Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2662 actions· ✨ 89 recent

The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea passed on 27 December 2024 a comprehensive amendment to the Act on Prevention of Divulgence and Protection of Industrial Technology (산업기술의 유출방지 및 보호에 관한 법률, the "ITA" or "Industrial Technology Protection Act"), effective 22 July 2025. The amendment grants MOTIE direct statutory authority to block or reverse unapproved exports and overseas transactions involving National Core Technologies (NCTs) — including M&As, technology-transfer transactions, and foreign-investment events — without requiring interdepartmental coordination that was necessary under prior enforcement-decree authority. Entities already verified as NCT holders must complete formal registration with MOTIE within six months of the effective date (by approximately 22 January 2026). Punitive damages for wilful NCT infringement are raised from 3x to 5x actual damages, and criminal fines for overseas NCT leakage are raised from KRW 1.5 billion to KRW 6.5 billion.

China's Ministry of Commerce announced on 3 December 2024 (MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2024) a formal ban on dual-use exports to the United States of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials including diamond and cubic boron nitride. The measure also imposed strict end-use review on graphite exports to the US, with extra scrutiny of military end-uses. It came one day after BIS issued a major export- control package on 2 December 2024 expanding controls on Chinese semiconductor equipment and adding 140 entities to the Entity List, and was framed by MOFCOM as a national- security countermeasure.

The National Assembly of Vietnam passed the Law on Data (Luật Dữ liệu), No. 60/2024/QH15, on 30 November 2024; it enters into force on 1 July 2025. The Law is Vietnam's first comprehensive horizontal data-governance statute, extending regulation beyond personal data (already covered by Decree 13/2023/ND-CP) to all digital data — public, private, and sectoral. It introduces statutory categories of "important data" (dữ liệu quan trọng) and "core data" (dữ liệu cốt lõi) tied to national-defence and national-security review for cross-border transfer, and establishes the National Data Centre under the Ministry of Public Security plus a statutory data-broker / data-services licensing framework.

By Government Decision No. 1533 of 27 November 2024 (published in the Official Monitor No. 1232 of 9 December 2024), the Government of Romania adopted the National Strategy for the Defence Industry 2024-2030. The strategy commits Romania to a 2.5%-of-GDP defence budget through 2030 with 35% earmarked for equipment procurement, sets ten sectoral objectives spanning powders/explosives, munitions, armoured vehicles, naval and aeronautical production, military C4I/cybersecurity, SME advancement, R&D, and a regulatory framework for autonomous combat vehicles and loitering munitions, and invokes Article 346 TFEU to anchor industrial-participation cooperation between foreign primes and national industry. A flagship target is domestic production of two million artillery projectiles per year by 2030.

Tanzania's Parliament passed the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Act, 2024 (Bill No. 15 of 2024, published in the Special Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania No. 34 Vol. 105 on 5 November 2024), which amends eight statutes including the Mining Act, Cap. 123. The mining-related provisions: (i) empower the Minister for Minerals, on recommendation from the Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST), to declare specific minerals as "critical" (essential to national economic, geopolitical, technology, or industrial use with limited or threatened supply) or "strategic" (mineral resources with diplomatic or defence importance) — the first Tanzanian statutory authority to do so; (ii) raise the minimum capital investment for a Mining Licence from USD 100,000 to USD 5,000,000 (a 50× hike pricing out junior explorers); (iii) authorise gemstone export following government-organised mineral auctions or international gem fairs while reaffirming the general beneficiation-in-Tanzania requirement on raw minerals and concentrates; (iv) require GST verification of mineral data on samples exported by mineral right holders; and (v) impose penalties for inaccurate or false mineral-data submissions. The Act establishes the gateway statutory authority for any future Tanzania critical- mineral export-control or stockpiling regime.

On 31 October 2024, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced strengthened export controls in response to North Korea's long-range ballistic missile launch earlier that day. The measure designates 15 "North Korea-customized" watch-list items across the solid-fuel missile production chain — including ammonium perchlorate, sodium chloride, liquid thiokol, carbon fiber, glass fiber fabric, thermal batteries and inertial-guidance components — that North Korea finds difficult to produce domestically. It operates under Korea's existing Special Notice on Trade for Fulfilling International Peace and Security Obligations, building on the June 2016 Nuclear and Missile Surveillance Items framework and Korea's NSG/MTCR commitments.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.

Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs amended the Eksportkontrollforskrift (Regulations on the export of defence- related products, dual-use items, technology and services) to add a new national control list — Annex III ("List III") — for emerging and disruptive technologies not yet covered by the EU dual-use list. Exports of items on Annex III require a licence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regardless of destination, including a catch-all licensing obligation. Controls cover semiconductor manufacturing equipment (including dry-etch apparatus), enriched silicon/germanium substrates, high- performance integrated circuits, quantum computers above specified controlled-qubit thresholds, quantum software and technology, software/technology for reverse-engineering integrated-circuit layouts, and additive-manufacturing equipment for metal/alloy components. The amendment, announced 3 October 2024 and effective 1 November 2024 (with a one-month transitional period), aligns Norway with parallel national measures adopted by the United States (BIS 6 Sep 2024 emerging- technology IFR), the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Denmark and Finland.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

The Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL) 2024 was registered on the Federal Register of Legislation on 16 August 2024 under the Customs Act 1901 and Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, repealing and replacing the DSGL 2021. It comprises the Munitions List (Part 1) and the Dual-Use List (Part 2, nine technology categories including nuclear materials, chemicals, electronics, sensors and marine and aerospace equipment) that Australia controls for export, brokering and intangible transfer. The 2024 instrument periodically realigns the list with changes agreed in the multilateral non-proliferation and export-control regimes Australia belongs to (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group); most changes are clarifications to existing controls, with a smaller number of items entering or leaving control or having their approval requirements adjusted.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 33 of 2024 on 15 August 2024, imposing an export licensing regime on antimony ore, antimony metal, antimony oxides (purity ≥99.99%), organic antimony compounds, antimony hydride, indium antimonide, and gold-antimony smelting technology, effective 15 September 2024. The announcement also covers six-sided top-press equipment used in superhard-materials (diamond, cubic boron nitride) production. China accounts for approximately 47% of global antimony mine output and an estimated 75-80% of refined antimony supply; in the months following implementation, Chinese antimony export volumes fell by approximately 97% and global antimony trioxide spot prices roughly doubled.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) finalized amendments to its Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) regulation at 15 CFR Part 700, originally proposed February 7, 2024. The final rule clarifies long-standing standards and procedures by which BIS provides Special Priorities Assistance (SPA) under the Defense Production Act of 1950, revises Schedule I to delineate Department of Commerce DPAS jurisdiction from other agencies' priority-rating authorities, and applies non-substantive technical edits reflecting updates since the regulation was last amended in 2014. The rule takes effect August 21, 2024.

Japan's National Diet enacted the Act on the Protection and Use of Critical Economic Security Information (重要経済安保情報の保護及び活用に関する法律, Act No. 27 of 2024) on 10 May 2024; it was promulgated on 17 May 2024 and came into full operation on 16 May 2025. The law establishes Japan's first peace-time economic-security clearance regime extending to private-sector employees. It designates "Critical Economic Security Information" (CESI) covering threat-intelligence on critical-infrastructure cyber attacks, regulatory-review information on essential infrastructure, and vulnerability data on critical-product supply chains; mandates Cabinet Office "適性評価" (suitability assessment) for cleared personnel; and imposes criminal penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for unauthorised disclosure. The CESI Act complements the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), closing the information-protection gap and aligning Japan's framework with Five Eyes and EU partners for joint R&D and dual-use cooperation.

Final rule by the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register on 10 May 2024 (89 FR 40369; FR Doc 2024-10280; effective 30 May 2024) making conforming and clarifying amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The most substantive change removes Cyprus from EAR Country Group D:5 — codifying in the EAR the suspension of the US arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus previously announced by the Department of State. The rule also standardises destination names (Swaziland → Eswatini, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) → North Macedonia, Turkey → Türkiye), corrects inadvertently-listed NS1/RS1/MT1 license requirements for Australia and the United Kingdom, removes obsolete footnote 3 designations, and removes redundant standalone references to "Russia" and "Russian Federation" in EAR provisions that already invoke Country Group D:5 (which encompasses both). The rule is largely administrative; the Cyprus D:5 removal is its only operational change to license requirements.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), within the U.S. Department of Commerce, published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2024-08813) on April 30, 2024 amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to restructure export controls on firearms, ammunition, parts, accessories, and related technology and software (EAR Categories 0 and 1). The rule created new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) for semi-automatic firearms, added Crime Control / Detection (CC) license requirements, narrowed license-exception eligibility, introduced a presumption of denial for many non-government end-users, and imposed a default 1-year license validity for semi-automatic firearms. Effective May 30, 2024; later rescinded (except for the new ECCNs) by FR Doc 2025-18992 on September 30, 2025.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 25503; FR Doc 2024-07760) added 11 entries to the Entity List under China (6), Russia (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2), effective 2024-04-11. The primary rationale for the Russia and UAE tranches — and at least one China entity (Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology) — is procurement of US-controlled dual-use aerospace and UAV components for Iran's Shahed- series UAV programme via the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); those drones have been used against oil tankers in the Middle East and deployed by Russia in Ukraine. The remaining five China entities were designated for acquiring US-origin items to support China's military modernisation. The rule also adds one alias to the existing entry for Shanghai Biren Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. This action was the first Entity List final rule published after BIS implemented the 50 Percent Rule for controlling foreign subsidiaries of listed entities.

The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (C2024A00021) received Royal Assent on 8 April 2024 and created three new criminal offences in the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012: section 10A (supply of Defence and Strategic Goods List technology in Australia to a non-exempt foreign person); section 10B (secondary supply of DSGL Part 1 Munitions or Part 2 Dual-Use Sensitive/Very Sensitive goods or technology outside Australia when originally exported from Australia); and section 10C (provision of DSGL Part 1 services to foreign nationals outside Australia). All three offences carry maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment or 2,500 penalty units (~A$782,500), or both. The offence framework commenced 1 September 2024 with a six-month compliance-transition period; criminal liability attached from 1 March 2025. The Act also codifies AUKUS-partnership exemptions, carving out supplies to and from citizens and permanent residents of the United Kingdom and United States, underpinning the licence-free trilateral technology-transfer environment sought under AUKUS Pillar 2.

The Aizsardzības industrijas likums (Defence Industry Law), adopted by the Saeima on 27 March 2024 and published in Latvijas Vēstnesis No. 70 on 10 April 2024, is Latvia's first standalone statute codifying state-support instruments for domestically registered defence-industrial-base firms. The law establishes a strategic-partnership agreement framework between the Ministry of Defence and Latvian-registered defence-tech manufacturers (including the Latvian drone-tech cluster — Atlas Aerospace, UAV Factory, Edge Autonomy Latvia), defines continuity-of-operations and supply-security obligations for strategic-partner firms, and provides a procurement-preference channel for Latvian-registered defence suppliers in MoD and State Defence Logistics and Procurement Centre contracting. The law also streamlines export-licence processing for qualified Latvian strategic- goods exporters and aligns state-support measures with EU Treaty Article 346 defence-exemption and EU European Defence Fund / EDIRPA co-financing rules.

On 5 March 2024 the European Commission and EU High Representative jointly published the first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) via Joint Communication JOIN(2024) 10 final. EDIS sets binding benchmarks for EU member-state procurement: ≥40% of defence equipment acquired cooperatively by 2030, ≥35% of defence trade conducted intra-EU by 2030, and ≥50% of EU-member defence expenditure directed to European-origin products by 2030 rising to ≥60% by 2035. The strategy is the programmatic framework underpinning EDIP (Regulation (EU) 2025/2643), EDF, ASAP and EDIRPA, and marks the first comprehensive attempt to embed defence industrial objectives into EU single-market and budgetary architecture.

On 29 February 2024 Switzerland's WBF decided to align with the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package by amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), effective 1 March 2024 at 18:00 CET. The amendment adds over 100 individuals and nearly 90 entities — mainly Russian military-industrial-complex firms and suppliers of DPRK-sourced weapons to Russia — to the asset-freeze and designation lists, and extends the dual-use/military-technology export ban to 27 additional companies believed to be circumventing existing controls.

On 23 February 2024, two years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and comprising the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package. It adds new CN codes to the export-ban annexes (dual-use and advanced-technology goods) and adds 27 entities — including firms based in China, Hong Kong, India, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Thailand and Turkiye — to the list of parties barred from any exemption from the export ban, on the basis they are assessed to be supporting Russia's military-industrial complex via circumvention routes. Asset-freeze listings (106 individuals, 88 entities) under the parallel Council Decision took effect 23 February 2024; the sectoral trade measures took effect 24 February 2024.

Canada made SOR/2024-32, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered and effective 2024-02-21 on the second anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The regulations add 163 persons to Schedule 1 — 10 individuals and 153 entities, predominantly Russian organizations tied to military-industrial production, logistics, insurance and oil-sector support — triggering Canadian dealing/asset bans. A parallel amendment to Schedule 7 adds five new goods categories under the Harmonized System (explosives and pyrotechnics; data-processing units and components; ball and roller bearings; semiconductor manufacturing equipment; optical and navigational instruments), banning their export to Russia or Russian persons.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Decree No. 31/2024 on 26 January 2024, establishing the All-Ukrainian Economic Platform "Made in Ukraine" (Зроблено в Україні) as the foundational legal architecture for Ukraine's wartime domestic-industrial-development programme. The decree creates a coordinating body under the President — an advisory council convening the Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Economy, Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and State Property Fund — mandated to implement public-procurement preferential margins for Ukrainian-origin goods, administer the eRobota state-grants programme (~UAH 35 bn/year), and establish the National Cashback programme rewarding consumers for purchasing domestic goods via the Diia state-digital platform. The instrument is the statutory parent for the cluster of wartime localisation and industrial-preference measures operationalised through subsequent Cabinet Resolutions and Verkhovna Rada legislation.

A joint advisory issued January 26, 2024 by six US agencies (USTR, State, Treasury, Commerce, DHS, and Labor) updating businesses on supply-chain risks associated with Burma's post-coup military regime (SAC). The advisory warns of reputational, economic, and legal exposure for entities operating in or sourcing from Burma and specifically flags heightened due-diligence requirements for metal importers, the SAC's opaque network of corporate affiliates in Thailand, Singapore, India, and the UAE that complicate traceability, and cross-border reporting gaps for goods and funds transfers. Targeted sectors include rare earths (dysprosium, terbium), base metals and gold mining, timber, aviation services and jet fuel, computer chips and ICT equipment, and small arms components.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-01408, 89 FR 4804, effective 23 January 2024) strengthens the EAR sanctions architecture against Russia and Belarus by adding 94 HTS-6 entries to the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions (§746.5/§746.8) — covering hand tools, parachutes, aircraft training simulators, and airplane/helicopter components — and expands the de minimis threshold for foreign-made goods incorporating US-origin 600-series and 9×515 items destined for Russia or Belarus. A parallel provision targets Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia by adding HTS code 852910 (antennas and antenna reflectors) to the §746.7 Iran export-control list. The rule also refines Crimea licensing to permit exports supporting Ukrainian Armed Forces deployments in occupied territories.

On 22 January 2024, Brazil's National Council for Industrial Development (CNDI), reactivated by President Lula in 2023, launched Nova Indústria Brasil (NIB) — Brazil's first comprehensive national industrial policy since the 2011-2014 Plano Brasil Maior. The framework commits roughly R$300 billion (~USD 60 billion) in financing through 2026, distributed across loans, non-refundable grants and equity participations administered by BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank), Finep (Research and Projects Financing Company) and Embrapii (Brazilian Industrial Research and Innovation Company), with quantitative targets running to 2033. The R$300bn envelope combines R$106bn announced at the first CNDI meeting in July 2023 with R$194bn redirected from existing budget lines. NIB is structured around six "missions": (1) sustainable and digital agro-industrial chains, (2) health-industrial complex resilience (medicines, vaccines, devices), (3) urban infrastructure and green mobility, (4) digital transformation and Industry 4.0 including semiconductors, (5) bioeconomy and energy transition, and (6) defence, sovereignty and national-security technologies. Two presidential decrees signed the same day establish local-content preferences for New PAC public-procurement bids and create an Interministerial Public Procurement Commission. As of February 2025, BNDES had approved R$220bn in NIB-aligned operations, and the plan has anchored downstream sectoral programmes including Brasil Semicon, the Mover automotive programme and Mais Inovação.

The Significant Investments Review Act 2024 (Act No. 1 of 2024) is Singapore's first horizontal, cross-sector statutory FDI screening regime. The Bill was passed by Parliament on 9 January 2024, assented to by the President on 6 February 2024 and gazetted on 14 February 2024; the Act commenced on 28 March 2024 under the SIRA 2024 (Commencement) Notification (S 228/2024), together with the Significant Investments Review Regulations 2024 (S 229/2024). The Act creates an "ownership-and-control" layer over a limited number of "designated entities" the Minister for Trade and Industry has identified as critical to Singapore's national-security interests, plus an "any entity" call-in power exercisable against firms that have acted against Singapore's national-security interests, regardless of whether they are designated. Acquisitions of ≥5% require post-closing notification within 7 days; acquisitions of ≥12% / ≥25% / ≥50% and cessations of ≥50% / ≥75% controller status require prior ministerial approval. Administered by the Office of Significant Investments Review (OSIR) within MTI. SIRA is the Singaporean structural peer of US CFIUS, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479, the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the Canada ICA national-security review.