Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On 20 May 2026 President Prabowo Subianto signed a Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah tentang Tata Kelola Ekspor Komoditas Sumber Daya Alam) establishing PT Danantara Sumber Daya Indonesia (DSI) — a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Danantara sovereign-investment holding company — as the sole legal exporter ("eksportir tunggal") for palm oil (CPO and derivatives), thermal and metallurgical coal, and ferroalloys (ferronickel, nickel pig iron, ferromanganese, ferrochrome), representing approximately USD 65 billion in annual Indonesian export proceeds. A phased implementation architecture applies: a transition period from 1 June through 31 August 2026 during which private exporters continue direct contractual relationships but must route all export documentation through DSI as the mandatory single-window reporting layer; followed by full implementation from 1 September 2026 under which DSI assumes the entire export chain including contract negotiation, buyer relationship, shipment booking, and payment receipt. The stated rationale is to strengthen export-flow oversight, eliminate under-invoicing and transfer-pricing-driven capital flight, and improve DHE-SDA foreign-exchange retention compliance.

On 2 May 2026, MOFCOM issued Announcement No. 21 of 2026 — the first concrete prohibition order ever issued under China's 2021 "Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures" (Blocking Rules) and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL). The order prohibits any Chinese organisation, individual, or foreign party operating in China from recognising, enforcing, or complying with US sanctions imposed under Executive Orders 13902 and 13846 against five Chinese independent ("teapot") refineries — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refining Co., Ltd., Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd., Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group Co., Ltd., Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd., and Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. — all designated by OFAC for purchasing Iranian crude. The announcement is the first operational test of the framework built up across the AFSL (2021), the AFSL Implementation Regulations (Order 803, March 2025), and State Council Order 835 on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (April 2026), and creates a direct compliance conflict for banks, insurers, traders, and shipping companies operating in or with China that had been winding down their exposure to the listed refineries.

On May 1, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated China-based independent ("teapot") refinery Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. — described as China's second-largest teapot — together with approximately 40 shipping firms and vessels operating as part of Iran's shadow fleet. OFAC sanctioned 19 shadow-fleet vessels (crude, LPG, and petrochemical tankers) as blocked property of designated owners or managers. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors) in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. Treasury press release SB0472. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License W authorising the wind-down of transactions involving the persons newly blocked on May 1, 2026, and published a structurally novel Iran-related Alert, "Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage." The Alert states that payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC — directly or indirectly — for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz are not authorised for US persons (including US financial institutions) or US-owned/-controlled foreign entities. OFAC also issued new FAQ 1250 to accompany the Alert and GL W. The wave is one of the largest single-day Iran enforcement actions of the Trump 2.0 administration. Treasury characterises it as part of a campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The Strait of Hormuz Alert is the operational US response to Iranian regulatory threats against the ~20% of global oil and ~25% of global LNG transiting Hormuz, putting tanker owners, P&I clubs, flag states, and oil-buyer compliance teams on direct notice.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative released the 2026 Special 301 Report on 30 April 2026, designating Vietnam as a Priority Foreign Country (PFC) — the most severe category under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2242). This is the first PFC designation since Ukraine held the status from 2013 through 2015, a gap of approximately 11 years. The PFC designation triggers a statutory 30-day window (expiring ~30 May 2026) within which USTR must decide whether to initiate a Section 301 investigation under 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A), which could lead to tariffs, withdrawal of trade benefits, or other Section 301 enforcement remedies against Vietnam. Separately, the EU was added to the Watch List for the first time, citing AI training-data, geographical-indications, and customs-enforcement concerns.

On April 24, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added 19 entities and 19 vessels to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. The action is the first OFAC designation of a Chinese independent ("teapot") refinery — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., described as one of Iran's largest single customers for crude oil and petroleum products, having purchased billions of US dollars' worth since at least 2023 from cargoes brokered by Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (the oil sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff, controlled by the Ministry of Defense / MODAFL). Co-designations span shipping firms and vessels registered in China, Hong Kong, Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Vietnam. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License V authorising a 30-day wind-down (through May 24, 2026) of transactions involving Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. and certain majority-owned entities. Treasury press release SB0472 ("Economic Fury Targets Global Network Fueling Iran's Oil Trade and Shadow Fleet") frames the action as part of the maximum-pressure campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The April 24 designations directly triggered the first-ever operational use of China's Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Announcement No. 21 of May 2, 2026) and preceded a second OFAC Iran wave on May 1, 2026 (General License W + Strait of Hormuz Sanctions Risk Alert).

Presidential decree signed by President Claudia Sheinbaum and published in the evening edition of the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 23 April 2026, in force 24 April 2026. The decree amends the Tariff of the Ley de los Impuestos Generales de Importación y de Exportación (LIGIE/TIGIE) and the Decreto que establece diversos Programas de Promoción Sectorial (PROSEC), imposing MFN import duties at 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 30% or 35% ad valorem on 185 tariff fractions covering chemical products, cosmetics, paper and cardboard, textiles, steel, graphic arts, aluminum manufactures, auto parts, electrical material, bicycles, musical instruments, furniture, wind turbines, and trailers. Goods originating in countries with which Mexico has a free-trade agreement remain eligible for preferential treatment, so practical incidence falls on China and other non-FTA suppliers (Korea, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, Taiwan, UAE, South Africa). Paired PROSEC modifications add tariff fractions to Article 5 sections I, II.b and XIX (electrical, electronic, automotive and auto-parts industries) at exempt (EX) rates.

The European Commission approved on 30 March 2026 an Italian state aid scheme (SA.118992) worth up to €6 billion to support domestic production of renewable hydrogen for the transport and industrial sectors, running through 31 December 2029. The scheme operates via two-way contracts for difference (CfD): a strike price is set through competitive bidding, with Italy compensating producers when market prices fall below the strike price and producers reimbursing the state when prices exceed it. SA.118992 is the first sectorally-specialised renewable-hydrogen CISAF approval on the register — distinct from the cleantech- manufacturing cohort (solar/wind/batteries) — and at €6 billion is the largest individual CISAF approval to date, roughly 4× the Bulgaria SA.120414 electricity-price precedent and ~2× Germany SA.121215.

India's Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved the Bharat Audyogik Vikas Yojna (BHAVYA) on 18 March 2026 with a ₹33,660 crore (~USD 4.0bn) outlay over six years (FY 2026-27 to FY 2031-32) to develop 100 plug-and-play industrial parks of 100-1,000 acres each across all states and Union Territories. Financial assistance of up to ₹1 crore per acre supports core infrastructure (internal roads, underground utilities, drainage, common treatment, ICT), value-added infrastructure (ready-built sheds, built-to-suit units, testing labs, warehousing), and social infrastructure (worker housing). The scheme is sector-agnostic and is implemented by the National Industrial Corridor Development Corporation (NICDC) under DPIIT, with states forming Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and committing to single-window clearances. The first phase will deliver 50 parks.

The European Commission approved a €3 billion German state aid scheme (SA.121215) under the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF), authorising federal support for strategic investments in cleantech manufacturing capacity across Germany through 31 December 2030. Aid is delivered via grants, tax advantages, and interest subsidies or guarantees for new loans, and is open to companies across the entire German territory. Eligible activities cover the production of net-zero technologies listed in Annex II of the CISAF — including batteries, solar PV, wind turbines, electrolysers, heat pumps, and CCUS equipment — as well as the production of new or recovered critical raw materials necessary for those final products and main specific components. This is the first €3-billion-tier individual CISAF approval in the register and establishes Germany as the principal Member State implementer of the Clean Industrial Deal's manufacturing-capacity investment pillar.

On 3 February 2026 the European Commission opened an in-depth Phase II investigation under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) — the second FSR ex officio case and the first targeting the renewable-energy wind-OEM sector — into whether Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. and its EU affiliates received Chinese foreign subsidies (grants, preferential tax treatment, and state-bank preferential financing) that distort competition for wind-turbine supply and services in the EU internal market. The case (FS.100143) follows the April 2024 preliminary-review opening and subjects Goldwind to an 18-month Phase II investigation with potential redressive-measures decision. The action structurally extends the FSR enforcement perimeter from security equipment (Nuctech, FS.100068) into the green-transition energy-equipment supply chain.

The UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero raised the fixed-bottom offshore wind budget pot for Contracts for Difference (CfD) Allocation Round 7 (AR7) from GBP 900 million to GBP 1.79 billion ahead of results, nearly doubling the subsidy envelope. On 14 January 2026 DESNZ announced AR7 results securing a record 8.4 GW of offshore wind capacity across eight projects at a clearing strike price of approximately GBP 91/MWh (2024 prices), unlocking an estimated GBP 22 billion in private-sector investment. RWE was the largest winner with 6.9 GW (Norfolk Vanguard East/West, Dogger Bank South, Awel y Môr); SSE secured 1.4 GW via Berwick Bank Phase B at GBP 89.49/MWh.

On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan passed the Artificial Intelligence Basic Act (人工智慧基本法) on third reading on 23 December 2025, and President Lai Ching-te promulgated the 20-article statute on 14 January 2026, bringing it into force immediately. The Act designates the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) as the central AI-policy competent authority and codifies seven governance principles — sustainability and well-being, human autonomy, privacy protection and data governance, cybersecurity and safety, transparency and explainability, fairness and non-discrimination, and accountability — that apply to all public-sector AI procurement and high-risk sectoral applications. The statute establishes a statutory foundation for the Taiwan AI Action Plan 2.0, mandates an Executive Yuan National AI Strategy Committee, and provides authority for sector-specific implementing regulations by FSC, NCC, MOHW, and MOTC across finance, telecoms, medical, and autonomous-vehicle AI within a two-year window. As the first national AI governance statute in the Greater China region and the third globally after the EU AI Act and South Korea's AI Basic Act, it frames regulatory expectations for the companies at the heart of the global AI hardware supply chain — TSMC, NVIDIA ODM partners, and advanced-packaging incumbents — that are headquartered or operate substantially in Taiwan.

Arrêté ministériel n° 00964/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2025, signed 19 December 2025 by DRC Mines Minister Louis Watum Kabamba, suspends with immediate effect all activities of entities (notably comptoirs d'achat / buying counters, treatment units and similar structures) involved in the purchase, processing, transformation and commercialisation of copper and cobalt minerals sourced from artisanal exploitation across the country. Industrial, legally established mining operators are excluded. The order requires affected entities to submit compliance documentation within ten days, establishes an ad hoc commission to verify administrative, legal, technical and traceability conformity (15-day review window), and obliges operators to demonstrate the lawful origin of their supplies in line with OECD due-diligence guidance. Framed as a "conservatory" measure to restore order in the cupro-cobaltifère value chain and curb illicit exports.

The European Commission approved a €4.1 billion Hungarian state aid scheme (SA.120705) under Section 6.1 of the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF), authorising grants and tax advantages for strategic investments that add cleantech-manufacturing capacity across Hungary through 31 December 2030. Eligible activities cover net-zero technologies listed in Annex II of the CISAF — batteries, solar PV, wind turbines, electrolysers, heat pumps, and CCUS equipment — plus their main specific components and the production or recovery of related critical raw materials. The scheme is open to companies across the whole territory of Hungary and is the CISAF-era successor to Hungary's EUR 2.36 billion TCTF net-zero scheme (approved 2023-08-30, aid deadline 31 December 2025), which channelled the bulk of Chinese and Korean battery/EV-supply-chain FDI into the Debrecen–Szeged–Göd–Nyíregyháza industrial cluster.

On 10 December 2025 the National Assembly of Vietnam adopted Law No. 134/2025/QH15 on Artificial Intelligence (8 chapters, 35 articles), Vietnam's first dedicated AI statutory framework and one of the first comprehensive horizontal AI laws in Southeast Asia. The law establishes a three-tier risk-based regulatory architecture (high / medium / low) for the research, development, provision, deployment, and use of AI systems; defines the rights and obligations of providers, deployers, importers, distributors, and users; and mandates state oversight via the Ministry of Information & Communications and Ministry of Science & Technology. Prohibited acts include systematic deception, manipulation of human perception, generation of fake content endangering national security, exploitation of vulnerable populations, and obstruction of human-supervision mechanisms. The law applies to Vietnamese agencies, organizations, and individuals as well as foreign organizations and individuals involved in AI-related activities in Vietnam, taking effect 1 March 2026 with 12-18 month transition windows for existing systems depending on sector.

Vietnam's National Assembly passed Law on Cybersecurity No. 116/2025/QH15 on 10 December 2025 (434 of 443 deputies in favour), effective 1 July 2026. The law supersedes both the 2018 Cybersecurity Law (Law 24/2018/QH14) and the 2015 Law on Cyber Information Security, consolidating cybersecurity, cyber-information-security, and network-information-security into a unified Ministry of Public Security-led framework. It retains data-localization obligations for foreign digital-service providers handling personal data, user-generated content, and relationship graphs of Vietnamese users (minimum 24-month retention), introduces 6-hour urgent / 24-hour standard content take-down windows on MPS request, expressly prohibits AI/deepfake forgery of images, voices, and videos for illegal purposes, and mandates child-safety platform measures.

On 26 November 2025 Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a package of measures to protect Canada's steel and softwood lumber industries, effective 26 December 2025. For steel, Canada tightened the tariff-rate quota (TRQ) available to countries without a Canada free trade agreement from 50% to 20% of 2024 import levels, and cut the TRQ for FTA partners outside CUSMA (i.e. not the US/Mexico) from 100% to 75% of 2024 levels; imports above quota face a 50% surtax. A new 25% tariff on the full value of listed steel-derivative products (doors, windows, fasteners, structural components and related goods) applies to all countries, covering an estimated CAD 10 billion+ of derivative imports. For softwood lumber, Canada added CAD 500 million to the BDC Softwood Lumber Guarantee Program (bringing it to CAD 1.2 billion) and earmarked a further CAD 500 million under the Large Enterprise Tariff Loan facility for lumber-sector liquidity support.

On 26 November 2025 the Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved a Rs 7,280 crore (~USD 800 million) scheme to establish 6,000 MTPA of integrated sintered Rare Earth Permanent Magnet (REPM) manufacturing capacity in India. The Ministry of Heavy Industries will allocate capacity to five beneficiaries (up to 1,200 MTPA each) via global competitive bidding. The package combines a Rs 6,450 crore sales-linked incentive (PLI-style, paid on REPM sales over 5 years) with a Rs 750 crore capital subsidy for facility build-out. The scheme runs 7 years from award (2-year gestation + 5-year disbursement) and covers the full value chain from rare-earth oxides through metals, alloys, to finished sintered Nd-Fe-B and SmCo magnets.

India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) notified the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 via Gazette notification G.S.R. 846(E) on 13 November 2025, operationalising the 2023 DPDP Act. The Rules introduce a "negative list" cross-border personal-data transfer regime under Rule 14, verifiable parental consent, breach-notification windows, and tiered penalties up to INR 250 crore. Implementation is phased: Data Protection Board provisions in force on notification, Consent Manager rules from 13 Nov 2026, and core data-fiduciary / cross-border-transfer obligations from 13 May 2027.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On October 22, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added Open Joint Stock Company Rosneft Oil Company ("Rosneft") and Lukoil OAO ("Lukoil") — together with dozens of named Russia-based subsidiaries — to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 14024 for "operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy." It is the first US designation of Russia's two largest integrated oil majors since the 2022 invasion-era sanctions architecture began. Under OFAC's 50% Rule, the blocking extends automatically to all entities owned 50% or more, directly or indirectly, by Rosneft or Lukoil — capturing a sprawling global subsidiary network including Lukoil retail/refining assets in Belgium, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Finland, the West Qurna-2 upstream stake in Iraq, and Lukoil Americas. Rosneft and Lukoil together account for roughly half of Russian crude exports (~5 mb/d combined production) and Lukoil holds a ~9% European retail-fuel market share. OFAC simultaneously issued General License 124 (Caspian Pipeline Consortium / Tengizchevroil / Karachaganak Kazakhstan-pipeline carve-out, no expiry), General License 125 (Lukoil retail service stations outside Russia, wind-down to November 21, 2025), General License 126 (general wind-down to November 21, 2025) and General License 127 (debt/equity divestment and derivatives wind-down to November 21, 2025). GL 131 (issued November 14, 2025) opened a divestment window for Lukoil International GmbH; subsequent GL 134/134A/134B extended cargo-offload authorisations through April–May 2026. The action was coordinated same-day with UK OFSI Rosneft/Lukoil designations and the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package adopted October 23, 2025 — the first major US-led Russia-energy escalation under the second Trump administration.

Presidential Decree (Cumhurbaşkanı Kararı) No. 10436, published in the Resmi Gazete on 22 September 2025, amends Türkiye's Import Regime Decision and the Additional Customs Duty Decision to standardise additional customs duty on passenger-vehicle imports (HS 8703) from all countries other than the ~24 FTA/customs-union partners (EU member states, South Korea, UK, Qatar and others). Rates are set at 25% or a minimum of USD 6,000/unit for conventional and non-plug-in hybrid vehicles, 30% or a minimum of USD 7,000/unit for plug-in hybrids, and 30% or a minimum of USD 8,500/unit for battery-electric vehicles. The decree enters into force 60 days after publication (21 November 2025), with a 30-day transition window in which declarations registered under the prior (lower or absent) duty regime are grandfathered.

Republic Act 12253, signed by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. on 4 September 2025, replaces the Philippines' long-standing flat-royalty regime for large-scale metallic mining with a five-tier margin-based royalty (1–5% on income from mines outside mineral reservations; 5% retained inside reservations) layered on a five-tier windfall-profits tax (1–10% on profits above a 30% margin), and ring-fences each mining agreement as a separate taxable entity. The law amends the National Internal Revenue Code (RA 8424) and is projected to raise an additional PHP 25.08 bn over 2026–2029. The new fiscal regime became operative on 17 February 2026, 150 days after effectivity, with DOF-issued IRR.

On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On 2025-07-08 President Trump issued a Section 721 (Defense Production Act) order retroactively prohibiting Hong Kong-based Suirui International Co., Ltd.'s 2020 acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC, a US video-wall and audio-visual technology maker, from Foxconn. CFIUS found the transaction posed a national security risk because a Chinese military company holds an indirect interest in Suirui Group and can appoint one of its directors, creating a risk that Jupiter's products — used in military and critical- infrastructure environments — could be compromised. The order requires Suirui to fully divest all interests and rights in Jupiter within 120 days of the order (extendable at CFIUS's discretion) and bars Jupiter from holding interests in Suirui-linked Asian subsidiaries formed after the 2020 deal.

H.R.1, the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" (Public Law 119-21), was signed into law by President Trump on 4 July 2025. The budget-reconciliation statute is the single largest reversal of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) industrial-policy framework: it accelerates the termination of IRA-era clean- energy tax credits and overlays a new "Foreign Entity of Concern" (FEOC) / "Prohibited Foreign Entity" (PFE) regime on the credits that survive. The §25E used-EV credit, the §30D new clean-vehicle credit, the §45W commercial clean-vehicle credit, and the §30C alternative-fuel-refueling-property credit terminate for vehicles or property placed in service after 30 September 2025. The §25C energy-efficient home improvement credit and the §25D residential clean-energy credit terminate for property placed in service after 31 December 2025. The §45Y clean-electricity production credit and §48E clean-electricity investment credit are eliminated for wind and solar facilities placed in service after 31 December 2027, with a safe harbour for projects whose construction begins on or before 4 July 2026. From 1 January 2026, projects beginning construction must satisfy "material assistance" thresholds limiting the share of components, subcomponents and critical minerals sourced from prohibited foreign entities (PRC, Russia, Iran, DPRK and entities controlled by them). For §45Y/§48E facilities the threshold starts at 40% non-PFE content in 2026 and steps up by 5 percentage points per year through 2030; for §45X advanced manufacturing PTC the analogous schedule begins at 50% in 2026 and rises through the decade. CBO scored the package's energy-credit terminations as generating roughly USD 280bn of revenue (gross), of which USD 77.4bn from §25D termination, USD 21.2bn from §25C, USD 77.8bn from §30D, USD 104.5bn from §45W, and USD 2bn from §30C, partially offsetting the bill's other tax cuts. The bill simultaneously re-authorises and broadens the §48D advanced manufacturing investment tax credit for semiconductor fabs, raising the credit rate from 25% to 35% for property placed in service after 31 December 2025 (preserving the CHIPS Act-aligned semiconductor leg of the IRA-era stack). The OBBBA therefore reshapes the IRA from a broad-based clean-energy + EV + manufacturing pull-through into a narrower, China-decoupling industrial policy concentrated on semiconductors and (residually) §45X battery / critical- mineral processing.

On June 27, 2025, the Government of Canada, by the Governor in Council, ordered Hikvision Canada Inc. — the Canadian subsidiary of Chinese video-surveillance manufacturer Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co. — to wind up its Canadian business and cease all operations within 120 days, following a national security review under the Investment Canada Act. The order requires Hikvision Canada to immediately stop sales, marketing and after-sales support, and to terminate staff and contracts within the wind-up window. Alongside the order, the government prohibited federal departments, agencies and Crown corporations from purchasing or using Hikvision products and directed audits to remove existing installations from federal facilities.

South African Cabinet on 25 June 2025 approved a three-part package to revitalise the domestic ferrochrome sector: (i) placement of chrome ore under export control via the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) under the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002, requiring an export permit prior to dispatch; (ii) initiation of work on a chrome ore export tax (rate not finalised; market reporting cites 25%); (iii) expanded SEZ incentives for ferrochrome smelters and a negotiated electricity- tariff relief mechanism. The DTIC notice formally placing chrome ore under export control was published in Government Gazette No. 53477 General Notice 6712 on 3 October 2025 with a 30-day public-comment window closing 31 October 2025; the final permit regime takes effect upon subsequent ministerial gazette notice. South Africa accounts for >70% of seaborne chrome ore exports, so the regime is globally material to stainless-steel supply chains.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs announced on 4 April 2025 export licensing requirements on seven medium and heavy rare-earth elements: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium. Exporters must apply for individual licences citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The announcement came two days after the 2 April Trump reciprocal-tariff package and was widely interpreted as a proportional response. Unlike the December 2024 Ga/Ge/Sb ban this is not US-specific on its face — but in practice licence approvals through April-June 2025 were heavily skewed away from US-bound shipments.

Ghana's Parliament passed the Ghana Gold Board Act, 2025 (Act 1140) on 29 March 2025; presidential assent followed on 2 April 2025, with full operational effect from 1 May 2025. The Act repeals PNDCL 219 (1989) and establishes the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) as the sole statutory licensor and exclusive primary buyer, seller, assayer, grader, weigher and exporter of all gold produced by the country's licensed Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) sector. Large-scale mining operations remain outside the monopsony. Effective 1 May 2025, no person other than GoldBod may export ASM gold from Ghana, and all gold trading and marketing businesses must hold a GoldBod licence (application window for Ghanaian-owned firms opened 22 April 2025). Proceeds from all ASM gold exports settle through the Bank of Ghana, channelling foreign-exchange flows from roughly 30% of national gold output — Ghana is the world's #6 producer and Africa's largest — into formal central-bank reserves. The stated objectives are to combat smuggling, capture the smuggling-loss premium for the state, support Bank of Ghana gold-reserves accumulation, and generate foreign exchange. The Act sits alongside the Bank of Ghana's Domestic Gold Purchase Programme as the legal infrastructure for Ghana's gold-as-reserve-asset strategy.

On 26 February 2025 the European Commission adopted the "Clean Industrial Deal" (CID), Communication COM(2025) 85 final, framed as a joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation. The CID bundles state-aid simplification, energy-cost relief, lead-market creation, capital mobilisation and circular-economy mandates into a single industrial strategy targeting both energy-intensive industries (steel, metals, chemicals, cement) and clean-tech manufacturing (batteries, solar, wind, heat pumps, electrolyzers). The Commission claims the package will mobilise more than €100 billion of public-and-private financing for EU-made clean manufacturing through a strengthened Innovation Fund, amendments to the InvestEU Regulation (up to €50bn additional guarantee capacity) and a proposed Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. CID directly precedes the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF, adopted 25 June 2025) and seeds legislative work on an Industrial Accelerator Act, a Circular Economy Act, and a strengthened CBAM. Severity 4 on mixed basis: explicit €100bn+ quant headline plus qualitative breadth across the EU industrial perimeter, formally re-anchoring the von der Leyen II mandate around competitiveness rather than pure decarbonisation.

On 22 February 2025 the Authority for the Regulation and Control of Strategic Mineral Substance Markets (ARECOMS) of the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued Decision No. 001/ARECOMS/2025 imposing a four-month suspension of all cobalt exports — industrial and artisanal — in response to a multi-year cobalt price collapse driven by structural oversupply from CMOC's Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. The DRC accounts for roughly 70-76% of global mined cobalt, so the ban removed the dominant source of feedstock from the seaborne market. The ban was extended in late June 2025 by another three months, then on 10 October 2025 ARECOMS issued Decision No. 005/ARECOMS/2025 lifting the outright suspension and replacing it with a hard annual export quota: 18,125 t for the November-December 2025 transition window, then 96,600 t per year for 2026 and 2027. The annual ceiling consists of an 87,000 t "base quota" distributed pro-rata using each producer's January 2022 - December 2024 historical export volumes, plus a 9,600 t "strategic quota" allocated at ARECOMS' sole discretion to projects of national strategic importance. Allocations for Q4 2025 went disproportionately to the largest incumbents: CMOC received 6,500 t (Tenke Fungurume + Kisanfu), Glencore 3,925 t (Kamoto + Mutanda), and Eurasian Resources Group 2,125 t (Metalkol). CMOC's award is far below its ~115 kt 2024 production rate, structurally capping the world's top cobalt producer below 30% of its operating capacity. Exporters must obtain a Quota Verification Certificate (AVQ) from ARECOMS, submit to joint sampling, weighing, sealing and physical inspection by multiple government agencies, and prepay the 10% mining royalty within 48 hours of declaring origin and sale. ARECOMS reserves the right to revise quotas quarterly in case of "significant imbalance in the cobalt market," and explicitly retained discretion to re-set 2027 volumes. The measure is the EM resource-nationalism complement to Indonesia's nickel-ore ban template, applied to the single material where one country has the most concentrated global supply share.

On 1 February 2025, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced the National Manufacturing Mission (NMM) in the Union Budget 2025-26 as a horizontal umbrella framework extending the 2014 "Make in India" architecture across small, medium and large industries. The mission rests on five focal areas: (i) ease and cost of doing business; (ii) a future-ready workforce for in-demand jobs; (iii) a vibrant and dynamic MSME sector; (iv) availability of technology; and (v) quality manufacturing. It will deliver policy support, execution roadmaps, and a governance/monitoring framework binding central ministries with states. NMM specifically commits to building a clean-tech manufacturing ecosystem with explicit coverage of solar PV cells, EV batteries, motors and controllers, electrolysers, wind turbines, very-high-voltage transmission equipment, and grid-scale batteries — i.e., the full hardware stack for India's Panchamrit (500 GW non-fossil by 2030), FAME-III EV ramp, and National Green Hydrogen Mission. NMM is the first horizontal Indian manufacturing-mission instrument in the IPTM register; existing IND entries are sector-specific PLIs (electronics, batteries, steel, semiconductors) and the National Critical Mineral Mission. Operational rollout flows through subsequent Cabinet-level scheme approvals (e.g. Biopharma SHAKTI ₹10,000 cr, Chemical Parks ₹600 cr in BE 2026-27); the mission itself does not carry a single headline outlay because it is the framework rather than an instrument.

On 29 January 2025 the Union Cabinet of India approved the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), a seven-year programme running FY2024-25 through FY2030-31 with a headline financial envelope of ₹34,300 crore (≈USD 4.0 bn). The structure is split: ₹16,300 crore of direct government outlay administered by the Ministry of Mines, plus an expected ₹18,000 crore of investment by central public-sector undertakings (PSUs) and other stakeholders. The mission was first announced by the Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2024-25 (23 July 2024) and the Cabinet approval gave it formal sanction. The NCMM covers the full critical-minerals value chain: domestic exploration, mining, beneficiation, processing, recycling from end-of-life products, and acquisition of overseas mineral assets. The Geological Survey of India (GSI) is tasked with executing 1,200 exploration projects over the seven-year window (vs. 368 projects over the prior three years), expanded to offshore polymetallic-nodule provinces containing cobalt, REE, nickel and manganese. More than 100 critical-mineral blocks are slated for auction. Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) — the JV of NALCO, HCL and MECL — is the designated vehicle for overseas acquisitions, with active Argentina lithium (CAMYEN SE, 15,703 ha) and Australia lithium/cobalt off-take pipelines. India's official critical-minerals list contains 30 commodities, of which 24 are inscribed in Part D of Schedule I of the MMDR Act 1957 (after the 2023 amendment), reserving central-government auction authority over them. The NCMM sets an explicit recycling target of 15-20% of domestic critical-mineral demand met from secondary sources (e-waste, battery scrap, industrial waste) by 2035. The mission also funds a National Centre of Excellence for Critical Minerals and offers customs-duty waivers on 25 critical minerals (announced in the same FY24-25 budget) to lower import costs while domestic capacity scales. NCMM is India's pull-side complement to the US IRA, EU Critical Raw Materials Act, Canada Critical Minerals Strategy and Australia Critical Minerals Strategy — a coordinated allied response to Chinese dominance over refined cobalt, REE, graphite and gallium/germanium. For India specifically it is framed as the supply-chain underpinning for FAME-III (EV adoption), the Semicon India programme (gallium/germanium/silicon), and the National Solar Mission (silicon, indium, tellurium, gallium for thin-film PV).

On January 10, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting jointly with the Department of State, designated PJSC Gazprom Neft and PJSC Surgutneftegas as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under Executive Orders 13662 and 14024, alongside more than 180 oil-carrying vessels (the bulk of Russia's "shadow fleet"), dozens of opaque oil traders, two major Russia-based oilfield service providers, marine insurance companies, and senior Russian energy-sector officials. The package included a new EO 14024 sectoral determination authorizing future designations against any person operating in the Russian energy sector, plus a new EO 14071 determination prohibiting the provision of US petroleum services (extraction, drilling, production support) to persons located in the Russian Federation, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on February 27, 2025. OFAC simultaneously issued General Licenses 117 (wind-down of transactions with the newly blocked entities) and 118 (debt/equity/derivatives wind-down), both expiring February 27, 2025. The action was the largest single Russia energy-sector designation since the 2022 invasion regime began and was coordinated with parallel UK OFSI shadow-fleet designations issued the same week. The action was finalized in the closing days of the Biden administration as a deliberate tightening of the oil-revenue and shadow-fleet vectors before the January 20 transition. Subsequent enforcement and any rollback decisions fell to the incoming Trump administration.

China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement 2025 No. 3 on 9 January 2025, the Final Determination of its Trade and Investment Barrier (TIB) investigation into the European Commission's enforcement practices under the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR). MOFCOM concluded that EC practices in FSR investigations targeting Chinese enterprises in rail transport, photovoltaics, wind energy, and security-equipment public procurement constitute trade and investment barriers under Article 3 of China's Rules on Trade and Investment Barrier Investigations (对外贸易壁垒调查规则). The determination documents €20.88 billion in estimated economic losses — including €10.18 billion from abandoned bids — and finds de-facto discrimination against Chinese SOEs relative to investors from other jurisdictions. MOFCOM committed to taking "necessary measures" including bilateral consultations, multilateral dispute settlement, or "other appropriate measures" to safeguard Chinese enterprises' legitimate rights and interests.

On 16 December 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3192 amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014, the 15th package of restrictive measures against Russia. The package adds 84 asset-freeze listings (54 individuals and 30 entities) under Regulation 269/2014 — for the first time including fully-fledged designations of seven Chinese individuals and entities supplying drone components, machine tools, and dual-use goods to the Russian military-industrial complex. It expands the EU shadow-fleet vessel- ban list by 52 tankers (total 79), activates the standalone EU hybrid- threats sanctions regime with its first 16-individual / 3-entity designations, extends the wind-down derogation for divestment from Russian subsidiaries to 31 December 2025, and reinforces anti- circumvention contractual clauses on EU exporters of dual-use goods.

On 26 July 2024 President Erdoğan unveiled the HIT-30 (High-Technology Investment Programme), Türkiye's largest single industrial-finance instrument since the 2018 Investment Office reform, allocating USD 30 billion in state support over 2024-2030 to attract investment across 37 priority programmes spanning electric vehicles, batteries, semiconductors, solar/wind energy, green hydrogen, hyperscale data centres, biotechnological medicine, industrial robotics, and R&D. The Ministry of Industry and Technology is the operating agency, with the Industrialization Executive Committee chaired by the President providing high-level oversight; an Industrialisation Executive Committee under the President directs sectoral allocations. Headline tools include USD 4.5bn earmarked for an 80 GWh battery-manufacturing capacity (with USD 6,000/MWh grants through 2030), USD 2.5bn for 15 GW of domestic solar-cell capacity, USD 1.7bn for wind-component manufacturing, USD 1bn for top-1000 corporate R&D centre support (covering 50% of personnel costs for 5 years), corporate tax reductions, social-security-contribution coverage, energy-cost subsidies covering 50% of bills for energy-intensive projects, customs/VAT exemptions, and free or discounted land allocation in organised industrial zones. Programme targets at least USD 20bn in private-sector co-investment.

Latvia's Saeima adopted on 27 March 2024 amendments to the National Security Law (Nacionālās drošības likums), entering into force on 24 April 2024, that widen the perimeter of foreign-investment and ownership transactions subject to Cabinet of Ministers pre-clearance over "companies of significance to national security." The amendments expand the universe of regulated subjects beyond registered companies to include foundations and associations, tighten the rules on beneficial-ownership disclosure, and bring additional sensitive activities — energy security including LNG-terminal acquisitions, electronic communications, cybersecurity, and critical-raw-materials processing — under the regime, while clarifying Cabinet authority to impose conditions or unwind transactions retroactively. The law functions as Latvia's horizontal FDI-screening instrument under the EU-wide cooperation framework of Regulation 2019/452.

Bulgaria's National Assembly adopted on 22 February 2024 amendments to the Investment Promotion Act establishing the country's first horizontal foreign direct investment screening mechanism, published in State Gazette No. 20 on 8 March 2024 and entering into force on 12 March 2024. The regime implements EU Regulation 2019/452 by creating an Interdepartmental Screening Council with a 45-day decision window over non-EU investments meeting a 10 % equity stake or €2 million threshold in critical-infrastructure, dual-use, advanced-technology, media, and financial-infrastructure sectors, with no threshold for investments by Russian or Belarusian persons or in oil and petroleum activities. Non-compliance and false declarations carry fines of 5 % of investment value, with a minimum BGN 50,000.

Lov 2023-06-20 nr. 77 (Lov om endringer i sikkerhetsloven — eierskapskontroll og lovens virkeområde), adopted by the Storting on 9 June 2023, signed 20 June 2023, in force 1 July 2023, is Norway's first substantive overhaul of Chapter 10 (Eierskapskontroll / ownership control) of the 2018 Security Act (Sikkerhetsloven). The amendment widens the scope of undertakings that can be brought under ownership control beyond entities directly linked to a "grunnleggende nasjonal funksjon" (fundamental national function) to include businesses of vital importance to national-security interests and businesses of significant importance to fundamental national functions, lowers and adds notification thresholds, and equips the King in Council with enhanced powers to block, condition, or unwind qualifying acquisitions. The reform converts a narrow security-classified regime into a broad horizontal FDI-screening architecture for Norway, the host of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund and a NATO frontline state.

On 9 June 2023 the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o spodbujanju investicij — ZSInv-C (Act on Amendments to the Investment Promotion Act), published in Uradni list RS No. 65/23 on 17 June 2023 and entering into force on 1 July 2023. The amendment converts Slovenia's temporary COVID-era inward FDI screening regime (originally introduced under ZIUOPDVE in 2020 and set to expire June 2023) into a permanent, horizontal screening framework administered by the Ministry of Economy, Tourism and Sport (MGTŠ). Non-EU (third-country) investors acquiring ≥10% voting rights or control in Slovenian entities operating in sectors listed under EU Regulation 2019/452 — including critical infrastructure, critical technology and dual-use goods, critical inputs, sensitive data, media, and health/AI/robotics — must submit a mandatory pre-closing notification; the ministry has suspensory power and may block, condition, or unwind transactions on grounds of security or public order. A subsequent 2024 amendment (Uradni list RS No. 31/24) broadened scope by redefining "corporate entity" to capture indirect investments channelled via branches of foreign entities established in other EU member states.

Law no. 164/2023, adopted by the Parliament of Romania on 31 May 2023 and published in Monitorul Oficial Partea I nr. 495 of 7 June 2023, approves and amends Emergency Government Ordinance 46/2022 implementing EU Regulation 2019/452 on screening of foreign direct investments. The law extends Romania's mandatory ex-ante FDI screening to investors established within the European Union (previously only non-EU investments were captured), sets a EUR 2 million de minimis transaction threshold for sensitive-sector deals, formally establishes the Commission for the Examination of Foreign Direct Investments (CEISD) chaired by the Prime Minister with multi-ministry composition, and empowers the Government to unwind transactions that breach the regime. Gun-jumping penalties reach up to 10 % of the investor's worldwide turnover. In force 10 June 2023.

Loi n° 2023-973 du 23 octobre 2023 relative à l'industrie verte (the Green Industry Law) is France's first comprehensive industrial-policy framework since France 2030 (2021). Published in the Journal officiel on 24 October 2023, it pursues three objectives: (i) accelerate the siting of strategic industrial projects on French territory, (ii) channel public procurement toward "virtuous" companies, and (iii) mobilise private savings for green-industrial CapEx. Its centrepiece is the new "Projet d'intérêt national majeur" (PINM) status, an exceptional procedure that fast-tracks urban planning, environmental permitting, and grid connection for projects deemed strategic for ecological transition or national sovereignty (gigafactories, hydrogen electrolysers, advanced semiconductor fabs). The law also creates the Plan d'épargne avenir climat (PEAC), a long-duration retail savings product reserved for under-21s and earmarked for European green-industrial financing, and codifies a 2023-2030 national green-industry strategy.

On 24 February 2023 the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions on 22 individuals and 83 entities, which Treasury describes as targeting key sectors, evasion efforts and military supplies. Treasury issued a determination under Executive Order 14024 identifying the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy as a sector subject to sanctions, and designated 11 Russian financial institutions, including Credit Bank of Moscow, plus Russian defence and advanced-materials enterprises and third-country evasion facilitators. General Licenses 60 and 61 authorise wind-down of dealings with newly blocked entities through 25 May 2023.

The Foreign Investment Reliability Assessment Act (välismaise investori usaldusväärsuse hindamise seadus, VUHS), adopted by the Riigikogu on 25 January 2023 and in force from 1 September 2023, establishes Estonia's first horizontal ex-ante foreign direct-investment screening regime. The Act transposes EU Regulation 2019/452 into Estonian law and designates the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority (Tarbijakaitse ja Tehnilise Järelevalve Amet — TTJA) as the screening authority. It covers acquisitions of qualifying holdings or material influence in target undertakings operating in defence, dual-use, vital services, energy and communications infrastructure, transport, financial services, media, critical raw materials extraction and other strategic sectors. TTJA can prohibit, condition or unwind non-compliant transactions and impose administrative non-compliance levies.

Belgium's first horizontal foreign-direct-investment screening regime, established by a Cooperation Agreement signed on 30 November 2022 between the Federal State and the Flemish, Walloon, Brussels-Capital and German-Community governments, and in force from 1 July 2023. The agreement creates a centralised Interfederal Screening Commission (ISC), chaired by the FPS Economy, to receive and process mandatory ex-ante notifications of foreign acquisitions of 10%, 25% or higher voting-rights / control thresholds (sector-dependent) in Belgian undertakings active in eleven strategic sectors. ISC decisions are binding; sanctions for failure to notify or for non-compliance with conditions imposed include unwinding of the transaction and administrative fines.