Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

President Trump signed a Presidential Proclamation on 20 February 2026 invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132) to impose a temporary 10% ad-valorem import surcharge on articles imported into the United States, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 24 February 2026. The proclamation was issued within hours of the US Supreme Court's 20 February 2026 ruling in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to set tariffs and vacated the IEEPA-based reciprocal-tariff regime previously in effect. The Section 122 surcharge is statutorily limited to 150 days (terminates 24 July 2026 absent Congressional extension) and the statute caps any such surcharge at 15% ad valorem. Goods qualifying as USMCA originating from Canada or Mexico are exempt; CAFTA-DR textile/apparel articles meeting specified rules of origin are exempt; and a substantial product-exception list excludes critical minerals, energy products, certain pharmaceuticals, electronics, vehicles, aerospace products, specified agricultural goods, and goods already subject to Section 232 duties (the Section 122 duty does not stack on Section 232).

The European Commission approved a €3 billion German state aid scheme (SA.121215) under the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF), authorising federal support for strategic investments in cleantech manufacturing capacity across Germany through 31 December 2030. Aid is delivered via grants, tax advantages, and interest subsidies or guarantees for new loans, and is open to companies across the entire German territory. Eligible activities cover the production of net-zero technologies listed in Annex II of the CISAF — including batteries, solar PV, wind turbines, electrolysers, heat pumps, and CCUS equipment — as well as the production of new or recovered critical raw materials necessary for those final products and main specific components. This is the first €3-billion-tier individual CISAF approval in the register and establishes Germany as the principal Member State implementer of the Clean Industrial Deal's manufacturing-capacity investment pillar.

Germany's first cross-sector federal statute establishing minimum requirements for the physical protection and resilience of critical infrastructure operators (KRITIS) — sectors covered include energy, transport, water, food, ICT, financial services, health, and federal government infrastructure. Transposes EU Directive 2022/2557 (CER Directive on the resilience of critical entities). Identifies operators of critical facilities with Europe-wide significance, mandates national risk analyses for critical services, requires operator risk-management measures and creates a federal incident-reporting regime. Passed by the Bundestag on 29 January 2026, confirmed by the Bundesrat on 6 March 2026, published in BGBl. 2026 I Nr. 66 on 16 March 2026, in force from 17 March 2026.

Germany's transposition of EU Directive 2022/2555 (NIS2), enacted as the "Gesetz zur Umsetzung der NIS-2-Richtlinie und zur Regelung wesentlicher Grundzüge des Informationssicherheitsmanagements in der Bundesverwaltung." Bundestag passage 13 November 2025; Bundesrat approval 21 November 2025; published as BGBl. I 2025 Nr. 301 on 5 December 2025; entered into force 6 December 2025. The statute designates the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) as the central national supervisory authority over an estimated 29,500 covered entities across 18 critical and important sectors, introduces a mandatory 24h initial / 72h detailed / 1-month final cyber-incident reporting cascade, establishes board-level personal liability for senior management, and applies to SME critical- infrastructure suppliers — with no transitional grace period from entry into force.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities based in Iran, the UAE, Turkiye, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany and Ukraine for operating procurement networks that supply Iran's ballistic missile and UAV programmes, including missile propellant precursors and UAV components. The action is Treasury's second round of nonproliferation sanctions since the 27 September 2025 reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran ("snapback") over its non-compliance with international nuclear and missile commitments. Designated entities include Iran-based Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), which Treasury says has worked with the IRGC-Qods Force to advance Iran's UAV programme. All property and interests of the designated parties subject to US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them.

President Trump signed Proclamation 10984 "Adjusting Imports of Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles, Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicle Parts, and Buses Into the United States" on 17 October 2025, invoking Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose a 25% ad valorem tariff on imports of Class 3 to Class 8 medium- and heavy-duty trucks (large pick-up trucks, moving trucks, cargo trucks, dump trucks, tractors) and on key MHDV parts, and a 10% ad valorem tariff on buses and other vehicles classified in HTSUS heading 8702. Duties take effect at 12:01 a.m. EDT on 1 November 2025 (Federal Register doc 2025-19639, 90 FR 48451, published 22 October 2025). USMCA-qualifying MHDVs are tariffed only on the value of non-U.S. content; the proclamation also establishes an offset programme for MHDV parts equal to 3.75% of the aggregate value of all MHDVs assembled in the United States from 2025 through 2030, mirroring the Proclamation 10925 light-vehicle offset architecture.

On 15 October 2025 the German Federal Cabinet adopted the Microelectronics Strategy of the Federal Government, jointly presented by the Federal Ministry for Research, Technology and Space (BMFTR) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE). The strategy is the first comprehensive cabinet-adopted German microelectronics policy framework in over a decade and operationalises Germany's contribution to the European Chips Act envelope. It is organised around three pillars — Research, Skilled Labour and Production — and creates a "Chips Office" to coordinate stakeholder interaction and implementation. It establishes a competence centre for chip design and a flagship "supercomputer in the car" project, and is framed as a key implementation instrument under the High-Tech Agenda Germany (HTAD) and as Germany's contribution to the September 29 2025 Semicon Declaration signed by all 27 EU member states calling for a revised EU Chips Act II.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 entities and 17 individuals across three procurement networks supplying Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and its subordinate weapons producers. The networks sourced ballistic-missile guidance components (accelerometers, gyroscopes, MEMS) for the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group and Shahid Hemmat Space Group, dual-use radar/missile-guidance electronics routed through Hong Kong and China for Shiraz Electronics Industries, and helicopter parts — including a US-origin helicopter — routed through Germany, Türkiye, Portugal and Uruguay for Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA). The action is Treasury's first nonproliferation-sanctions tranche following the 27 September 2025 UN Security Council "snapback" reimposing pre-JCPOA sanctions on Iran.

India's Ministry of Defence signed a contract worth over Rs 62,370 crore (excluding taxes, ~USD 7.5 billion) with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) on 25 September 2025 for 97 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk1A — 68 single-seat fighters and 29 twin-seat trainers — for the Indian Air Force. The acquisition falls under the "Buy (India-IDDM)" (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured) category of the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 and carries an indigenous-content requirement of over 64%, incorporating 67 additional indigenous items compared with the prior January 2021 LCA Mk1A contract. Deliveries begin 2027-28 and run over six years, supported by a vendor base of roughly 105 Indian component manufacturers.

On 18 September 2025 the Bundestag adopted the Gesetz zur Errichtung eines Sondervermögens "Infrastruktur und Klimaneutralität" (SVIKG), authorising up to EUR 500 bn of additional federal borrowing over a twelve-year horizon outside the constitutional debt brake, on the basis of the new Article 143h Grundgesetz inserted by the March 2025 constitutional amendment. The envelope splits into up to EUR 100 bn for Länder and municipal infrastructure (channelled via the companion Länder- und Kommunal-Infrastrukturfinanzierungsgesetz, LuKIFG, passed 9 October 2025), EUR 100 bn transferred to the Klima- und Trans- formationsfonds (KTF) in annual instalments through 2034, and up to EUR 300 bn for additional federal investments in transport, energy/ heat, hospital, education, digitalisation, civil protection and R&D infrastructure. Investments are eligible retroactively from 1 January 2025 and may be approved through 31 December 2036; loan repayment begins no later than 1 January 2044. SVIKG is the largest single industrial-finance instrument launched by an EU member state in the post-2022 industrial-policy cycle.

On 27 July 2025, President Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reached political agreement at Turnberry, Scotland, on a Framework Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair and Balanced Trade. The framework was formalised in a Joint Statement published on 21 August 2025 by the White House and DG TRADE. The deal establishes a 15% all-inclusive (MFN + Section 232) US tariff ceiling on the vast majority of EU originating goods — including autos, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber, and chemicals — replacing the threatened 20-30% reciprocal tariff trajectory under EO 14257 (April 2025). Steel and aluminium are excluded from the 15% ceiling and remain at the 50% Section 232 rate pending negotiation of a quota solution. In return, the EU commits to: (i) eliminate tariffs on all US industrial goods, (ii) preferential market access for a wide range of US agricultural and seafood products, (iii) suspension of its rebalancing countermeasures under Reg 2025/778 (suspension effective 7 August 2025), (iv) expected energy offtake of $750bn (LNG, oil, nuclear) through 2028, (v) at least $40bn in US AI chip purchases, and (vi) facilitation of $600bn in additional EU corporate investment into the US through 2028. Effective from 1 September 2025, the US applies MFN-only treatment (no 15% top-up) to: aircraft and parts, generic pharmaceuticals and ingredients, chemical precursors, cork, and certain unavailable natural resources. The framework is not legally binding but anchors the bilateral architecture; it is the largest-economy ART-programme deal alongside US-UK, US-Japan, US-Korea, US-Taiwan, and US-Indonesia.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14257 on 2 April 2025 declaring a national emergency over US trade deficits and imposing a baseline 10% ad-valorem tariff on imports from nearly all trading partners effective 5 April, with higher country-specific "reciprocal" rates effective 9 April. The rate schedule was constructed from a formula tied to bilateral goods-trade deficits and ranged from 10% (UK, Singapore, Brazil, Australia, others) through 20% (EU), 24% (Japan), 25% (Korea), 32% (Taiwan, Indonesia, Switzerland), 34% (China, later raised to 84% then 125% during the April escalation), 46% (Vietnam), 49% (Cambodia). Multiple subsequent EOs paused the country-specific rates for 90 days for non-China destinations on 9 April while keeping the 10% baseline, pending bilateral negotiations.

President Trump signed Proclamation 10908 "Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United States" on 26 March 2025, invoking Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose a 25% ad valorem tariff on imports of finished passenger vehicles and light trucks effective 12:01 a.m. EDT on 3 April 2025, with the duty extended to key automobile parts (engines and engine parts, transmissions and powertrain components, electrical components) effective 12:01 a.m. EDT on 3 May 2025. USMCA-origin automobiles receive an interim deduction equal to the value of US-origin content; USMCA-origin parts that satisfy the agreement's rules of origin are temporarily exempt from the parts duty pending a Commerce-administered process. The proclamation is the first Section 232 instrument applied to finished automobiles in US history and the largest-by-trade-volume Section 232 measure of the second Trump administration, covering roughly USD 460 billion of annual auto and auto-parts imports.

On 25 March 2025 the European Commission adopted the first list of 47 Strategic Projects inside the EU under Article 7 of the Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252), followed on 4 June 2025 by 13 Strategic Projects located in third countries — 60 designations in total. The 47 EU projects span 13 Member States and 14 strategic raw materials, with an expected EUR 22.5bn capital-investment envelope; the 13 third-country projects require a further EUR 5.5bn. Designation triggers fast-track permitting (max 27 months for extraction, 15 months for processing/recycling), preferential access to EU/EIB/EBRD finance, and Member State priority status, operationalising the CRMA's 2030 benchmarks (≥10% extraction, ≥40% processing, ≥25% recycling, ≤65% single-country dependence).

President Trump signed two Presidential Proclamations on 11 February 2025 reinstating a universal 25% ad-valorem tariff on all steel-mill products and raising the aluminum tariff from 10% to 25% on all imports into the United States, effective 12 March 2025. The proclamations revoked every bilateral exclusion and quota arrangement negotiated by the Biden administration with the EU, UK, Japan, Korea, Australia, and others under the 2021-2022 "alternative measures" frameworks, returning all trading partners to the baseline Section 232 rate without product-level or country-level carve-outs.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List, effective October 11, 2023. The bulk of additions — 42 of 49 — are Chinese entities determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, predominantly for supplying US-origin integrated circuits to Russian defense-sector consignees after March 1, 2023 in violation of export controls. Remaining entities span Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Turkey, UAE, and the United Kingdom and were designated on similar Russia-diversion or end-use violation grounds. All listed parties face a license requirement for all EAR-subject items, reviewed under a presumption of denial.

On 9 August 2023 the German Federal Cabinet adopted the government draft Wirtschaftsplan 2024 of the Climate and Transformation Fund (Klima- und Transformationsfonds, KTF) and the accompanying 2024–2027 financial plan. The plan envisaged ca. EUR 211.8 bn of programme spending across 2024–2027 (EUR 57.6 bn in 2024 alone), funded by national and European emissions-trading revenues plus federal grants, with major lines for semiconductor production (~EUR 4.0 bn in 2024), hydrogen industry build-out (~EUR 3.8 bn), building renovation (~EUR 18.9 bn), EEG renewables support (~EUR 12.6 bn) and electric mobility. The KTF is the principal German federal vehicle for co-financing the EU Chips Act state-aid envelope, IPCEI Hydrogen, decarbonisation contracts (Klimaschutzverträge) and other net-zero-aligned industrial-policy subsidies.

Germany's Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG, Foreign Trade and Payments Act; BGBl. I 2013 S. 1482 of 6 June 2013, replacing the original 1961 Act) is the foundational parent statute of the modern German economic-statecraft toolkit, providing the legislative authority for (i) export licensing of dual-use goods and technology administered by BAFA under the Außenwirtschaftsverordnung (AWV) implementing regulation — the national complement to EU Dual-Use Recast Regulation 2021/821; (ii) inward FDI screening by BMWK under §§ 55–62 AWG covering non-EU/non-EFTA acquisitions of ≥ 25% of voting rights cross-sectorally and ≥ 10%/20% in 27 sensitive-sector activities including defence, semiconductors, AI, quantum, biotech, space, and critical infrastructure; and (iii) German implementation of EU-level and autonomous trade and sanctions restrictions. As the EU's largest economy and a top-tier dual-use exporter, Germany's AWG-based regime is structurally peer-foundational to JP FEFTA 1949, UK NSI Act 2021, US ECRA 2018, CN Export Control Law 2020, and NL Wet Vifo 2022 in the G7+CN economic- statecraft parent-statute cluster.