Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2666 actions· ✨ 89 recent

Decree reforming various tariff fractions of the General Import and Export Duties Tariff (TIGIE), published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 29 December 2025 and in force 1 January 2026. The reform, approved by Congress as a statutory amendment to the LIGIE (Chamber of Deputies and Senate, Dec 2025) and signed by President Claudia Sheinbaum, raises MFN import duties to between 5% and 50% ad valorem on 1,463 tariff lines covering more than 20 chapters of the TIGIE, spanning automotive, auto parts, textiles, apparel, footwear, steel, aluminum, plastics, paper, leather, furniture, glass, toys, appliances and cosmetics. The increases apply only to goods originating in countries without a free trade agreement with Mexico — principally China, South Korea, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, the UAE, and South Africa. The decree formalises at statutory level the September 2024 Sheinbaum executive order placing a 50% duty on finished passenger vehicles from non-FTA states and is framed by the Secretaría de Economía and SHCP as the operational tariff instrument of Plan México (2025-01-21).

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a Russia-regime notice on 18 December 2025 designating five individuals and 19 entities under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Of the 19 entities, six are based in Russia, eight in the United Arab Emirates, four in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan — reflecting OFSI's continued focus on third-country intermediaries used to route sanctioned Russian trade and finance. Designated persons are subject to a full asset freeze and are barred from commercial transactions and investment instruments with UK persons.

On December 18, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 29 shadow-fleet vessels and 17 vessel-management/shipping firms — plus Egyptian businessman Hatem Elsaid Farid Ibrahim Sakr and two of his UAE-registered companies (Red Sea Ship Management LLC and High Seas Petroleum LLC) — under Executive Order 13902 for operating in Iran's petroleum sector. The vessels, flagged across Palau, Panama, Cook Islands, Barbados, Jamaica and unknown registries, are said to have transported "hundreds of millions of dollars'" worth of Iranian crude oil, fuel oil, bitumen, naphtha and condensate to buyers in Asia. Treasury frames the action as part of a campaign that has sanctioned more than 180 vessels since President Trump resumed office in January 2025, implementing NSPM-2 maximum-pressure policy.

On 15 December 2025 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2588 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2594, giving effect to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (Ukraine territorial-integrity asset-freeze regime) by adding 9 new designations: 5 individuals who own or control companies enabling Russian oil shipments and controlling a significant share of Russia's "shadow fleet," and 4 shipping companies headquartered in Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam that manage shadow-fleet tankers and engage in irregular, high-risk shipping practices. Listed persons and entities are subject to an EU asset freeze (and, for the individuals, a travel ban); EU persons and companies are prohibited from making funds or economic resources available to them.

On 12 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Council adopted the first tranche of listings aligning with the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033, 23 October 2025), amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine and the Belarus Ordinance with effect from 13 December 2025. The decision adds asset freezes and entry/transit bans for 22 natural persons and 42 entities tied to Russia's military-industrial complex, energy sector and shadow-fleet vessel management; extends purchase/sale/insurance bans to over 100 additional tankers; imposes transaction restrictions on 5 Russian banks and 4 Russian-bank branches in Belarus and Kazakhstan for use of specialised financial-messaging services; sanctions Chinese and Hong Kong trading companies and refineries implicated in circumventing the G7 oil price cap; and designates 5 Belarusian persons linked to military-industrial activities. Divestment-exemption deadlines for Swiss persons winding down Russian holdings are extended to end-2026. This is a partial, listings-only tranche — the more substantive measures of the EU's 19th package (Russian LNG import ban, crypto-services prohibition, AI/HPC service bans) were not adopted until the Federal Council's follow-on decision of 25 February 2026.

On 11 December 2025 the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit, held in Washington D.C. on 12 December 2025, at which the United States, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Israel signed the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration. The declaration commits signatories to coordinate "trusted" supply chains across the full technology stack — software, frontier foundation models, network infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transportation logistics, minerals refining and processing, and energy — explicitly to reduce "coercive dependencies." The coalition has since expanded to add the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Qatar, Sweden and India (signed 20 February 2026 at the India AI Impact Summit), and on 26 March 2026 State announced a USD 250 million Pax Silica Fund intended to catalyse trusted-capital co-investment in critical-minerals processing and semiconductor supply chains.

On 22 November 2025, the Abu Dhabi Exports Office (ADEX, the export-financing arm of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development) and the UAE Foreign Aid Agency launched a USD 1 billion "AI for Development" initiative to finance artificial-intelligence and digital-infrastructure projects across African countries. The announcement was made by Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, at the G20 summit. Global Trade Alert classifies the measure as a certainly-harmful "Other export incentive" intervention (state-act 95488), since it channels UAE state export-credit/aid capital toward AI-related exports and services rather than being a neutral development grant.

On 20 November 2025 the White House and US Department of Commerce / Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) authorised Abu Dhabi AI holding company G42 to import advanced computing chips — equivalent to approximately 35,000 Nvidia GB300 Blackwell processors — under the UAE-pioneered Regulated Technology Environment (RTE) compliance framework. The RTE is an Emirati-designed technology governance and audit architecture, developed by G42 and approved under BIS guidelines, with binding UAE-side controls to prevent onward diversion to foreign adversary nations. The authorisation accelerates the Stargate UAE project — a 1 GW AI compute cluster being built by G42 for OpenAI in partnership with Oracle, Cisco, NVIDIA, and SoftBank Group — and represents the first concluded major country-level advanced-compute authorisation following the May 2025 rescission of the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule.

The UAE Cabinet, chaired by Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum at a special meeting during the Dubai Airshow, approved the establishment of a National Investment Fund with initial capital of AED 36.7 billion (~USD 10 billion), open to future review and expansion. The Fund provides financial incentive packages to companies capable of delivering significant economic impact, via direct federal-level financing and cooperation with emirate-level economic, investment and tourism authorities. It targets raising annual FDI inflows from AED 115bn to AED 240bn, and cumulative FDI stock from AED 800bn to AED 2.2 trillion, by 2031.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities based in Iran, the UAE, Turkiye, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany and Ukraine for operating procurement networks that supply Iran's ballistic missile and UAV programmes, including missile propellant precursors and UAV components. The action is Treasury's second round of nonproliferation sanctions since the 27 September 2025 reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran ("snapback") over its non-compliance with international nuclear and missile commitments. Designated entities include Iran-based Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), which Treasury says has worked with the IRGC-Qods Force to advance Iran's UAV programme. All property and interests of the designated parties subject to US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them.

On 10 November 2025 the European Commission conditionally approved, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), the c. €14.7bn acquisition of German polymer and polyurethane producer Covestro AG by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The Phase II investigation identified foreign-subsidy distortions including an unlimited UAE State guarantee covering ADNOC and a committed capital increase by ADNOC's state-backed parent into Covestro. To clear the transaction, ADNOC committed to remove the State guarantee, Covestro committed to maintain existing R&D cooperation agreements with EU competitors, and Covestro committed to license its present and future sustainability-related patents (c. 200 patents) to qualifying EU market participants on pre-established transparent terms for ten years. This is the second-ever FSR Phase II conditional clearance (after the September 2024 e&/PPF Telecom decision) and the first FSR remedy package to deploy sustainability-IP licensing as a structural commitment.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 29 entries — 26 entities and 3 addresses — to the Entity List under the destinations of China (19), Turkey (9), and the United Arab Emirates (1). BIS determined these parties were diverting US-origin items to Iran, including to parties already on the BIS Entity List and on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, in support of Iranian drone-parts and electronics-procurement networks. The rule is a final rule effective October 8, 2025; new license requirements apply to all items subject to the EAR for these listed parties under a presumption-of-denial review policy.

On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.

On 30 September 2025 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed a facility agreement providing up to USD 1.8 billion (JBIC's portion) to Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), co-financed alongside Mizuho Bank (agent) and HSBC's Tokyo branch for a total facility of USD 3 billion. The loan is explicitly structured to support "stable imports of crude oil by Japanese companies" and is the seventh JBIC loan extended to ADNOC for this purpose. A companion MOU signed 4 November 2025 at ADIPEC 2025 broadens the JBIC-ADNOC partnership into downstream energy-transition sectors (hydrogen, ammonia, chemicals).

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) revised its Foreign End-User List (外国ユーザーリスト) — the reference list of foreign organisations for which WMD/missile or, for the first time, conventional-weapons development concerns cannot be excluded, used to trigger catch-all export-licence requirements. The revision adds 92 entities (from China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and the UAE) and removes 5 entities (from China, Iran and India), taking the list to 835 entities across 15 countries and regions — a net increase of 87. The revised list applies from 9 October 2025, the same date Japan's broader catch-all conventional-weapons supplementary export-control review took effect.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 32 entities to the Entity List, with the largest bloc — 23 entries — under the destination of China, plus India (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2). The rule also removed two addresses from one Russian entry (Intertech Rus LLC) and made 27 typographical corrections to existing entries. Several Chinese additions — including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, Sino IC Technology, GMC Semiconductor (Wuxi), and Chinese Academy of Sciences units (National Time Service Center; Aerospace Information Research Institute) — were given footnote 4 designations, extending the EAR's foreign-direct-product (FDP) reach to non-US-origin items destined for Russian military end use. Three Turkish entries (Atempo, EB Teknoloji, Dentun Elektronik) and one Indian entry (AR Sales Pvt Ltd) were footnote-3 Russian Procurement Entity designations. The rule is a final rule effective September 12, 2025; all listed parties are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two Iranian financial facilitators — Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand — along with more than a dozen Hong Kong- and UAE-based individuals and entities for operating a shadow-banking network that laundered proceeds from Iranian oil sales through front companies and cryptocurrency. The designated addresses account for over $600 million in total inflows, including more than $100 million in cryptocurrency purchases tied to oil sales between 2023 and 2025. Proceeds are alleged to benefit the IRGC-Qods Force and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This is the second round of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran's shadow-banking infrastructure since National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) directed a maximum-pressure campaign on Iran in February 2025.

On 11 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities and identified four vessels in what Treasury described as its broadest sanctions action to date against Iran-aligned Ansarallah (Houthi) support networks. The designated network — companies, owners, and operatives located in Yemen, China, the UAE, and the Marshall Islands — is accused of running oil and commodity smuggling through Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports, laundering the proceeds, and using them to finance a global weapons procurement supply chain of front companies and shipping facilitators. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on nine prior 2024-2025 OFAC actions against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and suppliers.

On 2 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Waleed Khaled Hameed al-Samarra'i, a dual Iraqi/St Kitts-and-Nevis citizen, along with his UAE-based shipping manager Babylon and five Marshall Islands-registered shell companies (Tryfo Navigation, Keely Shiptrade, Odiar Management, Panarea Marine, Topsail Shipholding) that hold registered ownership of nine Liberia-flagged tankers (ADENA, LILIANA, CAMILLA, DELFINA, BIANCA, ROBERTA, ALEXANDRA, BELLAGIO, PAOLA). The network blends Iranian crude with Iraqi oil via ship-to-ship transfers in the Arabian Gulf and at Iraqi ports, then markets the blend as solely Iraqi-origin to evade US sanctions, generating hundreds of millions of dollars for the Iranian regime and al-Samarra'i. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902 and blocks all US property and interests of the designated individual, entities and vessels.

President Mamadi Doumbouya signed two decrees on 5 August 2025 revoking Guinea Alumina Corporation's (GAC, a subsidiary of UAE's Emirates Global Aluminium) 690.20 km² bauxite mining concession in Boké Prefecture — citing GAC's non-compliance with article 88 of the October 2004 base convention requiring an alumina refinery development plan under the Simandou 2040 processing mandate. The concession was transferred without compensation to newly created 100%-Guinean state entity Nimba Mining Company SA (NMC), which received a 25-year mining title with a one-year deadline to commence operations. All technical reports and geological data (~400 Mt resource) were transferred to the State without indemnification.

On 30 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals and entities and identified more than 50 vessels belonging to the shipping empire of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader. Treasury described the action — over 115 sanctions in total — as its largest Iran-related action since 2018. The network launders billions of dollars from sales of Iranian and Russian crude oil and petroleum products (mostly to buyers in China) through vessels and front companies registered across the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Cyprus, Panama, Romania, China, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Seychelles. Concurrently, the State Department designated 20 entities and identified 10 vessels under E.O. 13846 and E.O. 13902 for trading and transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.

On 22 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two individuals and five entities under Executive Order 13224 for facilitating revenue generation and material support to the Houthis (Ansarallah) through petroleum importation and money laundering. The network — Muhammad Al-Sunaydar's Arkan Mars petroleum companies (Yemen/UAE) and Yahya Mohammed Al Wazir's Al-Saida Stone for Trading and Agencies and Amran Cement Factory — coordinated roughly $12 million of Iranian petroleum imports through the Houthi-controlled Ras Isa port with an Iranian IRGC-linked petrochemical trading entity, and laundered approximately €6 million through bulk-coal front-company transactions. The action builds on a cadence of OFAC designations against Houthi revenue and weapons-procurement networks running since mid-2024.

On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 22 entities based in Hong Kong (18), the UAE, and Türkiye under Executive Order 13224 for facilitating sales of Iranian oil that benefit the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The front-company network moves refinery payments for Iranian oil through offshore accounts to fund IRGC-QF activity; the action is the second round of sanctions under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's "maximum pressure" campaign, following a June 6, 2025 action against Iranian exchange-house money-laundering networks. All property and interests of the designated entities within US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced on 8 July 2025 that Harman International Industries, Inc. agreed to pay $1,454,145 to settle potential civil liability for 11 apparent egregious violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR, 31 CFR Part 560) that occurred between 22 May 2018 and 27 October 2020. Overseas employees of a U.S. subsidiary of Harman — a Samsung-owned consumer-electronics and automotive-electronics company headquartered in Stamford, CT — enabled the diversion of consumer-audio products through Harman's UAE distributor to end-users in Iran with knowledge that the distributor was reselling into Iran in violation of the ITSR. OFAC determined the apparent violations were egregious but voluntarily self-disclosed, and Harman agreed to invest $400,000 in additional compliance measures as partial satisfaction of the settlement amount.

On 3 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated a network of UAE- and UK-based companies controlled by Iraqi-British businessman Salim Ahmed Said that has smuggled Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi crude since at least 2020, plus five additional shadow-fleet vessel owners based in Seychelles, the Marshall Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. The action, taken pursuant to E.O. 13902 (Iran petroleum sector) and E.O. 13224 (counterterrorism), also identifies several tankers as blocked property and marks the eighth round of sanctions under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's Iran maximum-pressure campaign. Concurrently, the State Department designated six additional entities and four vessels under E.O. 13846.

Canada made SOR/2025-142, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered 2025-06-13. The regulations add 34 Russian entities to Part 2 of Schedule 1 alongside Keremet Bank Open Joint-Stock Company (Kyrgyzstan), three UAE-based entities, one Singapore-based entity, and two energy-commodity trading companies (Switzerland, Azerbaijan) — all designated as sanctions-evasion intermediaries for Russian trade. The amendments also add 201 vessels (by IMO number) to Schedule 1.1 as part of Russia's "shadow fleet," triggering a dealings ban, asset freeze, and a new prohibition on providing financial or other services to non-Canadians in relation to a listed vessel.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated more than 35 individuals and entities tied to Iranian brothers Mansour, Nasser, and Fazlolah Zarringhalam, whom OFAC says have collectively laundered billions of dollars through the international financial system using Iranian exchange houses (including Zarrin Ghalam, GCM Exchange, and Berelian Exchange) and foreign front companies based in the UAE and Hong Kong. The network is used to move revenue from Iranian oil and petrochemical sales that fund the regime's nuclear and missile programs and terrorist proxies. The action, taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902, is the first designation round under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's "maximum pressure" campaign since its February 4, 2025 issuance; Treasury's FinCEN concurrently issued an updated advisory on Iranian shadow-banking and oil-smuggling red flags for financial institutions.

International Resources Holding (IRH), an Abu Dhabi investment vehicle in the International Holding Company (IHC) orbit, completed on 22 July 2025 the acquisition of a 56% majority stake in TSX-V/JSE-listed Alphamin Resources Corp. through its wholly-owned subsidiary Alpha Mining Ltd. IRH acquired 718,990,967 common shares from Tremont Master Holdings (a subsidiary of US private-equity group Denham Capital) at C$0.70/share, a total consideration of approximately US$367 million; Tremont retained roughly 0.8% of Alphamin's outstanding shares. The definitive agreement was signed 3 June 2025. Alphamin operates the Bisie tin mine complex (Mpama North and Mpama South) in North Kivu, DRC, one of the world's highest-grade tin operations and the DRC's largest tin mine, supplying a meaningful share of global mined tin.

On 19 May 2025, Emirates Development Bank (EDB) launched the Emirates Growth Fund (EGF), an AED 1 billion (~USD 272 million) growth-equity platform targeting UAE-based SMEs with annual revenues of AED 10 million or more operating in four national priority sectors: manufacturing, food security, healthcare, and advanced technology. EGF takes active minority equity stakes, typically deploying AED 10-50 million in primary capital per company, to fill the "missing middle" between early-stage venture funding and traditional private equity. The fund forms part of EDB's broader financing portfolio supporting the UAE's Operation 300bn industrial strategy.

On 30 April 2025 the US Department of State designated seven entities and identified two vessels as blocked property for facilitating trade in Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, under Executive Order 13846 and in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2, "Restoring Maximum Pressure on the Government of Iran"). The action named four UAE-based sellers and one purchaser of Iranian petrochemicals — including Solvent Organics (over $300 million in exports of Iranian-origin petrochemicals to third countries) and Alseerah Trading (over $150 million) — plus a Turkiye-based petrochemical trader, an Iran-based cargo inspection company, and a marine management company involved in transporting millions of barrels of Iranian crude. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated the goal was to drive Iran's illicit oil and petrochemical exports, including to China, to zero.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 18 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 5. Of the 18 additions, 5 are under China, 6 under Finland, 3 under Türkiye, 2 under Kazakhstan, 1 under Italy, and 1 under the United Kingdom — a geographic distribution dominated by Russia-adjacent diversion corridors. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends use of EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 25 April 2025 (90 FR 17339).

In its first major export-regulatory action of the second Trump administration, BIS amended the EAR to add 70 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (42), Iran (2), Pakistan (19), South Africa (3), and the United Arab Emirates (4), and modified four existing entries (France, Iran, Senegal, UK). New listings carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions available. Stated objectives include restricting China's acquisition of high-performance computing and quantum technologies for military use, impeding hypersonic-weapons development, disrupting Iran's UAV and defense procurement, and impairing Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. The rule also targets the Test Flying Academy of South Africa for using U.S.-origin items to train Chinese military pilots.

The UAE Ministry of Economy & Tourism issued Directive No. (2) of 2025, implementing a GCC Ministerial Committee decision (dated 13 March 2025) to impose definitive anti-dumping duties on painted and/or coated, flattened or grained aluminium alloy plates, sheets, strips or coils of 0.2mm to 8mm thickness originating in or exported from China. The duties, ranging from 7.1% to 20% of CIF customs value depending on the producer/exporter, took effect 25 April 2025 across all GCC member states' customs territories, including the UAE.