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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and General Administration of Customs (GAC) issued Announcement No. 72 (2025) on November 9, 2025, suspending Article 2 of Announcement No. 46 (2024) — the provision that had imposed a categorical export ban on gallium, germanium, antimony, superhard materials, and graphite dual-use items destined for the United States. The suspension is valid until November 27, 2026, reverting these exports to China's standard dual-use licensing framework for that period. Article 1 of Announcement No. 46 — prohibiting re-exports to US military end-users regardless of routing — remains fully in force. The measure followed bilateral US-China trade consultations and signals a conditional de-escalation window within China's established critical-minerals counter-strike posture.
China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and General Administration of Customs (GAC) issued Announcement No. 70 (2025) on November 7, 2025, suspending for one year the package of rare-earth export-control measures announced on October 9, 2025 (Announcements Nos. 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62). The suspended measures include the licensing regime on medium- and heavy-rare-earth elements, rare-earth processing equipment and technologies, lithium-battery and synthetic-graphite anode materials, superhard materials, and — most significantly — the extraterritorial "0.1% content" rule of Announcement No. 61 that asserted licence jurisdiction over foreign-made products containing Chinese-origin controlled rare earths. The gazette text fixes the window explicitly: "自即日起至2026年11月10日" (from the date of issue until November 10, 2026). This is the rare-earth leg of the post-Busan US-China truce; the dual-use leg (gallium, germanium, antimony, graphite) was suspended two days later by the separate Announcement No. 72 (2025), which runs to November 27, 2026. The two instruments create a two-step expiry cliff in November 2026.
On October 31, 2025, Bulgaria's National Assembly voted 135-4 (42 abstentions) to adopt a decision introducing a temporary measure restricting the export and intra-EU supply of petroleum products — chiefly diesel and aviation fuel — to all destinations, including fellow EU member states. The measure took effect around November 1, 2025 upon publication. Gasoline was excluded because domestic production exceeds internal demand. The ban is a direct domestic-supply-security response to US OFAC's October 22, 2025 SDN designation of Lukoil (see responds_to), whose Burgas refinery supplies roughly 80% of Bulgaria's fuel market; lawmakers cited the risk that sanctions exposure could disrupt Lukoil's export activity and drain the volumes needed to cover domestic demand. Exemptions cover refuelling of ships and aircraft and deliveries to NATO and EU member-state armed forces under the common defence policy.
MOFCOM Announcement No. 69 of 2025 (商务部公告2025年第69号), issued 29 October 2025 by the Ministry of Commerce's Foreign Trade Division, sets China's total 2026-calendar-year export quotas for seven quota-managed goods: licorice and licorice products (5.2 million kg), artificially cultivated medicinal ephedra (1.0289 million kg), sawn timber (150,000 cubic metres), cattail and cattail products (16 million kg), and — specifically for the Hong Kong and Macao markets — live pigs (160.54 million head), live cattle (22,000 head) and live chickens for Hong Kong (3 million birds). Export traders apply to MOFCOM (via provincial commerce departments) for quota certificates, which are then presented to customs for export permits; licorice and cattail quotas are allocated by competitive bidding, the rest by application. The application window ran 1-15 November 2025, with MOFCOM allocating quotas to qualified applicants by 15 December 2025.
MOFCOM Announcement No. 68 of 2025 (商务部公告2025年第68号), issued on 26 October 2025, sets the application requirements and procedures for state-owned trading enterprises (STEs) authorised to export tungsten, antimony and silver during the 2026-2027 cycle. The notice formalises a quota review and joint-approval gate operated through the Key Export Supervision Catalog under MOFCOM's foreign-trade STE authority — distinct from the Export Control Law dual-use regime used in Announcement No. 10 of February 2025. Silver is added for the first time to the STE-managed list, framed by MOFCOM as defence of strategic supply for defence, electronics and photovoltaics. Approved-exporter lists were published in a follow-on review-results notice; the new regime applies to export shipments dated 1 January 2026 onwards.
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order effective 21 October 2025 prohibiting the export of all raw, unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi, covering uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, rutile, gold, copper, diamonds, heavy mineral sands, and all other minerals. Minerals that have been processed, refined, or value-added in Malawi are exempt. The order aligns with an announced National Mining Corporation to oversee mineral production and processing, and introduces fines and sanctions under Malawi law for violations.
On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.
China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and General Administration of Customs (GAC) jointly issued Announcement No. 58 of 2025 on 9 October 2025, adding high-energy-density lithium-ion batteries (cells and packs, >=300 Wh/kg), artificial graphite anode materials, related production equipment, and key manufacturing technologies to the dual-use export control list under licence requirement. The controls were scheduled to take effect 8 November 2025 but were suspended the day before via Announcement No. 70 (2025), which deferred entry-into-force until 10 November 2026 in the context of the US-China Busan economic-trade arrangement. Controls remain legislatively adopted and will become operative unless the suspension is renewed or withdrawn.
Government Resolution No. 1535 of 3 October 2025 introduced a temporary export customs duty of 10% of customs value on oil (oilseed) flax exported from Russia beyond the Eurasian Economic Union, entering into force 12 October 2025 and running through 31 August 2026. The duty was previously zero. The government's stated rationale is to stimulate utilisation of domestic flax-processing capacity and rebalance the domestic market against raw-material exports; the same package established regional export quotas for corn. Global Trade Alert records Belgium, China, and Czechia as the export destinations most exposed to the higher raw-material cost.
Singapore issued a package of four companion instruments in 2025 to modernise its strategic-goods control architecture: (i) the Strategic Goods (Control) Order 2025 (SGCO 2025), which revokes and replaces SGCO 2024 (S 641/2024) and expands the Singapore Strategic Goods Control List to align with the 2024 Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and 2024 EU List of Dual-Use Items, effective 1 December 2025; (ii) the Strategic Goods (Control) (Brokering) (Amendment) Order 2025 (S 662/2025), published 1 October 2025, updating Singapore's extraterritorial brokering regime for controlled goods; (iii) Singapore Customs Circular 01/2025 of 8 April 2025, amending import/export declaration requirements to mandate disclosure of the final destination country of goods rather than the consignee address on the commercial invoice; and (iv) a 4 April 2025 joint MTI–Singapore Customs advisory explicitly warning Singapore-based businesses and intermediaries that their compliance obligations extend beyond Singapore's own controls — i.e., that Singapore authorities will not condone deliberate circumvention or violation of US, EU, or Japanese export controls by Singapore-domiciled intermediaries. This package constitutes the first Singapore export-control-architecture filing in the IPTM register and is directly framed by the February 2025 Singapore–NVIDIA–Inspur–DeepSeek GPU-diversion case in which three Singapore residents were charged for fraudulent re-export of restricted AI accelerators to PRC end-users.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an Interim Final Rule amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to automatically extend Entity List, Military End-User List, and certain other restricted- party controls to any unlisted entity that is at least 50% owned — individually or in the aggregate — by one or more listed parties. The threshold is set to mirror the long-standing OFAC 50% rule. Published 90 FR 47201 (Sept. 30, 2025); effective Sept. 29, 2025. A Temporary General License covering pre-existing transactions with 50%-owned affiliates expired on Nov. 28, 2025. The rule was subsequently suspended for one year by BIS on Nov. 10, 2025 (FR Doc. 2025-19846) as part of the post-Busan US-China understanding.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), within the U.S. Department of Commerce, published a final rule in the Federal Register on September 30, 2025 (FR Doc 2025-18992) rescinding the April 30, 2024 Firearms Export License Requirements interim final rule in its entirety, with the sole exception of preserving the new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) it had introduced for firearms and ammunition. The rule also amends the EAR to remove the Congressional notification requirement for certain semi-automatic firearms license applications. It is effective on publication.
China's Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, General Administration of Customs, and State Administration for Market Regulation jointly issued Announcement No. 54 of 2025 on 26 September 2025, imposing export licence management on pure electric passenger vehicles (HS 8703801090, motor vehicles equipped solely with an electric drive motor and bearing a VIN), effective 1 January 2026. Only vehicle manufacturers and their authorised distributors may apply, and only for their own-brand output; eligibility criteria require Category I exporters to maintain more than 50 overseas after-sales service and maintenance outlets, a minimum 20% spare-parts inventory rate, and a maximum 48-hour maintenance response time in major export markets. The measure is framed by Beijing as shifting the NEV export sector "from scale expansion to quality first" and curbing non-compliant, low-accountability export practices.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 51 of 2025 on 25 September 2025, adding three US entities — Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (NYSE: HII, the largest US military shipbuilder), Planate Management Group, and Global Dimensions LLC — to China's Export Control List (出口管制 管控名单), effective the same day. The listing prohibits Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to the three firms and requires any ongoing related export activity to cease immediately. MOFCOM cited the firms' "military-technical cooperation with China's Taiwan region" as the trigger, issued in parallel with a same-day Unreliable Entity List designation of three other US firms (Saronic Technologies, Aerkomm, Oceaneering International).
India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) issued Notification No. 31/2025-26 on 23 September 2025, revising Appendix-3 of Schedule-II of the ITC(HS) Export Policy to add a new Category 7 — "Certain Emerging Technologies and related items" — to the SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) list. Category 7 brings under export-licence control: quantum-computing systems (≥34 qubits with controlled error rates), cryogenic CMOS integrated circuits, advanced lithography tools (≤45 nm minimum resolvable feature), additive-manufacturing equipment under vacuum, and related software/technology. The notification took effect 30 days from issuance, on 23 October 2025, and is the first new SCOMET category created since the list's last major restructure, aligning India's strategic-trade-control regime with parallel US BIS, Wassenaar Arrangement, and EU dual-use list updates.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 32 entities to the Entity List, with the largest bloc — 23 entries — under the destination of China, plus India (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2). The rule also removed two addresses from one Russian entry (Intertech Rus LLC) and made 27 typographical corrections to existing entries. Several Chinese additions — including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, Sino IC Technology, GMC Semiconductor (Wuxi), and Chinese Academy of Sciences units (National Time Service Center; Aerospace Information Research Institute) — were given footnote 4 designations, extending the EAR's foreign-direct-product (FDP) reach to non-US-origin items destined for Russian military end use. Three Turkish entries (Atempo, EB Teknoloji, Dentun Elektronik) and one Indian entry (AR Sales Pvt Ltd) were footnote-3 Russian Procurement Entity designations. The rule is a final rule effective September 12, 2025; all listed parties are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy.
Qatar's Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) issued Circular No. (3) of 2025, barring car dealerships, showrooms and other commercial exporters from re-exporting new vehicles that have not completed at least one year of domestic registration. The measure targets re-export arbitrage by dealers that was reducing new-car availability and pushing up prices in the local market; authorised dealers and vehicles bought for personal use are exempt. MoCI subsequently adopted, in coordination with the General Authority of Customs (GAC), an executive mechanism clarifying that vehicles imported from a country other than the manufacturing country (and therefore outside Qatar's manufacturer-allocation quota) may still be re-exported.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2003, adopted by the European Commission on 8 September 2025, published in the Official Journal on 14 November 2025 and entering into force on 15 November 2025, amends Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 to implement the 2024 multilateral decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, and NSG. The most extensive EU semiconductor-equipment additions since the 2021 framework took effect: ALD, epitaxial deposition, lithography, EUV pellicles/masks/reticles, SEM, and etching equipment, plus tighter controls on quantum computers, advanced FPGAs/ICs for AI training, additive-manufacturing, and cryogenic/superconducting components. The regulation is the EU-side update layer of the Western dual-use export control architecture, structurally aligned with the US BIS advanced- computing/SME packages and the Netherlands DUV-licensing regime.
The 22nd Regulation Amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (Zweiundzwanzigste Verordnung zur Änderung der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung), promulgated in Bundesgesetzblatt I 2025 Nr. 261 and entering into force on 1 November 2025, updates Germany's national export-control list (Ausfuhrliste, Annex AL to the AWV) to align with the 2024-cycle decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, and NSG. It is the German national implementation layer that parallels Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2003 — both ingest the same multilateral consensus into the EU+DE dual-use perimeter covering ALD, epitaxial deposition, lithography (EUV pellicles/masks/reticles), SEM and etching equipment, quantum computers, cryogenic components, advanced FPGAs/ICs for AI training, and additive-manufacturing systems. Sets the export-list baseline against which BAFA licence determinations from November 2025 onward are made. Distinct from the parallel AWG Implementing Act (entered into force 2026-02-06) which transposed EU Directive 2024/1226 into German sanctions criminal law.
On 2 September 2025 the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule (90 FR 42315; FR Doc 2025-16724) revising the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to substantially relax export and reexport controls on Syria, consistent with Executive Order 14312 ("Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions", 30 June 2025) and the parallel post-Assad sanctions architecture (PAARSS, OFAC, 25 Sep 2025). The rule (i) revises previously restrictive licence-application review policies for items subject to the EAR to be more favourable, (ii) extends the geographic eligibility of existing license exceptions to Syria, and (iii) adds new license exceptions for Syria including for EAR99 items. The rule is effective on publication; section 6 of EO 14312 had already waived application of section 5(a)(1) of the Syria Accountability Act with respect to items on the Commerce Control List, and section 7 waived CBW Act sections 307(a)(5) and 307(b)(2)(C) restrictions on EAR-subject exports to Syria.
Malaysia's Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry, acting through the Strategic Trade Controller, issued Directive No. 1/2025 on 14 July 2025 invoking Section 12 of the Strategic Trade Act 2010 to declare high-performance US-origin AI chips (GPUs, TPUs, neural processors, AI accelerators meeting the Annex I total-processing-performance and performance-density thresholds) as "unlisted controlled items". With effect from 14 July 2025, any export, transshipment, or transit of those chips through Malaysian territory requires a Strategic Trade Permit, a 30-day prior notification, an export-control classification from the manufacturer, and a re-export licence from the originating country. The directive is the formal Malaysian response to US scrutiny over alleged Nvidia AI-chip flows to China via Malaysian freight forwarders and data-centre operators, and it remains binding even after the US relaxes its own export rules.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 35 of 2025 on 9 July 2025, adding 8 Taiwan-based entities to its Dual-Use Items Export Control List under the Export Control Law and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items. The listed firms — spanning aerospace/aviation, unmanned systems, and shipbuilding — are barred from receiving dual-use item exports from China; ongoing export activity to them must cease immediately, with exceptions only via case-by-case MOFCOM approval. The measure took effect the same day it was published.
South African Cabinet on 25 June 2025 approved a three-part package to revitalise the domestic ferrochrome sector: (i) placement of chrome ore under export control via the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) under the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002, requiring an export permit prior to dispatch; (ii) initiation of work on a chrome ore export tax (rate not finalised; market reporting cites 25%); (iii) expanded SEZ incentives for ferrochrome smelters and a negotiated electricity- tariff relief mechanism. The DTIC notice formally placing chrome ore under export control was published in Government Gazette No. 53477 General Notice 6712 on 3 October 2025 with a 30-day public-comment window closing 31 October 2025; the final permit regime takes effect upon subsequent ministerial gazette notice. South Africa accounts for >70% of seaborne chrome ore exports, so the regime is globally material to stainless-steel supply chains.
Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs International Trade Administration (MOEA-ITA) amended the Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) export-control Entity List on 10 June 2025 (announced 15 June 2025) under Article 13 of the Trade Act, adding 601 new entities — including Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC) plus 599 additional entities domiciled in China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Myanmar. Taiwanese exporters (TSMC, UMC, ASE, KYEC and downstream suppliers) must obtain pre-export government licences for direct or third-party shipments of any SHTC-listed item to the listed entities; the action expands Taiwan's total entity-list population to ~10,844 entities. Two follow-on amendments tightened the regime further: a +279-entity expansion on 18 September 2025 and an 18-item commodity-list expansion on 18 November 2025 covering advanced 3D printers, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, electron microscopes and quantum-computing hardware.
The Gabonese Council of Ministers on 30 May 2025 adopted a decision prohibiting all exports of raw (crude) manganese ore effective 1 January 2029, requiring that all manganese mined in Gabon be processed domestically before export. A Commission has been established to draft the implementing regulation, and the Ministry of Industry and Local Transformation is working with COMILOG (Eramet) on transition modalities including the planned Moanda ferromanganese plant (300 kt/yr capacity). The measure applies to the world's #2 manganese producer (~25% of global reserves; ~8 Mt/yr current output, the bulk via COMILOG-Eramet), forcing upstream beneficiation onto Eramet/COMILOG, CITIC, and Ningbo Steel. The ban is the flagship industrial-policy instrument of the "Gabon Industriel 2035" national strategy under President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema.
On 13 May 2025, two days before the AI Diffusion Rule's primary 15 May 2025 compliance date, the Trump administration's BIS announced it would rescind the Biden-era Framework for AI Diffusion (90 FR 4544) and simultaneously issued three guidance documents that re-routed US AI export policy through existing EAR authorities. The package comprises (1) GP10 guidance asserting that all ECCN 3A090 ICs designed by PRC-headquartered firms are presumptively EAR-violative, with Huawei Ascend 910B/910C/910D processors named explicitly — making US- and non-US-person use, transfer, financing, or servicing of those chips anywhere in the world a presumptive General Prohibition 10 violation; (2) a policy statement warning industry that supplying US advanced computing ICs for training or inference of Chinese AI models risks EAR enforcement; and (3) industry guidance on diversion-prevention diligence. BIS stated a formal Federal Register rescission and replacement rule would follow.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 18 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 5. Of the 18 additions, 5 are under China, 6 under Finland, 3 under Türkiye, 2 under Kazakhstan, 1 under Italy, and 1 under the United Kingdom — a geographic distribution dominated by Russia-adjacent diversion corridors. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends use of EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 25 April 2025 (90 FR 17339).
Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) overhauled the catch-all export-control framework under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) — the first comprehensive review of Japan's catch-all controls in 12 years (since 2013). Cabinet decisions were taken on 25 March 2025 and 4 April 2025 with METI's consolidated announcement on 9 April 2025; the amended Cabinet Order entered into force on 9 October 2025. The reform (i) splits catch-all-controlled items into "core items" (high dual-use risk, including certain semiconductors and machine tools) and a general catch-all tier, (ii) adds a new end-user requirement alongside the existing end-use requirement and extends both from UN-arms-embargo countries only to "general countries" (everywhere outside Group A), materially expanding the perimeter of items requiring METI export licences for general-country end-users including China, and (iii) introduces an "informed" condition for exports to Group A countries — once METI notifies an exporter of a defined risk pattern, a Group A export becomes licence-required, addressing transit-export-circumvention to Russia. Structurally distinct from the 23-category equipment-specific 2023 amendment (2023-03-31-japan-meti-semi-equipment-export-controls); this is the underlying horizontal catch-all reform and brings Japan's framework closer to US BIS EAR catch-all controls.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations to add 12 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (11) and Taiwan (1) via Final Rule 2025-05427 (90 FR 14046), companion to the larger 70-entity rule (2025-05426) published the same day. Targets fall in three clusters: (i) Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence and Beijing Innovation Wisdom Technology — added for acquiring US-origin items in support of China's military modernization, specifically developing large AI models and advanced computing chips for defense; (ii) the Inspur group — Inspur (Beijing) Electronic Information Industry, Inspur Electronic Information Industry, Inspur Electronic Information (Hong Kong), Inspur (HK) Electronics, Inspur Software, and Inspur Taiwan — added as subsidiaries contributing to supercomputers for military end use; and (iii) Henan Dingxin, Nettrix Information Industry, Suma Technology, and Suma-USI Electronics — added for involvement in the development of Chinese exascale supercomputers. License requirements are for all items subject to the EAR; review policy is presumption of denial for the AI cluster and policy of denial for the supercomputer clusters.
In its first major export-regulatory action of the second Trump administration, BIS amended the EAR to add 70 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (42), Iran (2), Pakistan (19), South Africa (3), and the United Arab Emirates (4), and modified four existing entries (France, Iran, Senegal, UK). New listings carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions available. Stated objectives include restricting China's acquisition of high-performance computing and quantum technologies for military use, impeding hypersonic-weapons development, disrupting Iran's UAV and defense procurement, and impairing Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. The rule also targets the Test Flying Academy of South Africa for using U.S.-origin items to train Chinese military pilots.
Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan Nomor 8 Tahun 2025 (Permendag 8/2025), signed 6 March 2025 and effective 10 March 2025, is the Third Amendment to Indonesia's Export-Prohibited Goods List (Permendag 22/2023), revising prohibited-export categories across seven commodity groups: forestry (wood, bamboo), agriculture (natural rubber, porang, rice, kratom), subsidised fertilisers (nitrogen-containing mineral/chemical fertilisers), mining (tin and minerals subject to general downstream-processing rules), cultural heritage, metal waste/scrap (iron and steel), and marine sedimentation products (sea sand, marine sludge). The regulation introduces a structured hilirisasi force-majeure relaxation pathway allowing companies that have completed construction of domestic mineral refining/smelting facilities — but cannot yet operate due to force majeure — to temporarily export copper concentrate with a minimum 15% Cu content, subject to Ministry of Trade approval. It is the direct predecessor to the Fourth Amendment (Permendag 6/2026, 26 March 2026).
South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy issued the 36th amendment to the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items (전략물자수출입고시) as MOTIE Notice No. 2025-20, with promulgation on 24 February 2025 and effect from 28 February 2025. The amendment adds 21 advanced-technology items and technologies — including quantum computers, AI-class semiconductors, 3D-printing equipment, isotopes for quantum computing, ultra-low-temperature measurement equipment, and high-temperature coatings — to the Strategic Items List, implementing recent updates from the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group multilateral export-control regimes. The same amendment introduces a humanitarian-medical-device carve-out for exports of diagnostic X-ray and radiographic imaging equipment to Russia, simplifies end-user verification (intermediaries deemed final end-user where verification is "extremely difficult"), extends the post-transaction reporting period from 7 days to 3 months, creates a self-disclosure system for non-compliance, and allows one-time extensions of individual export licences beyond original validity.
On 22 February 2025 the Authority for the Regulation and Control of Strategic Mineral Substance Markets (ARECOMS) of the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued Decision No. 001/ARECOMS/2025 imposing a four-month suspension of all cobalt exports — industrial and artisanal — in response to a multi-year cobalt price collapse driven by structural oversupply from CMOC's Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. The DRC accounts for roughly 70-76% of global mined cobalt, so the ban removed the dominant source of feedstock from the seaborne market. The ban was extended in late June 2025 by another three months, then on 10 October 2025 ARECOMS issued Decision No. 005/ARECOMS/2025 lifting the outright suspension and replacing it with a hard annual export quota: 18,125 t for the November-December 2025 transition window, then 96,600 t per year for 2026 and 2027. The annual ceiling consists of an 87,000 t "base quota" distributed pro-rata using each producer's January 2022 - December 2024 historical export volumes, plus a 9,600 t "strategic quota" allocated at ARECOMS' sole discretion to projects of national strategic importance. Allocations for Q4 2025 went disproportionately to the largest incumbents: CMOC received 6,500 t (Tenke Fungurume + Kisanfu), Glencore 3,925 t (Kamoto + Mutanda), and Eurasian Resources Group 2,125 t (Metalkol). CMOC's award is far below its ~115 kt 2024 production rate, structurally capping the world's top cobalt producer below 30% of its operating capacity. Exporters must obtain a Quota Verification Certificate (AVQ) from ARECOMS, submit to joint sampling, weighing, sealing and physical inspection by multiple government agencies, and prepay the 10% mining royalty within 48 hours of declaring origin and sale. ARECOMS reserves the right to revise quotas quarterly in case of "significant imbalance in the cobalt market," and explicitly retained discretion to re-set 2027 volumes. The measure is the EM resource-nationalism complement to Indonesia's nickel-ore ban template, applied to the single material where one country has the most concentrated global supply share.
BIS published a correcting amendment to its January 16, 2025 interim final rule "Implementation of Additional Due Diligence Measures for Advanced Computing Integrated Circuits" (FR Doc 2025-00711). The correction revises the license-requirement table for ECCN 3A090 by changing the first row, first column from "RS applies to the entire entry, except 3A090.a" to "RS applies to 3A090.a", aligning the Regional Stability control scope with BIS's intended policy in the Advanced Computing Chip rules. Effective February 11, 2025; comments due March 14, 2025. Docket BIS-2024-0055; RIN 0694-AJ98.
After a comprehensive two-year mining ban (August 2023–April 2025), Wa State authorities formally opened new three-year licence applications for mining, processing, and prospecting in Man Maw in February 2025, with permits issued to operators from approximately April 2025. The restart regime imposes a 30% universal tax-in-kind on all tin concentrate exports plus an additional 5% first-batch concentrate levy to fund joint mine dewatering, materially re-pricing approximately 10% of global tin concentrate supply. Shipments recovered to ~1,300 tonnes contained tin per month by November–December 2025.
BIS published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2025-00711, 90 FR 4544-publication slot; companion to the AI Diffusion Framework signed three days earlier) revising the EAR to add explicit due-diligence procedures for advanced computing integrated circuits captured by ECCN 3A090. The rule (i) creates an Authorized IC Designer / Approved IC Packager regime so that foundries and OSATs can identify trustworthy customers via lists maintained by BIS, (ii) imposes new front-end-fabricator reporting requirements for any 3A090.a IC produced for an authorized IC designer to give the US government supply-chain visibility, and (iii) adjusts the scope of covered advanced-computing items. Effective 16 January 2025; compliance required from 31 January 2025; comment period extended to 14 March 2025. The rule was immediately followed by the 16 January Entity List additions (Sophgo et al.) targeting circumvention paths and was technically amended on 14 February 2025 to narrow the RS license requirement to ECCN 3A090.a only.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 16 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (14) and Singapore (2). The additions concentrate on the Sophgo Technologies cluster and a set of affiliated PRC fabless / system houses (Suanze, Suanxin, Suanhu, Suanli, Suanneng, Sophon, Quliang, Shunhua) plus two Singapore entities (Sophgo Technologies Pte. Ltd., PowerAir Pte. Ltd.) acting as offshore extensions of the same group. BIS cites involvement in "supporting or directly contributing to the development of advanced computing integrated circuits" that further PRC advanced-weapons, WMD, and high-tech surveillance programs. License requirement covers all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy. The rule was effective on publication, January 16, 2025.
The Netherlands extended its national export-control measure under the Besluit Strategische Goederen to a new equipment class: specific optical and e-beam measuring and inspection systems used in advanced semiconductor production (capable of detecting defects at 21 nm and below). A national licence issued by the Dutch government (CDIU / BUZA / EZ joint approval) is now required for exports to all destinations outside the EU. The measure was announced by Minister Klever in the Government Gazette on 15 January 2025 and took effect 1 April 2025, directly affecting ASML's Hermes Microvision (HMI) subsidiary and ASM International (ASMI).
The Bureau of Industry and Security signed an Interim Final Rule on 13 January 2025 (90 FR 4544, published 15 January 2025) introducing the first horizontal export-control regime for advanced AI compute and closed-weight model weights. It revised ECCN 3A090 advanced-IC thresholds, created a new ECCN 4E091 covering closed-weight model weights trained on more than 10^26 operations, and bucketed every destination worldwide into a three-tier country group: Tier 1 (~18 close allies, license-free flows), Tier 2 (the rest of the world, per-country compute caps with National VEU and Universal VEU pathways), Tier 3 (US arms-embargoed destinations including China and Russia under comprehensive denial). It added license exceptions AIA, ACM, and LPP and set staggered compliance dates of 15 May 2025 (general) and 15 January 2026 (data-center / model-weight provisions). The Trump administration's BIS rescinded the rule on 13 May 2025 — two days before the primary compliance date — but it was on the books for four months and shaped allied compliance build-out and the architecture of subsequent US AI export controls.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List, listed under the destinations of Burma (1), China (11), and Pakistan (1). The PRC additions concentrate on the optics/photonics, RF/microwave, and military-civil-fusion research-institute layer of China's military-modernization stack — including CAS Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP), Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOM), Peng Cheng Laboratory, Ji Hua Laboratory, and the Yaguang/Chengdu RML defense-electronics cluster — with explicit references to support for hypersonic-weapons development. The Burma entity is Telecom International Myanmar (Mytel), added for providing surveillance services and financial support to the post-coup military regime; the Pakistan entity (Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd) was added for contributions to Pakistan's ballistic-missile programme. All 13 entries carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions. The rule was effective on publication, January 6, 2025, with a savings clause through February 5, 2025 for goods already en route.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued its largest single export-control package targeting China's semiconductor industry on 2 December 2024, with three layered measures (final rules published in the Federal Register 5 December 2024). First, controls on high-bandwidth memory (HBM) above set performance thresholds — blocking the memory architecture that is foundational to AI training. Second, additions of 24 semiconductor manufacturing equipment item types to the Commerce Control List, covering deposition, etch, ion- implant, advanced packaging, and metrology categories. Third, Entity List designations for 140+ entities, the bulk Chinese semiconductor companies + equipment makers + investment vehicles, including major Chinese fab tooling firms. The package triggered MOFCOM's same-day-following retaliation (filed: 2024-12-03-china-mofcom-ge-ga-sb-export-ban-us).
Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2897 of 18 November 2024 amends Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 (restrictive measures over Iran's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine and to armed groups in the Middle East and Red Sea region). It replaces Annex II with an expanded list of goods and technology whose sale, supply or export to Iran is prohibited where they could enable UAV or missile production, across ten technology categories, and adds Article 2a, a prohibition on transactions with the ports listed in Annex IV (Amirabad and Anzali). It entered into force on publication in the Official Journal.
Final rule (RIN 0694-AJ93, FR Doc 2024-25445, 89 FR 87279) under which BIS expands the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions of the Export Administration Regulations to cover an enumerated list of chemical precursors used in the synthesis of chloropicrin and riot-control agents (CS, CN, CR), and adds associated technical clarifications. The action is the export- control complement to the US Department of State's annual report to Congress on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, which determined that Russia had used riot-control agents as a method of warfare against Ukrainian forces in violation of the CWC. Effective on publication, 1 November 2024.
On 31 October 2024, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced strengthened export controls in response to North Korea's long-range ballistic missile launch earlier that day. The measure designates 15 "North Korea-customized" watch-list items across the solid-fuel missile production chain — including ammonium perchlorate, sodium chloride, liquid thiokol, carbon fiber, glass fiber fabric, thermal batteries and inertial-guidance components — that North Korea finds difficult to produce domestically. It operates under Korea's existing Special Notice on Trade for Fulfilling International Peace and Security Obligations, building on the June 2016 Nuclear and Missile Surveillance Items framework and Korea's NSG/MTCR commitments.
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1400 of 23 October 2024, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, sets temporary export quotas on mineral fertilisers from Russia for the six-month period 1 December 2024 – 31 May 2025. The aggregate cap is approximately 19.2 million tonnes, comprising about 11.2 Mt for nitrogen fertilisers and roughly 8 Mt for compound (NPK / NP / NPS) fertilisers. As with prior cycles, the quota is allocated across exporters by historical share and motivated by domestic-market supply stabilisation rather than revenue capture. Russia is the world's largest mineral-fertiliser exporter (~15-20% of global trade depending on segment), so the semi-annual quota is one of the principal global ag-input policy instruments.
Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 84460, Doc 2024-24562) adding 26 entities to the Entity List across four destinations: six in China (aviation simulation for PLA modernisation; procurement for Iran WMD/UAV programs; evasive conduct), one in Egypt and three in the UAE (acquiring US civil aircraft parts for Russian buyers post-Ukraine invasion), and sixteen in Pakistan (nine front companies of Advanced Engineering Research Organization for Pakistan's cruise-missile and strategic-UAV programs, plus seven contributing to Pakistan's ballistic- missile program). The rule also removes two existing entries. All additions are licensed under a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items.
In a final rule published at 89 FR 84766 (FR Doc 2024-23932), the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove BIS licence requirements on certain spacecraft and related items — including remote-sensing spacecraft and on-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (OSAM) items — for exports and reexports to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The rule is effective immediately on publication (23 October 2024) and is part of a three-rule package modernising the US space-related export-control regime (companion IFR 2024-23958 broadens controls relief for ~40 additional destinations; companion proposed rule 2024-23975 floats a new License Exception Commercial Space Activities). The AU/CA/UK carve-out builds on the trilateral National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) framework.
Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 8 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 2. Of the 8 additions, 3 are under China, 2 under Germany, 1 under Pakistan, and 2 under Türkiye. Of the 2 removals, 1 is under Saudi Arabia and 1 under China. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 16 October 2024 (89 FR 83428, FR Doc 2024-23638).
Guinean customs authorities suspended bauxite exports from Guinea Alumina Corporation (GAC, a subsidiary of UAE's Emirates Global Aluminium) on 11 October 2024, following unresolved disputes over GAC's non-compliance with its base convention's alumina refinery-development obligation. EGA said it was "seeking clarity from customs on the reason for this action." The suspension cut GAC's annual bauxite exports from 14.1 million wet metric tonnes in 2023 to 10.8 million wet metric tonnes in 2024 and forced EGA to record a AED 1.8 billion ($488 million) impairment on GAC's book value. The suspension was the opening move in a sequence that escalated to full concession revocation in August 2025 and was formally resolved by an amicable settlement in May 2026.