Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

President Trump signed Executive Order 14387 on 18 February 2026, invoking Section 101 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to ensure an adequate domestic supply of elemental phosphorus and glyphosate-based herbicides. The order delegates DPA §101 priority-allocation and contract- direction authority to the Secretary of Agriculture, authorises USDA to direct the production and distribution of these inputs for national-defense purposes, and grants legal immunity to domestic producers acting in compliance with USDA directives. The EO is the first DPA invocation specifically targeting the phosphorus supply chain, reflecting the concentration of global white/yellow phosphorus production in China (~75% share) and the existence of only a single operating US producer.

The Government of Rajasthan approved its first dedicated semiconductor industrial policy on 21 January 2026, offering a layered incentive stack on top of India's national Semiconductor Mission (ISM). The policy covers fab, ATMP, OSAT, compound semiconductors (SiC, GaN), display fabs, sensors, power electronics, PCBs, and fabless design, with investment-classification tiering (large / mega / ultra-mega categories). Key incentives include a 60% top-up on any ISM capital subsidy received, a 5% interest subsidy on term loans, 100% electricity duty exemption for seven years, 75% stamp duty and land conversion charges exemption, and SGST reimbursements. The official policy document was publicly released on 24 March 2026 via the Rising Rajasthan portal.

On 7 January 2026 the National Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Industry Policy Committee (the "Semiconductor Board"), chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Ekniti Nitithanprapas, endorsed the Draft National Strategy for the Development of the Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Industry, prepared by the Board of Investment (BOI) with Roland Berger after a public hearing in October 2025. The 25-year roadmap (2026-2050) targets more than THB 2.5 trillion (~USD 79.6 billion) in investment, training of more than 230,000 highly-skilled engineers, and construction of a complete upstream-to- downstream semiconductor ecosystem with phased milestones for 2030, 2040 and 2050. The strategy prioritises five product groups where Thailand has competitive potential — Power chips, Sensors, Photonics, Analog and Discrete chips — and explicitly aims to move the country beyond OSAT (Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test) into IC design and upstream wafer fabrication ("Made-in-Thailand chips"). Implementation runs through a five-pillar BOI support mechanism: long-term low-interest financing and grants, human-capital development, technology upgrade of the Microelectronics Technology Centre (TMEC), specialised industrial clusters with guaranteed renewable-energy and water security, and streamlined regulatory approvals including a new BOI "FastPass" fast-track facility (16 pilot projects worth THB 170 billion already processed).

On December 9, 2025 in Niamey, Niger's state uranium company TNUC and Uranium One Group JSC (a Rosatom State Corporation subsidiary) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to jointly obtain permits for new uranium deposits, conduct geological exploration of prospective sites, and establish new uranium mining operations in Niger. The agreement completes Niger's post-coup pivot from French-controlled uranium channels (Orano/SOMAÏR expelled 2024–2025) to Russian-aligned supply, routing future NE yellowcake production through the Rosatom global enrichment network. A companion Rosatom–Niger MoU on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation (NPP feasibility and reactor construction) was signed in the same period.

On 2 October 2025, Navoiyuran State Enterprise (45%), French nuclear-fuel-cycle company Orano SA (45%), and Japanese trading house ITOCHU Corporation (10%) completed the restructuring of their Nurlikum Mining joint venture, unlocking industrial development of the South Djengeldi uranium deposit in Uzbekistan's Kyzylkum Desert (Navoi region). The initial shareholder framework was signed in Paris on 10 March 2025. The project plans to produce approximately 500 tU/year over a ten-year mine life using in-situ leaching (ISL) technology, with production start targeted for Q4 2025, creating a Western-and-Japan-supply-chain-aligned uranium stream distinct from the Rosatom/ Kazatomprom-dominated channel.

Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB), Bolivia's state lithium SOE, signed a contract in September 2024 with Uranium One Group — a subsidiary of Russia's Rosatom state nuclear corporation — for the design, construction, and initial operation of an industrial direct-lithium-extraction (DLE) carbonation plant at Salar de Uyuni, with initial capacity of 14,000 t/yr lithium carbonate (expandable to 25,000–45,000 t/yr), representing a total investment exceeding USD 970 million and a 51%/49% profit-split in Bolivia's favour. The contract was approved by Bolivia's Comisión de Economía Plural in February 2025 amid corruption allegations, then suspended by parliamentary motion on 14 February 2025; a Bolivian court issued a further precautionary suspension order on 27 May 2025 on human-rights, environmental, and Mother Earth rights grounds, while the Arce government continued to insist on legislative ratification through at least 29 May 2025.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim launched Malaysia's National Semiconductor Strategy (NSS) on 28 May 2024 in his keynote at SEMICON Southeast Asia, with implementation led by MITI. The NSS commits at least RM25 billion (~USD 5.3 billion) in fiscal support over a ten-year horizon and structures the chip industrial policy in three sequential phases: (1) shoring up Malaysia's existing strength in outsourced semiconductor assembly and test (OSAT) and back-end packaging, (2) moving domestic firms into integrated-circuit (IC) design, advanced packaging and advanced manufacturing equipment, and (3) developing Malaysian-owned global champions across the chip value chain under a "Made by Malaysia" framing. Headline targets include developing 10 local design and advanced- packaging companies with revenues between RM1 billion and RM4.7 billion, 100 broader semiconductor-related companies near the RM1 billion revenue mark, and training 60,000 high- skilled engineers. The RM25 billion envelope decomposes into RM5 billion in tax forgone over five years, RM2 billion for existing capital grants, RM1.25 billion for an HRD Fund semiconductor allocation, RM2 billion for a Semiconductor Industrial Park, RM1.59 billion for an Advanced Packaging Centre, plus RM2 billion each for the National Energy Transition Facility and Green Tech Financing Scheme. By June 2025, the government reported RM70.7 billion in announced investments attracted under the NSS umbrella.

Uttar Pradesh notified its first dedicated state-level Semiconductor Policy on 12 February 2024 (cabinet-cleared 30 January 2024), making it the fourth Indian state with a sectoral semiconductor incentive regime after Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Gujarat. The policy stacks a 50% additional state capital subsidy on top of the central India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 50% subsidy — yielding an effective ~75% capex coverage for qualifying fab, display-fab, compound-semiconductor, ATMP/OSAT, and sensor units approved by ISM. It adds a 75% land rebate on the first 200 acres for ATMP/OSAT (30% on additional land), a 5% interest subsidy (capped at ₹1 cr/year for 7 years) on investments up to ₹200 cr, 100% stamp-duty and registration-fee exemption, and a 10-year electricity-duty exemption. Within months of notification the state attracted ₹40,038 cr in investment proposals (Tarq Semiconductor, Kaynes Semicon, Aditech, Vamasundari) with ~32,000 projected jobs, prompting the cabinet to later approve mega-project incentives for investments ≥ ₹3,000 cr.