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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 7 September 2026 the UK made the Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2026 (SI 2026/983), laid before Parliament 8 September 2026 and due to come into force 29 September 2026. The instrument substantially rewrites the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 and the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2019, adding new financial restrictions (bans on loans, credit and joint ventures with Iranian manufacturing, oil/gas, petrochemical and uranium interests; a ban on UK banks opening accounts or representative offices for Iranian banks; an insurance/reinsurance ban; a ban on trading Iranian government bonds issued after the regulation date), new trade-control chapters covering gold/precious metals/diamonds, energy-related goods and services, and sectoral software, new import bans on Iranian gold, oil, petrochemicals and natural gas, and new aircraft/shipping parts restricting Iranian cargo flights, chartering of specified vessels, and UK port entry and ship registration for sanctions-evading vessels.
On 24 August 2026, the Director of OFAC, in consultation with the Department of State and pursuant to 31 CFR 560.802, determined that section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13902 shall apply to the aviation, digital asset, gold, shipping, and technology sectors of the Iranian economy, effective the same day and formally published in the Federal Register on 27 August 2026 (FR Doc 2026-17487). The determination — part of a Treasury campaign publicly branded "Operation Economic Outcast" — exposes any person operating in, or knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer of significant goods or services to or from, these five sectors to secondary-sanctions and SDN-listing risk under E.O. 13902, and extends potential correspondent/ payable-through account restrictions to foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate such transactions. OFAC did not publish sector definitions and concurrently suspended several general licenses covering educational exchange, personal remittance, conference, and academic/ sports-exchange activity with Iran (administered separately via GL AA and GL BB, wind-down through 8 September 2026).
On 25 February 2026 the Swiss Federal Council adopted extensive amendments to the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (Ukraine Ordinance) and the Ordinance on Measures against Belarus, completing implementation of the EU's 19th sanctions package with effect from 26 February 2026. Headline measures: a complete ban on the purchase and import of Russian LNG taking effect 25 April 2026 (transition period until end-2026 for pre-existing long-term contracts); a complete prohibition on the provision of crypto-asset services to Russian persons and companies; new service bans covering advanced-technology / AI / high-performance-computing services and tourism-related services; expansion of the dual-use end-user list (Annex 2) including additional Chinese entities; SECO authority to grant divestment-exemption licences until end-2026 under Art. 30a; and parallel adoption of the EU October 2025 Belarus measures via amendment to the Belarus Ordinance.
Canada made SOR/2025-143, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered 2025-06-13. The regulations add 14 new items (743-756) to Part 2 of Schedule 1, designating Russian quantum-technology institutions and firms — including the Moscow State University Quantum Technology Centre, the National University of Science and Technology's Centre for Quantum Communications, QRate, and Rusnano — triggering a dealings ban and asset freeze. The same instrument adds a new import prohibition on coal products (Schedule 5.01) and a new export prohibition on jet fuel and additives (Schedule 5.02) and on chemical/ biological-weapons-related items (Schedule 10.1), and extends the existing metals import ban (Schedule 11) to further product lines — all coming into force 60 days after registration (~2025-08-12), with a 120-day grace period for pre-existing contracts.
China's Unreliable Entity List (UEL) Working Mechanism, led by MOFCOM, issued Announcement [2025] No. 2 on 4 February 2025, designating PVH Group (parent of Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger) and Illumina Inc. (US genomics / gene-sequencing equipment maker) as Unreliable Entities under the 2020 UEL Provisions, citing violations of normal market-transaction principles and discriminatory measures against Chinese enterprises. PVH was cited for its Xinjiang-cotton sourcing boycott (MOFCOM probe launched September 2024); Illumina was cited for restricting Chinese customers' access to gene-sequencing equipment. The announcement was issued on the same day as China's IEEPA-retaliation tariff package (10–15 % on US coal, LNG, crude oil, agricultural goods, and autos), making it the first UEL listing of a Western consumer-brand / retail company and the first combining a UEL designation with a subsequent sector-specific export prohibition (gene sequencers, imposed 28 February 2025).
On 29 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1864, amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 to extend Belarus's sanctions regime so that it mirrors the restrictive measures already in force against Russia, closing routes used to circumvent the Russia sanctions via Belarus. The package bans the import of gold, diamonds, helium, coal and other mineral products (including crude oil) originating in or exported from Belarus; bans the import of goods and technology on the EU Common Military List if of Belarusian origin; extends the export ban on dual-use goods, oil-refining and LNG-liquefaction equipment, maritime-navigation goods and luxury goods to Belarus; prohibits transit via Belarus of EU-exported firearms and ammunition; and broadens the road-transport ban. The measures entered into force on 1 July 2024, the day after publication in the Official Journal.
On 29 February 2024 Switzerland's WBF decided to align with the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package by amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), effective 1 March 2024 at 18:00 CET. The amendment adds over 100 individuals and nearly 90 entities — mainly Russian military-industrial-complex firms and suppliers of DPRK-sourced weapons to Russia — to the asset-freeze and designation lists, and extends the dual-use/military-technology export ban to 27 additional companies believed to be circumventing existing controls.
On 23 February 2024, two years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and comprising the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package. It adds new CN codes to the export-ban annexes (dual-use and advanced-technology goods) and adds 27 entities — including firms based in China, Hong Kong, India, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Thailand and Turkiye — to the list of parties barred from any exemption from the export ban, on the basis they are assessed to be supporting Russia's military-industrial complex via circumvention routes. Asset-freeze listings (106 individuals, 88 entities) under the parallel Council Decision took effect 23 February 2024; the sectoral trade measures took effect 24 February 2024.
Poland's Minister of Development and Technology, Waldemar Buda, established a temporary compulsory administrator (tymczasowy zarządca przymusowy) over the Grupa Azoty S.A. shares held by sanctioned Russian oligarch Vyacheslav Kantor through three holding vehicles — Norica Holding S.à r.l. (Luxembourg), Opansa Enterprises Limited and Rainbee Holdings Limited (both Cyprus) — which together controlled 19.82% of the state-linked fertiliser and chemicals group, worth over PLN 0.5bn. The ministry cited Kantor's inclusion on Poland's sanctions list and the protection of the country's economic and energy security, and stated its intent to find a buyer for the stake and compensate Kantor. The Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw (WSA) later overturned the decision establishing the administration; the ministry did not appeal, and the ruling became final around 30 July 2024, ending the administrator's mandate — though the underlying EU/Polish sanctions on Kantor continue to freeze his ability to exercise any rights attached to the shares.
On 23 June 2023 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and comprising the EU's 11th Russia sanctions package. It extends the list of goods generating significant revenue for Russia subject to import bans, adds further export-ban categories (including additional industrial goods, dual-use and advanced-technology items), and introduces a new anti-circumvention tool (Article 12g) allowing the EU to restrict exports of specified sanctioned goods and technology to third countries assessed as high-risk transshipment routes for Russia. Asset-freeze listings under the parallel Council Decision took effect 23 June 2023; the sectoral trade measures took effect 24 June 2023.
On 25 February 2023, one year into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2023/427, the 10th package of sanctions, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. It entered into force on publication the following day (26 February 2023). The package bans imports of asphalt and synthetic rubber from Russia (with a temporary transitional import quota for rubber products running to 30 June 2024), expands the export ban on dual-use and advanced-technology goods, suspends further Russian media broadcasting licences in the EU, and designates 87 individuals and 34 entities — including Iranian persons and entities involved in drone manufacture and supply, and 96 entities tied to Russia's defence-industrial base — to the EU asset-freeze/travel-ban list.
On 16 December 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474, the 9th package of restrictive measures against Russia, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. It entered into force on publication the following day (17 December 2022). The package extends the prohibition on new EU investment from the Russian energy sector to the Russian mining and quarrying sector, bans exports of aircraft and drone engines and their parts to Russia (and to any third country that could re-supply drones to Russia), adds 168 entities to the sectoral export- control annex covering chemicals, nerve agents, night-vision and radio- navigation equipment, electronics and IT components, and prohibits EU advertising, market-research, product-testing and technical-inspection services to Russia. A parallel Council Decision/Implementing Regulation designated a further 141 individuals and 49 entities to the EU asset-freeze and travel-ban list.
The UK laid the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (UKSI 2022/748), in force 5 July 2022, extending the Belarus sanctions regime to mirror measures already imposed on Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. The regulations ban export to Belarus of dual-use goods and technology for all purposes, and of critical-industry goods and technology including quantum-computing components, microelectronics, marine and navigation equipment, and aircraft/aircraft parts. They widen existing import bans to cover a greater range of petroleum/mineral products and prohibit import of arms, iron and steel products originating in or consigned from Belarus, and extend financial sanctions barring Belarusian companies from issuing debt or securities in London or obtaining loans from UK banks, and barring UK persons from providing financial services to the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus or the Belarusian Ministry of Finance.
On 1 March 2022, OFAC published an interim final rule adding the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR) at 31 CFR Part 587, codifying into Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations all prohibitions previously imposed by Executive Order 14024 of 15 April 2021. The regulations were issued in abbreviated form to provide immediate public guidance, with OFAC indicating an intent to supplement them with additional definitions, general licenses, and interpretive guidance. All transactions prohibited under EO 14024 — including prior sectoral determinations and directives targeting Russia's financial services sector, sovereign debt markets, and key state institutions — are formally prohibited under Part 587, giving domestic courts and compliance teams a stable regulatory anchor.