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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: semiconductor. Ownership re-checked 2026-09-12 — exposure claims not re-checked since fill. Company profile →
JSC Angstrem is a legacy Soviet-founded (1963) integrated-circuit fab in Zelenograd, Moscow, operating at 250nm–90nm process nodes. It makes discrete transistors, microcontrollers (including PDP-11/MCS-51/ARM-compatible and newer RISC-V-based parts), and smart-card/secure-ID chips, with output going to Russia's Defense Ministry, state enterprises, and the broader military-industrial base. Ownership is state-linked but split, not a clean majority: PAO Element (a Rostec/Ruselectronics-AFK Sistema joint electronics holding) is the largest direct shareholder at 35.
96%, with ~25% blocks held by OOO Angstrem Invest and AO KontraktFinans Grupp and the remainder in NRD nominee accounts (beneficial owners undisclosed); some secondary sources also name RT-Capital as a historical minority holder. The U.S. Treasury added JSC Angstrem itself to the OFAC SDN list on 2022-09-15 for operating in Russia's electronics sector in support of its military. Separately from the 2019-bankrupt subsidiary Angstrem-T (an unrelated 130nm fab joint-venture project), JSC Angstrem was itself declared bankrupt by a Moscow court on 2024-12-02, at the petition of PAO Bank Zenit over a RUB 1bn 2019 judgment debt left unpaid for six years; by the time of the filing the Russian tax service counted 108 separate enforcement proceedings against the company totalling RUB 147.6bn, and it posted a RUB 236.3bn net loss for 2024 (47x its annual revenue). Reporting since describes the entity "under observation" (restructuring) rather than shut down, and it continued to report (much reduced) revenue through 2025. The earlier VEB.RF/2008-credit-line narrative found in some coverage belongs to the separate Angstrem-T bankruptcy, not to JSC Angstrem's own 2024 filing — corrected here after this claim did not hold up against the sources found on re-check (2026-09-03). The bankruptcy makes near-term production volumes uncertain even where the underlying exposure (what the fab's process needs, if operating) is not in question.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇷🇺 Russia, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Tungsten — *structural component*. Standard contact/via-plug metal in IC interconnect stacks at the 250nm–90nm nodes Angstrem runs; sourcing is concentrated in China, which dominates global mined and processed supply.
Silicon — *bulk input*. Wafer substrate for every IC the fab produces; the foundational material of the whole product line.
Helium — *bulk input*. Process/carrier gas for wafer cooling, inert atmosphere, and leak testing in fab operations; global supply is thin and Russia has limited domestic helium infrastructure, so imports are a real constraint even at legacy nodes.
Copper — *structural component*. Copper-damascene interconnect is the industry-standard metallization below ~130nm, which Angstrem's stated 90nm-node development work would require; less concentrated than the other listed materials but still an industrial input under general sanctions friction for Russian buyers.
Tin — *trace additive*. Solder alloy for IC package leads/interconnect; a small per-unit quantity but a required finishing material across the fab's packaged-chip output (microcontrollers, smart cards).
Tantalum — *structural component*. Used as a diffusion-barrier layer in interconnect metallization and in tantalum capacitors common in IC packaging; conflict-mineral sourcing scrutiny (DRC/Central Africa) and thin refining capacity outside China make it a chokepoint input.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 56d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Copper — *structural component*. Copper-damascene interconnect is the industry-standard metallization below ~130nm, which Angstrem's stated 90nm-node development work would require; less concentrated than the other listed materials but still an industrial input under general sanctions friction for Russian buyers.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
DR Congo supplies 14% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇨🇱 CL 31% · 🇵🇪 PE 16% · 🇨🇳 CN 10% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.7% — shares renormalised after removing CD.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 73d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Copper — *structural component*. Copper-damascene interconnect is the industry-standard metallization below ~130nm, which Angstrem's stated 90nm-node development work would require; less concentrated than the other listed materials but still an industrial input under general sanctions friction for Russian buyers.
China supplies 7.8% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇨🇱 CL 29% · 🇨🇩 CD 17% · 🇵🇪 PE 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.1% — shares renormalised after removing CN.
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches coppertantalum · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 54d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Copper — *structural component*. Copper-damascene interconnect is the industry-standard metallization below ~130nm, which Angstrem's stated 90nm-node development work would require; less concentrated than the other listed materials but still an industrial input under general sanctions friction for Russian buyers.
Tantalum — *structural component*. Used as a diffusion-barrier layer in interconnect metallization and in tantalum capacitors common in IC packaging; conflict-mineral sourcing scrutiny (DRC/Central Africa) and thin refining capacity outside China make it a chokepoint input.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
copper — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇱 CL 26% · 🇨🇩 CD 16% · 🇵🇪 PE 13% · 🇨🇳 CN 8.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
tantalum — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇩 CD 52% · 🇷🇼 RW 16% · 🇳🇬 NG 16% · 🇧🇷 BR 7.6% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches tungstentantalum · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Tungsten — *structural component*. Standard contact/via-plug metal in IC interconnect stacks at the 250nm–90nm nodes Angstrem runs; sourcing is concentrated in China, which dominates global mined and processed supply.
Tantalum — *structural component*. Used as a diffusion-barrier layer in interconnect metallization and in tantalum capacitors common in IC packaging; conflict-mineral sourcing scrutiny (DRC/Central Africa) and thin refining capacity outside China make it a chokepoint input.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
ZM · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 31 Jul 2026, 67d pending
Minister of Finance, acting under s. 89 of the Customs and Excise Act, cut the copper-concentrate export duty to ZERO for tariff headings 2603. 00. 21 / 2603. 00. 22 / 2603. 00. 23 / 2603. 00. 29, capped at 271,742 t, effective 1 June 2026 with automatic lapse 30 September 2026, with per-entity tonnage caps and (per one secondary) a requirement that exempt shipments channel through Industrial Resources Limited. This is a SUPPLY-RELIEF (liberalising) action — a net EASING of a copper/cobalt chokepoint for ~4 months, explicitly to clear stockpiled unprocessed concentrate while Zambia's major smelters are down for extended maintenance. It is the "(No. 2)" successor instrument to the already-filed 2026-03-05-zambia-si-15-2026-copper-concentrates-export-duty-suspension (a distinct SI with its own number, tonnage cap and validity window). Severity ~2 expected.
source ↗Copper — *structural component*. Copper-damascene interconnect is the industry-standard metallization below ~130nm, which Angstrem's stated 90nm-node development work would require; less concentrated than the other listed materials but still an industrial input under general sanctions friction for Russian buyers.
This changes the form of what ZM exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your ZM-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a ZM processing partner, not a supplier switch.
ZM supplies 4.1% of world copper mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid ZM entirely: copper supply outside ZM is 🇨🇱 CL 27%, 🇨🇩 CD 17%, 🇵🇪 PE 14% (shares renormalised after removing ZM).
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax…
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever…
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0.
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Indonesia = ~20% of global refined tin exports (Bangka Belitung); a ban on refined-tin exports would force downstream solder/semiconductor-packaging manufacturing domestically; disrupts global electr…
Requires US allies — primarily the Netherlands (ASML) and Japan (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu) — to align their national export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment with US BIS res…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
Taiwan ITA (International Trade Administration, MOEA) launched a 60-day public consultation on planned revisions to the SHTC (Sensitive High-Tech Commodity) controlled-goods export list to add AI chi…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
Reuters (exclusive, multiple sources) reported 31 Dec 2025 that Chinese authorities have been requiring domestic chipmakers to source at least 50% of equipment spend from Chinese toolmakers when appl…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
If enacted, first Taiwan restriction covering all Chinese customers (not just blacklisted entities); would require Taiwanese OEMs (Foxconn, Pegatron, ASUS, Quanta, Wiwynn), server makers, and compone…
4 of 79 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in semiconductors. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-06), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+1 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
No listed, tradable substitute passes the screen — 3 tracked ex-bloc producers remain a research starting point.
Full substitution matrix →+56 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+10 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.