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On 2 April 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 ("Adjusting Imports of Pharmaceuticals and Pharmaceutical Ingredients into the United States") imposing a 100% ad valorem tariff on imports of patented pharmaceutical products listed in the FDA Orange Book and Purple Book, together with the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and key starting materials used to make them. The base rate takes effect at 12:01 a.m. EDT on 31 July 2026 for the 17 manufacturers identified in Annex III, and on 29 September 2026 for all other companies. The proclamation adopts findings of the Section 232 investigation initiated by the Department of Commerce on 14 April 2025 into pharmaceuticals and APIs as a national- security supply-chain risk. The instrument is structured around a multi-tier rate ladder rather than a flat tariff: concessionary 15% rates for EU/Japan/South Korea/Switzerland/Liechtenstein under reciprocal-deal tracks, 10% for the UK with a pathway to 0% under the pending UK pharmaceutical agreement, a "+20%" surcharge for companies operating under a Commerce-approved onshoring plan (until 2 April 2030), and a 0% pathway for companies that combine an approved onshoring plan with an MFN-pricing agreement with HHS (until 20 January 2029). Generics, biosimilars and their ingredients, orphan drugs, nuclear medicines, plasma-derived therapies, fertility treatments, and cell/gene therapies are carved out.

The US Department of Energy announced $2.7 billion in task-order funding over ten years to rebuild domestic uranium enrichment capacity: $900 million each to American Centrifuge Operating and General Matter to develop high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) enrichment capacity, $900 million to Orano Federal Services to expand low-enriched uranium (LEU) enrichment capacity, and $28 million to Global Laser Enrichment for next-generation enrichment technology. DOE frames the awards as reducing US reliance on foreign — chiefly Russian — enriched uranium supply and securing fuel for the country's 94 commercial reactors and future advanced-reactor deployment, with funds distributed under a milestone-based accountability framework.

On 26 December 2025, Japan's Cabinet approved the FY2026 (Reiwa 8) national budget, which allocates JPY 122.0 billion (~USD 800m) to the "Next-Generation Innovative Reactor Technology Development and Industrial Base Strengthening Support Project" (次世代革新炉の技術開発・産業基盤強化支援事業), up from JPY 88.9 billion in the FY2025 initial budget plus a JPY 6.0 billion FY2025 supplementary allocation. The programme, administered by ANRE under METI's GX (Green Transformation) Promotion budget, funds technology development and supply-chain build-out for Japan's "innovative light-water reactors" (revised BWR/PWR designs with enhanced passive safety) and small modular reactors under the government's GX2040 Vision. The budget takes effect with Japan's fiscal year on 1 April 2026, subject to ordinary Diet passage in early 2026.

On 26 December 2025 the President of Kazakhstan signed a law amending the Code "On Subsoil and Subsoil Use" with respect to the hydrocarbon and uranium sectors, followed on 30 December 2025 by a parallel set of amendments implementing presidential instructions on broader subsoil-use governance. Both packages take effect on 2 March 2026. The uranium amendments grant the National Atomic Company Kazatomprom (KAP) a statutory priority right to obtain exploration licences over prospective uranium areas listed in the State Subsoil Fund Management Programme, and to reserve blocks containing uranium mineralisation or deposits. Where uranium mineralisation is discovered on a solid-mineral block held by a third-party subsoil-user, an extension of that licence is conditional on the licensee surrendering the uranium-bearing block to the State; private subsoil-users no longer obtain priority production rights for uranium they discover. The amendments also raise the minimum direct or indirect Kazatomprom interest in any uranium mining project from 50% to 75%, and permit subsequent transfer to investors or joint-venture partners only subject to that 75% floor. The 30 December 2025 package establishes the National Geological Service as a non-privatisable national operator subordinate to the authorised subsoil-exploration agency and as the operator responsible for managing geological information; it also creates a Unified Subsoil Use Platform digital infrastructure (open geological-information database integrated with the Unified State System for Management of the Fuel and Energy Complex). The hydrocarbon track of the law shortens block-reservation periods and pushes unallocated plots into electronic-auction allocation to accelerate competitive exploration. The amendments accompany an announced USD 500m state geological-exploration programme.

On 18 November 2025, during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's White House visit (17-19 November 2025), the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on Securing Uranium, Metals, Permanent Magnets, and Critical Minerals Supply Chains. The framework was signed by US Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and Saudi Minister of Energy H.R.H. Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, and positions Saudi Arabia (via Ma'aden + Public Investment Fund vehicles) as a regional hub for processing rare earths and producing permanent magnets, supports a US-backed rare-earths refinery in the Kingdom, and channels Saudi capital — alongside the broader USD ~1 trillion Saudi investment commitment in the US announced the same week — into US and allied critical-mineral projects. It is paired with a separate joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperation (Section 123 Agreement contemplated) and was operationalised one day later by the 19 November 2025 binding term sheet between MP Materials, the US Department of War, and Ma'aden to develop a rare-earth refinery in Saudi Arabia (Department of War financing the US side's 49% stake; Ma'aden retaining ≥51%).

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities based in Iran, the UAE, Turkiye, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany and Ukraine for operating procurement networks that supply Iran's ballistic missile and UAV programmes, including missile propellant precursors and UAV components. The action is Treasury's second round of nonproliferation sanctions since the 27 September 2025 reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran ("snapback") over its non-compliance with international nuclear and missile commitments. Designated entities include Iran-based Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), which Treasury says has worked with the IRGC-Qods Force to advance Iran's UAV programme. All property and interests of the designated parties subject to US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them.

On 8 August 2025, Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 595/2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom and its international corporate network. Sanctions were applied to 18 individuals and 17 legal entities identified as involved in attempts to integrate the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant into Russia's grid, participation in the seizure of the Chornobyl NPP, production and servicing of dual-use nuclear equipment, and export of enriched uranium through Rosatom subsidiaries registered in Switzerland, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Finland. Named entities include Uranium One Holding N.V. (Netherlands), Rosatom Finance Ltd (Cyprus), and JSC Kirov-Energomash (Russia).

On 27 July 2025, President Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reached political agreement at Turnberry, Scotland, on a Framework Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair and Balanced Trade. The framework was formalised in a Joint Statement published on 21 August 2025 by the White House and DG TRADE. The deal establishes a 15% all-inclusive (MFN + Section 232) US tariff ceiling on the vast majority of EU originating goods — including autos, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber, and chemicals — replacing the threatened 20-30% reciprocal tariff trajectory under EO 14257 (April 2025). Steel and aluminium are excluded from the 15% ceiling and remain at the 50% Section 232 rate pending negotiation of a quota solution. In return, the EU commits to: (i) eliminate tariffs on all US industrial goods, (ii) preferential market access for a wide range of US agricultural and seafood products, (iii) suspension of its rebalancing countermeasures under Reg 2025/778 (suspension effective 7 August 2025), (iv) expected energy offtake of $750bn (LNG, oil, nuclear) through 2028, (v) at least $40bn in US AI chip purchases, and (vi) facilitation of $600bn in additional EU corporate investment into the US through 2028. Effective from 1 September 2025, the US applies MFN-only treatment (no 15% top-up) to: aircraft and parts, generic pharmaceuticals and ingredients, chemical precursors, cork, and certain unavailable natural resources. The framework is not legally binding but anchors the bilateral architecture; it is the largest-economy ART-programme deal alongside US-UK, US-Japan, US-Korea, US-Taiwan, and US-Indonesia.

The UK's National Wealth Fund, the state-owned investment bank, committed a term loan facility of up to GBP 36.6 billion to finance construction of the Sizewell C nuclear power station in Suffolk. The facility forms the bulk of the project's construction-phase debt, alongside a GBP 5bn Bpifrance Assurance Export-guaranteed loan tranche from a French bank pool. It was announced on 22 July 2025 alongside the UK government's 44.9% equity stake in the project as its largest shareholder.

On 19 June 2025 the Council of Ministers of Niger, presided over by the head of the CNSP transition government, adopted a draft ordonnance nationalising the Société des Mines de l'Aïr (SOMAÏR SA), the joint venture that operates Niger's only currently producing uranium mine at Arlit. The communiqué transfers all SOMAÏR shares and assets to the Nigerien State and provides for compensation to existing shareholders net of legal obligations including mining-site rehabilitation costs. SOMAÏR was 63.40% owned by Orano (the French state-controlled nuclear fuel-cycle company, ex-AREVA) and 36.60% by state-owned SOPAMIN; the government cited "irresponsible, illegal and disloyal" conduct by Orano, the expiry of the prior mining convention on 31 December 2023, and a finding that Orano had taken 86.3% of cumulative production between 1971 and 2024 versus its 63.4% shareholding. The same Council of Ministers also nationalised the electricity utility NIGELEC. Orano announced the same day that it would seek full compensation through arbitration and reserved criminal-action rights against third parties acquiring SOMAÏR uranium stock.

In its first major export-regulatory action of the second Trump administration, BIS amended the EAR to add 70 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (42), Iran (2), Pakistan (19), South Africa (3), and the United Arab Emirates (4), and modified four existing entries (France, Iran, Senegal, UK). New listings carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions available. Stated objectives include restricting China's acquisition of high-performance computing and quantum technologies for military use, impeding hypersonic-weapons development, disrupting Iran's UAV and defense procurement, and impairing Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. The rule also targets the Test Flying Academy of South Africa for using U.S.-origin items to train Chinese military pilots.

On 4 February 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2, "Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran's Malign Influence." The memorandum reimposes the first- term "maximum pressure" framework, directing the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General to (i) drive Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products — including to the People's Republic of China — to zero; (ii) review and modify or rescind sanctions waivers and general licences (notably the Chabahar port waiver benefiting India); (iii) sanction shadow-fleet vessels, intermediaries, refineries (including PRC "teapot" refiners) and oil traders facilitating Iranian energy exports; and (iv) lead a diplomatic isolation campaign including a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions under JCPOA Resolution 2231 paragraph 11. Since promulgation, OFAC has designated 1,000+ Iran-related persons, vessels and aircraft and four PRC independent ("teapot") refiners alleged to have processed sanctioned Iranian crude. The DOJ is also directed to pursue impoundment of Iranian oil cargoes and seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy US-court terrorism-victim judgments.

Mongolia's State Great Hural adopted a comprehensive package of amendments to the 2009 Nuclear Energy Law on 21 November 2024 (approved by 68.1% of votes), restructuring the country's uranium-sector governance across three principal axes. The amendments introduce a dynamic three-tier uranium royalty framework — 5% basic (AMNAT) + 5% special + 0–9% price-linked incremental royalty, yielding approximately 14–19% aggregate — that replaces a flat-rate structure with a price-elastic mechanism designed to capture uranium supercycle upside for the Mongolian state. The law also prohibits export of radioactive minerals in raw ore form (mandatory domestic processing to at least yellowcake/U₃O₈ before export), prohibits import, transit, and disposal of foreign spent nuclear fuel in Mongolia, and provides the parliamentary legal underpinning for the ~USD 1.6 billion Orano (France)– Mongolia state investment agreement on the Zuuvch-Ovoo in-situ-leach uranium deposit (Dornogovi province), signed October 2024, targeting first production in 2028 with eventual ramp-up to ~2,500 t/yr uranium output.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule on 5 September 2024 (effective 6 September 2024, published in the Federal Register on the same day as 89 FR 73285) establishing multilateral export controls on four categories of emerging technologies: (1) quantum computing items including quantum computers, related cryogenic / control / measurement systems, and certain quantum software; (2) gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET) production technology — the next-node semiconductor architecture beyond FinFET; (3) advanced additive-manufacturing equipment for metals + alloys; (4) certain biotech-related items added in a parallel rule on 12 September 2024. The rule operates without country exceptions for some categories, with multilateral coordination via Wassenaar + Australia Group + Nuclear Suppliers Group frameworks.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

On 20–21 June 2024 Niger's Ministry of Mines, acting under the CNSP military-transition government, formally notified the Director General of Imouraren SA (the Orano subsidiary holding the Imouraren uranium permit) that the perimeter of the "IMOURAREN Permit" returned to the public domain of Niger and was freed of all derived rights, in application of articles 59 and 61 of Ordinance no. 93-16 of 2 March 1993 (Niger Mining Law). The decision followed a 7 June 2024 ministerial "note d'information" giving Orano until 19 June to engage development works under the earlier 19 March 2024 mise en demeure, and the Ministry's finding that Orano's 26 April 2024 exploitation plan "did not meet our expectations". Imouraren is one of the world's largest known uranium deposits at ~200,000 t U (Orano-disclosed reserves, originally permitted to AREVA in January 2009 with mine-build paused after the 2011 Fukushima uranium-price collapse). Orano had held 63.4% of Imouraren SA against 36.6% by Niger state-owned Sopamin. Orano notified the public on 20 June 2024 that it took note of the decision, and on 4 December 2024 initiated ICSID arbitration against the Niger state contesting the revocation. The action is the first leg of the 2024–2025 Niger-Orano break (followed by the December 2024 announcement of loss of operational control over Somaïr / Cominak / Imouraren and the June 2025 Somaïr nationalisation announcement).

The Bureau of Industry and Security added 24 entities across 26 entries to the Entity List, effective December 8, 2022, covering Latvia, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates. Three distinct enforcement clusters are addressed: Russian defense-electronics firms and their foreign affiliates supporting Russia's military-industrial base post-Ukraine invasion; Singapore-based front companies that supplied controlled items to PASNA, an Iran-based Specially Designated National; and Pakistani and Emirati entities engaged in unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic-missile proliferation. One entity (Safe Technical Supply Co., LLC) was simultaneously removed from three entries covering Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities — 70 Russian and 1 Belarusian — to the Entity List, effective June 2, 2022, in direct response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The entities were designated as military end users acquiring or attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military, and are subject to a policy of denial for all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Sixty-six entities receive a "footnote 3" military end-user designation, while five face outright denial with no license exceptions available beyond humanitarian food and medicine.

The Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 91 entities (across 96 entries) to the Entity List under 15 CFR Part 744, in direct response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The listed entities span ten destinations — Belize, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malta, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom — and include Russian military research institutes, shipbuilding facilities, aerospace and electronics manufacturers, and suspected front companies in third countries used to circumvent EAR controls. A license is required for all items subject to the EAR; the review policy is denial for 86 entities and case-by-case (for US Government-supported space programs) for five.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.

France 2030 is a €54 billion public investment plan unveiled by President Emmanuel Macron on 12 October 2021 to fund breakthrough innovation and reindustrialisation across ten strategic priorities — small modular nuclear reactors, green hydrogen, low-carbon transport (incl. two million EVs/year), food/agritech, twenty drug therapies for cancer and chronic disease, cultural industries, space, deep-sea exploration, semiconductors and electronic components, and robotics/digital (AI/cloud). Two cross-cutting rules require 50% of investment to flow to decarbonisation and 50% to emerging innovative players. Operationalised from the 2022 budget law, the plan is coordinated by the Secrétariat général pour l'investissement (SGPI) under the Prime Minister and delivered by ANR, ADEME, Bpifrance and Caisse des Dépôts / Banque des Territoires.

Regulation (EU) 2021/821, adopted 20 May 2021 and applied from 9 September 2021, establishes the Union regime for controlling exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, repealing Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Annex I lists controlled items implementing internationally agreed dual-use controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG, and Chemical Weapons Convention. The regulation introduces a new catch-all control on cyber-surveillance technologies that could facilitate human-rights violations (Art. 5 and Annex IV), and strengthens cooperation between Member States and the European Commission, placing specific obligations on exporters. It serves as the statutory anchor for all EU export licences, every multilateral-regime transposition into EU law, and coordination mechanisms with US BIS, UK ECJU, JP METI, and KR MOTIE export-control regimes.

The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (c.25), receiving Royal Assent on 29 April 2021 and entering full force on 4 January 2022, created the UK's first standalone investment-screening regime, separating national-security review from the Competition and Markets Authority merger-control process. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to call in any acquisition of "control or influence" over a qualifying entity or asset on national-security grounds, and designates 17 sensitive sectors in which acquisitions crossing 25%/50%/75% share-or-voting-rights thresholds (or material influence) require mandatory pre-completion notification to the Investment Security Unit (Cabinet Office); completion before clearance is void and criminal sanctions of up to 5 years imprisonment apply to non-notifying parties. The Act is the structural peer of US CFIUS/FIRRMA (2018), EU Regulation 2019/452, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479, Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the broader allied FDI-screening parent-statute lattice, and the enabling statute under which all UK mandatory-notification schedule amendments operate.

The Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted by the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress on 17 October 2020 (Presidential Order No. 58) and entered into force on 1 December 2020. Comprising 5 chapters and 49 articles, it establishes the unified statutory framework governing China's export-control regime over dual-use items, military items, nuclear items, and other goods, technologies, services, and data whose export could affect national security or China's non-proliferation obligations. The law introduces comprehensive licensing requirements, end-user and end-use certification, deemed-export and re-export controls with extraterritorial reach, a Controlled Entities List (CEL) with matching-entity restrictions, and substantial criminal and administrative penalties — and it is the parent statutory authority under which every China export-control implementing instrument in the IPTM register operates.

On 27 December 2017 President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed Code No. 125-VI ZRK "On Subsoil and Subsoil Use," a wholesale recodification replacing the 2010 Subsoil Use Law that entered into force on 29 June 2018 (with certain provisions deferred to 1 January 2019). The Code establishes the licensing architecture for all mineral extraction in Kazakhstan — the world's leading uranium producer (~40% of global U₃O₈ output, ~22,000 tU/yr) and a top-11 oil exporter (~1.8 mbpd) — covering solid minerals, hydrocarbons, and uranium under a single codified framework. For solid minerals the Code introduces a liberalised "first-come first-served" auction-free licence model for non-strategic deposits and a state-tender model for strategic deposits, alongside subsoil-use rights transfer and pledge provisions governing all M&A in the sector. For uranium the Code codifies the National Atomic Company Kazatomprom's statutory role as state operator over all uranium blocks, with government priority pre-emption rights and mandatory Kazatomprom participation in all production licences. For hydrocarbons the Code establishes the concession and production-sharing framework governing the pre-salt Caspian mega-projects (Tengiz, Karachaganak, Kashagan) and the model contract architecture for petroleum products. Horizontal obligations — local Kazakh-content procurement floors, social-package requirements, and environmental-restoration mine-closure security — apply across all subsoil-use categories. Structurally this Code is the parent statute for every subsequently filed KZ action: the 2023-12-28 REE Comprehensive Plan and the 2025-12-26 Kazatomprom uranium-priority amendments both operate under delegated authority created by this Code.

The Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA), Act No. 5559, is the foundational statute governing all inbound foreign direct investment into the Republic of Korea. Enacted 16 September 1998 by the National Assembly under President Kim Dae-jung as part of IMF-conditionality-driven economic-liberalisation reforms following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, it replaced the 1966 Foreign Capital Inducement Act (외자도입법). FIPA establishes the MOTIE-chaired Foreign Investment Committee, the Invest Korea (KOTRA) operational arm, and national-security/public-order restrictions on FDI in sensitive industries under Article 4 — the primary legal authority for all inward-FDI screening, conditional-approval, and prohibition decisions. It also creates the Foreign Investment Zone (FIZ) and Cash Grant Programme incentive architecture that continues to underpin major semiconductor and EV-battery FDI into Korea.

South Korea's Foreign Trade Act (대외무역법, Act No. 5211, enacted 31 December 1986 and repeatedly amended) is the foundational statutory framework of the Republic of Korea's foreign trade and export-control regime. It establishes the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) as the administering authority for foreign trade policy and empowers it to designate strategic items, issue and revoke export licences, operate catch-all controls over non-listed goods destined for WMD-development end-uses, and coordinate with the Nuclear Suppliers Group-administered National Security Authority for Strategic Commerce (NSASC) on Category-0 nuclear items and the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) on military goods. Every MOTIE strategic-items notification (the "Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Materials," currently encompassing Categories 1-9 dual-use items harmonised with Wassenaar, MTCR, AG, and NSG) and every MOTIE outbound-investment screening measure derives its legal authority from the Act.