Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 20 May 2026 President Prabowo Subianto signed a Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah tentang Tata Kelola Ekspor Komoditas Sumber Daya Alam) establishing PT Danantara Sumber Daya Indonesia (DSI) — a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Danantara sovereign-investment holding company — as the sole legal exporter ("eksportir tunggal") for palm oil (CPO and derivatives), thermal and metallurgical coal, and ferroalloys (ferronickel, nickel pig iron, ferromanganese, ferrochrome), representing approximately USD 65 billion in annual Indonesian export proceeds. A phased implementation architecture applies: a transition period from 1 June through 31 August 2026 during which private exporters continue direct contractual relationships but must route all export documentation through DSI as the mandatory single-window reporting layer; followed by full implementation from 1 September 2026 under which DSI assumes the entire export chain including contract negotiation, buyer relationship, shipment booking, and payment receipt. The stated rationale is to strengthen export-flow oversight, eliminate under-invoicing and transfer-pricing-driven capital flight, and improve DHE-SDA foreign-exchange retention compliance.

On 8 May 2026 the US Department of Commerce and South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIR) signed the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Initiative (KUSPI) MOU, establishing a standing bilateral platform covering commercial shipbuilding cooperation, workforce development, industrial modernisation, and maritime manufacturing investment. The agreement creates the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center in Washington D.C. (expected operational later in 2026) as the permanent coordination mechanism for technical exchanges, shipyard productivity improvement projects, FDI into the US maritime industrial base, and joint workforce training. KUSPI operationalises the $150 bn Korean investment sub-pledge to US shipbuilding — itself a tranche of the broader $350 bn / $20 bn-annual-cap commitment under the December 2025 US-Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal — and structurally positions the US-ROK allied axis as the coordinated civilian shipbuilding counterweight to China's dominant global shipyard share.

Brazil enacted Lei 15.506 of 16 September 2026 (in force on publication, Art. 51), establishing the Política Nacional de Minerais Críticos e Estratégicos (PNMCE) — Brazil's first standalone critical-minerals sovereignty framework — and the Conselho Nacional para Industrialização de Minerais Críticos e Estratégicos (CIMCE). The law originated as Bill PL 2780/2024, approved by the Chamber of Deputies on May 6-7, 2026 (one day before the Lula-Trump White House meeting) and then by the Senate. It authorises the Union to create the Fundo Garantidor da Atividade Mineral (FGAM) with up to R$2bn (Art. 9) to guarantee critical-mineral projects, and a tax credit of up to 20% of spend on critical-mineral processing, transformation and urban mining. The Chamber-approved text (CMCE committee with prior-approval rights over takeovers and foreign participation, FGAM up to R$5bn, 0.3% gross-revenue R&D levy) was amended before enactment; see the 2026-09-16 amendment.

Mozambique's National Mining Institute (INAMI) presented a draft revision of the country's mining law for public consultation, with parliamentary debate scheduled for 7 May 2026. The bill mandates that the state hold a minimum 15% equity stake in all mining projects (raisable on a project-by-project basis), reserves "strategic minerals" exclusively for the state mining company Empresa Nacional de Minas (ENM), prohibits the export of unprocessed minerals (forcing in-country processing), caps concessions at 25 years, and channels 10% of mining revenues to a local development fund for the province, district, and community where operations occur. Implementation is not expected before 2027 to allow development of secondary regulations and ENM institutional build-out. This is the flagship economic-policy instrument of President Daniel Chapo's January 2025 mining and oil/gas restructuring agenda.

The European Commission and the US announced on 24 April 2026 the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a strategic partnership on critical minerals, accompanied by an EU-US Critical Minerals Action Plan. The framework deepens cooperation on supply-chain security across the strategic raw-materials list shared between the two jurisdictions — joint financing, recycling, mutual recognition of strategic- project status under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (filed: 2024-05-23-eu-crma-entry-into-force) and US IRA §30D / §45X frameworks (filed: 2022-08-16-us-inflation-reduction-act). The agreement is positioned as a joint response to non-market practices in third-country supply chains for the named materials.

President Trump issued five Presidential Determinations on 20 April 2026 under Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. § 4533), invoking the authority granted by Executive Order 14156 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency, signed 20 January 2025). The five determinations cover: (1) domestic petroleum production, refining, and logistics; (2) large-scale energy and energy-related infrastructure development, manufacturing, and deployment; (3) natural gas transmission, processing, storage, and LNG capacity; (4) coal supply chains and baseload power generation; (5) grid infrastructure, equipment, and supply chain. Each determination authorises the relevant Cabinet Secretary (primarily Energy) to use DPA §303 powers — direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase commitments, and equity investments — to expand domestic capacity in the named category.

On 15 April 2026 Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published the interim summary "Manufacturing Base Strengthening Report" from the Study Group on Strengthening Manufacturing Base in Light of Geopolitical Risks. The report frames Japan's manufacturing base as the source of national power and proposes shifting economic-security support for "autonomy assurance" from "point" measures to "area"-wide measures — expanding the scope of Specified Critical Materials under the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) beyond narrowly defined inputs to cover foundational petrochemicals (ethylene, propylene, methanol, synthetic rubber) and process-industry technologies (casting, forging), plus components for emerging technologies (humanoid-robot actuators and sensors, lasers for quantum computing). It is the cornerstone framework document operationalising METI's FY2026 strategic-budget package (~¥3.07 trillion overall envelope; ~¥1.23 trillion specifically for semiconductors and AI, including ¥150bn for Rapidus and ¥387.3bn for AI development) as Japan's coordinated response to deepening Chinese export-control pressure on dual-use items, gallium/germanium, graphite, antimony and heavy rare earths.

On 8–9 April 2026 the Argentine Cámara de Diputados gave final passage (137–111 with 3 abstentions) to a bill amending Ley 26.639 (the 2010 Régimen de Presupuestos Mínimos para la Preservación de los Glaciares y del Ambiente Periglacial), after the Senate had already approved the reform in February 2026 (40–31 with 1 abstention). The Executive promulgated the law as Ley 27.804 via Decreto 271/2026, published in the Boletín Oficial on 24 April 2026. The reform narrows the federal protection floor by limiting strict protection to glaciers and periglacial geoforms with proven hydrological function, and transfers to provincial governments the authority to define the technical and scientific criteria delimiting protected areas — directly unblocking the "ABCD" copper pipeline (Agua Rica/MARA, Filo del Sol, Josemaría, Los Azules, El Pachón) and adjacent lithium and gold projects whose prior periglacial-buffer encumbrance had stalled an estimated USD 30bn of investment, ~70% in copper / gold / silver.

On 31 March 2026 the Government of Vietnam issued Decree 96/2026/ND-CP, the principal implementing decree for the Law on Investment 2025 (Law 143/2025/QH15). It takes effect on its signing date and replaces Decree 31/2021/ND-CP, Decree 19/2025/ND-CP and Decree 239/2025/ND-CP — the first comprehensive overhaul of Vietnam's general FDI-licensing framework since 2021. The decree operationalises the new Special Investment Procedure (a registration-and-commitment fast-track in industrial parks, export-processing zones, hi-tech parks, concentrated digital- technology zones, free-trade zones, international financial centres and economic-zone functional areas) and details the list of 16 specially-incentivised sectors covering semiconductor and chip manufacturing, AI, big data, digital technology and high-tech R&D. It also rewrites foreign-investor market-access conditions, document procedures and dispute / grievance mechanisms.

On 20 March 2026, METI/MOFA (Japan) and the US Departments of State and Energy jointly published the "Japan–United States Critical Minerals Project Cooperation Joint Fact Sheet," identifying five specific upstream critical-mineral projects spanning four continents (Australia, Tanzania, Brazil, UAE, Namibia) to receive structured joint financing through JOGMEC equity and offtake instruments and US DFC/Ex-Im Bank facilities. The document operationalises the October 2025 US-Japan Critical Minerals Framework and the same-day Action Plan, converting policy-framework language into named project commitments covering nickel, lithium, battery-anode graphite, and heavy rare earths. It was released the day following the Takaichi–Trump summit on 19 March 2026 and follows the Critical Minerals Investment Ministerial convened in Tokyo on 14 March 2026.

On 19 March 2026, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, METI, and Ministry of Finance jointly released the "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" — the operational follow-on to the 27 October 2025 US-Japan Framework. The Action Plan formally commits both governments to develop a plurilateral trade initiative in critical minerals "supported by price floors or other measures", to consult on embedding "border-adjusted price floors" in a binding plurilateral agreement, and to identify specific mining/processing/manufacturing projects in the US, Japan, or third countries for prioritised joint financing. It is the first formal US/Japan trade-policy commitment to administered floor-pricing as an instrument of critical-minerals trade governance, and explicitly invites third countries to join the contemplated plurilateral.

India's Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved the Bharat Audyogik Vikas Yojna (BHAVYA) on 18 March 2026 with a ₹33,660 crore (~USD 4.0bn) outlay over six years (FY 2026-27 to FY 2031-32) to develop 100 plug-and-play industrial parks of 100-1,000 acres each across all states and Union Territories. Financial assistance of up to ₹1 crore per acre supports core infrastructure (internal roads, underground utilities, drainage, common treatment, ICT), value-added infrastructure (ready-built sheds, built-to-suit units, testing labs, warehousing), and social infrastructure (worker housing). The scheme is sector-agnostic and is implemented by the National Industrial Corridor Development Corporation (NICDC) under DPIIT, with states forming Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and committing to single-window clearances. The first phase will deliver 50 parks.

At the PDAC Convention 2026 in Toronto, Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson announced the Critical Minerals Sovereign Fund (CMSF), a CAD 2 billion vehicle to be operated by Natural Resources Canada that will deploy equity investments, debt, and offtake agreements into Canadian critical-minerals projects and companies. Initial focus covers six of Canada's 34 critical minerals — copper, nickel, lithium, graphite, cobalt, and rare earth elements — with capital expected to begin flowing in spring 2026. The CMSF is part of a broader CAD 3.6 bn PDAC-day announcement package that NRCan estimates will unlock CAD 12.1 bn in mining-project capital across 30+ partnerships, and is structurally modelled on Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve.

The European Commission on 4 March 2026 adopted COM(2026) 100 final, the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), the central horizontal industrial- policy instrument of the 2024-29 Commission term. The proposal targets raising EU manufacturing's share of GDP from 14.3% (2024) to at least 20% by 2035 via three pillars: (i) demand-side "Made in EU" and low-carbon public-procurement preferences for strategic sectors; (ii) FDI conditionality on investments above €100 million from countries with >40% global manufacturing share in batteries, EVs, solar PV or critical raw materials; (iii) accelerated permitting through a one-stop-shop and member-state-designated Industrial Acceleration Areas. The IAA is a proposal — co-decision adoption is expected mid-to-late 2027.

The Ecuadorian National Assembly approved on 26 February 2026 (vote 77-70, urgent-economic-matter procedure) the Ley Orgánica para el Fortalecimiento de los Sectores Estratégicos de Minería y Energía, the statutory complement to President Daniel Noboa's Decreto Ejecutivo 273 of 31 December 2025. The law was published in the Quinto Suplemento of Registro Oficial on 2 March 2026 with no presidential objection and entered into force the same day. It comprises 28 articles, two general provisions and one transitory provision. The mining title codifies the 3–8% sliding royalty scale and channels 60% of royalty receipts to social investment via decentralised governments (45% provincial / 35% municipal / 20% parochial) — the legislative anchor for the regime introduced by Decree 273. The energy title amends the Ley Orgánica del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica to recognise distributed generation, self-supply and autonomous energy districts, and establishes exception-route participation for foreign state-owned enterprises and popular/solidarity-economy organisations alongside private capital. A controversial Galápagos-adjacent provision permitting expedited mining/energy procedures has triggered domestic constitutional challenge.

On 17 February 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney launched Canada's first standalone Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), introducing the "Build–Partner–Buy" framework as the central guiding principle of Canadian defence procurement. The strategy mobilises over half a trillion CAD across the next decade — including ~CAD 180 bn in defence procurement opportunities, ~CAD 290 bn in defence-related capital investment, and ~CAD 125 bn in anticipated downstream economic benefit by 2035 — and targets 125,000 new high-paying jobs. Operationally, the DIS introduces Canadian Content Value (CCV) requirements with a proposed Canadian Company Boost for firms meeting 70–100% domestic-content thresholds, sets a 10-year goal of awarding 70% of defence procurements to Canadian firms, and signals willingness to invoke the national security exception to set aside trade-agreement obligations and exclude foreign bidders for "sovereign capability" contracts. It is the first standalone industrial-strategy document covering the Canadian defence-industrial base, distinct from prior DPA-narrow filings.

Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) confirmed it has officially cut the 2026 nickel-ore Work Plan and Budget (RKAB) production ceiling to 260–270 million wet metric tonnes (wmt), down from the ~379 million wmt approved for 2025 — a reduction of roughly one-third. Actual 2026 production is targeted at approximately 209–210 million tonnes. Minister Bahlil Lahadalia framed the cut as a supply-demand balancing measure to stabilise nickel prices and conserve reserves; the government first signalled the production control on 23 December 2025, after which world nickel prices rose from roughly US$14,800/t under oversupply to above US$17,000–18,800/t. This is the operative 2026 application of the annual RKAB cycle established by Permen ESDM 17/2025.

On 12 February 2026, Chile's Ministry of Mining and Codelco (via subsidiary Salar de Maricunga SpA) signed the definitive Contrato Especial de Operación de Litio (CEOL) for the Salar de Maricunga, formalising Rio Tinto as strategic partner with a capital commitment of up to US$900 million. The instrument constitutes the second tranche of Chile's 2023 National Lithium Strategy, distinct from the NovaAndino Litio (Codelco–SQM) JV that governs the Salar de Atacama tranche. Rio Tinto was selected as partner in May 2025 following a competitive process; the definitive CEOL modifies the original 2018 exploration contract, expands the concession area (incorporating pre-1979 concessions acquired from Lithium Power International in 2024), and extends the exploration phase by four years. Remaining conditions precedent — including foreign competition-authority approvals — were projected for completion during 2026.

On 10 February 2026 in Baku, US Vice President JD Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership — a foundational bilateral instrument covering five cooperation tracks: economy and trade, energy, connectivity and digital development (including AI), security and defense, and critical-minerals transit. The Charter commits both governments to facilitate the transit of critical minerals via the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor to global markets, and formally recognises the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) as the multi-modal connectivity link between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The instrument builds on the 8 August 2025 MoU signed in Washington during the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Summit that established the Strategic Working Group tasked with drafting the Charter, and marks the first US Vice-Presidential visit to Azerbaijan since Dick Cheney in 2008.

On 6 February 2026 South African Trade, Industry and Competition Minister Parks Tau and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao signed the Framework Agreement on Economic Partnership for Shared Prosperity (CAEPA) in Pretoria. The framework — non-binding by design — covers four pillars: trade, investment, new-energy, and multilateral cooperation. China commits to provide duty-free access to South African exports under a follow-on Early Harvest Agreement (EHA) scheduled for conclusion by the end of March 2026; a progressive reduction of the 10% Chinese MFN tariff on South African fruit is already underway with full duty-free treatment for fruit scheduled for 1 May 2026. The signing took place against the backdrop of US "reciprocal" tariff pressure on South African exports (30% threatened, ~30,000 jobs at risk) and AGOA preference uncertainty, positioning China as a counterweight market. CAEPA is the first China-Africa bilateral framework structured as a quasi-FTA precursor rather than a FOCAC-style aid/concessional package.

On 4 February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio launched the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) at the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, DC, attended by representatives from 54 countries and the European Commission. FORGE is the successor to the 2022 Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and is structured as a plurilateral coalition that creates a preferential trade-and-investment zone for critical minerals, including coordinated price-floor mechanisms designed to counter adversarial market manipulation — explicitly framed against Chinese mineral-supply dominance. The Republic of Korea chairs FORGE through June 2026. Eleven bilateral critical-minerals frameworks/MoUs were signed simultaneously (Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, UAE, UK, Uzbekistan), and FORGE is paired with Project Vault, an EXIM Bank direct loan facility of up to USD 10 billion to back FORGE-aligned critical-mineral projects.

On 2 February 2026 the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) Board approved a Direct Loan of up to USD 10 billion to an independently governed public-private partnership establishing the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve ("Project Vault"), alongside nearly USD 2 billion of private-sector investment for an envelope of approximately USD 12 billion. The reserve will physically stockpile the 60 minerals on the USGS 2025 Critical Minerals List across multiple US storage facilities, with participating original equipment manufacturers (Clarios, GE Vernova, Western Digital, Boeing) committing to specific volumes and grades and trading partners (Hartree Partners, Mercuria Americas, Traxys) handling sourcing. EXIM characterises the transaction as the largest single financing in its 92-year history and the first use of EXIM authority as the financing vehicle for a domestic strategic-minerals stockpile rather than for export-credit insurance abroad.

On 1 February 2026 Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, presenting the Union Budget 2026-27, announced the launch of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0 — the second-phase national semiconductor industrial-policy framework succeeding ISM 1.0 (2021, INR 76,000 crore). The Budget makes an initial INR 1,000 crore provision for ISM 2.0 in FY 2026-27 and raises the Electronics Components Manufacturing Scheme (ECMS) outlay from INR 22,919 crore to INR 40,000 crore. ISM 2.0's distinct architecture centres on four strategic priorities not in ISM 1.0: (i) indigenous semiconductor equipment, chemicals, gases and materials production, (ii) full-stack Indian semiconductor IP design, (iii) industry-led R&D and skills/training centres, and (iv) domestic and global supply-chain integration. Total mission outlay reported as approximately INR 1-1.2 lakh crore (~USD 12-14bn) is being finalised; Cabinet clearance and the formal scheme launch are expected by mid-2026.

On 29 January 2026, European Council President António Costa and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính signed a Joint Statement in Hanoi upgrading EU-Vietnam bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) — the highest tier in Vietnam's diplomatic hierarchy, placing the EU on the same level as Vietnam's CSPs with China, Russia, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, France, and the United States. The CSP establishes a reinforced bilateral cooperation framework spanning critical raw materials, semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, trusted 5G infrastructure, climate and energy transition, security and defence (including cyber and maritime), and full implementation of the 2019 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) tariff-elimination schedule plus ratification of the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EVIPA). It is the EU's eleventh CSP globally and its second in Southeast Asia (after Singapore, 2024), and constitutes the foundational bilateral parent framework for all future EU-Vietnam cooperation under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) Article 13 third-country strategic-project designation pipeline, given Vietnam's approximately 22 Mt rare-earth reserves — the world's second-largest deposit after China.

South Korea's National Assembly passed the "Special Act on Strengthening and Supporting the Competitiveness of the Semiconductor Industry" (반도체산업 경쟁력 강화 및 지원에 관한 특별법) on 29 January 2026 by 199 votes in favour out of 206 members present, after roughly 18 months of inter-party deadlock. The act establishes (i) a Presidential Commission for Enhancing Semiconductor Competitiveness as the central inter-ministerial coordination body, (ii) a statutory five-year master plan with annual implementation plans, (iii) a dedicated semiconductor industry special account ("반도체산업 특별회계") to ring-fence funding for fabs, materials, parts and equipment, and packaging across the full memory + system-LSI + design + manufacturing supply chain, and (iv) authority to designate semiconductor clusters outside the greater Seoul area with relocation incentives. Promulgation by the Cabinet is expected shortly after passage; effectiveness contingent on enforcement-ordinance finalisation, expected Q3 2026. The KRW 2tn anchor envelope of the special account does not begin disbursing until 2027 because companion amendments to the National Finance Act were not enacted in time.

On 27 January 2026 President Gabriel Boric presented Chile's National Critical Minerals Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Minerales Críticos, NCMS) — the country's first horizontal critical-minerals governance framework, identifying 14 minerals as priorities for development and establishing five strategic pillars: production and diversification of critical minerals; responsible mining; development opportunities based on critical minerals; enabling capacities; and strategic international positioning. The strategy was developed through a multi-year participatory process coordinated through Cochilco and Sernageomin, involving a 16-member high-level advisory committee, 120 specialists from 56 institutions, regional workshops and a public consultation. It materially broadens Chile's mineral policy beyond the 2023 lithium-specific National Lithium Strategy to a cross-cutting framework that underpins future bilateral critical-minerals MOUs and positions Chile as a strategic raw-materials partner for the US, EU and Japan under their respective IRA/CRMA/GX supply-chain frameworks.

On 14 January 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 titled "Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States". Unlike the parallel 14 January 2026 semiconductor proclamation and the subsequent April 2026 pharmaceutical proclamation, the PCMDP proclamation does NOT immediately impose tariffs. Instead it directs the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to jointly negotiate bilateral and plurilateral supply agreements with trading partners, with an initial 180-day status report due 13 July 2026. The proclamation reserves residual authority to impose tariffs if negotiations fail or prove ineffective, and explicitly contemplates "price floors" on PCMDP imports as a negotiated instrument.

On 7 January 2026 the National Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Industry Policy Committee (the "Semiconductor Board"), chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Ekniti Nitithanprapas, endorsed the Draft National Strategy for the Development of the Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Industry, prepared by the Board of Investment (BOI) with Roland Berger after a public hearing in October 2025. The 25-year roadmap (2026-2050) targets more than THB 2.5 trillion (~USD 79.6 billion) in investment, training of more than 230,000 highly-skilled engineers, and construction of a complete upstream-to- downstream semiconductor ecosystem with phased milestones for 2030, 2040 and 2050. The strategy prioritises five product groups where Thailand has competitive potential — Power chips, Sensors, Photonics, Analog and Discrete chips — and explicitly aims to move the country beyond OSAT (Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test) into IC design and upstream wafer fabrication ("Made-in-Thailand chips"). Implementation runs through a five-pillar BOI support mechanism: long-term low-interest financing and grants, human-capital development, technology upgrade of the Microelectronics Technology Centre (TMEC), specialised industrial clusters with guaranteed renewable-energy and water security, and streamlined regulatory approvals including a new BOI "FastPass" fast-track facility (16 pilot projects worth THB 170 billion already processed).

On 27 December 2025, Codelco and SQM formally closed NovaAndino Litio SpA, the 50:50 joint venture (with a golden share for state-owned Codelco) mandated by the 2023 National Lithium Strategy to bring the Salar de Atacama under state operational control. The vehicle is formed by merging Codelco's subsidiary Minera Tarar SpA with SQM's SQM Salar SpA, governed by a six-director board (three Codelco, three SQM), and runs until 2060 under a CORFO contract amendment that extends operations beyond SQM's previous 2030 lease expiry. SQM manages operations 2025-2030, Codelco from 2031 onward; the Chilean state captures up to ~70% of operating margins through 2030 and ~85% from 2031. As part of the closing, SQM transferred all of its mining concessions in the Salar de Maricunga to Codelco. President Boric and the Cabinet Económico formally endorsed the venture on 29 December 2025, when the first board meeting was held in Santiago.

Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and the Cabinet Office jointly published the Shipbuilding Revival Roadmap (造船業再生ロードマップ) on 26 December 2025, redefining shipbuilding as a "national strategic industry" within an All-Japan shipping-and-shipbuilding framework. The Roadmap targets doubling domestic shipbuilding capacity from ~9 million GT to 18 million GT by 2035 (re-capturing roughly 20% global market share) backed by a ¥1 trillion (~USD 6.4 bn) public-private investment commitment over three staged phases (2026-28 automation, 2029-31 facility expansion, 2032-34 dock-operation support), mandates consolidation of domestic shipbuilders into 1-3 groups by 2028, and is funded in its first three years by a ¥120 bn FY2025 supplementary budget enacted in December 2025.

On 26 December 2025 the President of Kazakhstan signed a law amending the Code "On Subsoil and Subsoil Use" with respect to the hydrocarbon and uranium sectors, followed on 30 December 2025 by a parallel set of amendments implementing presidential instructions on broader subsoil-use governance. Both packages take effect on 2 March 2026. The uranium amendments grant the National Atomic Company Kazatomprom (KAP) a statutory priority right to obtain exploration licences over prospective uranium areas listed in the State Subsoil Fund Management Programme, and to reserve blocks containing uranium mineralisation or deposits. Where uranium mineralisation is discovered on a solid-mineral block held by a third-party subsoil-user, an extension of that licence is conditional on the licensee surrendering the uranium-bearing block to the State; private subsoil-users no longer obtain priority production rights for uranium they discover. The amendments also raise the minimum direct or indirect Kazatomprom interest in any uranium mining project from 50% to 75%, and permit subsequent transfer to investors or joint-venture partners only subject to that 75% floor. The 30 December 2025 package establishes the National Geological Service as a non-privatisable national operator subordinate to the authorised subsoil-exploration agency and as the operator responsible for managing geological information; it also creates a Unified Subsoil Use Platform digital infrastructure (open geological-information database integrated with the Unified State System for Management of the Fuel and Energy Complex). The hydrocarbon track of the law shortens block-reservation periods and pushes unallocated plots into electronic-auction allocation to accelerate competitive exploration. The amendments accompany an announced USD 500m state geological-exploration programme.

President Trump signed the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 119-60) into law on 18 December 2025, incorporating the bipartisan DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act of 2025 (originating as H.R. 5299). The act reauthorizes the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation for six years, through 31 December 2031, and raises its Maximum Contingent Liability lending cap from $60 billion to $205 billion — an increase of over 300%. It also creates a new $5 billion Equity Revolving Fund at the Treasury Department, giving DFC a dedicated capital stream for direct equity investment (previously scored as a loss-making grant expenditure under budget rules), and raises DFC's permitted minority-equity stake in a portfolio company from 30% to 40%.

Decreto Supremo Nº 5503, signed 17 December 2025 by the Paz administration on its first business day in office, declares a national Economic, Financial, Energy and Social Emergency and enacts a 120-article comprehensive stabilization package. Headline measures: a 15-year fiscal and legal stability guarantee for "strategic" foreign investment in mining, hydrocarbons, energy, agro-industry, infrastructure and export-manufacturing; a fast-track 30-day investment-approval procedure; 0% import tariff on industrial machinery, equipment and key inputs through 2026; accelerated depreciation for 2026 fixed-asset acquisitions (excluding extractive mining and hydrocarbons); discretionary write-off of pre-October 2025 tax interest and penalties; and elimination of fuel subsidies (with a 6-month transition price freeze). The decree restructures Bolivia's investment-incentive architecture and signals a pivot from the Morales/Arce-era resource nationalism toward foreign-capital attraction — directly material for the Salar de Uyuni lithium pipeline (CBC, Uranium One, Citic Guoan tenders).

On 16 December 2025 the European Commission adopted in Strasbourg the Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework of measures for strengthening the Union's biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors particularly in the area of health — the "European Biotech Act" (COM(2025) 1022 final). The proposal is the third axis of the EU's pharma/biotech industrial-policy stack alongside the Critical Medicines Act (filed: 2025-03-11-eu-critical-medicines-act-proposal) and the US Section 232 pharmaceuticals track (filed: 2026-04-02-us-section-232-pharmaceutical-proclamation), and is explicitly designed to keep biotech innovation, investment, and biomanufacturing capacity in Europe in the face of US/China competitiveness pressure. Core instruments: (1) statutory recognition for "Health Biotechnology Strategic Projects" (HBSPs) and "High-Impact" HBSPs eligible for accelerated permitting via a single national contact point, plus administrative/technical/ financial support; (2) regulatory sandboxes for novel biotech and biomanufacturing modalities; (3) a 12-month Supplementary Protection Certificate extension for qualifying biotech and advanced-therapy medicines; (4) targeted simplification of existing EU life-sciences acquis (clinical-trial timelines, risk-proportionate requirements); (5) an EU Health Biotechnology Investment Pilot co-developed with the EIB Group, paired with a EUR 10bn 2026-27 EIB-Commission financing initiative; (6) biosecurity safeguards including a list of "biotechnology products of concern" and mandatory built-in screening for benchtop nucleic-acid synthesis devices. A second tranche covering industrial biotechnologies and biomanufacturing outside health is expected later in 2026.

Vietnam's 15th National Assembly adopted the Law on Investment 2025 (Law No. 143/2025/QH15) at its 10th session on 11 December 2025, effective 1 March 2026. The law replaces the 2020 Law on Investment (Law 61/2020/QH14) as the umbrella FDI framework. Article 19 lets foreign investors establish enterprises in Vietnam without a prior investment project, unlocking holding-company / regional-headquarters structures. A fast-track Special Investment Procedure (SIP) covers industrial parks, export-processing zones, hi-tech parks, concentrated digital-technology zones, free-trade zones, international financial centres and economic-zone functional areas, targeting semiconductor, data-centre and 5G/digital-infrastructure capex. Appendix IV abolishes 38 conditional business sectors and adjusts 20 others (from 1 July 2026 only 199 conditional sectors remain). Operationalised by Decree 96/2026/ND-CP (issued and effective 31 March 2026) and Decree 103/2026/ND-CP for outbound investment.

On 11 December 2025 the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit, held in Washington D.C. on 12 December 2025, at which the United States, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Israel signed the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration. The declaration commits signatories to coordinate "trusted" supply chains across the full technology stack — software, frontier foundation models, network infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transportation logistics, minerals refining and processing, and energy — explicitly to reduce "coercive dependencies." The coalition has since expanded to add the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Qatar, Sweden and India (signed 20 February 2026 at the India AI Impact Summit), and on 26 March 2026 State announced a USD 250 million Pax Silica Fund intended to catalyse trusted-capital co-investment in critical-minerals processing and semiconductor supply chains.

On 8 December 2025 the Council of the EU gave final approval to Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), the first dedicated EU defence-industrial regulation. The regulation was signed on 17 December 2025 and entered into force on 30 December 2025 following publication in the Official Journal. EDIP provides EUR 1.5bn in grants for 2025-2027 plus an earmarked EUR 300m Ukraine Support Instrument, sets a statutory cap limiting non-EU/EEA components to 35% of estimated component cost in end-products procured with Union funding, and creates EU-level demand-aggregation, common procurement and security-of-supply frameworks for defence products.

On 4 December 2025, the United States and the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement on Trade and Investment, executed at a White House trilateral ceremony alongside the parallel U.S.-Rwanda framework and witnessed by President Trump, President Tshisekedi (DRC), and President Kagame (Rwanda). The Agreement creates a Strategic Minerals Reserve (SMR) and a Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) under DRC sovereignty, gives U.S. persons preferential access to SAR assets, and commits DRC and its state-owned enterprises to route at least 30% of their commercialised cobalt volumes through the Sakania-Lobito Corridor within five years. A Joint Steering Committee (JSC) co-chaired by State and DRC's Ministry of Economy holds its inaugural meeting on 4-5 February 2026, designating the initial SAR asset list and launching implementation. The DFC announced a proposed equity investment in a Gécamines-Mercuria copper/cobalt joint venture as the first commercial vehicle under the framework.

The Ivorian Council of Ministers adopted on 3 December 2025 the Politique Intégrée des Ressources Minérales et de l'Énergie (PIRME), a 15-year cross-sector extractive and energy industrial-policy strategy requiring CFA 38,000 billion (~USD 68bn) across three five-year phases to 2040. The policy targets doubling the mining-energy sector's GDP contribution from 7% (2022) to 14% by 2040, positioning it as the economy's second pillar after agriculture. Core mandates include a 50% local transformation target for gold, a 10 million-tonne iron-ore production target, a 500,000 bbl/day oil production target, 45% renewable energy integration, and a 38% reduction in energy-sector emissions — backed by national-content and value-addition requirements across mining, hydrocarbons, and electricity sub-sectors.

On 3 December 2025 the European Commission adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan (COM(2025) 945 final), a horizontal critical-raw-materials supply-security instrument complementing the 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act. The plan mobilises €3 billion in EU funds within twelve months for priority CRM projects, creates a European Critical Raw Materials Centre operational from 2026 (modelled on Japan's JOGMEC) acting as portfolio manager for diversified supply chains, joint purchasing and stockpiling, and activates the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act (IMERA) "vigilance" and "emergency" modes from May 2026 with mandatory information requests, priority deliveries and coordinated stockpile distribution. A targeted CRMA amendment expands product labelling for permanent-magnet recycling and adds export controls on permanent-magnet and aluminium scrap. Targets a 30-50% reduction by 2029 in single-country dependency for battery, rare-earth and defence raw-material value chains.

ECOFIN on 12 December 2025 adopted a Council Implementing Decision approving the 4th amendment to Poland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (Krajowy Plan Odbudowy, KPO), following Commission proposal C(2025) 7998 final of 19 November 2025. The amendment modifies 80 measures within the plan while keeping Poland's total financial contribution under the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) unchanged at EUR 25,276,853,716 in grants, alongside an estimated EUR 20.6 bn REPowerEU chapter envelope. Adopted in parallel with amendments for Austria, Cyprus, Czechia, France, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia, this amendment continues the structural pivot — first opened by the May 2025 third amendment — that allows Poland to redirect post-COVID recovery funds toward defence-industrial and dual-use spending given the NATO eastern-flank context.

On 18 November 2025, during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's White House visit (17-19 November 2025), the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on Securing Uranium, Metals, Permanent Magnets, and Critical Minerals Supply Chains. The framework was signed by US Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and Saudi Minister of Energy H.R.H. Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, and positions Saudi Arabia (via Ma'aden + Public Investment Fund vehicles) as a regional hub for processing rare earths and producing permanent magnets, supports a US-backed rare-earths refinery in the Kingdom, and channels Saudi capital — alongside the broader USD ~1 trillion Saudi investment commitment in the US announced the same week — into US and allied critical-mineral projects. It is paired with a separate joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperation (Section 123 Agreement contemplated) and was operationalised one day later by the 19 November 2025 binding term sheet between MP Materials, the US Department of War, and Ma'aden to develop a rare-earth refinery in Saudi Arabia (Department of War financing the US side's 49% stake; Ma'aden retaining ≥51%).

Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia signed Peraturan Menteri ESDM Nomor 18 Tahun 2025 ("Permen ESDM 18/2025") on 14 November 2025, Indonesia's first comprehensive ministerial-level framework for the exploration, designation, allocation, and utilisation of rare-earth resources. The regulation operationalises Government Regulation PP 39/2025 (signed 11 September 2025), which inserted a dedicated rare-earths article (Article 18A) into PP 96/2021 on the implementation of mineral and coal mining business activities. It empowers the Minister to designate BUMN (state-owned enterprises) as preferred operators of rare-earth mining and processing, mandates that REE output prioritise domestic strategic industries (defence, electric vehicle batteries, advanced technology, permanent magnets), and routes inventarisation through the geological agency before WIUP (mining business permit areas) are awarded.

On 11 November 2025 President Mamadi Doumbouya officially inaugurated start of operations at the Simandou Integrated Project — Africa's largest greenfield mine-and-infrastructure asset — at a ceremony attended by the presidents of Rwanda and Gabon, China's Vice-Premier, and PMs from Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone. The project comprises Blocks 1–2 (WCS: Winning International / China Hongqiao / Baowu) and Blocks 3–4 (SimFer: Rio Tinto 53% / Chinalco-led JV 47%), connected by 622 km of multi-use trans-Guinean railway to barge and transhipment port facilities at Forécariah, operated by Compagnie du TransGuinéen (CTG). Combined design capacity is up to 120 Mt/yr of high-grade (~65% Fe) iron ore, the largest single addition to seaborne supply since Vale's S11D ramp in 2016, structurally reshaping Australia-Brazil price competition and China's iron-ore import geography.

On 6 November 2025 in Washington, DC, US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and Kazakhstan's Minister of Industry and Construction Yersayin Nagaspayev signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Critical Minerals Cooperation during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's state visit and the C5+1 Presidential Summit. The MoU establishes a framework for joint exploration, processing, and supply-chain transparency for tungsten, uranium, and rare-earth elements, with the explicit objective of building "resilient, non-Chinese supply-chains" for the global energy transition. The instrument is paired with up to USD 900 million in potential US financing to Cove Kaz Capital Group for tungsten development and sits inside a broader USD 17 billion package of Washington-signed agreements that lifts headline US-Kazakhstan economic engagement to a reported USD 117 billion.

On 31 October 2025, Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson announced — on the sidelines of the G7 Energy & Environment Ministers' Meeting in Toronto — that the federal government will leverage the Defence Production Act (DPA) to designate critical minerals as defence supplies and build a strategic stockpile, with the Crown acting as buyer of last resort and setting confidential minimum prices to insulate Canadian producers from Chinese price suppression. The announcement was paired with an initial round of 26 investments, partnerships and measures totalling C$6.4 billion in unlocked critical-mineral capital (~C$120m direct federal spend plus up to ~C$1.2 bn in offtake agreements, expressions of interest and export guarantees) and aligned with nine allied countries. It is the first time Canada has invoked DPA stockpiling and priority-procurement powers for non-traditional defence inputs (lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, rare earths, graphite, uranium) and repositions Canada as an allied-aligned strategic supplier parallel to US DPA Title III action under EO 14241.

On 27 October 2025, during the Trump-Takaichi Tokyo summit, the United States and Japan announced the "Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing", signed by President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on 28 October 2025. The non-binding framework establishes a US-Japan Critical Minerals Supply Security Rapid Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Japanese METI Minister; commits both governments to provide financial support to selected mining and processing projects within six months via grants, guarantees, loans, equity, offtake arrangements, and insurance — mobilising DFC + EXIM (US side) with JOGMEC + JBIC (Japan side); develops a "mutually complementary stockpiling arrangement" leveraging existing national systems; and schedules a Mining, Minerals and Metals Investment Ministerial within 180 days. The framework was subsequently operationalised through the 19 March 2026 "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" jointly issued by USTR and METI.

On 26 October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur, on the margins of the ASEAN Summit, President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim signed two complementary instruments structuring the US-Malaysia economic relationship: (i) a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation to Diversify Global Critical Minerals Supply Chains and Promote Investments, establishing quarterly working-level meetings on bilateral exploration, extraction, processing, refining, manufacturing, and recycling, plus shared commitments on streamlined permitting and protection from non-market policies; and (ii) a legally-binding Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) covering goods (chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, metals, vehicles, dairy, horticulture, poultry, pork, rice, fuel ethanol), digital trade, services, and investment. Under the ART, the United States maintains a 19% reciprocal tariff on Malaysian imports (with carve-outs for products receiving 0% under EO 14346) while Malaysia commits to refrain from banning or quota-restricting exports of critical minerals or rare earths to the US, ensure no restrictions on rare-earth magnet sales to US firms, and grant extended operating licenses to US partners. The ART enters into force 60 days after exchange of notifications of completed domestic procedures.

On 20 October 2025, President Donald J. Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed at the White House the "United States-Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths" — a non-binding common-policy instrument committing both governments to provide at least USD 1 billion each in financing within six months (USD 3bn+ joint commitment against an USD 8.5bn project pipeline and a stated USD 53bn recoverable-resource pipeline). The framework establishes a US-Australia Critical Minerals Supply Security Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Australian Minister for Resources, mandates streamlined permitting for mining/separation/processing projects, and explicitly couples the US demand-side architecture (DPA Title III + Defense Logistics Agency stockpile) to Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve. Concurrent with signing, EXIM issued seven Letters of Interest totalling USD 2.2bn (unlocking up to USD 5bn) to Arafura Rare Earths, Northern Minerals, Graphinex, La Trobe Magnesium, VHM, RZ Resources, and Sunrise Energy Metals; the US Department of War separately committed to a 100 metric-ton-per-year advanced gallium refinery in Western Australia, and Australia took USD 200m concessional equity in the Alcoa-Sojitz Wagerup gallium project and USD 100m equity in the Arafura Nolans rare-earths project.