Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On May 1, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated China-based independent ("teapot") refinery Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. — described as China's second-largest teapot — together with approximately 40 shipping firms and vessels operating as part of Iran's shadow fleet. OFAC sanctioned 19 shadow-fleet vessels (crude, LPG, and petrochemical tankers) as blocked property of designated owners or managers. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors) in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. Treasury press release SB0472. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License W authorising the wind-down of transactions involving the persons newly blocked on May 1, 2026, and published a structurally novel Iran-related Alert, "Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage." The Alert states that payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC — directly or indirectly — for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz are not authorised for US persons (including US financial institutions) or US-owned/-controlled foreign entities. OFAC also issued new FAQ 1250 to accompany the Alert and GL W. The wave is one of the largest single-day Iran enforcement actions of the Trump 2.0 administration. Treasury characterises it as part of a campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The Strait of Hormuz Alert is the operational US response to Iranian regulatory threats against the ~20% of global oil and ~25% of global LNG transiting Hormuz, putting tanker owners, P&I clubs, flag states, and oil-buyer compliance teams on direct notice.

On 23 April 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted the 20th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2026/506 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions) and Council Regulation (EU) 2026/511 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 120 additional individuals and entities, the largest single tranche in two years). The package operationalises and extends the crypto-sanctions architecture introduced in the 19th package and constructs the legal scaffolding for a future full prohibition on maritime services to vessels carrying Russian crude/petroleum products. Headline measures: (i) full sectoral prohibition on transactions with crypto-asset service providers and exchange platforms established in Russia or Belarus, plus designation of the rouble-backed stablecoin RUBx and the digital rouble (CBDC) on Annex LIII — effective 24 May 2026, with EU support for the digital rouble's development banned outright; (ii) 36 new energy-sector listings spanning upstream extraction, refining and transportation; (iii) prohibition on providing technical, financial, brokering and insurance services to Russia-flagged, Russian-certified or Russian-managed LNG tankers and icebreakers effective 25 April 2026, extending to foreign-flagged vessels operating in Russian interests by January 2027 and culminating in a categorical ban on LNG terminal services to Russian-controlled entities on 1 January 2027; (iv) full transaction ban on 20 Russian banks plus four third-country banks listed for SPFS connectivity / sanctions circumvention; (v) 46 newly listed shadow-fleet vessels and new tanker sale-due-diligence obligations on EU shipping operators; (vi) 58 designations of companies and associated individuals in the Russian military-industrial complex including drone developers/manufacturers; (vii) further Annex IV third-country circumvention enabler listings (China, Hong Kong, Turkey, UAE); (viii) parallel measures against Belarus. Entry into force on 24 April 2026 (day following publication in OJ L_202600506), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

President Trump issued five Presidential Determinations on 20 April 2026 under Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. § 4533), invoking the authority granted by Executive Order 14156 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency, signed 20 January 2025). The five determinations cover: (1) domestic petroleum production, refining, and logistics; (2) large-scale energy and energy-related infrastructure development, manufacturing, and deployment; (3) natural gas transmission, processing, storage, and LNG capacity; (4) coal supply chains and baseload power generation; (5) grid infrastructure, equipment, and supply chain. Each determination authorises the relevant Cabinet Secretary (primarily Energy) to use DPA §303 powers — direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase commitments, and equity investments — to expand domestic capacity in the named category.

On 12 March 2026 Senegal's Primature held a press conference releasing mid-term findings of the National Commission for the Re-evaluation and Renegotiation of Petroleum, Gas, and Mining Contracts, created in August 2024 under Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko's reform programme. The Commission identified a 1,075.9 billion FCFA shortfall in the mining sector — concentrated in unpaid taxes/royalties and unauthorised tax exemptions at ICS (Industries Chimiques du Sénégal) — and announced the termination of four offshore oil-exploration blocks (Djifer Offshore, Kayar Offshore, Saint-Louis Offshore, Rufisque Offshore). Renegotiation of the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) gas project, operated by BP with Kosmos Energy and Woodside as partners on the Senegal-Mauritania maritime border, is under active examination; the Primature projects 900 bn FCFA in incremental fiscal revenue 2026-2040 from the contract revision programme. This is Senegal's first major instance of retroactive resource-contract review under the Sonko-Faye government and establishes the legal-political baseline for subsequent contract renegotiations across the 27 mining contracts and remaining hydrocarbon licences under Commission review.

On 25 February 2026 the Swiss Federal Council adopted extensive amendments to the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (Ukraine Ordinance) and the Ordinance on Measures against Belarus, completing implementation of the EU's 19th sanctions package with effect from 26 February 2026. Headline measures: a complete ban on the purchase and import of Russian LNG taking effect 25 April 2026 (transition period until end-2026 for pre-existing long-term contracts); a complete prohibition on the provision of crypto-asset services to Russian persons and companies; new service bans covering advanced-technology / AI / high-performance-computing services and tourism-related services; expansion of the dual-use end-user list (Annex 2) including additional Chinese entities; SECO authority to grant divestment-exemption licences until end-2026 under Art. 30a; and parallel adoption of the EU October 2025 Belarus measures via amendment to the Belarus Ordinance.

On 12 February 2026, Ambassador Jamieson Greer of the Office of the United States Trade Representative oversaw the signing of the US-Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) in Washington, DC. The instrument was signed under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO). Headline terms: (i) US IEEPA reciprocal-tariff rate on Taiwan reduced from 20% to 15% and Section 232 auto-parts/timber/lumber rate cut from 25% to 15%; (ii) Taiwan eliminates or reduces 99% of its tariff barriers on US goods, most immediately and the remainder phased over three years; (iii) Taiwan side commits ~USD 85bn in directed purchases through 2029 (USD 44.4bn LNG/crude, USD 15.2bn civil aircraft and engines, USD 25.2bn power equipment); (iv) sectoral chapters covering tariffs, non-tariff barriers, digital trade, economic security, and high-tech supply-chain resilience. Operationally linked to the 15 January 2026 AIT-TECRO Memorandum of Understanding on investment, under which Taiwan pledges USD 250bn in direct Taiwanese-enterprise investment in the US plus USD 250bn in Taiwan-government credit guarantees (USD 500bn total) to fund US-side industrial parks/clusters in advanced semiconductors, energy, and AI manufacturing. Entry into force is conditional on Taiwan's Legislative Yuan completing its review.

On 6 February 2026 Presidents Trump and Modi announced a framework for an Interim Trade Agreement that resets the bilateral tariff posture installed in 2025. Two operative instruments: (i) an executive order signed 6 February eliminating, effective 7 February 2026, the additional 25% IEEPA "Russian-oil" duty on Indian imports imposed by EO 14329 (27 August 2025), conditional on India's commitment to cease buying Russian crude and to expand defence cooperation; and (ii) reduction of the EO 14257 reciprocal-tariff rate on India from 25% to 18% on listed product categories (textiles and apparel, leather and footwear, plastics and rubber, organic chemicals, home décor, artisanal products, certain machinery), to take effect on finalisation of the Interim Agreement. India commits to eliminate or reduce tariffs on all US industrial goods and a wide range of agricultural products (DDGs, red sorghum, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, soybean oil, wine, spirits) and to purchase >USD 500bn of US energy, ICT, coal, aircraft and aircraft parts, and precious-metals products over five years. The framework also commits the parties to negotiating "robust, ambitious, and mutually beneficial digital trade rules" and to addressing non-tariff barriers in medical devices, ICT import licensing, and food/agricultural standards. US tariff reductions on Indian generic pharmaceuticals, gems, diamonds, aircraft parts, and certain automotive components are flagged as contingent on completion of the full Interim Agreement.

Regulation (EU) 2026/261 of the European Parliament and of the Council (adopted 26 January 2026, in force 3 February 2026) sets a legally binding stepwise ban on imports of Russian-origin natural gas — both liquefied (LNG) and pipeline. Russian LNG under short-term contracts signed before 17 June 2025 is prohibited from 25 April 2026; long-term LNG contracts from 1 January 2027. Russian pipeline gas under short-term contracts is prohibited from 17 June 2026; long-term pipeline gas from 30 September 2027 (latest 1 November 2027 if EU storage targets remain on track). The regulation operates outside the Russia-sanctions architecture (Article 215 TFEU) as a REPowerEU internal-market instrument, with narrow operational-amendment carve- outs and no provision for volume increases.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On 15 October 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 39 entities and specified 51 vessels — including, for the first time, Russia's two largest integrated oil majors PJSC Rosneft Oil Company and PJSC Oil Company Lukoil — for supporting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. 51 vessels (44 identified as "shadow fleet" tankers) were specified for transporting Russian crude oil and LNG in evasion of the G7 price cap. The package also introduced a ban on importing oil products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude, closing a refined-product loophole in the price-cap regime.

On 27 July 2025, President Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reached political agreement at Turnberry, Scotland, on a Framework Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair and Balanced Trade. The framework was formalised in a Joint Statement published on 21 August 2025 by the White House and DG TRADE. The deal establishes a 15% all-inclusive (MFN + Section 232) US tariff ceiling on the vast majority of EU originating goods — including autos, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber, and chemicals — replacing the threatened 20-30% reciprocal tariff trajectory under EO 14257 (April 2025). Steel and aluminium are excluded from the 15% ceiling and remain at the 50% Section 232 rate pending negotiation of a quota solution. In return, the EU commits to: (i) eliminate tariffs on all US industrial goods, (ii) preferential market access for a wide range of US agricultural and seafood products, (iii) suspension of its rebalancing countermeasures under Reg 2025/778 (suspension effective 7 August 2025), (iv) expected energy offtake of $750bn (LNG, oil, nuclear) through 2028, (v) at least $40bn in US AI chip purchases, and (vi) facilitation of $600bn in additional EU corporate investment into the US through 2028. Effective from 1 September 2025, the US applies MFN-only treatment (no 15% top-up) to: aircraft and parts, generic pharmaceuticals and ingredients, chemical precursors, cork, and certain unavailable natural resources. The framework is not legally binding but anchors the bilateral architecture; it is the largest-economy ART-programme deal alongside US-UK, US-Japan, US-Korea, US-Taiwan, and US-Indonesia.

MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 10 [2025] on 4 February 2025, imposing dual-use export-licence controls on items related to tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The controls cover metals, alloys, powders, compounds and related processing technologies across roughly 25 listed item categories (41 HS 10-digit codes). The measure is global in scope but was issued the same day China announced 10-15% retaliatory tariffs on US LNG, coal, crude and farm equipment in response to the Trump administration's 10% fentanyl-tariff hike — extending the MOFCOM critical-minerals control regime beyond gallium/germanium/graphite/antimony/heavy-REEs.

China's Unreliable Entity List (UEL) Working Mechanism, led by MOFCOM, issued Announcement [2025] No. 2 on 4 February 2025, designating PVH Group (parent of Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger) and Illumina Inc. (US genomics / gene-sequencing equipment maker) as Unreliable Entities under the 2020 UEL Provisions, citing violations of normal market-transaction principles and discriminatory measures against Chinese enterprises. PVH was cited for its Xinjiang-cotton sourcing boycott (MOFCOM probe launched September 2024); Illumina was cited for restricting Chinese customers' access to gene-sequencing equipment. The announcement was issued on the same day as China's IEEPA-retaliation tariff package (10–15 % on US coal, LNG, crude oil, agricultural goods, and autos), making it the first UEL listing of a Western consumer-brand / retail company and the first combining a UEL designation with a subsequent sector-specific export prohibition (gene sequencers, imposed 28 February 2025).

President Trump signed three Executive Orders on 1 February 2025 (EO 14193, 14194, 14195) declaring national emergencies under IEEPA over the cross-border flow of fentanyl + illegal migration, and using that authority to impose new tariffs: 25% on imports from Canada (with a reduced 10% rate on Canadian energy products), 25% on imports from Mexico, and an additional 10% on imports from China (separate from pre-existing Section 301 + Section 232 tariffs). The tariffs took effect 4 February 2025. On 3 February 2025 the administration announced a 30-day pause for both Canada and Mexico following bilateral border-enforcement commitments; the China tariff was not paused. China responded 4 February with retaliatory tariffs of 15% on US LNG/coal/farm equipment and additional measures. The package set the precedent for the broader 2 April 2025 "Liberation Day" reciprocal-tariff regime (filed: 2025-04-02-us-trump-reciprocal-tariff-regime).

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), with the UK Foreign Office, announced on 13 January 2025 a sanctions package targeting Russia's oil "shadow fleet" — vessels operated outside Western maritime insurance and flag-state registries to evade the G7+ Russian crude price cap (set at $60/bbl since December 2022). The package designated 18 vessels (oil tankers transporting Russian crude in violation of the cap) and traders, with separate designations of two LNG carriers and two oil-services firms. This is the largest single UK shadow-fleet designation to date and was synchronised with EU Council and US OFAC packages in mid-January 2025.

On 29 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1864, amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 to extend Belarus's sanctions regime so that it mirrors the restrictive measures already in force against Russia, closing routes used to circumvent the Russia sanctions via Belarus. The package bans the import of gold, diamonds, helium, coal and other mineral products (including crude oil) originating in or exported from Belarus; bans the import of goods and technology on the EU Common Military List if of Belarusian origin; extends the export ban on dual-use goods, oil-refining and LNG-liquefaction equipment, maritime-navigation goods and luxury goods to Belarus; prohibits transit via Belarus of EU-exported firearms and ammunition; and broadens the road-transport ban. The measures entered into force on 1 July 2024, the day after publication in the Official Journal.

On 27 June 2024 the Argentine Congress passed Law 27.742, the "Ley de Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Libertad de los Argentinos" ("Ley Bases"), the flagship economic reform of the Milei administration. The law was published in the Boletín Oficial on 8 July 2024 and Title VII established the Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones (RIGI) — a promotional regime designed to attract large-scale capex into mining, energy, oil & gas, LNG, steel, forestry, tourism, infrastructure, and technology. Implementing Decree 749/2024 was issued on 23 August 2024 and the regime became fully operational with Resolution 1074/2024 on 22 October 2024. RIGI offers single-project vehicles ("VPUs") that commit at least USD 200M (with sector-specific thresholds rising to USD 600M and up to USD 2B for long-term "strategic export" projects) a 30-year regulatory, tax, customs and foreign-exchange stability guarantee. Headline benefits include a reduced 25% corporate income tax (vs. 35% standard), accelerated depreciation, full deductibility of inflation adjustments, an import-duty exemption on capital goods and inputs, a phased relaxation of central-bank obligations to repatriate and convert export proceeds (20% free after year one, 40% after year two, 100% after year three), and reduced dividend withholding tax. Disputes are subject to international arbitration under ICSID or UNCITRAL rules. As of mid-2025, RIGI's project pipeline reached USD 33.9B in submitted applications, of which roughly USD 15.7B (46.5%) had been approved across nine projects spanning steel (Sidersa), energy/LNG (PAE Southern Energy, YPF Argentina LNG), three mining projects, and infrastructure. The flagship approval was Rio Tinto's USD 2.5B Rincón battery-grade lithium carbonate plant in Salta (initial 53,000 t/yr, scaling to 60,000 t/yr by 2028) — the first mining project approved under the regime, on 21 May 2025. Strategically, RIGI is Argentina's bid to compete with Chile's lithium framework and Brazil's industrial policies for upstream-critical-minerals capex. Combined with the lifting of Argentina's FX controls (cepo cambiario) in April 2025 it sharply re-rates the country's project-economics math for multinationals — particularly in the Lithium Triangle, the Vaca Muerta shale, and pipeline/LNG infrastructure. Whether the 30-year stability guarantee survives a future change of government is the dominant political-risk overhang on the regime.

On 24 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745, the 14th package of restrictive measures against Russia, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. The package introduces the EU's first targeted measures against Russian LNG (a ban on EU-port transhipment to third countries after a 9-month transition, and a prohibition on EU investment and goods/services exports to Russian LNG projects under construction such as Arctic LNG 2 and Murmansk LNG), bans EU entities outside Russia from using the SPFS Russian financial-messaging system, designates 27 named "shadow-fleet" tankers under a new vessel-specific port-access ban, and imposes a "best-efforts" obligation on EU parents to ensure non-EU subsidiaries do not engage in sanctions circumvention. It adds 116 new listings (69 individuals, 47 entities), including third-country circumvention enablers, to the asset-freeze and travel-ban regime.

Latvia's Saeima adopted on 27 March 2024 amendments to the National Security Law (Nacionālās drošības likums), entering into force on 24 April 2024, that widen the perimeter of foreign-investment and ownership transactions subject to Cabinet of Ministers pre-clearance over "companies of significance to national security." The amendments expand the universe of regulated subjects beyond registered companies to include foundations and associations, tighten the rules on beneficial-ownership disclosure, and bring additional sensitive activities — energy security including LNG-terminal acquisitions, electronic communications, cybersecurity, and critical-raw-materials processing — under the regime, while clarifying Cabinet authority to impose conditions or unwind transactions retroactively. The law functions as Latvia's horizontal FDI-screening instrument under the EU-wide cooperation framework of Regulation 2019/452.

The Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures (Law No. 43 of 2022), enacted 18 May 2022, establishes a four-pillar framework: (1) supply-chain resilience for "specified critical products," (2) security of critical infrastructure, (3) state-backed development of "specified critical technologies," and (4) non-disclosure of nationally sensitive patents. A December 2022 Cabinet Order designated 11 product categories as specified critical products, including semiconductors, storage batteries, permanent magnets, cloud programs, LNG, critical minerals, machine tools, and aircraft parts. Competent ministries must publish stable-supply plans, can fund private-sector surveys, and may provide subsidies to qualifying firms.

Algeria's Law n° 19-13 of 11 December 2019, published in Journal Officiel N° 79 of 22 December 2019, replaces the 2005 hydrocarbons law (Loi n° 05-08) and restructures the entire upstream oil and gas legal-fiscal framework. The law reintroduces Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) and Risk Service Contracts (RSC) alongside the legacy royalty-and-tax Participation Contract model that the 2005 statute had offered as the sole contractual form, and establishes a new three-way institutional architecture separating the Ministry of Energy (policy), Autorité de Régulation des Hydrocarbures (ARH, upstream regulator), and Agence Nationale pour la Valorisation des Ressources en Hydrocarbures (ALNAFT, licensing authority) from Sonatrach's operational NOC role. Sonatrach retains a statutory minimum-participation right and pre-emption privilege across all upstream contracts, while fiscal terms are restructured with basin-maturity and project-economics calibration to attract international investment after the 2014 oil-price collapse froze new entrants.

Senegal's National Assembly adopted Loi n° 2019-04 on 24 January 2019 and President Macky Sall promulgated it on 1 February 2019, establishing the foundational legal framework for maximising Senegalese participation across the entire hydrocarbon value chain — from exploration through decommissioning. The law creates three activity-classification regimes (exclusif, mixte, non-exclusif), mandates priority employment of Senegalese workers, and creates two implementing bodies: the Comité National de Suivi du Contenu Local (CNSCL, via Décret 2020-2046) and the Fonds d'appui au développement du contenu local (FADCL, via Décret 2020-2048). It underpins all petroleum contracts under which Petrosen, Woodside (Sangomar, first oil June 2024), bp/Kosmos (GTA Tortue Ahmeyim, first gas December 2024), and future Yakaar-Teranga development licenses operate.