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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a Russia-regime notice on 18 December 2025 designating five individuals and 19 entities under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Of the 19 entities, six are based in Russia, eight in the United Arab Emirates, four in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan — reflecting OFSI's continued focus on third-country intermediaries used to route sanctioned Russian trade and finance. Designated persons are subject to a full asset freeze and are barred from commercial transactions and investment instruments with UK persons.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), signed into law on 18 December 2025, expands the Department of Defense's existing "covered materials" domestic- sourcing restriction (which already barred DoD contracting for SmCo/NdFeB magnets, tantalum and tungsten sourced from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea) to add gallium, germanium and molybdenum under Section 844. Restrictions on materials "melted or produced" in a covered nation take effect 31 December 2026, widening on 1 January 2027 to also cover materials "mined, refined, or separated" in a covered nation; the gallium/germanium additions specifically phase in on 18 December 2027. The same NDAA bundles two related supply-chain provisions: Section 867 gives DoD broader authority (contracts, grants, other-transaction agreements, equity-style investments, and anti-market-manipulation subsidies) to invest in the domestic industrial base for critical minerals, microelectronics, machine tools and other defense-relevant capacity, and Section 842 bars DoD from procuring advanced batteries whose cells or key components are owned, sourced, refined or produced by a foreign entity of concern, phased in 2028-2031.
On 15 December 2025 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2588 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2594, giving effect to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (Ukraine territorial-integrity asset-freeze regime) by adding 9 new designations: 5 individuals who own or control companies enabling Russian oil shipments and controlling a significant share of Russia's "shadow fleet," and 4 shipping companies headquartered in Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam that manage shadow-fleet tankers and engage in irregular, high-risk shipping practices. Listed persons and entities are subject to an EU asset freeze (and, for the individuals, a travel ban); EU persons and companies are prohibited from making funds or economic resources available to them.
On 15 December 2025 the Government of the Russian Federation, via Order No. 3758-р signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, allocated an additional RUB 60.58 billion (approx. USD 759 million) from the government's reserve fund to subsidise interest payments and provide financial grants to Russian credit organisations supporting preferential loans to agricultural producers. The allocation preserves preferential interest rates on roughly 48,000 previously issued loans, freeing working capital for producers to expand output of cereals, fruit and vegetables. It brings total 2025 federal subsidisation of the preferential agricultural credit programme to RUB 250.1 billion.
On 15 December 2025 Rosatom's fuel division (via subsidiary Renera, under managing company TVEL) put Russia's first full-cycle lithium-ion battery "gigafactory" into pilot-industrial operation in the Neman district of Kaliningrad Oblast. Deputy Industry and Trade Minister Mikhail Ivanov disclosed that the project was financed through a comprehensive state-support package: a RUB 5 billion preferential loan from the federal Industry Development Fund (FRP) under its "Avtokomponenty" (auto-components) programme, plus RUB 5 billion in direct subsidies from the Kaliningrad Oblast government, alongside a special investment contract (SPIC) for the project. The facility has a design capacity of 4 GWh/year — enough to supply battery packs for roughly 50,000 electric vehicles — and is described by officials as a step toward Russian "technological sovereignty" in energy-storage manufacturing following the exit of Western and Asian battery suppliers since 2022.
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 2012 of 12 December 2025 sets a temporary quantitative restriction on imports of agricultural seeds (potato, wheat, rye, barley, corn, soybean, rapeseed, sunflower, and sugar beet) from countries Russia classifies as "unfriendly," effective 1 January to 31 December 2026. The total quota is cut to 15,000 tonnes for 2026 (from 18,300 tonnes in 2025), with potato seed receiving the largest single allocation (10,000 tonnes) while wheat, rye, barley, and soybean seed quotas remain at zero — effectively barring those categories from unfriendly-country suppliers. The measure extends a policy first introduced in January 2024 to stimulate domestic Russian plant breeding and seed production.
On 12 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Council adopted the first tranche of listings aligning with the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033, 23 October 2025), amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine and the Belarus Ordinance with effect from 13 December 2025. The decision adds asset freezes and entry/transit bans for 22 natural persons and 42 entities tied to Russia's military-industrial complex, energy sector and shadow-fleet vessel management; extends purchase/sale/insurance bans to over 100 additional tankers; imposes transaction restrictions on 5 Russian banks and 4 Russian-bank branches in Belarus and Kazakhstan for use of specialised financial-messaging services; sanctions Chinese and Hong Kong trading companies and refineries implicated in circumventing the G7 oil price cap; and designates 5 Belarusian persons linked to military-industrial activities. Divestment-exemption deadlines for Swiss persons winding down Russian holdings are extended to end-2026. This is a partial, listings-only tranche — the more substantive measures of the EU's 19th package (Russian LNG import ban, crypto-services prohibition, AI/HPC service bans) were not adopted until the Federal Council's follow-on decision of 25 February 2026.
On 11 December 2025 the Government of the Russian Federation issued Order No. 3701-r, allocating more than RUB 966 million (approx. USD 12.1 million) from the government's reserve fund to the Industry Development Fund (Fond razvitiya promyshlennosti, FRP). The FRP extends concessional loans (3-5% annual rates, up to 7-year terms) to Russian industrial enterprises developing technologies and production intended to replace foreign analogues. The order is one of several in-year top-ups to the FRP in 2025, which had already been recapitalised by close to RUB 20 billion earlier in the year.
The UK government designated Russian media entity Rybar LLC and its director-general Mikhail Zvinchuk, alongside Aleksandr Dugin, the Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond), and affiliated entities Euromore, Golos, and the Center for Geopolitical Expertise, under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The designations impose asset freezes and bans on commercial transactions and investment instruments with the named parties, on the basis that Rybar runs a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) network promoting Russian state interests and destabilising Ukraine. Pravfond's network was separately alleged to have moved funds across at least 11 EU member states to fund pro-Kremlin media outlets while concealing state ties.
On 3 December 2025 Russia's federal Industry Development Fund (FRP) disclosed a concessional loan of RUB 2.4 billion (approx. USD 30.2 million) to Liteyny Zavod "Petrozavodskmash" (LZ PZM), a foundry subsidiary of rail-equipment group Transmashholding (TMX), to fund purchase of casting and machining equipment. The financing supports a project titled "Localisation of foundry blanks for various diesel engines," shifting the plant from simple castings toward complex cylinder-head and engine-suspension components (new capacity: 13,800 cylinder heads and 7,000 engine suspensions per year) for diesel engines used by Kolomna Plant and Penza Diesel. The loan was disclosed the same day Karelia's regional head, Artur Parfenchikov, opened a new 1,700 sq m machining section at the foundry, with TMX framing the project as advancing Russia's "technological sovereignty" in engine manufacturing (import substitution for diesel engine components).
Russia's Government adopted Resolution N° 1958 on 29 November 2025, amending Resolution N° 313 of 9 March 2022 to add eight commodity positions to Appendix 3 — the list of dual-use goods banned for export to "unfriendly" states. The added items are specialty electro-optical and semiconductor materials: lithium niobate, zinc telluride, gadolinium-gallium garnet, gallium arsenide, gallium phosphide, unprocessed and processed quartz wafers/plates, and polished tellurium-oxide prisms. These materials are inputs to electro-optical components (modulators, acousto-optic devices, IR/laser optics) with both civil and military (guidance, imaging) applications. The measure took effect 1 December 2025 and runs through the underlying ban's 31 December 2027 expiry; it applies to all countries except Eurasian Economic Union member states.
Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 870/2025 on 29 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 26 Russian legal entities involved in crude petroleum and natural gas extraction, petroleum-product refining, and related energy-sector activity. The decree imposes asset freezes and bars commercial transactions and investment dealings with the designated entities. It entered into force on 2 December 2025, the date of official publication.
Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 871/2025 on 29 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against a list of Russian legal entities and individuals identified by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) as involved in the production, supply, or operational support of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs/drones) used by Russia. The decree imposes asset freezes and restrictions on commercial transactions and investment instruments with the designated parties. It entered into force on 2 December 2025, the date of official publication.
Russia's Government adopted Resolution N° 1947 on 28 November 2025, extending for a fourth consecutive six-month period the temporary ban on the export of waste and scrap of precious metals and of electrical and electronic equipment used principally for precious-metals recovery. The restriction runs from 1 December 2025 through 31 May 2026, covering waste and scrap of gold, silver, platinum, palladium, rhodium, iridium, osmium, and ruthenium, as well as metals plated or clad with precious metals. Carve-outs apply for cathode antimony ingots and small laboratory samples (≤500 g per batch) shipped by refineries for quality verification.
On 26 November 2025 Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a package of measures to protect Canada's steel and softwood lumber industries, effective 26 December 2025. For steel, Canada tightened the tariff-rate quota (TRQ) available to countries without a Canada free trade agreement from 50% to 20% of 2024 import levels, and cut the TRQ for FTA partners outside CUSMA (i.e. not the US/Mexico) from 100% to 75% of 2024 levels; imports above quota face a 50% surtax. A new 25% tariff on the full value of listed steel-derivative products (doors, windows, fasteners, structural components and related goods) applies to all countries, covering an estimated CAD 10 billion+ of derivative imports. For softwood lumber, Canada added CAD 500 million to the BDC Softwood Lumber Guarantee Program (bringing it to CAD 1.2 billion) and earmarked a further CAD 500 million under the Large Enterprise Tariff Loan facility for lumber-sector liquidity support.
Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 860/2025 on 25 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 41 legal entities that collectively own 56 maritime vessels. The vessels are alleged to have made illegal port calls at Sevastopol and Feodosia — Ukrainian ports under temporary Russian occupation — to load and export stolen Ukrainian wheat, sunflower seeds, and other food commodities between 2022 and 2025. The sanctions (asset freezes, restrictions on commercial transactions and transit, and foreign- customer limitations) apply for a term of 10 years and entered into force on 27 November 2025, the date of official publication.
On 24 November 2025, OFAC assessed a civil monetary penalty of USD 4,677,552 — the statutory maximum and the largest single OFAC penalty ever imposed against an individual — against an Atlanta-based real-estate investor operating through King Holdings LLC. Between April 2023 and March 2024 the respondent willfully purchased, mortgaged, renovated, and resold US residential property beneficially owned by a family member of a Russian oligarch sanctioned under EO 14024, in direct violation of a prior OFAC cease-and-desist order and in defiance of an administrative subpoena. OFAC found the violations egregious and non-self-disclosed; both aggravating factors drove the penalty to the statutory ceiling.
On 20 November 2025 Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed Government Order No. 3351-r, approving a list of 15 companies selected to receive a combined RUB 4.97 billion in 2025 federal infrastructure subsidies under the "New Opportunities for the Far East" federal project (part of the "Socio-Economic Development of the Far Eastern Federal District" state programme). The two largest line items — RUB 2 billion (~USD 24.7m) each, the programme's legal per-project ceiling — go to OOO "Amur Minerals" for grid connection at its planned mining-and-processing plant on the Malmyzhskoye copper-gold deposit (Khabarovsk Krai) and to OOO "Udokanskaya Med'" (Udokan Copper) for construction of a transport-storage complex at its Udokan copper mining-and-metallurgical combine (Zabaykalsky Krai). Subsidies reimburse a share of investors' capital spending on power grid connection, water/heat networks and access infrastructure, contingent on job-creation and capex targets set out in the order's annex.
On 19 November 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in a coordinated action with Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, designated 5 individuals and 7 companies linked to two Russia-based "bulletproof hosting" (BPH) providers, Media Land and Aeza Group, under Executive Order 13694. Media Land and its subsidiaries (Media Land Technology, Data Center Kirishi, ML Cloud) supplied server infrastructure to ransomware groups including LockBit, BlackSuit and Play. The designations also targeted three companies Aeza Group used to evade its July 2025 OFAC designation and rebrand its infrastructure: Hypercore Ltd. (United Kingdom), Smart Digital Ideas DOO (Serbia), and Datavice MCHJ (Uzbekistan). All designated persons' U.S.-nexus assets are blocked and U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting with them.
Canada made SOR/2025-228, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered 2025-11-06 and announced by Minister Anand on 2025-11-12. The regulations add 13 individuals to Part 1 of Schedule 1, 11 entities to Part 2 of Schedule 1, and 100 vessels (by IMO number) to Schedule 1.1, freezing their Canadian assets and prohibiting dealings. Targets include Russian LNG-trading entities, drone-programme developers, cyber-infrastructure suppliers for hybrid operations against Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan-based financial enablers (including Capital Bank of Central Asia and the A7 payments platform) used to evade earlier Russia sanctions. The 100-vessel designation targets Russia's "shadow fleet" used to move crude oil, LNG and arms while evading the G7 price cap and flag-state controls.
On 31 October 2025 the Government of the Russian Federation, via Order No. 3080-р signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, allocated more than RUB 34.6 billion (approx. USD 428.8 million) to subsidise preferential loans for Russian agricultural producers. The allocation provides financial grants and interest-payment subsidies to credit organisations that issue short-term and investment loans to farmers and processors at below-market rates under the standing federal preferential-lending programme. The measure was published on the government's official portal on 1 November 2025.
New Zealand's 33rd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 designated 65 "shadow fleet" tanker vessels involved in transporting Russian-origin crude oil, together with seven entities and two individuals based in Russia, Belarus, North Korea and Iran that refine or transport Russian oil or facilitate oil-related payments. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on the supply of services (including port access, insurance, chartering and cargo handling) by New Zealand persons. The measure targets the revenue chain funding Russia's war in Ukraine rather than imposing a new tariff or trade-flow control.
Russia's federal Industry Development Fund (FRP) disclosed a RUB 950 million (approx. USD 12 million) concessional loan under its "Development Projects" programme to biopharmaceutical company Nanolek LLC, financing purchase of high-tech equipment for Russia's first domestic human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine production line. The facility, part of a RUB 7.5 billion total investment in the Orichevsky District of Kirov Region, opened 25-29 October 2025 and produces the "Tsegardeks" vaccine at an initial capacity of over 600,000 doses per year, rising to 3-3.5 million doses annually by 2027 with a planned second production line.
On 29 October 2025 the Swiss Federal Council amended the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), published as AS 2025 662, completing Switzerland's alignment with the remaining goods, finance and services elements of the EU's 18th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, 18 July 2025) and tightening the parallel Belarus regime. The amendment took effect 30 October 2025 and adds: an export ban covering additional structural-metal, general-purpose-machinery and machine-tool goods; an import ban on further petroleum-oil products and waste/scrap categories; and expanded controls on commercial transactions and investment instruments spanning financial services, investment banking, crude-petroleum trade and motor-vehicle/trailer goods. The Federal Department of Economic Affairs (WBF) had already taken over the measures within its own competence on 12 August 2025; this decision closes the remainder. In parallel, the Federal Council's asset-freeze annexes were extended to 14 individuals and 41 companies/organizations.
On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.
On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2040 (amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP), widening the EU's Belarus restrictive-measures regime in lockstep with the 19th Russia sanctions package adopted the same day. The package widens the export ban to industrial goods (salts, ores, rubber articles, tyres, millstones, construction materials, electronic components, rangefinders, propellant chemicals, metals/oxides/alloys), extends the import ban to all acyclic hydrocarbons, introduces a new prior-licensing requirement for services supplied to Belarus, its government, or public bodies, and mirrors the Russia regime's space, AI, and high-performance/ quantum-computing service restrictions. A companion instrument, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2039, adds 5 new asset-freeze listings (2 individuals + 3 entities, including JSC Holography Industry, Horizont Holding, and ICT Horizont). Entered into force 24 October 2025.
Russia's federal Industry Development Fund (FRP) disclosed a RUB 930 million (approx. USD 11.4 million) concessional loan to ООО "ПК "Промтрактор" (Promtraktor Production Company LLC, part of Kontsern Traktornye Zavody) in Cheboksary, Chuvash Republic, funding purchase of 98 units of high-tech casting and machining equipment as part of a RUB 1.2 billion total modernisation. The loan financed serial production of two new heavy-bulldozer models, CHETRA T30 (30-tonne class) and CHETRA T45 (45-tonne class, billed as Russia's most powerful serial-production bulldozer), which entered series production 23 October 2025. Resulting capacity for bulldozer, pipe-layer and front-end-loader components rose 25% to 13,700 units per year, with management targeting a rise in CHETRA's domestic heavy-bulldozer market share from ~30% to 70%, partially displacing Western imports (e.g. Caterpillar, Komatsu) that exited the Russian market after 2022.
On October 22, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added Open Joint Stock Company Rosneft Oil Company ("Rosneft") and Lukoil OAO ("Lukoil") — together with dozens of named Russia-based subsidiaries — to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 14024 for "operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy." It is the first US designation of Russia's two largest integrated oil majors since the 2022 invasion-era sanctions architecture began. Under OFAC's 50% Rule, the blocking extends automatically to all entities owned 50% or more, directly or indirectly, by Rosneft or Lukoil — capturing a sprawling global subsidiary network including Lukoil retail/refining assets in Belgium, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Finland, the West Qurna-2 upstream stake in Iraq, and Lukoil Americas. Rosneft and Lukoil together account for roughly half of Russian crude exports (~5 mb/d combined production) and Lukoil holds a ~9% European retail-fuel market share. OFAC simultaneously issued General License 124 (Caspian Pipeline Consortium / Tengizchevroil / Karachaganak Kazakhstan-pipeline carve-out, no expiry), General License 125 (Lukoil retail service stations outside Russia, wind-down to November 21, 2025), General License 126 (general wind-down to November 21, 2025) and General License 127 (debt/equity divestment and derivatives wind-down to November 21, 2025). GL 131 (issued November 14, 2025) opened a divestment window for Lukoil International GmbH; subsequent GL 134/134A/134B extended cargo-offload authorisations through April–May 2026. The action was coordinated same-day with UK OFSI Rosneft/Lukoil designations and the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package adopted October 23, 2025 — the first major US-led Russia-energy escalation under the second Trump administration.
On 15 October 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 39 entities and specified 51 vessels — including, for the first time, Russia's two largest integrated oil majors PJSC Rosneft Oil Company and PJSC Oil Company Lukoil — for supporting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. 51 vessels (44 identified as "shadow fleet" tankers) were specified for transporting Russian crude oil and LNG in evasion of the G7 price cap. The package also introduced a ban on importing oil products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude, closing a refined-product loophole in the price-cap regime.
On 14 October 2025 the Board (Collegium) of the Eurasian Economic Commission adopted Decision No. 96 imposing five-year definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of titanium dioxide pigment (80%+ TiO2 dry-weight content, HS 3206 11 000 0) originating in China and entering the EAEU customs territory (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan). Duty rates are 14.27% for the LB Group (Henan Billions / Lomon Billions and named subsidiaries) and 16.25% for Shandong Dawn Titanium Industry and all other Chinese producers. Price undertakings were approved for the LB Group and Shandong Dawn Titanium, exempting compliant volumes from duty. The decision entered into force 16 November 2025, 30 days after official publication, following an investigation initiated 17 August 2023.
Russian Government Resolution No. 1545 of 6 October 2025 amends Resolution No. 851 (11 May 2022) to add Renault SAS to Russia's list of foreign legal entities subject to "special economic measures" tied to military-technical cooperation. Renault is listed as entry No. 75 and becomes subject to prohibitions on commercial transactions and on the use of investment instruments (securities/equity dealings) involving the company. The designation follows reporting that Renault planned to help manufacture unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) for Ukraine; a related GTA-tracked intervention imposes an export ban on the same entity under the same resolution.
On 7 October 2025 the Board (Collegium) of the Eurasian Economic Commission adopted Decision No. 89, setting 2026 tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for beef, pork, poultry and whey imports into the EAEU customs territory and their distribution among the five member states. Kyrgyzstan's national duty-free quota for frozen chicken cuts (halves/quarters/leg portions) was cut from 58,000 to 48,000 tonnes for 2026 -- a 17.2% reduction -- while Kazakhstan's and Russia's chicken-cut allocations (128,000t and 250,000t respectively) and other member states' beef/pork lines were left unchanged or increased. Imports above the reduced quota face the EAEU's higher out-of-quota duty rate. The decision entered into force 9 November 2025, 30 days after official publication, and governs the calendar-year 2026 quota period.
Presidential Decree No. 710 of 6 October 2025 amends the standing list of foreign-owned assets under "temporary management" (established by Decree No. 302 of 25 April 2023) to add 100 percent of the shares in Vonorus LLC — the Russian operating subsidiary of Silgan Metal Packaging Mitterdorf GmbH, the Austrian unit of US-listed Silgan Holdings Inc. (NYSE: SLGN) — transferring control of the company to Rosimushchestvo. The decree entered into force on its date of official publication (6 October 2025) and is one of a running series of company-specific amendments to Decree 302, Russia's mechanism for placing Russian assets of "unfriendly state" companies under state administration in reciprocal response to Western sanctions and asset freezes.
Government Resolution No. 1535 of 3 October 2025 introduced a temporary export customs duty of 10% of customs value on oil (oilseed) flax exported from Russia beyond the Eurasian Economic Union, entering into force 12 October 2025 and running through 31 August 2026. The duty was previously zero. The government's stated rationale is to stimulate utilisation of domestic flax-processing capacity and rebalance the domestic market against raw-material exports; the same package established regional export quotas for corn. Global Trade Alert records Belgium, China, and Czechia as the export destinations most exposed to the higher raw-material cost.
Presidential Decree No. 693 of 30 September 2025 ("On certain particularities of the sale of property held in federal ownership"), signed by Vladimir Putin and entered into force on the day of its official publication, creates an accelerated pathway for disposing of federally-owned property in cases determined by a separate decision of the President, where the goal is to ensure the Russian Federation's defence capability and security. Market valuation and the appraisal report must be completed within 10 business days of signing the appraisal contract; PSB Bank JSC (formerly Promsvyazbank, the state-controlled defence-procurement bank) is designated as the sale-organising agent and seller-on-behalf-of-the-state. The Decree also authorises the President to set special features of how Russian legislation on privatisation, joint-stock companies, limited-liability companies, the securities market, banks and competition protection applies to such sales. Expressly framed as a counter-measure to "unfriendly" actions by the United States and its allies; structurally the disposal-mechanism complement to the foreign-asset external- administration and seizure decrees (95/322/520/442) — the fast-track liquidation channel that converts seized or nationalised assets into state-budget cash for defence purposes.
Russia's government imposed a temporary ban on exports of diesel fuel, marine (bunker) fuel and other gas oils (EAEU HS codes 2710 19 421 0 - 2710 19 429 0), including volumes purchased on exchange trading, effective 1 October 2025. The measure was framed as a domestic fuel-market stabilisation tool and initially exempted direct refinery producers from the ban. Russia is one of the world's largest diesel/gasoil exporters, so a full-coverage export halt on these grades has global gasoil-market significance, not just a regional effect. The ban has since been extended and tightened four times through mid-2026 (see amendments).
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an Interim Final Rule amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to automatically extend Entity List, Military End-User List, and certain other restricted- party controls to any unlisted entity that is at least 50% owned — individually or in the aggregate — by one or more listed parties. The threshold is set to mirror the long-standing OFAC 50% rule. Published 90 FR 47201 (Sept. 30, 2025); effective Sept. 29, 2025. A Temporary General License covering pre-existing transactions with 50%-owned affiliates expired on Nov. 28, 2025. The rule was subsequently suspended for one year by BIS on Nov. 10, 2025 (FR Doc. 2025-19846) as part of the post-Busan US-China understanding.
Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) revised its Foreign End-User List (外国ユーザーリスト) — the reference list of foreign organisations for which WMD/missile or, for the first time, conventional-weapons development concerns cannot be excluded, used to trigger catch-all export-licence requirements. The revision adds 92 entities (from China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and the UAE) and removes 5 entities (from China, Iran and India), taking the list to 835 entities across 15 countries and regions — a net increase of 87. The revised list applies from 9 October 2025, the same date Japan's broader catch-all conventional-weapons supplementary export-control review took effect.
On 19 September 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office designated two Georgian nationals — Otar Partskhaladze and Levan Vasadze — and two companies, UK-based Aeza International Ltd and Russia-based HeliCo Group LLC, under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, citing their roles in supporting Russian disinformation and Georgia's Kremlin-aligned political network. In the same package OFSI proscribed two oil tankers, Bavly and Karakuz, for allegedly delivering Russian-origin crude to the port of Batumi, Georgia, barring both vessels from UK ports and the UK Ship Register. Designated individuals face asset freezes, travel bans and director-disqualification sanctions.
Australia aligned with the EU/G7's 18th-package price cap by lowering its own cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, and designated 95 additional "shadow fleet" tanker vessels used to circumvent the cap, under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. Foreign Minister Penny Wong framed the measure as intended to depress the market value of Russian crude and reduce war-financing oil revenue. The listings bring Australia's cumulative shadow-fleet vessel designations to over 150 since June 2025 and its total Russia-related sanctions actions since 2022 to roughly 1,600.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 32 entities to the Entity List, with the largest bloc — 23 entries — under the destination of China, plus India (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2). The rule also removed two addresses from one Russian entry (Intertech Rus LLC) and made 27 typographical corrections to existing entries. Several Chinese additions — including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, Sino IC Technology, GMC Semiconductor (Wuxi), and Chinese Academy of Sciences units (National Time Service Center; Aerospace Information Research Institute) — were given footnote 4 designations, extending the EAR's foreign-direct-product (FDP) reach to non-US-origin items destined for Russian military end use. Three Turkish entries (Atempo, EB Teknoloji, Dentun Elektronik) and one Indian entry (AR Sales Pvt Ltd) were footnote-3 Russian Procurement Entity designations. The rule is a final rule effective September 12, 2025; all listed parties are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy.
Japan lowered its price cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, effective for contracts concluded on or after 12 September 2025, aligning with the EU's July 2025 cut under its 18th sanctions package. The measure bars Japanese entities from importing, or providing shipping, insurance, financing or other services for, Russian crude priced above the new cap. In the same package Japan added 47 Russian entities and 9 individuals, 6 Crimea/Donbas-linked persons and entities, and 3 third-country entities to its asset-freeze list (transactions now require Ministry of Finance approval), and imposed export prohibitions on 2 Russian entities and 9 entities in third countries. Japan's own Russian crude imports are minimal (~0.1% of total crude imports, Jan-Jul 2025), so the measure is primarily a coalition-alignment and shipping/insurance-chokepoint action rather than a material change to Japan's own energy sourcing.
New Zealand's 32nd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 (Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 4) 2025, SL 2025/195) lowered the price cap on Russian-origin crude oil (HS 2709) from US$60/bbl to US$47.60/bbl, a roughly 21% cut, aligning New Zealand with the EU, UK and Canada's most recent price-cap reductions. The same instrument designated 19 individuals and entities plus 19 vessels, including Russia's GRU cyber unit 29155 (implicated in malware attacks on Ukrainian government networks), actors involved in chemical-weapons use and disinformation, additional "shadow fleet" tankers, alternative payment providers, and third-country facilitators based in North Korea and Iran supporting Russia's war effort.
On 12 September 2025 the UK government, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 3 individuals and 27 entities — 19 Russian, plus third-country intermediaries in Thailand (3), Hong Kong (3), India (1) and Türkiye (1) accused of supplying electronics, chemicals and explosives used in Russian missile and weapons production — and proscribed 70 vessels (oil tankers and cargo ships, identified by IMO number) linked to Russia's shadow fleet evading the G7 crude price cap. The package brings the UK's cumulative tanker designations to nearly 500, more than any other single jurisdiction.
On 2025-09-10 the Russian government adopted Resolution No. 1396, amending Resolution No. 2240 (2022-12-07), which raised import customs duty rates on selected goods from "unfriendly states." The duty on malt beer (HS 2203) rose from EUR 1.0/litre to EUR 1.5/litre and on cider and similar sparkling/still beverages (HS 2206) from 22.5% to 30% of customs value. The resolution also set new duty rates on automotive semi-trailers (HS 8716) of 35% of customs value for units exceeding 15 tonnes gross weight and at least 13.6 m in length, and 20% for refrigerated semi-trailers with cargo volume of at least 76 m³; Hungary and Slovakia were excluded from the "unfriendly state" designation for these lines. The measure entered into force on 2025-09-20, seven days after official publication, and was set to run through 2025-12-31 (subsequently extended to 2027-12-31 by a later resolution).
The 22nd Regulation Amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (Zweiundzwanzigste Verordnung zur Änderung der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung), promulgated in Bundesgesetzblatt I 2025 Nr. 261 and entering into force on 1 November 2025, updates Germany's national export-control list (Ausfuhrliste, Annex AL to the AWV) to align with the 2024-cycle decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, and NSG. It is the German national implementation layer that parallels Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2003 — both ingest the same multilateral consensus into the EU+DE dual-use perimeter covering ALD, epitaxial deposition, lithography (EUV pellicles/masks/reticles), SEM and etching equipment, quantum computers, cryogenic components, advanced FPGAs/ICs for AI training, and additive-manufacturing systems. Sets the export-list baseline against which BAFA licence determinations from November 2025 onward are made. Distinct from the parallel AWG Implementing Act (entered into force 2026-02-06) which transposed EU Directive 2024/1226 into German sanctions criminal law.
On 2025-08-30 the Russian government adopted Resolution No. 1341, amending the standing "unfriendly states" import-duty schedule (Resolution No. 2240 of 2022-12-07) to raise customs duty rates on selected oils, fats and bottled drinking water originating from states Russia designates as "unfriendly." Coconut oil and palm kernel oil rose to 25% of customs value (palm kernel oil subject to a EUR 0.56/kg floor); margarine rose from 15% (min EUR 0.12/kg) to 25% (min EUR 0.90/kg); non-carbonated natural mineral water rose to 20% of customs value (EUR 0.11-0.18/litre floor depending on packaging). The resolution entered into force on 2025-09-09.
Presidential Decree No. 606 of 29 August 2025 amends the standing list of foreign-owned Russian assets under "temporary management" (established by Decree No. 302 of 25 April 2023) to add the shares of Air Liquide's Russian subsidiaries, transferring control to M-Logistika LLC, a Russian company. Reported affected entities include Air Liquide's joint venture with steelmaker Severstal and regional operating units (Alabuga, Balakovo, Lipetsk, Ryazan, Kstovo, Kuzbass, Sever Liquid Gas), covering the bulk of the French industrial-gas group's Russian footprint. The decree entered into force on its date of official publication and is one of a running series of company-specific amendments to Decree 302, Russia's reciprocal-response mechanism for placing "unfriendly state" companies' Russian assets under state administration.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated a Russian national (Vitaliy Sergeyevich Andreyev), a Russia-based DPRK economic and trade consular official (Kim Ung Sun), a Chinese front company (Shenyang Geumpungri Network Technology Co., Ltd), and a DPRK trading company subordinate to the DPRK Ministry of People's Armed Forces General Political Bureau (Korea Sinjin Trading Corporation) for facilitating a fraudulent overseas IT-worker scheme that funds North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. The action expands on the prior designation of Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company, an entity tied to the DPRK defense ministry that deploys IT worker delegations in Russia and Laos. Treasury said Andreyev and Kim Ung Sun facilitated cryptocurrency-to-cash conversions worth nearly USD 600,000 since December 2024, and that Shenyang Geumpungri's delegation of DPRK IT workers has earned Chinyong and Sinjin over USD 1 million in profits since 2021. Designations were made under Executive Order 13687, blocking all US-jurisdiction property of the four parties and barring US persons from transactions with them.
Presidential Decree No. 593 of 25 August 2025 amends the standing schedule of foreign-owned Russian assets under "temporary management" (established by Decree No. 302 of 25 April 2023), adding as item 44 the 314,949 thousand ordinary shares of JSC Chelyabenergoremont held by Fortum Holding B.V. (the Dutch holding vehicle of Finnish state-controlled utility Fortum), transferring control to Rosimushchestvo (Federal Agency for State Property Management). Fortum was the sole shareholder, so the decree effectively nationalises the entire company — a 70-year-old turbine and boiler-equipment maintenance and repair service provider for power plants, with reported 2023 revenue of RUB 2.35bn. The decree entered into force on its date of official publication and is one of a running series of company-specific amendments to Decree 302 following Fortum's 2022-23 exit announcement and the earlier seizure of its main generation subsidiary Fortum Russia B.V. (renamed Fora Energy) and of Unipro.