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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: electronics. Company profile →
Lynred (Palaiseau / Veurey-Voroize, France) is Europe's leading manufacturer of infrared (IR) detector arrays, formed in 2019 by merging Sofradir (cooled detectors) and ULIS (uncooled microbolometers). It supplies focal-plane arrays (FPAs) to defence, space, industrial, and automotive customers. It is a 50/50 joint venture of Thales and Safran (corrected 2026-09-13; a prior version of this dossier named Thales and CEA Investment as majority shareholders, which no source supports).
All wafer-level epitaxy and detector fabrication is done in France; Lynred USA handles sales and module-level integration only.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Lynred produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
Silicon — Read-out integrated circuits (ROICs) bonded to every FPA are silicon-on-CMOS; also used in amorphous-silicon uncooled variants. Standard semiconductor silicon supply risk is lower than the compound semiconductors above but remains a dependency.
Indium — Used in two detector families: indium antimonide (InSb) cooled arrays for MWIR and indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs) for SWIR. Indium refining is ~65–80 % Chinese; there is no commercially viable substitute in epitaxial III-V detectors.
Tellurium — Mercury cadmium telluride (HgCdTe / MCT) is Lynred's core semiconductor for cooled MWIR and LWIR detectors (defense, space). HgCdTe epitaxy is tellurium-intensive; tellurium is byproduct-only (copper smelting), with ~45 % of refined supply concentrated in China, making it among the most supply-constrained critical minerals.
Vanadium — Vanadium oxide (VOx, typically x ≈ 1.8) is the sensing element in Lynred's uncooled microbolometer line (ULIS heritage).
Antimony — Co-constituent in InSb detectors. Antimony production is ~90 % Chinese; EU listed it as a Strategic Raw Material under the CRMA (2024 Annex II).
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 4 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches galliumsiliconindium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗gallium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
Silicon — Read-out integrated circuits (ROICs) bonded to every FPA are silicon-on-CMOS; also used in amorphous-silicon uncooled variants. Standard semiconductor silicon supply risk is lower than the compound semiconductors above but remains a dependency.
Indium — Used in two detector families: indium antimonide (InSb) cooled arrays for MWIR and indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs) for SWIR. Indium refining is ~65–80 % Chinese; there is no commercially viable substitute in epitaxial III-V detectors.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches silicon · flagged 28 Jun 2026, 99d pending
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever is higher" on exports of quartz minerals (HS 25. 06) and feldspar (HS 2529. 10. 00) via amendment to the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196 — a distinct beneficiation-forcing EXPORT-TAX instrument that pushes raw quartz/feldspar exporters toward in-country value-addition. 196), and neither existing entry mentions it; (2) material-relevant — quartz HS 25. 06 covers high-purity/silica quartz feeding the silicon→semiconductor/solar value chain, so a Tanzanian export tax re-prices a raw-silica supply node; the same "rocks to riches" beneficiation logic Tanzania applies elsewhere; (3) part of the wider African raw-mineral-export-tax wave (cf. Zimbabwe 10% lithium-concentrate levy, Namibia unprocessed-mineral ban, Guinea bauxite reference price).
source ↗Silicon — Read-out integrated circuits (ROICs) bonded to every FPA are silicon-on-CMOS; also used in amorphous-silicon uncooled variants. Standard semiconductor silicon supply risk is lower than the compound semiconductors above but remains a dependency.
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid TZ entirely: silicon supply outside TZ is 🇨🇳 CN 86%, 🇧🇷 BR 3.9%, 🇳🇴 NO 2.8% (shares renormalised after removing TZ).
EU · stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated likelihood · touches gallium · flagged 30 Jul 2026, 67d pending
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence on CRM value chains**; (b) steer and de-risk finance into strategic projects with public and private partners; (c) support **strategic stockpiling**; and (d) run **joint purchasing** by pooling company orders and matchmaking demand with supply (a "raw materials platform" pooling orders and creating joint stocks, with an EU-coordinated stockpiling pilot to become operational in the following year). A **call for evidence + public consultation opened 19 May 2026**, and the Commission announced a **legislative proposal for Q2 2026**. Supply-relief on the material axis (EU-side aggregation, stockpiles and de-risking finance directly loosen chokepoint exposure for EU industrial buyers), but it also creates a new EU purchasing/allocation gatekeeper whose membership and priority rules will be contested. If it carries reporting or data-submission duties on participating companies, it becomes a second corporate-facing CRM information obligation alongside CRMA Art. 24.
source ↗gallium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
EU · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches silicon · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Second wave of CRMA Art. 14 strategic projects (drawn from 160+ applications: 95 EU-domestic + 66 third-country including 40 from strategic-partnership countries) gains fast-track permitting (27-month EU cap, 15-month Member State cap), EIB/EBRD financing-hub priority, and off-taker certainty; 75 battery-value-chain projects + 21 REE-for-permanent-magnets in pool; widens the EU's 2030 extraction/processing benchmarks pipeline beyond the first 60 projects
source ↗Silicon — Read-out integrated circuits (ROICs) bonded to every FPA are silicon-on-CMOS; also used in amorphous-silicon uncooled variants. Standard semiconductor silicon supply risk is lower than the compound semiconductors above but remains a dependency.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
2 of 29 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (electronics) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+5 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
+1 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
+3 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.