Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On June 17, 2026, at the margins of the G7 Évian summit, Prime Minister Carney and Chancellor Merz issued a bilateral joint statement committing Canada and Germany to a critical-minerals stockpiling partnership with capital investments to be concluded by end-2026. The statement also launches a joint supply chain mapping initiative to identify priority battery-value-chain opportunities, with a specific named project — RCT Solutions (DE) + Sio Silica + Manitoba partners — targeting the extraction and integrated solar manufacturing of 99.9%+ purity silica sand. It builds on the August 2025 CA–DE Declaration of Intent (which established the supply-chain mapping framework and business missions) and extends the relationship into binding capital-deployment commitments.

The Republic of Guinea (represented by Minister of Mines Bouna Sylla and Minister of Finance), Guinea Alumina Corporation (GAC, subsidiary of UAE's Emirates Global Aluminium), and EGA signed an amicable settlement on 6 May 2026, formally ending the 18-month dispute that followed Guinea's August 2025 revocation of GAC's Sangarédi bauxite concession. Key terms: (1) Guinea pays EGA/GAC an undisclosed lump-sum (~USD 300M widely reported but not officially confirmed) in exchange for the formal transfer of all Sangarédi project assets, mining rights, equipment, and operational contracts to state-owned Nimba Mining Company (NMC) — the concession transfer is not reversed; (2) NMC assumes responsibility for advancing the Sangarédi project, including the alumina refinery investment commitment that GAC failed to fulfil; (3) CBG–EGA and NMC–EGA bauxite supply arrangements are restored — CBG agreed to renew long-term supply contracts with EGA under mutually beneficial commercial terms, re-anchoring EGA's UAE alumina refinery feedstock (~2.6 Mt/yr alumina output dependent on Guinea bauxite); (4) the settlement definitively terminates all disputes arising from the October 2024 export suspension, the August 2025 presidential decree revocation, and any CBG-related supply interruptions. EGA had taken a USD 680m write-down in 2025 following the original revocation. No formal Journal Officiel decree identified; settlement announced via EGA joint press release co-signed by both Guinea ministers.

On 21 April 2026, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal issued a final injury finding in Inquiry NQ-2025-005, determining that the dumping of oil country tubular goods (OCTG) originating in or exported from Mexico, the Philippines, Türkiye, and South Korea has caused material injury to the domestic Canadian steel industry. Anti- dumping duties are payable on imports released by CBSA on or after 21 April 2026 and remain in effect for five years. The US investigation was terminated separately.

On 19 March 2026 the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE) announced the selection of 38 German projects across 12 federal Länder for the IPCEI Advanced Semiconductor Technologies (IPCEI AST) — the next Important Project of Common European Interest on semiconductors under EU State Aid Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. The federal commitment is EUR 3 billion drawn from the Sondervermögen Infrastruktur und Klimaneutralität (SVIK), the EUR 100 bn special-purpose vehicle enacted via SVIKG in September 2025. The 38 selected projects span AI chips and chiplets, photonic integrated circuits, advanced manufacturing equipment, sensor technologies, and power electronics, with approximately one-third being startups and SMEs. The measure operationalises Germany's Microelectronics Strategy (October 2025) at the project-funding layer and is the first major SVIK semiconductor-tranche deployment.

Peru's Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) issued Decreto Supremo N° 002-2026-EM on 5 March 2026, modifying Decreto Supremo N° 017-2018-EM (Reglamento del Mecanismo de Racionamiento de Gas Natural) to establish a binding six-tier priority order for natural gas allocation whenever the rationing mechanism is formally activated during declared energy emergencies. Tiers prioritise residential and regulated commercial consumers at the top, followed by CNG vehicle/public-transport stations, regulated industrial consumers by volume threshold, independent consumers with firm contracts, and interruptible-contract holders at the base. The decree imposes binding obligations on natural-gas producers, pipeline-transport concessionaires, distribution concessionaires, and LNG-plant operators to optimise production and supply during declared emergencies, with Osinergmin empowered to grant temporary regulatory exemptions. The decree was triggered by the 2 March 2026 Megantini district rupture of Transportadora de Gas del Perú's (TGP) main Camisea pipeline, which reduced supply to approximately 9–10% of normal capacity and forced Cálidda (Lima/Callao distributor) to cut gas to 850 industrial users and all thermal power plants.

On 1 May 2026 the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (the "Interim Trade Agreement", iTA) entered provisional application between the European Union and the four Mercosur states — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — following its publication in the EU Official Journal on 27 February 2026 alongside the broader EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA). The iTA covers goods (eliminating duties on more than 90% of bilateral trade over a transition period including immediate cuts on cars, pharmaceuticals, wine and olive oil), services, government procurement at federal and state level, intellectual property (344 EU geographical indications protected), SPS/TBT disciplines, and a sustainability chapter. Mercosur receives tariff-rate quotas on agri-food exports (beef, poultry, sugar, ethanol, honey). Provisional application proceeds pending full ratification of EMPA by the Council, European Parliament and all EU national parliaments and a pending CJEU opinion; only the trade pillar applies provisionally.

The European Commission approved EUR 321.8 million (approx. USD 343.4 million) in additional German state aid (case SA.104276) for Salzgitter Flachstahl GmbH's SALCOS ("Salzgitter Low CO2 Steelmaking") Stage I decarbonisation project. The increment lifted the German federal and Lower Saxony state governments' combined funding commitment for Stage I to EUR 1.322 billion, split roughly two-thirds federal (BMWK) and one-third Land Niedersachsen, after the German government publicly confirmed the top-up on 24 February 2026. Stage I comprises a 100MW electrolyser, a direct-reduction-iron plant, and an electric-arc furnace intended to replace blast-furnace/basic- oxygen-furnace production and cut CO2 emissions from the affected process by up to 95%, targeting start-up from 2027.

On 4 February 2026, in Washington, DC, Guinea's Minister of Mines and Geology Bouna Sylla and US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg signed an intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate on critical-mineral supply chains, covering exploration, extraction, processing, and downstream investment. The MoU was one of eleven founding-member bilateral instruments signed simultaneously at the inaugural FORGE (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement) Critical Minerals Ministerial hosted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Guinea holds approximately 26% of global bauxite reserves (~3.7bn tonnes) and is the world's largest bauxite exporter and #2 alumina exporter, making it the choke-point upstream node for any non-Chinese aluminium value chain.

On 2026-01-26 the US Department of Commerce initiated countervailing duty (anti-subsidy) investigations covering van-type trailers and subassemblies thereof from Canada, China, and Mexico, companion to the antidumping investigation covering the same product and countries. On 2026-06-05 Commerce published preliminary affirmative CVD determinations: China received an 82.37% subsidy rate for CIMC Baowell Industries/Qingdao CIMC Reefer Trailer and all other exporters, and a 128.78% adverse-inference rate for non-responsive companies; Mexico received rates of 1.90-1.95% for cooperating respondents (Hyundai de Mexico, Utility Trailer Manufacturing de México) and a 62.67% adverse-inference rate for five non-responsive companies. The Canada CVD investigation was terminated on 2026-05-27 after the petitioner withdrew that portion of the petition. Cash deposits at the preliminary rates began on Federal Register publication; final CVD determinations are scheduled for 2026-08-24 (China) and 2026-10-13 (Mexico).

Uruguay's Poder Ejecutivo promulgated Decreto Nº 329/025 on 23 December 2025, comprehensively overhauling the general investment-promotion framework established under Ley Nº 16.906 (1998) and replacing Decreto 268/020. Administered by COMAP under the Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, the decree entered into force on 1 February 2026 with a coexistence transition period through 30 April 2026 and became the sole operative instrument from 1 May 2026. The decree extends project timelines, creates tiered investment categories (including a mega-investment tier providing up to 25-year IRAE exemptions), expands incentives for SMEs, and explicitly calibrates the scoring matrix toward decentralisation, innovation, export capacity, and strategic sectors including data-centers, green hydrogen, sustainable forestry-pulp, agtech, and global business services.

The Mexican federal government published the Programa Sectorial de Energía 2025-2030 (PMSE) in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 22 December 2025, establishing a binding five-year state-led energy-planning mandate for the Sheinbaum administration (2024-2030). The PMSE mandates a 54-46 state-to-private electricity generation mix, sets a 35 GW new clean-generation target by 2030 (13.6 GW from CFE + 22 GW from private/state/community projects), and formally supersedes the prior market-led Estrategia Nacional de Energía 2018-2032 and PRODESEN architecture. The Program is legally mandatory for all federal public administration entities including CFE, PEMEX, CENACE, and CENAGAS, operationalising the 2024 constitutional reform that restored CFE and PEMEX to strategic-sector status under Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution.

On 3 December 2025 President Pedro Sánchez presented the Plan España Auto 2030, a five-year roadmap to mobilise EUR 30 bn (public + private) through 2030 to anchor electric-vehicle, battery and charging- infrastructure manufacturing in Spain. The plan is the first comprehensive Spanish auto-industrial policy of the post-COVID era and is structured as three immediate 2026 envelopes plus a multi-year PERTE-track: (i) Plan Auto+ — EUR 400 m in direct consumer-purchase subsidies effective 1 January 2026, replacing the autonomous-region- managed MOVES III with a centralised dealer-discount model run by MINCOTUR; (ii) MOVES Corredores — EUR 300 m for fast-charging-corridor deployment; and (iii) an additional EUR 580 m allocated to the PERTE VEC (Vehículo Eléctrico y Conectado) industrial-finance instrument in 2026, on top of the EUR ~3 bn already mobilised across previous PERTE VEC calls. The headline ambition is a sub-EUR 25,000 "affordable Spanish electric car" and 95% electrified light-vehicle production by 2035.

Mozambique's Council of Ministers, at its 39th Ordinary Session on 18 November 2025, approved the terms and conditions of a concession contract granting a state-company consortium the exclusive right to finance, construct, import, and operate (i) a floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) LNG terminal at Beira and Inhassoro (Inhambane province), and (ii) the 865-km ROMPCO gas pipeline connecting Mozambican gas fields to South Africa via Komatipoort — both for a 30-year concession term. The concessionaire is a Specific Object Entity (Entidade de Objecto Específico, EOE) constituted by four state enterprises — the National Hydrocarbon Company (ENH, E.P.), Mozambique Ports & Railways (CFM), Mozambique Electricity (EDM), and Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric (HCB) — plus government-selected technical and financial partners. The decree marks the first midstream LNG infrastructure-rights award in Mozambique and represents a foundational shift toward state-led control of the country's regasification and cross-border pipeline architecture rather than concession to international IOCs.

On 10 November 2025 the European Commission conditionally approved, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), the c. €14.7bn acquisition of German polymer and polyurethane producer Covestro AG by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The Phase II investigation identified foreign-subsidy distortions including an unlimited UAE State guarantee covering ADNOC and a committed capital increase by ADNOC's state-backed parent into Covestro. To clear the transaction, ADNOC committed to remove the State guarantee, Covestro committed to maintain existing R&D cooperation agreements with EU competitors, and Covestro committed to license its present and future sustainability-related patents (c. 200 patents) to qualifying EU market participants on pre-established transparent terms for ten years. This is the second-ever FSR Phase II conditional clearance (after the September 2024 e&/PPF Telecom decision) and the first FSR remedy package to deploy sustainability-IP licensing as a structural commitment.

DRC's Cadastre Minier (CAMI) granted KoBold Metals seven exclusive exploration permits covering approximately 1,600 km² in Tanganyika (four permits, Manono territory) and Haut-Lomami (three, Malemba Nkulu territory) provinces, valid for five years. The permits were issued August 27, 2025 following a July 2025 accord de principe between KoBold and the DRC Ministry of Mines; an official handover ceremony was held September 3, 2025, presided by Minister of Mines Louis Watum Kabamba. KoBold Metals — backed by Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, and Sam Altman — becomes the first US company to hold formal DRC lithium exploration rights over the Manono deposit, one of the world's largest confirmed hard-rock lithium resources (~400 Mt estimated), placing it in direct strategic competition with Chinese-backed Zijin/La Cominière whose rights over the same deposit are contested in ICSID arbitration by AVZ Minerals.

Guinea's Council of Ministers activated a longstanding right in the Mining Code on 14 July 2025, mandating that at least 50% of all bauxite export volumes be shipped on Guinean-flag vessels. To operationalise the mandate, the government simultaneously created Guinéenne des Transports Maritimes (GUITRAM), a 100% state-owned maritime company designated as the exclusive Guinean-flag carrier for the mandated share. A complementary Guinea Bauxite Index (GBX) was launched simultaneously to establish a state-managed reference price for export pricing. The measures redirect freight revenues — estimated at $15–25 per tonne — from existing (predominantly Chinese-controlled) shipping operators toward the Guinean state, applied to approximately 130 Mt/year of exports that constitute roughly 60% of global seaborne bauxite supply.

On 25 June 2025, FinCEN issued three coordinated orders identifying CIBanco S.A., Intercam Banco S.A., and Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. as foreign financial institutions of primary money-laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, and prohibiting US covered financial institutions from engaging in certain transmittals of funds (including convertible virtual currency transmittals) to or from those three institutions or any account or CVC address administered on their behalf. The orders were published in the Federal Register on 30 June 2025 (FR docs 2025-11991 Vector, 2025-11993 CIBanco, 2025-11990 Intercam) with an original effective date of 21 July 2025. These are the first-ever orders issued under Section 2313a of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA (added by the FEND Off Fentanyl Act and Fentanyl Sanctions Act), and target Mexican counterparties tied by FinCEN to the Beltran-Leyva Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), and the Gulf Cartel.

On 19 June 2025 the Council of Ministers of Niger, presided over by the head of the CNSP transition government, adopted a draft ordonnance nationalising the Société des Mines de l'Aïr (SOMAÏR SA), the joint venture that operates Niger's only currently producing uranium mine at Arlit. The communiqué transfers all SOMAÏR shares and assets to the Nigerien State and provides for compensation to existing shareholders net of legal obligations including mining-site rehabilitation costs. SOMAÏR was 63.40% owned by Orano (the French state-controlled nuclear fuel-cycle company, ex-AREVA) and 36.60% by state-owned SOPAMIN; the government cited "irresponsible, illegal and disloyal" conduct by Orano, the expiry of the prior mining convention on 31 December 2023, and a finding that Orano had taken 86.3% of cumulative production between 1971 and 2024 versus its 63.4% shareholding. The same Council of Ministers also nationalised the electricity utility NIGELEC. Orano announced the same day that it would seek full compensation through arbitration and reserved criminal-action rights against third parties acquiring SOMAÏR uranium stock.

On 16 June 2025 the European Investment Bank (EIB) signed a EUR 1.6 billion loan facility with French and Spanish transmission-system operators RTE and Red Eléctrica to finance the Bay of Biscay electricity interconnection, the first submarine power link between the two countries. First tranches totalling EUR 1.2 billion were signed at EIB headquarters in Luxembourg; the project separately holds a EUR 578 million EU Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) grant. The 400 km link (300 km submarine, connecting Cubnezais, France to Gatika, Spain) will raise cross-border exchange capacity from 2,800 MW to 5,000 MW and is expected to enter service in 2028.

On 10–11 May 2025 in Geneva, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and USTR Jamieson Greer met with PRC Vice Premier He Lifeng and on 12 May 2025 issued the "Joint Statement on US-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva," producing the first bilateral de-escalation of the post-2 April 2025 reciprocal-tariff stand-off. The agreement was implemented on the US side via Executive Order 14298 of 12 May 2025 ("Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Discussions With the People's Republic of China," published in the Federal Register 21 May 2025 as 90 FR 21831 / 2025-09297) and on the Chinese side via State Council Tariff Commission Announcement No. 4 of 2025. Effective 12:01 a.m. EDT on 14 May 2025, both sides suspended for 90 days (through 12 August 2025) the 24 percentage points of additional ad valorem duty layered on top of the prior 10% reciprocal rate, while the 10% reciprocal rate itself was retained. On the US side this reduced the headline reciprocal-tariff burden on PRC-origin goods from a 125% scheduled rate (under EOs 14259 and 14266) to 10%; combined with the still-in-force 20% IEEPA-fentanyl tariff under Executive Order 14195 (separately filed: `2025-02-01-us-trump-fentanyl-tariffs-canada-mexico-china`), the effective additional rate on most Chinese imports came down to ~30%. China made a parallel 24pp suspension on US-origin goods (from a 125% retaliatory rate to 10%) and additionally suspended non-tariff countermeasures imposed since 2 April 2025 (export controls, unreliable-entity designations, MOFCOM probes). The truce is structurally a calibrated freeze of the reciprocal-tariff ladder under the April 2025 regime, not a repeal: the underlying EO 14257 / IEEPA framework remains intact and was scheduled to re-engage at the 24pp escalated rate on 12 August 2025 absent further extension. The Geneva agreement is the precursor to the August 2025 Stockholm extension and the October 2025 Busan Economic and Trade Arrangement (separately filed: `2025-10-30-us-china-busan-economic-trade-arrangement`).

On 9 April 2025 the European Commission adopted Communication COM(2025)165, the AI Continent Action Plan, setting out a five-pillar strategy to make the EU a global AI leader. The pillars are (1) computing infrastructure, (2) data for AI, (3) strategic AI innovation and adoption, (4) AI skills and talent, and (5) regulatory simplification. Headline commitments include mobilising approximately €200bn of public+private investment via the InvestAI initiative announced at the AI Action Summit in Paris (11 February 2025), deploying 13 AI Factories (HPC-anchored shared compute facilities) plus regional antennas, building 5 AI Gigafactories powered by >100,000 advanced AI processors with €20bn earmarked from InvestAI, launching the Apply AI Strategy and Data Union Strategy, and proposing a Cloud and AI Development Act with a public consultation closing 4 June 2025. The one-year progress report (9 April 2026) confirmed 19 AI Factories deployed across EU supercomputers with 13 Antennas providing regional access, and €1bn in Apply AI funding calls earmarked.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/612 of 24 March 2025 amends the EU steel safeguard regime first imposed by Regulation (EU) 2019/159, materially tightening the tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system that governs imports across 26 product categories of finished and semi-finished steel. The Commission cuts the annual liberalisation rate (the volume by which TRQs grow each year) from 1% to 0.1%, effectively freezing the in-quota volumes available to third-country exporters at near-current levels through the safeguard's expiry on 30 June 2026. The regulation also repeals the carry-over mechanism that previously allowed unused quarterly TRQ volumes to roll into the next quarter for product categories under significant import pressure, and eliminates the ability of exporting countries to access the residual (other-country) quota in the final quarter of each safeguard year for those categories. The latter change forecloses the route by which Chinese, Indian, Turkish, Korean and Vietnamese mills had increasingly back-filled into unused Russian and Belarusian quota allocations after the 2022 sanctions disruption. Most adjustments enter into force on 1 April 2025; the slower liberalisation pace and the carry-over removal in the most pressured categories take effect 1 July 2025. The measure is the headline trade-policy deliverable of the European Steel and Metals Action Plan unveiled by the Commission on 19 March 2025, and it is explicitly framed as a defensive response to (i) global overcapacity in Chinese steel and (ii) anticipated trade diversion into the EU after the United States reinstated universal 25% Section 232 steel/aluminum tariffs on 12 March 2025. Above-quota imports remain subject to the 25% out-of-quota duty inherited from the 2019 safeguard.

On 25 February 2025 the Government of the Republic of Botswana and De Beers Group (Anglo American) signed binding agreements in Gaborone formalising the September 2023 Heads of Terms. The package replaces the previous Debswana sales arrangement (which expired 30 June 2023 and had operated under rolling extensions) with a new 10-year sales agreement, optionally extendable by a further 5 years; extends the four Debswana mining licences (Jwaneng, Orapa, Letlhakane, Damtshaa) by 25 years from August 2029 to July 2054; and progressively shifts rough-diamond allocation toward the state-owned Okavango Diamond Company (ODC). Under the new sales split, ODC takes 30% of Debswana production with De Beers selling 70% in the first five years (2025-2030), rising to 40%/60% in years 6-10 (2030-2035), and 50%/50% in the optional 5-year extension period — a step-up from the legacy 25%/75% split. De Beers has also committed an upfront BWP 1 billion (~USD 75 million) contribution to a new Diamonds for Development Fund, with further annual contributions tied to Debswana dividends, to support diversification under Botswana's Vision 2036 and National Development Plan. The agreement bundles in-country beneficiation commitments: a new diamond jewellery manufacturing facility in Botswana, a De Beers Institute of Diamonds grading laboratory, and a diamond vocational training institute. The deal was signed by Minister of Minerals and Energy Bogolo Joy Kenewendo and De Beers CEO Al Cook, with President Duma Boko presiding. It is the first Botswana entry in the IPTM register and the cleanest worked example of the negotiated / equity-sharing model of resource nationalism — distinct from the outright export bans pursued by Indonesia, the DRC and Zimbabwe, but driven by the same producing-country imperative to capture rents and margin from a strategic mineral sector.

President Trump signed two Presidential Proclamations on 11 February 2025 reinstating a universal 25% ad-valorem tariff on all steel-mill products and raising the aluminum tariff from 10% to 25% on all imports into the United States, effective 12 March 2025. The proclamations revoked every bilateral exclusion and quota arrangement negotiated by the Biden administration with the EU, UK, Japan, Korea, Australia, and others under the 2021-2022 "alternative measures" frameworks, returning all trading partners to the baseline Section 232 rate without product-level or country-level carve-outs.

On 8 October 2024 Botswana's National Assembly assented to the Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act No. 14 of 2024, the most significant rewrite of the country's mining statute (Cap. 66:01, 1999) in over two decades. The Act commenced on 1 October 2025 via Statutory Instrument 120 of 2025 and introduces five structurally significant provisions: a mandatory 24% citizen/local-investor equity participation in new mining concessions (if the state elects not to take the stake itself), a broadened "controlling interest" definition capturing indirect offshore transactions, enhanced ministerial licence-transfer approval requirements, strengthened environmental rehabilitation obligations, and an in-country beneficiation push. The measure closes the offshore-transaction loophole that previously allowed indirect change-of-control via Mauritius/BVI/Singapore SPVs to bypass ministerial approval, and operationalises Botswana's resource-nationalism turn alongside the companion February 2025 De Beers / Debswana commercial renegotiation.

Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB), Bolivia's state lithium SOE, signed a contract in September 2024 with Uranium One Group — a subsidiary of Russia's Rosatom state nuclear corporation — for the design, construction, and initial operation of an industrial direct-lithium-extraction (DLE) carbonation plant at Salar de Uyuni, with initial capacity of 14,000 t/yr lithium carbonate (expandable to 25,000–45,000 t/yr), representing a total investment exceeding USD 970 million and a 51%/49% profit-split in Bolivia's favour. The contract was approved by Bolivia's Comisión de Economía Plural in February 2025 amid corruption allegations, then suspended by parliamentary motion on 14 February 2025; a Bolivian court issued a further precautionary suspension order on 27 May 2025 on human-rights, environmental, and Mother Earth rights grounds, while the Arce government continued to insist on legislative ratification through at least 29 May 2025.

Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data — the "Data Act" — was published in the Official Journal on 22 December 2023, entered into force on 11 January 2024, and applies generally from 12 September 2025 (with longer transitional periods for IoT product-design obligations under Article 3(1), which apply to products placed on the market after 12 September 2026, and for the data-portability standardisation framework, applicable from 12 September 2027). The Data Act is the third pillar of the EU data-economy framework alongside the GDPR (personal data) and the Data Governance Act 2022/868 (data-intermediation services), and is the world's first horizontal statutory regime governing access to and portability of industrial / IoT / non-personal data — covering by-design data-availability obligations on connected-product manufacturers, a mandatory cloud- switching framework with progressive elimination of switching charges, B2G emergency data-sharing in exceptional needs, unfair-contract-terms protection for SMEs, and safeguards against unlawful international government access to non-personal data held in EU cloud.