Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2666 actions· ✨ 90 recent

China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) Raw Materials Industry Division opened a 30-day public consultation on 28 April 2026 on the Administrative Penalty Discretion Standards Table operationalising the State Council's Rare Earth Management Regulation (Order No. 785, in force 1 October 2024). The draft sets a tiered fines schedule for breaches across the entire mining → smelting → separation → sales value chain — fines up to five times "illegal gains" for production-quota breaches under 10%, escalating to product/equipment confiscation and licence revocation for breaches over 30%. Traceability-reporting failures under MIIT's national rare-earth traceability platform are penalised separately with fines up to ten times illegal gains. Comments close 28 May 2026.

The European Commission and the US announced on 24 April 2026 the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a strategic partnership on critical minerals, accompanied by an EU-US Critical Minerals Action Plan. The framework deepens cooperation on supply-chain security across the strategic raw-materials list shared between the two jurisdictions — joint financing, recycling, mutual recognition of strategic- project status under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (filed: 2024-05-23-eu-crma-entry-into-force) and US IRA §30D / §45X frameworks (filed: 2022-08-16-us-inflation-reduction-act). The agreement is positioned as a joint response to non-market practices in third-country supply chains for the named materials.

On 1 April 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and President Emmanuel Macron held a Tokyo summit and signed a bilateral roadmap on cooperation in critical minerals — the first formal Japan-France instrument on supply-chain resilience for rare earths and other critical materials. The centrepiece is joint government support for Caremag, a heavy rare-earths refining project in southern France due to begin operations in late 2026, with backing from Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC), Iwatani Corporation, and the French government; the project targets approximately 20% of Japan's future demand for dysprosium and terbium (heavy rare-earth oxides used in EV motors, offshore-wind turbines, and electronic components). The two leaders also launched parallel high-level dialogues on dual-use AI, quantum technologies, space (including debris mitigation), cybersecurity, and a joint declaration on startups and innovation, expressing "serious concerns" over export controls on critical minerals and other materials affecting global supply chains — an explicit reference to China's tightening rare-earths export regime.

On 19 March 2026, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, METI, and Ministry of Finance jointly released the "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" — the operational follow-on to the 27 October 2025 US-Japan Framework. The Action Plan formally commits both governments to develop a plurilateral trade initiative in critical minerals "supported by price floors or other measures", to consult on embedding "border-adjusted price floors" in a binding plurilateral agreement, and to identify specific mining/processing/manufacturing projects in the US, Japan, or third countries for prioritised joint financing. It is the first formal US/Japan trade-policy commitment to administered floor-pricing as an instrument of critical-minerals trade governance, and explicitly invites third countries to join the contemplated plurilateral.

India's Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) issued Press Note 2 of 2026 on March 15, 2026 (following Cabinet approval on March 10, 2026), recalibrating the Press Note 3 (2020) FDI framework for investments from countries sharing a land border with India. Global investors with up to 10% non-controlling Chinese (or other land-border) shareholding can now invest in India under the automatic route across sectors, while entities domiciled in China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Afghanistan continue to require prior government approval. For 40 designated strategic sub-sectors — including rare earth permanent magnets, polysilicon and ingot-wafer manufacturing, printed circuit boards, electronic capital goods, Li-ion batteries and machine tools — proposals will be decided within a binding 60-day window, with majority Indian ownership and control mandated at all times. Effective from the date of the corresponding amendment to the FEMA Non-Debt Instruments Rules.

On 1 February 2026 Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman tabled India's Union Budget 2026-27, with Customs Notification No. 02/2026-Customs (dated 1 Feb 2026, effective 2 Feb 2026) implementing the customs-duty package. The notification zero-rates basic customs duty (BCD) on (i) capital goods imported for domestic processing of critical minerals — crushing, beneficiation, refining, chemical-processing, separation/purification, and metallurgical/alloy-making equipment; (ii) capital goods for lithium-ion cell manufacturing for battery energy storage systems (BESS), extending the 2024-25 EV-cell exemption to stationary storage; and (iii) twelve additional critical minerals plus cobalt powder and lithium-ion battery scrap, on top of the 25 critical minerals already exempted in the FY2024-25 budget. In parallel, critical minerals (including monazite / rare-earth concentrate) are migrated from the customs-exemption notification mechanism into the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act at Nil BCD, effective 1 May 2026 — a tariffisation step that locks the rate into primary legislation rather than annually renewable notification. The Budget also commits to dedicated critical-mineral / rare-earth-magnet processing corridors in Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Structurally this is the fiscal/tariff layer underneath the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM, Jan 2025) and the National Manufacturing Mission (Feb 2025): NCMM funds capex and overseas asset acquisition (₹34,300 cr), this Budget removes the import-duty drag on the equipment needed to actually run domestic processing lines. It complements the REPM scheme (Nov 2025) for sintered rare-earth magnets and Semicon Mission 2.0 (Feb 2026) on the demand side for refined critical minerals.

The US Department of Commerce's CHIPS Program Office, invoking authority under the CHIPS and Science Act, signed a non-binding letter of intent on 2026-01-26 to provide USA Rare Earth with up to $277 million in direct federal funding and a $1.3 billion senior secured loan. The funding backs a "mine-to-magnet" vertically integrated supply chain: a rare earth mine at Round Top, Texas (commercial production targeted 2028) and a neodymium-iron-boron magnet and rare-earth-metals manufacturing facility in Stillwater, Oklahoma. In exchange, Commerce receives roughly 16.1 million USAR common shares and warrants for a further 17.6 million shares. The agreements were finalized as definitive on 2026-06-03, unlocking access to up to $1.6 billion combined with the federal award, alongside a separately raised $1.5 billion in private capital.

On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.

On 31 December 2025, China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly published Announcement No. 91 of 2025, releasing the 2026 edition of the Catalogue of Dual-Use Items and Technologies Subject to Import and Export Licence Administration, effective 1 January 2026. The update replaces the 2025 catalogue and is issued under the Export Control Law of the PRC and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items. Key additions to the export-licensing perimeter include samarium, gadolinium, and lutetium compounds — mid-to-heavy rare earths critical for permanent magnets (EV motors, wind turbines), phosphors (medical imaging, displays), and defence applications — requiring MOFCOM export licences for all covered shipments from 1 January 2026.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), signed into law on 18 December 2025, expands the Department of Defense's existing "covered materials" domestic- sourcing restriction (which already barred DoD contracting for SmCo/NdFeB magnets, tantalum and tungsten sourced from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea) to add gallium, germanium and molybdenum under Section 844. Restrictions on materials "melted or produced" in a covered nation take effect 31 December 2026, widening on 1 January 2027 to also cover materials "mined, refined, or separated" in a covered nation; the gallium/germanium additions specifically phase in on 18 December 2027. The same NDAA bundles two related supply-chain provisions: Section 867 gives DoD broader authority (contracts, grants, other-transaction agreements, equity-style investments, and anti-market-manipulation subsidies) to invest in the domestic industrial base for critical minerals, microelectronics, machine tools and other defense-relevant capacity, and Section 842 bars DoD from procuring advanced batteries whose cells or key components are owned, sourced, refined or produced by a foreign entity of concern, phased in 2028-2031.

On 3 December 2025 the European Commission adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan (COM(2025) 945 final), a horizontal critical-raw-materials supply-security instrument complementing the 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act. The plan mobilises €3 billion in EU funds within twelve months for priority CRM projects, creates a European Critical Raw Materials Centre operational from 2026 (modelled on Japan's JOGMEC) acting as portfolio manager for diversified supply chains, joint purchasing and stockpiling, and activates the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act (IMERA) "vigilance" and "emergency" modes from May 2026 with mandatory information requests, priority deliveries and coordinated stockpile distribution. A targeted CRMA amendment expands product labelling for permanent-magnet recycling and adds export controls on permanent-magnet and aluminium scrap. Targets a 30-50% reduction by 2029 in single-country dependency for battery, rare-earth and defence raw-material value chains.

On 26 November 2025 the Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved a Rs 7,280 crore (~USD 800 million) scheme to establish 6,000 MTPA of integrated sintered Rare Earth Permanent Magnet (REPM) manufacturing capacity in India. The Ministry of Heavy Industries will allocate capacity to five beneficiaries (up to 1,200 MTPA each) via global competitive bidding. The package combines a Rs 6,450 crore sales-linked incentive (PLI-style, paid on REPM sales over 5 years) with a Rs 750 crore capital subsidy for facility build-out. The scheme runs 7 years from award (2-year gestation + 5-year disbursement) and covers the full value chain from rare-earth oxides through metals, alloys, to finished sintered Nd-Fe-B and SmCo magnets.

On 18 November 2025, during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's White House visit (17-19 November 2025), the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on Securing Uranium, Metals, Permanent Magnets, and Critical Minerals Supply Chains. The framework was signed by US Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and Saudi Minister of Energy H.R.H. Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, and positions Saudi Arabia (via Ma'aden + Public Investment Fund vehicles) as a regional hub for processing rare earths and producing permanent magnets, supports a US-backed rare-earths refinery in the Kingdom, and channels Saudi capital — alongside the broader USD ~1 trillion Saudi investment commitment in the US announced the same week — into US and allied critical-mineral projects. It is paired with a separate joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperation (Section 123 Agreement contemplated) and was operationalised one day later by the 19 November 2025 binding term sheet between MP Materials, the US Department of War, and Ma'aden to develop a rare-earth refinery in Saudi Arabia (Department of War financing the US side's 49% stake; Ma'aden retaining ≥51%).

Portaria Normativa GM/MME nº 120/2025, published in the Diário Oficial da União on 14 November 2025 by the Ministério de Minas e Energia, regulates the Política de Debêntures para Projetos de Transformação de Minerais Estratégicos para a Transição Energética. It sets the eligibility criteria, classification methodology and project-approval pipeline (under Decreto 11.964/2024 and Leis 12.431/2011 and 14.801/2024) for tax-exempt incentivised debentures and infrastructure debentures financing the downstream transformation of cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel and rare earths into battery and permanent-magnet inputs (lithium carbonate/hydroxide, cobalt sulfate, nickel sulfate, battery-grade copper foil, rare earth oxides/ chlorides/metals/alloys). MME estimates ~R$5.2 bn/year in unlocked private investment (R$3.7 bn transformation + R$1.5 bn mining/ beneficiation, with up to 49% of bond proceeds usable on linked upstream activities).

Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia signed Peraturan Menteri ESDM Nomor 18 Tahun 2025 ("Permen ESDM 18/2025") on 14 November 2025, Indonesia's first comprehensive ministerial-level framework for the exploration, designation, allocation, and utilisation of rare-earth resources. The regulation operationalises Government Regulation PP 39/2025 (signed 11 September 2025), which inserted a dedicated rare-earths article (Article 18A) into PP 96/2021 on the implementation of mineral and coal mining business activities. It empowers the Minister to designate BUMN (state-owned enterprises) as preferred operators of rare-earth mining and processing, mandates that REE output prioritise domestic strategic industries (defence, electric vehicle batteries, advanced technology, permanent magnets), and routes inventarisation through the geological agency before WIUP (mining business permit areas) are awarded.

On 3 November 2025 the US Department of Commerce's CHIPS Program Office (administered via NIST) announced a non-binding preliminary letter of intent to take a $50 million equity stake in Vulcan Elements, a North Carolina-based rare-earth magnet producer. The CHIPS and Science Act funding is earmarked for equipment to separate, metallize and manufacture Neodymium Iron Boron (NdFeB) magnets, targeting up to 10,000 metric tonnes of annual domestic production capacity. Commerce framed the investment around NdFeB magnets' role in the semiconductor equipment supply chain (EUV lithography, CVD, etch and pump systems). The equity stake is conditioned on final negotiation and approval and runs alongside a separately-tracked $620 million Department of War Office of Strategic Capital loan to Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies announced the same day.

On 3 November 2025 the US Department of War's Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), together with the Department of Commerce, announced a joint conditional loan commitment of $700 million to two domestic rare-earth magnet producers: $620 million to Vulcan Elements and $80 million to ReElement Technologies. The loans fund separation, metallization and finished-magnet manufacturing capacity for Neodymium Iron Boron (NdFeB) magnets, targeting up to 10,000 metric tons of annual domestic magnet production. In exchange, the Department of War receives warrants in both companies. This action covers the OSC loan tranche; a related, separately-tracked action covers the Department of Commerce's parallel $50 million CHIPS Act equity stake in Vulcan Elements.

On 27 October 2025, during the Trump-Takaichi Tokyo summit, the United States and Japan announced the "Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing", signed by President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on 28 October 2025. The non-binding framework establishes a US-Japan Critical Minerals Supply Security Rapid Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Japanese METI Minister; commits both governments to provide financial support to selected mining and processing projects within six months via grants, guarantees, loans, equity, offtake arrangements, and insurance — mobilising DFC + EXIM (US side) with JOGMEC + JBIC (Japan side); develops a "mutually complementary stockpiling arrangement" leveraging existing national systems; and schedules a Mining, Minerals and Metals Investment Ministerial within 180 days. The framework was subsequently operationalised through the 19 March 2026 "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" jointly issued by USTR and METI.

On 26 October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur, on the margins of the ASEAN Summit, President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim signed two complementary instruments structuring the US-Malaysia economic relationship: (i) a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation to Diversify Global Critical Minerals Supply Chains and Promote Investments, establishing quarterly working-level meetings on bilateral exploration, extraction, processing, refining, manufacturing, and recycling, plus shared commitments on streamlined permitting and protection from non-market policies; and (ii) a legally-binding Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) covering goods (chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, metals, vehicles, dairy, horticulture, poultry, pork, rice, fuel ethanol), digital trade, services, and investment. Under the ART, the United States maintains a 19% reciprocal tariff on Malaysian imports (with carve-outs for products receiving 0% under EO 14346) while Malaysia commits to refrain from banning or quota-restricting exports of critical minerals or rare earths to the US, ensure no restrictions on rare-earth magnet sales to US firms, and grant extended operating licenses to US partners. The ART enters into force 60 days after exchange of notifications of completed domestic procedures.

On 20 October 2025, President Donald J. Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed at the White House the "United States-Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths" — a non-binding common-policy instrument committing both governments to provide at least USD 1 billion each in financing within six months (USD 3bn+ joint commitment against an USD 8.5bn project pipeline and a stated USD 53bn recoverable-resource pipeline). The framework establishes a US-Australia Critical Minerals Supply Security Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Australian Minister for Resources, mandates streamlined permitting for mining/separation/processing projects, and explicitly couples the US demand-side architecture (DPA Title III + Defense Logistics Agency stockpile) to Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve. Concurrent with signing, EXIM issued seven Letters of Interest totalling USD 2.2bn (unlocking up to USD 5bn) to Arafura Rare Earths, Northern Minerals, Graphinex, La Trobe Magnesium, VHM, RZ Resources, and Sunrise Energy Metals; the US Department of War separately committed to a 100 metric-ton-per-year advanced gallium refinery in Western Australia, and Australia took USD 200m concessional equity in the Alcoa-Sojitz Wagerup gallium project and USD 100m equity in the Arafura Nolans rare-earths project.

China's Ministry of Commerce on 9 October 2025 issued Announcements No. 61 and No. 62, jointly constituting the largest single architectural escalation of PRC export controls to date. No. 61 expands the controlled rare-earth list from 7 to 12 of 17 elements (adding holmium, erbium, thulium, europium, ytterbium) and — for the first time — imposes extraterritorial application via a 0.1% de-minimis rule, a foreign-direct-product (FDP) rule, and a 50%-affiliate rule, directly mirroring US BIS architecture. No. 62 places rare-earth extraction, smelting, separation, magnet manufacturing, and recycling technologies (including IP licensing, investment, and provision to foreign persons) under export licensing. PRC-direct exports were controlled from publication; the de-minimis and FDP offshore-items provisions were due to take effect 1 December 2025. On 7 November 2025 MOFCOM Announcement No. 70 suspended both measures until 10 November 2026 as part of the post-APEC Trump-Xi tariff detente — see amendments block.

Brazil's Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) and the Serviço Geológico do Brasil (SGB) released the final report of the Plano Decenal de Pesquisa de Recursos Minerais (PlanGEO 2026-2035) on 24 September 2025. The plan defines 145 priority research areas selected through public consultation for ten years of focused geological mapping and mineral-resources research, prioritising ten commodities — rare earths, lithium, copper, nickel, manganese, graphite, tin, gold, phosphate, and potassium — covering the battery / magnets demand spectrum plus food-security inputs. The plan is enabled by Portaria Normativa nº 72/GM/MME of 13 March 2024 and operates on a 2026-2035 horizon, with a SGB/MME budget-and-staffing scenario proposing up to a 50% increase in execution team and a 100% expansion in annual financial investment.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve (CMSR) on 24 April 2025 as a A$1.2bn election commitment in the 2025-26 Budget. The Department of Industry, Science and Resources released the design package on 12 January 2026, prioritising antimony, gallium, and rare earth elements as the initial focus minerals (A$1bn for offtake transactions drawn from an expanded A$5bn Critical Minerals Facility, plus A$185m for physical stockpiling and implementation). The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Amendment (Strategic Reserve) Act 2026 passed Parliament on 31 March 2026 with effect 1 April 2026, giving Export Finance Australia (EFA) statutory power to enter offtake agreements, contracts for difference, forward contracts, and physical stockpiles for fuel and critical minerals. CMSR becomes operational in second half 2026.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs announced on 4 April 2025 export licensing requirements on seven medium and heavy rare-earth elements: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium. Exporters must apply for individual licences citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The announcement came two days after the 2 April Trump reciprocal-tariff package and was widely interpreted as a proportional response. Unlike the December 2024 Ga/Ge/Sb ban this is not US-specific on its face — but in practice licence approvals through April-June 2025 were heavily skewed away from US-bound shipments.

On 25 March 2025 the European Commission adopted the first list of 47 Strategic Projects inside the EU under Article 7 of the Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252), followed on 4 June 2025 by 13 Strategic Projects located in third countries — 60 designations in total. The 47 EU projects span 13 Member States and 14 strategic raw materials, with an expected EUR 22.5bn capital-investment envelope; the 13 third-country projects require a further EUR 5.5bn. Designation triggers fast-track permitting (max 27 months for extraction, 15 months for processing/recycling), preferential access to EU/EIB/EBRD finance, and Member State priority status, operationalising the CRMA's 2030 benchmarks (≥10% extraction, ≥40% processing, ≥25% recycling, ≤65% single-country dependence).

The Biden administration announced on 14 May 2024 a package of Section 301 tariff increases on Chinese imports following the four-year statutory review of the original 2018-2019 tariffs. The hikes target sectors central to the US-China industrial-policy contest: BEVs went from 25% to 100%, lithium- ion EV batteries 7.5% → 25% (with non-EV battery cells rising in 2026), battery parts 7.5% → 25%, natural graphite + magnets 0% → 25% (phased to 2026), semiconductors 25% → 50% (phased to 2025), solar cells 25% → 50%, steel + aluminum products in selected categories 0-7.5% → 25%, ship-to-shore cranes 0% → 25%, certain medical products 0-7.5% → 50%. USTR issued the final determination on 13 September 2024 with most items effective 27 September 2024.

The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252) entered into force on 23 May 2024 after publication in the EU Official Journal on 3 May 2024. The Act sets binding 2030 benchmarks for the Union: ≥10% of annual consumption from domestic extraction, ≥40% from domestic processing, ≥25% from domestic recycling, and a strict ≤65% concentration limit from any single third country for each strategic raw material. It establishes a list of 17 strategic raw materials and 34 critical raw materials, creates a "Strategic Project" fast-track permitting regime (≤27 months for extraction, ≤15 months for recycling), and mandates joint purchasing and supply-risk stress tests for large EU manufacturers.

The Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures (Law No. 43 of 2022), enacted 18 May 2022, establishes a four-pillar framework: (1) supply-chain resilience for "specified critical products," (2) security of critical infrastructure, (3) state-backed development of "specified critical technologies," and (4) non-disclosure of nationally sensitive patents. A December 2022 Cabinet Order designated 11 product categories as specified critical products, including semiconductors, storage batteries, permanent magnets, cloud programs, LNG, critical minerals, machine tools, and aircraft parts. Competent ministries must publish stable-supply plans, can fund private-sector surveys, and may provide subsidies to qualifying firms.

The Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4501–4568) is the foundational US statute governing wartime and emergency industrial mobilization. Signed by President Truman on 8 September 1950 during the Korean War, the Act empowers the President to compel industrial priority-rated ordering (Title I / DPAS), authorize direct investment in domestic production capacity for critical industries (Title III), and conduct investment security review (Title VII, precursor to CFIUS). Reauthorized approximately 50 times, most recently extended through September 2025 by Pub. L. 115-263 (2018) and further extended under NDAA FY2026; it has been invoked by every Administration since 1950 and has accelerated dramatically since 2020 to target critical-minerals processing, semiconductor manufacturing, battery supply chains, biopharmaceuticals, and energy infrastructure.