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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: commodity trading. Company profile →
Sinochem Holdings Corporation Ltd. is a Chinese central state-owned enterprise formed from the 2021 combination of Sinochem Group and ChemChina, administered directly by SASAC. It describes its activities across eight sectors: life science, materials science, basic chemicals, environmental science, rubber & tire, machinery & equipment, city operation, and industrial finance.
Its best-known holdings are the Syngenta Group (crop protection and seeds — around 28% of group turnover in 2025), Pirelli (tyres), and Adisseo (animal nutrition), alongside domestic petrochemical refining and a large fertilizer business. For critical-materials purposes the group's centre of gravity is agricultural minerals, not metals. That runs through Sinofert Holdings Limited (HKEX: 0297), China's largest fertilizer producer and distributor, in which Sinochem Hong Kong (Group) Company Limited holds a 52.65% controlling stake and Sinochem Holdings is the ultimate controlling shareholder. Sinofert covers the chain from resource sourcing through production to distribution, with reported holdings of three nitrogen, four phosphate, four compound and one potash fertilizer producer and combined annual capacity above 10 million tonnes.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇨🇳 China, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Potash — *bulk input*. Sinofert is described as one of only two key firms handling China's potash imports, sourcing from Canada and Russia.
Phosphate — *bulk input*. Four phosphate fertilizer producers sit under Sinofert, and its product range explicitly includes phosphate fertilizers plus monocalcium and dicalcium phosphate.
Sulfur — *bulk input*. Sulfur appears as a named Sinofert product line, not merely an inferred process input.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches phosphatesulfur · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 72d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Phosphate — *bulk input*. Four phosphate fertilizer producers sit under Sinofert, and its product range explicitly includes phosphate fertilizers plus monocalcium and dicalcium phosphate.
Sulfur — *bulk input*. Sulfur appears as a named Sinofert product line, not merely an inferred process input.
China supplies 44% of world phosphate mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇲🇦 MA 28% · 🇺🇸 US 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 11% · 🇯🇴 JO 9.2% — shares renormalised after removing CN.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
China supplies 23% of world sulfur mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇺🇸 US 17% · 🇷🇺 RU 15% · 🇸🇦 SA 15% · 🇦🇪 AE 12% — shares renormalised after removing CN.
SN · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · touches phosphate · flagged 13 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Replaces 2016 Code Minier; embeds 'sovereignty doctrine' with stronger state participation, local-transformation mandate, and WAEMU-conformity requirements; President Faye targeted adoption before end-2025; PM Sonko's May 2026 dismissal may have delayed/revised the bill
source ↗Phosphate — *bulk input*. Four phosphate fertilizer producers sit under Sinofert, and its product range explicitly includes phosphate fertilizers plus monocalcium and dicalcium phosphate.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches phosphate · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Phosphate — *bulk input*. Four phosphate fertilizer producers sit under Sinofert, and its product range explicitly includes phosphate fertilizers plus monocalcium and dicalcium phosphate.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
MA · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches phosphate · flagged 4 Sept 2026, 31d pending
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025. Three structural changes: (1) a National Commission for Strategic and Critical Minerals empowered to designate an official list of "strategic and critical minerals" — Morocco's first formal legal mechanism to do so, which would sit upstream of and interact directly with the phosphate chokepoint (Morocco holds ~70% of world phosphate-rock reserves via OCP); (2) the digital mining cadastre (governance/transparency layer — this component has ALREADY gone live, launched 2026-04-07, and is queued separately to filing. md as an enacted action); (3) sharply increased penalties for illegal mining/prospecting (unauthorised prospecting: MAD 100k-1m; illegal extraction/transport/sale: up to MAD 2m). Morocco is chokepoint-tier and thinly covered (only 4 prior MA actions: 2022 Investment Charter, an AfDB agriculture loan, the 2026 Loi de Finances, and a Feb-2026 mining-tender notice — none creates a minerals-designation regime).
source ↗Phosphate — *bulk input*. Four phosphate fertilizer producers sit under Sinofert, and its product range explicitly includes phosphate fertilizers plus monocalcium and dicalcium phosphate.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
EU · stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated likelihood · touches phosphate · flagged 30 Jul 2026, 67d pending
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence on CRM value chains**; (b) steer and de-risk finance into strategic projects with public and private partners; (c) support **strategic stockpiling**; and (d) run **joint purchasing** by pooling company orders and matchmaking demand with supply (a "raw materials platform" pooling orders and creating joint stocks, with an EU-coordinated stockpiling pilot to become operational in the following year). A **call for evidence + public consultation opened 19 May 2026**, and the Commission announced a **legislative proposal for Q2 2026**. Supply-relief on the material axis (EU-side aggregation, stockpiles and de-risking finance directly loosen chokepoint exposure for EU industrial buyers), but it also creates a new EU purchasing/allocation gatekeeper whose membership and priority rules will be contested. If it carries reporting or data-submission duties on participating companies, it becomes a second corporate-facing CRM information obligation alongside CRMA Art. 24.
source ↗Phosphate — *bulk input*. Four phosphate fertilizer producers sit under Sinofert, and its product range explicitly includes phosphate fertilizers plus monocalcium and dicalcium phosphate.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
Introduced 28-Apr-2026 by Sen.
2 of 15 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (commodity trading) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.