to commercial agreement extending through March 31, 2027.
ECOFIN on 12 December 2025 adopted a Council Implementing Decision approving the 4th amendment to Poland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (Krajowy Plan Odbudowy, KPO), following Commission proposal C(2025) 7998 final of 19 November 2025. The amendment modifies 80 measures within the plan while keeping Poland's total financial contribution under the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) unchanged at EUR 25,276,853,716 in grants, alongside an estimated EUR 20.6 bn REPowerEU chapter envelope. Adopted in parallel with amendments for Austria, Cyprus, Czechia, France, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia, this amendment continues the structural pivot — first opened by the May 2025 third amendment — that allows Poland to redirect post-COVID recovery funds toward defence-industrial and dual-use spending given the NATO eastern-flank context.
On 31 October 2025, Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson announced — on the sidelines of the G7 Energy & Environment Ministers' Meeting in Toronto — that the federal government will leverage the Defence Production Act (DPA) to designate critical minerals as defence supplies and build a strategic stockpile, with the Crown acting as buyer of last resort and setting confidential minimum prices to insulate Canadian producers from Chinese price suppression. The announcement was paired with an initial round of 26 investments, partnerships and measures totalling C$6.4 billion in unlocked critical-mineral capital (~C$120m direct federal spend plus up to ~C$1.2 bn in offtake agreements, expressions of interest and export guarantees) and aligned with nine allied countries. It is the first time Canada has invoked DPA stockpiling and priority-procurement powers for non-traditional defence inputs (lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, rare earths, graphite, uranium) and repositions Canada as an allied-aligned strategic supplier parallel to US DPA Title III action under EO 14241.
The US Department of War announced a USD 43.4 million Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III award to Alaska Range Resources, LLC — a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nova Minerals Limited — to fund the initial phase of an integrated domestic antimony supply chain at the Estelle Gold and Critical Minerals Project, roughly 150 km northwest of Anchorage, Alaska. The award funds extraction, concentration and refining of stibnite ore into military-grade antimony trisulfide, used in munitions primer production and case hardening. It follows China's December 2024 ban on antimony exports to the US and is intended to establish a "full spectrum" domestic antimony mining and refining hub to reduce reliance on Chinese-controlled supply.
The US Department of War announced two Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III investments totaling USD 33.5 million to expand the domestic solid rocket motor (SRM) industrial base: USD 12.6 million to Americarb Inc. (Niagara Falls, New York) to develop a process converting woven rayon fabric into carbonized rayon phenolic (CRP), a polymeric ablative material used to insulate SRM nozzles in tactical missile, hypersonic and strategic programs, and USD 20.9 million to General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GD-OTS, Lincoln, Nebraska) to stand up a new composite rocket-nozzle and insulator production line using tape- wrapping and high-rate material-handling technology. The awards bring the cumulative total under the Defense Industrial Base Consortium Other Transaction Agreement (DIBC OTA) SRM solicitation to USD 87.3 million across six recipients.
The US Department of War announced three Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III investments totaling USD 39.6 million to expand the domestic solid rocket motor (SRM) industrial base: USD 25.2 million to Materials Resources LLC (Xenia, Ohio) for prototype production capability for SRM metallic cases using additive manufacturing; USD 9.3 million to ICF Mercantile LLC (Warren, New Jersey) to establish the first domestic production source of rayon filament cellulose precursor used in ablative SRM insulation; and USD 5.1 million to SPARC Research LLC (Warrenton, Virginia) to develop a dedicated and affordable supply of rocket motor components. The awards bring the total number of DPA Title III awards for the SRM industrial base under the related Defense Industrial Base Consortium Other Transaction Agreement solicitation to four, with a cumulative value of USD 53.9 million.
On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.
Spain's Council of Ministers approved Royal Decree 768/2025 (published in BOE no. 212, 3 September 2025), establishing the regulatory basis for a direct state loan of up to EUR 1,011,850,000 to Hisdesat Servicios Estratégicos SA to develop the PAZ 2 radar Earth-observation satellite program (two SAR satellites plus ground segment), replacing the PAZ 1 satellite whose service life ends around 2030-2031. The program runs 2025-2032 and is designed to maintain Ministry of Defence access to synthetic-aperture-radar imagery for national-security purposes, with Hisdesat providing observation capacity to the Ministry of Defence for an initial 10-year period per satellite once operational.
The US Department of Defense announced a USD 10 million Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III award to Elk Creek Resources Corp (ECRC), a subsidiary of NioCorp Developments Ltd, to advance a domestic "mine-to-master-alloy" scandium supply chain at the Elk Creek Critical Minerals Project in Nebraska. The funds support feasibility-level engineering, additional reserve drilling and updated cost estimates for the polymetallic deposit (scandium, niobium, titanium and rare earths), and support integration of aluminum-scandium master alloy into aerospace platforms alongside a defense prime contractor. The award notes the US has not mined scandium since 1969 and that current global scandium supply is overwhelmingly foreign-sourced, with China the dominant producer.
Export Finance Australia (EFA), the Australian Government's export credit agency, credit-approved a loan facility of up to USD 150 million (AUD ~229.3 million) on 2025-06-27 to support Austal Limited's capital expansion at its Mobile, Alabama shipyard. The facility funds a new assembly hall, waterfront improvements, and a new ship lift system as part of a broader USD 1.2 billion expansion program tied to Austal's US Navy and US Coast Guard shipbuilding contracts and its role in the submarine industrial base. The loan documentation was signed subject to conditions precedent, with Austal executing a USD 100 million tranche of the facility shortly after.
Senators Mark Kelly (D-AZ) and Todd Young (R-IN) introduced S.1541 on 30 April 2025 and Representatives John Garamendi (D-CA) and Trent Kelly (R-MS) introduced the companion H.R.3151 on 1 May 2025 — the Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security for America (SHIPS for America) Act. The bill sets a national goal of 250 US-flag commercial vessels within 10 years via a Strategic Commercial Fleet Program, establishes a Maritime Security Trust Fund (US $50 million per year FY2026-2035), creates a 25 % investment tax credit for qualified shipyard capital expenditures, and mandates cargo-preference requirements (100 % of US-government cargo; 10 % of China-origin imports) on US-flag vessels. Status as of 2026-05-13: introduced in both chambers; not enacted (GovTrack enactment probability <3 %).
President Trump signed Executive Order 14269 on 9 April 2025 (FR publication 15 April 2025), launching the first whole-of-government US shipbuilding and maritime industrial-policy instrument since the 1996 Maritime Security Program. The order directs development of an America's Maritime Action Plan (MAP) under APNSA leadership within 210 days (released 13 February 2026) and tasks DoD, DoT, DHS, Commerce, USTR, and OMB with a sequenced set of reviews covering deregulation of the domestic commercial maritime fleet, expansion of the Maritime Industrial Base, mariner workforce development, Maritime Prosperity Zones, and Office of Strategic Capital loan deployment to commercial shipyards. The EO is the cross-government industrial-policy umbrella; the simultaneously-developed USTR Section 301 China Maritime/Logistics/Shipbuilding action (filed 17 April 2025) is the China-specific tariff-track instrument.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14241 on 20 March 2025 (Federal Register publication 25 March 2025) invoking Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III sections 301, 302, and 303 — and selected Title VII authorities — for domestic critical-mineral production, and delegated those authorities to the Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The order operationalises the "national energy emergency" declared by EO 14156 (Jan 2025) to waive certain DPA §303 congressional-notification thresholds, designates "mineral production" as an Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program priority, expands the EO definition of "critical minerals" to include uranium, copper, potash, gold (and any further item designated by the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council), and directs the Departments of the Interior, Energy, Treasury, and EXIM Bank to mobilise federal lands, permitting, and financing to expand US upstream and midstream capacity. EO 14241 is the cross-cutting domestic-mineral umbrella authority of the second Trump administration, paired with FY2025 supplemental appropriations (USD 2bn National Defense Stockpile, USD 5bn Industrial Base Fund) and complemented by the 24 April 2025 follow-on EO on offshore minerals and the 8 April 2025 coal amendment.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 14385; FR Doc 2024-03969; Docket 240215-0050; RIN 0694-AJ54) added 93 entities under 95 entries to the Entity List, effective 23 February 2024, with destinations Russia (63), Turkey (16), China (8), UAE (4), Kyrgyzstan (2), India (1), and South Korea (1). The dominant rationale is enforcement of Russia-diversion controls: 46 Russian defense manufacturers are designated as military end users acquiring US-origin items for Russia's armed forces, five Chinese entities (including Dennex Enterprises Limited and Shenzhen Speed Industrial Materials Co.) are cited for facilitating diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia, and 16 Turkish firms are cited as procurement hubs obtaining US-origin items of importance to Russia's war effort. Four UAE entities are designated for transshipment networks serving both Russia and Iran. All entities are subject to a presumption of denial for EAR-controlled items; Russian military end users are additionally subject to the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (15 CFR 734.9(g)).
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed nine Russian persons from the Unverified List (UVL) and simultaneously added them to the Entity List after the Russian government failed to facilitate end-use checks for more than 60 days — the first application of BIS's October 2022 escalation policy. All nine entities are subject to a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a policy of denial and no license exceptions available. The list spans electronics traders, state maritime infrastructure, defense R&D, microelectronics, and industrial equipment manufacturers.
The Council of the EU adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 of 3 June 2022, implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The regulation adds 65 individuals and 18 legal entities to Annex I, subjecting them to an EU-wide asset freeze and a prohibition on EU persons or entities making funds or economic resources available to them. The listed entities span Russia's defense-industrial base, military-linked vehicle and tyre manufacturing, and financial-market infrastructure.
On 1 February 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense announced a USD 30.4 million Defense Production Act Title III technology investment agreement with Lynas USA LLC, the U.S. subsidiary of Australia's Lynas Rare Earths Ltd, to establish domestic light rare earth element (LREE) separation capacity in Hondo, Texas. DOD framed the award as reducing reliance on China for rare earth oxides used in defense and commercial applications; the department projected that, if the Texas facility and Lynas's Malaysian operations are completed as planned, Lynas would supply roughly 25% of world rare earth oxide demand outside China.