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Italy's national development bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), together with a banking consortium led by Intesa Sanpaolo (including Crédit Agricole and Banca Popolare di Sondrio), provided a EUR 56 million financing package to ICAM SpA, an Italian chocolate and cocoa semi-finished products manufacturer based in Orsenigo (Como province). Of the total, EUR 40 million is earmarked for expansion of the Orsenigo production facility — including a new production building, an innovation centre for chocolate recipe development, energy-efficient automated machinery, and enhanced raw-material traceability systems — while EUR 16 million supports the company's capital structure. The expansion will add over 23,000 square meters across four levels and raise production capacity from 30,000 to 50,000 tons annually by 2027.

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan's state export-credit and outbound-investment finance institution, signed a loan agreement on 2025-12-22 providing approximately USD 189 million toward a syndicated facility for UnicornMark Discovery Pte. Ltd., a special-purpose vehicle incorporated by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL) to own Singapore's first floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU). Co-lenders are MUFG Bank, DBS Bank, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation, and Standard Chartered (Singapore). The vessel will be chartered to Singapore LNG Corporation, the state-owned LNG terminal operator, under a leasing/operation/maintenance arrangement.

On 18 November 2025, the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, ESMA, and EIOPA) jointly designated 19 Critical ICT Third-Party Providers (CTPPs) under DORA Article 31, with immediate effect — the first-ever exercise of direct EU financial-regulator supervision over hyperscale cloud and infrastructure providers. The designated entities include Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, Deutsche Telekom, Oracle, SAP, IBM, Bloomberg LP, London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), Tata Consultancy Services, and Orange, among others. Designation triggers direct oversight by a lead ESA (EBA for banking-critical, ESMA for capital-markets-critical, EIOPA for insurance-critical) via Joint Examination Teams (JETs), with powers to conduct investigations, carry out on-site inspections, and impose fines of up to 1% of average daily worldwide turnover per day for non-compliance.

Bpifrance Assurance Export, France's state export credit agency, guaranteed GBP 5 billion (~EUR 5.68bn) of lending arranged by a pool of 13 international banks (HSBC Corporate and Institutional Banking as lead/coordinator) to support the construction of the Sizewell C nuclear power plant in Suffolk, England. The guarantee covers up to 95% of the non-payment risk on export contracts held by French companies (led by EDF, a Sizewell C equity partner) involved in the project. It was announced alongside the project's financial close on 4 November 2025, complementing a GBP 36.6bn term loan facility from the UK's National Wealth Fund that forms the bulk of the project's debt financing.

On 29 October 2025 the Swiss Federal Council amended the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), published as AS 2025 662, completing Switzerland's alignment with the remaining goods, finance and services elements of the EU's 18th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, 18 July 2025) and tightening the parallel Belarus regime. The amendment took effect 30 October 2025 and adds: an export ban covering additional structural-metal, general-purpose-machinery and machine-tool goods; an import ban on further petroleum-oil products and waste/scrap categories; and expanded controls on commercial transactions and investment instruments spanning financial services, investment banking, crude-petroleum trade and motor-vehicle/trailer goods. The Federal Department of Economic Affairs (WBF) had already taken over the measures within its own competence on 12 August 2025; this decision closes the remainder. In parallel, the Federal Council's asset-freeze annexes were extended to 14 individuals and 41 companies/organizations.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2040 (amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP), widening the EU's Belarus restrictive-measures regime in lockstep with the 19th Russia sanctions package adopted the same day. The package widens the export ban to industrial goods (salts, ores, rubber articles, tyres, millstones, construction materials, electronic components, rangefinders, propellant chemicals, metals/oxides/alloys), extends the import ban to all acyclic hydrocarbons, introduces a new prior-licensing requirement for services supplied to Belarus, its government, or public bodies, and mirrors the Russia regime's space, AI, and high-performance/ quantum-computing service restrictions. A companion instrument, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2039, adds 5 new asset-freeze listings (2 individuals + 3 entities, including JSC Holography Industry, Horizont Holding, and ICT Horizont). Entered into force 24 October 2025.

FinCEN issued a final rule under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (31 U.S.C. § 5318A) prohibiting US covered financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent account for, or on behalf of, Cambodia-based Huione Group, a foreign financial institution found to be of primary money-laundering concern. Treasury determined that Huione Group and its subsidiaries — including Haowang Guarantee, Huione Pay PLC, and Huione Crypto — laundered at least $4 billion of illicit proceeds between August 2021 and January 2025, including funds tied to North Korean cyber-heist actors and Southeast Asian "pig-butchering" investment-scam compounds. The rule also imposes a special-due-diligence requirement on US covered institutions to guard against indirect access via foreign correspondent accounts. Effective November 17, 2025.

Bpifrance, France's public investment bank, joined a five-bank syndicate (alongside MUFG, Kommunalkredit Austria, La Banque Postale and BNP Paribas) providing a EUR 170 million refinancing package (EUR 120m base plus EUR 50m additional capacity) to ETIX, a French-headquartered proximity data-center operator, to fund its expansion across France and Europe. Bpifrance's press release frames the deal explicitly around European digital sovereignty: ETIX positions itself as a "credible and sustainable European alternative" to a data-center market "dominated by extra-European players." GTA records the state-loan tranche attributable to Bpifrance at EUR 120 million (~USD 139.6 million).

Presidential Decree No. 693 of 30 September 2025 ("On certain particularities of the sale of property held in federal ownership"), signed by Vladimir Putin and entered into force on the day of its official publication, creates an accelerated pathway for disposing of federally-owned property in cases determined by a separate decision of the President, where the goal is to ensure the Russian Federation's defence capability and security. Market valuation and the appraisal report must be completed within 10 business days of signing the appraisal contract; PSB Bank JSC (formerly Promsvyazbank, the state-controlled defence-procurement bank) is designated as the sale-organising agent and seller-on-behalf-of-the-state. The Decree also authorises the President to set special features of how Russian legislation on privatisation, joint-stock companies, limited-liability companies, the securities market, banks and competition protection applies to such sales. Expressly framed as a counter-measure to "unfriendly" actions by the United States and its allies; structurally the disposal-mechanism complement to the foreign-asset external- administration and seizure decrees (95/322/520/442) — the fast-track liquidation channel that converts seized or nationalised assets into state-budget cash for defence purposes.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two Iranian financial facilitators — Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand — along with more than a dozen Hong Kong- and UAE-based individuals and entities for operating a shadow-banking network that laundered proceeds from Iranian oil sales through front companies and cryptocurrency. The designated addresses account for over $600 million in total inflows, including more than $100 million in cryptocurrency purchases tied to oil sales between 2023 and 2025. Proceeds are alleged to benefit the IRGC-Qods Force and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This is the second round of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran's shadow-banking infrastructure since National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) directed a maximum-pressure campaign on Iran in February 2025.

Tanzania's Minister for Minerals issued the Mining (Local Content) (Amendment) Regulations, 2025 via Government Notice No. 563 of 2025, published on 12 September 2025 and in force on the same day with no grace period. The amendment overhauls the Mining (Local Content) Regulations, 2018 (GN No. 3 of 2018) and introduces a new Regulation 13A empowering the Tanzania Mining Commission to publish — in the Gazette, on its website, and in nationwide media — a list of "reserved" goods and services that may be supplied only by an Indigenous Tanzanian Company (ITC) that is 100% Tanzanian-owned (no joint venture permitted in those reserved categories). For non-reserved categories, non- indigenous suppliers must form a JV with an ITC operating in the same line of business in which the ITC holds at least 20% equity, with the JV agreement subject to prior Mining Commission approval. Sole-sourced contracts above ~USD 10,000 must be notified to the Commission, and Local Content Plans must now include Banking Services and Procurement sub-plans, channelling mining-related financial transactions through Tanzanian-registered banks.

Bpifrance and Crédit Mutuel Arkéa's corporate banking arm launched "Avance Défense +," a EUR 500 million short-term working-capital financing facility dedicated to France's Base Industrielle et Technologique de Défense (BITD), split evenly with EUR 250 million from each institution. The mechanism lets defence prime contractors pay suppliers ahead of invoice due dates or defer their own payments while subcontractors are settled on time, and lets SMEs and mid-cap suppliers convert invoices into working-capital liquidity via the Tréso2 digital platform (built by Pytheas Capital). Over 4,500 BITD actors are eligible.

FinCEN published an order amending the three June 25, 2025 special-measure orders (as previously amended by the July 11, 2025 order, FR doc 2025-12973) prohibiting US covered financial institutions from transmitting funds to or from CIBanco S.A., Intercam Banco S.A., and Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. — three Mexican institutions designated of primary money-laundering concern in connection with illicit-opioid trafficking under Section 2313a of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. The amendment extends the effective date of all three prohibitions from September 4, 2025 to October 20, 2025, granting US covered institutions an additional ~46 days to wind down correspondent exposures. The underlying primary-money-laundering-concern findings remain intact — only the implementation deadline shifts.

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed a loan agreement, announced 2025-08-21 (signed 2025-08-20), providing up to USD 14 million (JBIC's portion) toward a USD 24 million total co-financing package with Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation for ETC Group Limited, a Mauritius-based company backed by Mitsui & Co., Ltd. The loan funds liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) operations conducted through ETG Energy, ETC Group's wholly owned subsidiary, across Zambia, South Africa, Mozambique, and Uganda. JBIC explicitly framed the financing as supporting Japanese overseas business expansion and enabling a household-fuel transition from charcoal to LPG aligned with the recipient countries' Paris Agreement emissions commitments.

On 20 August 2025 the UK government, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated three individuals and five entities — OJSC Capital Bank of Central Asia, Grinex LLC, CJSC Tengricoin, Old Vector LLC (all Kyrgyzstan-based) and Altair Holding SA (Luxembourg-based) — for helping Russia evade Western financial sanctions via opaque Kyrgyz banking channels and cryptocurrency rails. The designations target the A7A5 rouble-backed stablecoin network, which the FCDO says moved USD 9.3bn in transactions over four months, and the Grinex/Meer crypto exchanges used to convert and route the proceeds; designated parties face UK asset freezes and trust-services prohibitions.

On 8 August 2025, Türk Eximbank — Turkey's state export credit agency — secured a USD 145 million, three-year murabaha (Islamic finance) syndication facility coordinated by the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector (ICD), the private-sector arm of the Islamic Development Bank Group. Three Gulf-region Islamic banks (Warba Bank, Kuwait International Bank, and AlRayan Bank) participated in the syndication. The facility is on-lent to Türk Eximbank's participation (interest-free) banking window to fund export-oriented Turkish businesses across all sectors, and is logged by Global Trade Alert as a state export-financing intervention.

Czech Republic's first standalone federal statute on the resilience of critical-infrastructure entities — Act No. 266/2025 Sb., "Zákon o odolnosti subjektů kritické infrastruktury a o změně souvisejících zákonů" (Critical Infrastructure Act). Transposes EU Directive 2022/2557 (CER Directive on the resilience of critical entities) into Czech law and removes critical-infrastructure regulation from the earlier crisis-management law (Zákon č. 240/2000 Sb.) into a dedicated statute. Covers the 11 CER-Directive sectors (energy, transport, banking, financial-market infrastructure, health, drinking water, wastewater, digital infrastructure, public administration, space, food production-processing-distribution) and obligates designated operators of essential services to conduct risk analyses, implement technical/organisational resilience measures, report incidents to sector-competent authorities, and submit to inspection. Published in the Sbírka zákonů on 4 August 2025; in force 19 August 2025; operator information-obligation deadline 1 March 2026.

On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

The Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA) published the Guide on DORA Oversight Activities (JC 2025 29) on 15 July 2025, the definitive operational description of how the ESAs will supervise Critical ICT Third-Party Providers (CTPPs) designated under DORA Art. 31. The guide establishes the governance of Joint Examination Teams (JETs), the oversight examination lifecycle (planning, risk assessment, binding recommendations, follow-up), penalty processes of up to 1% of average daily worldwide turnover per day of breach (DORA Art. 35(6)), and lead-overseer assignments (EBA for banking, ESMA for capital markets, EIOPA for insurance). It is authoritative ESA interpretive guidance, not legally binding per se, but constitutes the supervisory playbook CTPPs and their dependent financial entities must plan against.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 22 entities based in Hong Kong (18), the UAE, and Türkiye under Executive Order 13224 for facilitating sales of Iranian oil that benefit the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The front-company network moves refinery payments for Iranian oil through offshore accounts to fund IRGC-QF activity; the action is the second round of sanctions under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's "maximum pressure" campaign, following a June 6, 2025 action against Iranian exchange-house money-laundering networks. All property and interests of the designated entities within US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.

FinCEN published an order amending the three June 25, 2025 special-measure orders (FR docs 2025-11991, 2025-11993, 2025-11990; 90 FR 27770 et seq.) prohibiting US covered financial institutions from transmitting funds to or from CIBanco S.A., Intercam Banco S.A., and Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. — three Mexican institutions designated of primary money-laundering concern in connection with illicit-opioid trafficking under Section 2313a of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. This first extension shifts the effective date of all three prohibitions from July 21, 2025 to September 4, 2025 (a 45-day delay), giving US covered institutions additional time to wind down correspondent exposures. The underlying primary-money-laundering- concern findings remain unchanged — only the implementation deadline shifts.

On 3 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting jointly with the other member states of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), designated five entities and sixteen individuals forming the core of Hizballah's financial infrastructure, under Executive Order 13224 as amended. Newly designated entities include Tashilat SARL (a Lebanese lender that provided loans on behalf of Hizballah and operated as part of Al-Qard Al-Hassan (AQAH) and Bayt al-Mal), alongside senior AQAH officials Samer Hasan Fawaz and Ali Mohamad Karnib. The action reaffirms and expands sanctions on AQAH, Hizballah's shadow "benevolent loan association" bank, and Bayt al-Mal, its unofficial treasury, both previously designated by OFAC in 2007 and 2006 respectively. It is the ninth TFTC joint designation since the center's creation in May 2017 and the third under this Administration; designated persons are alleged to have moved over $500 million through the formal Lebanese banking system — including US-designated Jammal Trust Bank — via joint and shadow accounts despite existing sanctions.

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed a loan agreement on 2025-06-30 for up to approximately USD 626 million (JBIC portion) with Mitsui & Co., Ltd. Co-financed with Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, the total co-financing package reaches approximately USD 1,044 million. Proceeds fund Mitsui's investment in Blue Point Number One, LLC, a low-carbon ammonia production facility under construction in Louisiana using CCS technology to cut over 95% of process CO2 emissions. JBIC frames the loan against Japan's Basic Hydrogen Strategy, Seventh Strategic Energy Plan, and GX2040 Vision, which treat hydrogen and its derivatives as key decarbonization energy sources requiring policy-bank-mobilized capital.

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan's state export-credit and outbound-investment finance institution, signed a loan agreement on 2025-06-27 providing USD 252 million toward a syndicated facility for White Eagle Energy Limited, a Cyprus-registered special-purpose vehicle wholly owned by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL). Co-lenders are Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank. The facility finances White Eagle's acquisition of a newly built floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) — Poland's first — which will be chartered to Operator Gazociągów Przesyłowych GAZ-SYSTEM S.A., Poland's state-owned gas transmission operator, under a leasing/operation/maintenance arrangement.

On 26 June 2025, the Governing Board of Mexico's National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV), invoking Article 129 of the Ley de Instituciones de Crédito, decreed the temporary managerial intervention of CI Banco, S.A. and Intercam Banco, S.A., replacing their administrative bodies and legal representatives. The measure came one day after the US Treasury's FinCEN designated both institutions (along with Vector Casa de Bolsa) as foreign financial institutions of primary money-laundering concern tied to opioid-trafficking networks, and prohibited certain US fund transmittals to them. CNBV/SHCP framed the intervention as a depositor- and creditor-protection measure to safeguard the two banks' operations against the fallout of the US action; Vector Casa de Bolsa was not included in the CNBV intervention.

On 25 June 2025, FinCEN issued three coordinated orders identifying CIBanco S.A., Intercam Banco S.A., and Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. as foreign financial institutions of primary money-laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, and prohibiting US covered financial institutions from engaging in certain transmittals of funds (including convertible virtual currency transmittals) to or from those three institutions or any account or CVC address administered on their behalf. The orders were published in the Federal Register on 30 June 2025 (FR docs 2025-11991 Vector, 2025-11993 CIBanco, 2025-11990 Intercam) with an original effective date of 21 July 2025. These are the first-ever orders issued under Section 2313a of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA (added by the FEND Off Fentanyl Act and Fentanyl Sanctions Act), and target Mexican counterparties tied by FinCEN to the Beltran-Leyva Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), and the Gulf Cartel.

On 18 June 2025 the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the BPCE banking group signed a EUR 300 million loan agreement to expand financing available to French small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) active in the security and defence supply chain, delivered through BPCE's Banque Populaire and Caisse d'Epargne networks. It is the first such operation the EIB has signed in France, and the second in Europe, under the EIB's Pan-EU Security & Defence Lending Envelope, which was expanded from EUR 1 billion to EUR 3 billion earlier in 2025 (a first tranche was signed with Deutsche Bank in Germany the preceding week). Funds are earmarked for SMEs investing in cybersecurity, surveillance, resilience, and defence technologies.

The Canada Infrastructure Bank (CIB) and Scotiabank announced a CAD 100 million (approx. USD 73 million) financing partnership under CIB's Building Retrofit Initiative (BRI), CIB's second partnership with a Canadian financial institution under that program. Scotiabank Commercial Banking Real Estate clients — owners of commercial, industrial, office, and multi-residential buildings — gain access to low-cost financing for deep energy retrofits (envelope upgrades, HVAC electrification, automation/fuel switching, lighting, EV charging) that cut a building's emissions by at least 30%. Scotiabank markets, originates, underwrites, and administers the loans on the partnership's behalf; CIB has now committed more than CAD 1 billion under the BRI overall.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated more than 35 individuals and entities tied to Iranian brothers Mansour, Nasser, and Fazlolah Zarringhalam, whom OFAC says have collectively laundered billions of dollars through the international financial system using Iranian exchange houses (including Zarrin Ghalam, GCM Exchange, and Berelian Exchange) and foreign front companies based in the UAE and Hong Kong. The network is used to move revenue from Iranian oil and petrochemical sales that fund the regime's nuclear and missile programs and terrorist proxies. The action, taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902, is the first designation round under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's "maximum pressure" campaign since its February 4, 2025 issuance; Treasury's FinCEN concurrently issued an updated advisory on Iranian shadow-banking and oil-smuggling red flags for financial institutions.

Bangladesh Bank's Foreign Exchange Policy Department issued Circular No. 14 of 20 April 2025, amending paragraph 26, Chapter 7 of the Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Transactions, 2018 (GFET-2018) to liberalise import-LC discrepancy-handling procedures. Authorised Dealers (AD banks) may now settle discrepant import bills against importer-issued indemnity-and-waiver letters without prior Bangladesh Bank approval, provided discrepancies do not contravene UCP-600 or constitute material changes as defined in GFET-2018 para 31(c). The same treatment is extended to back-to-back import LCs under the export-oriented bonded-warehouse and EPZ regime, directly benefiting Bangladesh's garment-manufacturing sector in settling raw-material import payments against export-LC proceeds.

On 11 April 2025 President Javier Milei signed Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia 269/2025, published in the Boletín Oficial on 14 April 2025 (edición Nº 35.647). The decree repealed Decreto 28/2023, formally lifting the cepo cambiario — the foreign-exchange restrictions that had been in continuous operation in some form since November 2011. Operative provisions include elimination of the 80/20 export-proceeds-channelling mandate, removal of individual USD purchase and wire-transfer caps, permission for companies to repatriate post-1-January-2025 dividend profits, and replacement of the daily crawling-peg with a band float within a $1,000–$1,400 ARS/USD corridor with BCRA floor/ceiling intervention rules. The measure was coordinated with the IMF Extended Fund Facility (USD 20bn total; USD 15bn 2025 free-availability tranche) approved 11 April 2025, and operationalises the currency-stability guarantee embedded in the RIGI large- investment regime (Law 27.742, July 2024).

Kuwait's Amir issued Decree-Law No. 60 of 2025 on 26–27 March 2025, establishing a KD 30 billion (~USD 98 billion, ~60% of GDP) public debt ceiling — the first sovereign debt-issuance framework Kuwait has had since its 2017 law expired. The law authorises sovereign bonds and sukuk with maturities up to 50 years, denominated in Kuwaiti dinars or major convertible foreign currencies, and explicitly targets development of a Kuwaiti sovereign yield curve to anchor local capital-market pricing. It is the operative financing instrument for Kuwait's Vision 2035 development plan and the 124 infrastructure projects approved in the 2025–26 budget cycle.

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/532, adopted 24 March 2025 and published in the Official Journal on 2 July 2025, supplements DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) with binding Regulatory Technical Standards governing ICT subcontracting of critical or important functions. It requires all EU-regulated financial entities to establish a subcontracting policy, conduct due-diligence and concentration-risk assessments at each tier of the ICT supply chain (including nth-party providers), impose equivalent resilience standards on sub-ICT-providers, and maintain enforceable termination and information-access rights. The RTS entered into force on 22 July 2025, completing the second-batch DORA implementing acts on outsourcing chains.

On 24 February 2025 President Prabowo Subianto launched Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara), Indonesia's new state investment-management agency, consolidating around USD 900bn–1tn of Indonesian state-owned-enterprise assets — including Pertamina, PLN, Bank Mandiri, BRI, BNI, Telkom, MIND ID, Antam and Inalum — into a single super-holding modelled on Singapore's Temasek. Danantara was created by the Third Amendment to the BUMN Law (Law No. 1 of 2025, enacted 24 February 2025) and Government Regulation No. 10 of 2025 on its organisation and governance, with board appointments formalised by Presidential Regulation No. 30 of 2025. The agency reports directly to the President, bypassing the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, and is mandated to deploy SOE balance-sheet capacity into Prabowo's 8% growth target via co-investment in mineral downstreaming, refinery and EV-battery build-out, food security, and semiconductor / data-centre infrastructure.