Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On 19 June 2026, President Mamadi Doumbouya chaired a strategic meeting in Conakry with industrial, semi-industrial and artisanal gold operators and gold-buying counters, announcing that "l'exportation de l'or brut appartient désormais au passé" — a formal and permanent prohibition on exporting unrefined gold mined in Guinea. All gold must henceforth be refined domestically, primarily via the state-backed Nimba Gold Refinery (Gbessia, Conakry), before any international sale. Operators who continue exporting raw gold risk suspension or revocation of their operating licence and mining convention. The measure extends Guinea's Simandou 2040 local-transformation doctrine — already applied to bauxite and iron ore — to the gold sector for the first time.

Presidential Decree No. 193, signed by President Vladimir Putin on 25 March 2026 and in force from 1 May 2026, prohibits the export from Russia of refined gold bars (аффинированное золото в слитках) with a total weight exceeding 100 grams by individuals, legal entities, and individual entrepreneurs. Narrow exceptions apply for EAEU-destination and non-EAEU-destination movements through designated international airports (Vnukovo, Sheremetyevo, Domodedovo, and Knevichi/Vladivostok) conditional on Federal Assay Office or Federal Border Service permits. The stated rationale — curbing shadow-economy use of bullion as a foreign-currency substitute and closing capital-flight channels — is analytically inseparable from the broader post-2022 Russia counter-sanctions context and the G7 / LBMA delisting of Russian-origin gold.

On 25 February 2026 Zimbabwe's Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, under Minister Polite Kambamura, announced an immediate and indefinite suspension of exports of all unprocessed minerals — including lithium-bearing spodumene concentrates, which had previously been exempt from the country's December 2022 ban on raw lithium ore (Statutory Instrument 213 of 2022). The directive was communicated by ministerial letter dated 17 February 2026 to the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe and copied to lithium producers; the suspension took effect on 25 February and explicitly covered consignments already in transit, with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) ordered to halt clearance at the border. The measure brings forward by roughly eleven months a lithium-concentrate export ban that had been telegraphed for January 2027, and broadens it to all raw mineral exports. The Minister cited "national interest", in-country beneficiation, transparency, and prevention of mineral export "leakages" (smuggling and under-invoicing) as the rationale. Bloomberg and Reuters reporting noted under-declaration of grade and value as a proximate trigger; the government later (April 2026) clarified that reinstated exports would require Quota Verification certificates, monthly reporting, on-site assay laboratories, and individual producer-level export ceilings — i.e. the suspension functions as a reset to a quota regime rather than a permanent embargo. Zimbabwe is the world's fifth-largest lithium producer (~6-7% of global supply on a contained-LCE basis) and exported 1.128 million tonnes of spodumene concentrate in 2025 (an 11% YoY increase). The producer base is overwhelmingly Chinese-owned: Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (Arcadia / Prospect), Sinomine Resource Group (Bikita Minerals), Chengxin Lithium (Sabi Star), and Sichuan Yahua (Kamativi) together account for the majority of output. The ban therefore primarily disrupts Chinese midstream lithium converters in Sichuan and Jiangxi that depend on Zimbabwean spodumene feedstock, while incrementally tightening the global seaborne concentrate market. The action is structurally a continuation of the EM resource-nationalism / upstream-capture template pioneered by Indonesia's nickel-ore ban (2020) and most recently extended by the DRC's ARECOMS cobalt suspension and quota system (Feb-Oct 2025). It reinforces a pattern in which producing-country governments capture processing margin from consuming-country smelters, and it does so in a commodity (lithium) where ex-China refining capacity is still thin, magnifying near-term price impact even though the headline share of global supply removed is moderate.

On 9 December 2025, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 79 of 2025, reinstating an export-licence management system for ~300 HS-coded steel products effective 1 January 2026. Exporters must obtain a per-contract licence supported by a manufacturer-issued product quality inspection certificate; licences are issued by MOFCOM (for centrally-administered SOEs) and provincial / sub-provincial commerce departments. The regime is the first reinstatement of Chinese steel-export licensing in 16 years (since 2009) and applies the export-licensing instrument — previously used for critical minerals and dual-use goods — to a non-critical bulk commodity for the first time.

Russia's Government adopted Resolution N° 1947 on 28 November 2025, extending for a fourth consecutive six-month period the temporary ban on the export of waste and scrap of precious metals and of electrical and electronic equipment used principally for precious-metals recovery. The restriction runs from 1 December 2025 through 31 May 2026, covering waste and scrap of gold, silver, platinum, palladium, rhodium, iridium, osmium, and ruthenium, as well as metals plated or clad with precious metals. Carve-outs apply for cathode antimony ingots and small laboratory samples (≤500 g per batch) shipped by refineries for quality verification.

Japan's Cabinet adopted a Cabinet Order on 11 November 2025 (promulgated 14 November 2025, effective 14 February 2026) amending Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (輸出貿易管理令) to add three new list-control item categories: (i) peptide synthesizers and related components (Item group mapping to Australia Group 2023–2024 plenary dual-use biotechnology controls, aligning Japan with the US BIS implementation promulgated December 2024), (ii) powders of refractory metals or their alloys below specified particle-size and purity thresholds — tungsten, molybdenum, niobium, tantalum, and rhenium powders used as additive- manufacturing feedstocks (Item 5(20), implementing a Wassenaar Arrangement plenary outcome on metal-powder dual-use), and (iii) modules, assemblies, or devices incorporating field-programmable logic devices (FPGAs) above specified gate-count and process-node thresholds (Item 7(10-2), extending Japan's semiconductor-component AI-compute perimeter). This is the first discrete Appended Table 1 list-control amendment filed under the post-October-2025 FEFTA catch-all- controls overhaul architecture.

On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.

On 6 February 2025 the South African Revenue Service updated its Prohibited and Restricted Imports and Exports list to require an International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) export permit for a broad basket of base-metal tariff headings: 72.04 (excl. 7204.21), 7404.00, 72.05, 72.06, 72.07, 72.18, 72.24 (iron/steel waste, ingots, semi-finished and granules), 74.02, 74.03, 74.05, 74.06 (unrefined/refined copper and copper powders), 76.01, 76.03, 76.04 (unwrought aluminium, powders and bars), 78.01 (unwrought lead), 79.01 (unwrought zinc) and 80.01 (unwrought tin). The same update removed the export-permit requirement from six copper sub-headings (7403.12, 7403.13, 7403.19, 7403.21, 7403.22, 7403.29) and added several machinery tariff headings (8417.10, 8417.80, 8462-series) to the import-permit list.

MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 10 [2025] on 4 February 2025, imposing dual-use export-licence controls on items related to tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The controls cover metals, alloys, powders, compounds and related processing technologies across roughly 25 listed item categories (41 HS 10-digit codes). The measure is global in scope but was issued the same day China announced 10-15% retaliatory tariffs on US LNG, coal, crude and farm equipment in response to the Trump administration's 10% fentanyl-tariff hike — extending the MOFCOM critical-minerals control regime beyond gallium/germanium/graphite/antimony/heavy-REEs.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule on 5 September 2024 (effective 6 September 2024, published in the Federal Register on the same day as 89 FR 73285) establishing multilateral export controls on four categories of emerging technologies: (1) quantum computing items including quantum computers, related cryogenic / control / measurement systems, and certain quantum software; (2) gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET) production technology — the next-node semiconductor architecture beyond FinFET; (3) advanced additive-manufacturing equipment for metals + alloys; (4) certain biotech-related items added in a parallel rule on 12 September 2024. The rule operates without country exceptions for some categories, with multilateral coordination via Wassenaar + Australia Group + Nuclear Suppliers Group frameworks.

On 5 April 2024 Japan's Cabinet adopted an amendment to the Export Trade Control Order, following a 1 March 2024 Cabinet understanding, extending the export prohibition on goods that strengthen Russia's industrial base. The additional goods span parts of HS chapters 27 (mineral fuels and oils), 28 (inorganic chemicals), 39, 73, 81 (tungsten powder, molybdenum, cobalt, zirconium, rhenium), 82, 84, 85 (including lithium-ion and nickel-metal-hydride batteries), 89 and 90, with the specific goods fixed by ministerial ordinance and notices issued on 10 April. The export ban applies from 17 April 2024. A separate METI notice bans imports of non-industrial diamonds of Russian origin from 10 May 2024, regardless of port of shipment.

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023 (SI 2023/1364) amend the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to prohibit UK persons from acquiring, importing, supplying or delivering listed Russian-origin metals and metal articles, delivering the Prime Minister's commitment to ban Russian copper, nickel and aluminium. Per law-firm summaries the list (a new Schedule 3BA) also covers lead, zinc, tin, tungsten, molybdenum, tantalum, magnesium, cobalt, antimony, manganese and further metals, and most provisions took effect on 15 December 2023 with a grace period for cargoes consigned before that date.

Statutory Instrument 57 of 2023, the Base Minerals Export Control (Unbeneficiated Base Mineral Ores) (Amendment) Order, 2023 (No. 1), was issued by Zimbabwe's Minister of Mines and Mining Development (Hon. Winston Chitando) in April 2023 to amend the foundational SI 5 of 2023 ban on raw base-mineral ore exports. The amendment imposes lithium-specific permit conditions: exporters must either own an Approved Processing Plant (APP) or contractually commit to building one within two years of receiving an export permit, unbeneficiated lithium permits may only be granted to Zimbabwean citizens or wholly-Zimbabwean-owned entities, and any such permit further requires the President's concurrence. The order also requires that beneficiated lithium export prices not fall below the floor set by the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), and stipulates penalties of up to level 9 fines or twice the value of the mineral involved, plus up to two years' imprisonment, for non-compliance. SI 57 sits between the December 2022 lithium-bearing-ore ban (SI 213/2022) and the February 2026 ministerial directive that suspended all raw-mineral and lithium-concentrate exports outright — it is the foundational statutory architecture that the 2026 reset later operated on top of.

Statutory Instrument 5 of 2023, gazetted by Zimbabwe's Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, banned the export of unbeneficiated ("raw" / unprocessed) base mineral ores from Zimbabwe, widening the December 2022 lithium-only export ban (SI 213 of 2022) into a horizontal ban covering the entire base-minerals category — including lithium, chrome, copper, nickel and coal — while excluding precious metals, precious stones, oil and natural gas. Exporters need a written ministerial permit, granted only where compelling reasons show the ore cannot be beneficiated inside Zimbabwe, or for small assay samples. Non-compliance carries a level-9 fine or twice the mineral's value (whichever is greater), up to two years' imprisonment, or both. SI 5 was itself amended three months later by SI 57 of 2023, which layered lithium-specific citizenship and beneficiation-plant conditions onto this base order.

Resolution No. 1466 of 27 December 2022 approves, for 2023, the volume of export quotas for licensed goods (Annex 1), the controlled ozone-depleting substances and fluorinated gases whose export and import require a licence (Annexes 2-3), and a list of goods whose export requires a licence (Annex 5). Annex 1 sets a zero quota for hard coal and anthracite, wood fuel, natural gas of Ukrainian origin, unwrought gold and silver and precious-metal scrap, and finite quotas of 900,000 t for coking coal and 540,000 t for fuel oil. The resolution took effect on 1 January 2023 and was amended repeatedly during 2023.

South Africa's Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, acting under sections 5 and 6 of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002, published Government Gazette Notices R.2801-R.2804 (Gazette No. 47627, 30 November 2022). The notices impose a temporary six-month export ban (30 November 2022 - 30 May 2023) on ferrous and non-ferrous waste and scrap metal, suspend ITAC's Price Preference System for scrap metal for the same period, and introduce new export permit requirements on semi-finished metal products and import permit requirements on furnaces and scrap-melting machinery. The measure was framed as an emergency response to copper and scrap-metal theft from public infrastructure, estimated at roughly R47 billion a year.

Australia designated aluminium ores (including bauxite), alumina and aluminium hydroxide as "export sanctioned goods" for Russia under the Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods -- Russia) Designation 2022, banning their export from Australia to Russia effective 20 March 2022. Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced the measure a day earlier as part of Australia's response to the invasion of Ukraine, framing it as an attack on Russia's aluminium industry, which sourced roughly 20% of its alumina from Australian supply. Rusal, Russia's dominant aluminium producer, was identified as the primary target.

Turkey's Ministry of Trade amended the İhracı Kayda Bağlı Mallara İlişkin Tebliğ (İhracat: 2006/7) via two communiqués — Tebliğ İhracat 2021/8 (fertilizers, GTİP 3101–3105) and İhracat 2021/9 (sulphuric acid/oleum, GTİP 2807.00, and pure ammonia, GTİP 2814.10) — published in Official Gazette No. 31630 of 16 October 2021. The measure places these goods on the "goods whose export is subject to registration" list: exporters must register each shipment with the Istanbul Minerals and Metals Exporters' Association (İMMİB) before customs clearance, a monitoring/prioritisation gate intended to secure domestic fertilizer supply rather than an outright ban. Global Trade Alert logs the measure under its "export ban" category; the primary text is a registration requirement, not a prohibition, and this filing follows the primary text.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security added five Xinjiang-based entities to the Entity List on June 24, 2021, citing their roles in human rights violations and forced labor against Uyghur, Kazakh, and other Muslim minority populations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The five entities — four major polysilicon and silicon producers plus the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) paramilitary body — are subject to a presumption-of- denial licensing policy for most items. Together the four polysilicon companies supplied a significant fraction of global polysilicon feedstock used in solar panel manufacturing.

Indonesia's Ministry of Trade issued Regulation (Permendag) No. 18 of 2021 on 1 April 2021, establishing an omnibus schedule of goods prohibited from export and goods prohibited from import. Global Trade Alert logs the measure as bundling an export ban and an import ban that took effect 19 November 2021, with tracked coverage spanning precious and semi-precious stones/metals, jewellery and related articles, and fertilizers/pesticides. The regulation consolidated and repealed several prior prohibited- goods instruments. It was later superseded by Permendag No. 47 of 2025.

South Africa's Precious Metals Act 37 of 2005 establishes a standing, discretionary ministerial export-approval regime for platinum group metals. Section 12(2) provides that "no person may export any unwrought or semi-fabricated metals of the platinum group except with the written approval of the Minister which shall be granted subject to the promotion of equitable access to, and the orderly local beneficiation of such metals." The Act was assented to and published in the Government Gazette on 21 April 2006 (Act 37 of 2005) and commenced on 1 July 2007 per Presidential proclamation under s.25 (Government Gazette 30071 of 12 July 2007). South Africa supplies roughly 70-80% of global mined platinum, rhodium and iridium output, making this the register's first PGM-specific ZA export instrument (prior ZA filings — MPRDA 2002, the 2025 Mineral Resources Development Bill, IDS 2026 — are generic mining-law/industrial-policy instruments rather than PGM-specific export controls).