Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 3 July 2026 the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) issued a final injury finding in Inquiry NQ-2025-009, determining that dumped (and, for non-cooperating exporters, subsidized) imports of truck bodies from China have caused material injury to the Canadian domestic industry. Final anti-dumping duties of 119.4% (Qingdao CIMC Reefer Trailer Co., Ltd.) and 257.1% (all other exporters) are now collected by CBSA on goods released on or after 3 July 2026. CBSA separately terminated the parallel subsidy (countervailing duty) investigation with respect to CIMC Reefer on 4 June 2026 after finding its subsidy margin (0.9%) insignificant; CBSA and CITT statements indicate the countervailing-duty track continued and duties are being collected for the non-cooperating "all other exporters" category.

On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense published its annual update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies (CMIC) list, adding 65 entities (17 new parent companies and 48 subsidiaries), bringing the total to approximately 188–200 designated entities. Major additions span EV and battery manufacturing (BYD, NIO, CATL), consumer internet (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent), semiconductors (SMIC, YMTC, CXMT), solar (JA Solar, Trina Solar), biotech (BGI Genomics, WuXi AppTec), drones/robotics (DJI, Unitree, RoboSense), and telecoms (TP-Link). Effective June 30, 2026, DoD is prohibited from procuring goods, services, or technology directly from listed entities; effective June 30, 2027, the ban extends to indirect supply-chain procurement through prime contractors and all sub-tiers.

The UK laid the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2026 (SI 2026/543) before Parliament on 19 May 2026; it came into force on 20 May 2026. The instrument inserts a new Chapter 4KA (regulations 46Z23A-46Z23G) into the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, prohibiting the import into the UK of uranium (HS 2844.10/2844.20/2844.30) that originates in or is consigned from Russia, the direct or indirect acquisition of Russian-origin or Russia-located uranium, and the supply or delivery of uranium from Russia to a third country — plus associated technical assistance, financial services/funds, and brokering services. Each prohibition carries a criminal offence with a reasonable-cause-to- suspect defence, subject to narrow exceptions and licensing grounds at regulations 16-19 of the amending instrument. The same instrument separately extends the existing ban on imports of relevant (2709-origin) Russian crude to cover oil products refined from that crude in a third country (new regulations 46Z9F-46Z9I).

On 2 May 2026, MOFCOM issued Announcement No. 21 of 2026 — the first concrete prohibition order ever issued under China's 2021 "Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures" (Blocking Rules) and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL). The order prohibits any Chinese organisation, individual, or foreign party operating in China from recognising, enforcing, or complying with US sanctions imposed under Executive Orders 13902 and 13846 against five Chinese independent ("teapot") refineries — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refining Co., Ltd., Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd., Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group Co., Ltd., Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd., and Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. — all designated by OFAC for purchasing Iranian crude. The announcement is the first operational test of the framework built up across the AFSL (2021), the AFSL Implementation Regulations (Order 803, March 2025), and State Council Order 835 on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (April 2026), and creates a direct compliance conflict for banks, insurers, traders, and shipping companies operating in or with China that had been winding down their exposure to the listed refineries.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative released the 2026 Special 301 Report on 30 April 2026, designating Vietnam as a Priority Foreign Country (PFC) — the most severe category under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2242). This is the first PFC designation since Ukraine held the status from 2013 through 2015, a gap of approximately 11 years. The PFC designation triggers a statutory 30-day window (expiring ~30 May 2026) within which USTR must decide whether to initiate a Section 301 investigation under 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A), which could lead to tariffs, withdrawal of trade benefits, or other Section 301 enforcement remedies against Vietnam. Separately, the EU was added to the Watch List for the first time, citing AI training-data, geographical-indications, and customs-enforcement concerns.

On 23 April 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted the 20th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2026/506 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions) and Council Regulation (EU) 2026/511 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 120 additional individuals and entities, the largest single tranche in two years). The package operationalises and extends the crypto-sanctions architecture introduced in the 19th package and constructs the legal scaffolding for a future full prohibition on maritime services to vessels carrying Russian crude/petroleum products. Headline measures: (i) full sectoral prohibition on transactions with crypto-asset service providers and exchange platforms established in Russia or Belarus, plus designation of the rouble-backed stablecoin RUBx and the digital rouble (CBDC) on Annex LIII — effective 24 May 2026, with EU support for the digital rouble's development banned outright; (ii) 36 new energy-sector listings spanning upstream extraction, refining and transportation; (iii) prohibition on providing technical, financial, brokering and insurance services to Russia-flagged, Russian-certified or Russian-managed LNG tankers and icebreakers effective 25 April 2026, extending to foreign-flagged vessels operating in Russian interests by January 2027 and culminating in a categorical ban on LNG terminal services to Russian-controlled entities on 1 January 2027; (iv) full transaction ban on 20 Russian banks plus four third-country banks listed for SPFS connectivity / sanctions circumvention; (v) 46 newly listed shadow-fleet vessels and new tanker sale-due-diligence obligations on EU shipping operators; (vi) 58 designations of companies and associated individuals in the Russian military-industrial complex including drone developers/manufacturers; (vii) further Annex IV third-country circumvention enabler listings (China, Hong Kong, Turkey, UAE); (viii) parallel measures against Belarus. Entry into force on 24 April 2026 (day following publication in OJ L_202600506), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 835 on 13 April 2026 promulgating the "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign States' Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" (20 articles), effective on the date of publication. The Regulations are the first State Council–level administrative regulation to operationalise the PRC's framework for identifying and countering foreign extraterritorial measures on a horizontal basis, complementing the 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and the March 2025 AFSL implementation regulations. Article 5 establishes a State Council–led inter-agency coordination mechanism; Article 6 vests the State Council legal affairs department (the Ministry of Justice in practice) with authority to identify "improper" foreign extraterritorial measures and to grant exemptions; Article 8 authorises a new Malicious Entity List targeting foreign organisations and individuals that "promote or participate in implementing" such measures, with nine countermeasure categories spanning visa denial, asset freezing, trade restrictions and fines; Article 11 codifies an exemption-application channel under which Chinese persons facing conflicting legal demands may request approval to comply with foreign measures within a defined scope; Article 14 authorises a private right of action for harmed Chinese citizens and organisations to sue parties enforcing such measures; and Article 18 elevates enforcement beyond administrative penalties by referencing potential criminal liability.

On 1 May 2026 the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (the "Interim Trade Agreement", iTA) entered provisional application between the European Union and the four Mercosur states — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — following its publication in the EU Official Journal on 27 February 2026 alongside the broader EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA). The iTA covers goods (eliminating duties on more than 90% of bilateral trade over a transition period including immediate cuts on cars, pharmaceuticals, wine and olive oil), services, government procurement at federal and state level, intellectual property (344 EU geographical indications protected), SPS/TBT disciplines, and a sustainability chapter. Mercosur receives tariff-rate quotas on agri-food exports (beef, poultry, sugar, ethanol, honey). Provisional application proceeds pending full ratification of EMPA by the Council, European Parliament and all EU national parliaments and a pending CJEU opinion; only the trade pillar applies provisionally.

On 25 February 2026 the Swiss Federal Council adopted extensive amendments to the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (Ukraine Ordinance) and the Ordinance on Measures against Belarus, completing implementation of the EU's 19th sanctions package with effect from 26 February 2026. Headline measures: a complete ban on the purchase and import of Russian LNG taking effect 25 April 2026 (transition period until end-2026 for pre-existing long-term contracts); a complete prohibition on the provision of crypto-asset services to Russian persons and companies; new service bans covering advanced-technology / AI / high-performance-computing services and tourism-related services; expansion of the dual-use end-user list (Annex 2) including additional Chinese entities; SECO authority to grant divestment-exemption licences until end-2026 under Art. 30a; and parallel adoption of the EU October 2025 Belarus measures via amendment to the Belarus Ordinance.

Romania's Government adopted Emergency Ordinance nr. 8/2026 on 24 February 2026, published in the Official Gazette (Monitorul Oficial) nr. 147 of 25 February 2026 and entering into force 1 March 2026, committing a EUR 5 billion (~RON 25 bn) horizontal economic-recovery and productive-investment envelope through 2032 structured around nine state-aid schemes, a 200% corporate R&D expense deduction (High-Tech Research Schema), a RON 1 bn Investment and Development Bank (BID) recapitalization, and a RON 1 bn EximBank export-credit allocation. The ordinance frames Romania's pivot "from consumption to investments as the engine of economic growth" and establishes a Strategic Investment tier (minimum RON 1 bn project value) qualifying for the highest-intensity state-aid eligibility, while introducing a 3% tax-compliance bonus and asset-expensing threshold raised to RON 5,000.

On 3 February 2026 the European Commission opened an in-depth Phase II investigation under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) — the second FSR ex officio case and the first targeting the renewable-energy wind-OEM sector — into whether Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. and its EU affiliates received Chinese foreign subsidies (grants, preferential tax treatment, and state-bank preferential financing) that distort competition for wind-turbine supply and services in the EU internal market. The case (FS.100143) follows the April 2024 preliminary-review opening and subjects Goldwind to an 18-month Phase II investigation with potential redressive-measures decision. The action structurally extends the FSR enforcement perimeter from security equipment (Nuctech, FS.100068) into the green-transition energy-equipment supply chain.

On 9 February 2026 the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a comprehensively revised enforcement and monetary-penalties guidance following its July–October 2025 public consultation. The update introduces a Settlement Scheme (20% penalty discount for subjects who agree not to contest OFSI's findings within 30 business days), an Early Account Scheme (up to 20% discount for legal persons providing a timely senior-attested factual account), a revised voluntary-disclosure framework (maximum discount cut from 50% to 30% and renamed to cover both prompt self-reporting and full cooperation), a four-level case-assessment seriousness matrix (severity × conduct), and fixed monetary penalties of £5,000 and £10,000 for information, reporting, and licensing offences. A planned legislative amendment (requiring primary legislation) will subsequently double the statutory civil monetary-penalty cap from £1m / 50%-of-breach to £2m / 100%-of-breach; in the interim the Policing and Crime Act 2017 caps remain in force. The revised guidance is the foundational enforcement architecture for all UK financial-sanctions programs (Russia, Iran, DPRK, Syria, Belarus, Myanmar, and 10+ additional regimes).

Germany's first cross-sector federal statute establishing minimum requirements for the physical protection and resilience of critical infrastructure operators (KRITIS) — sectors covered include energy, transport, water, food, ICT, financial services, health, and federal government infrastructure. Transposes EU Directive 2022/2557 (CER Directive on the resilience of critical entities). Identifies operators of critical facilities with Europe-wide significance, mandates national risk analyses for critical services, requires operator risk-management measures and creates a federal incident-reporting regime. Passed by the Bundestag on 29 January 2026, confirmed by the Bundesrat on 6 March 2026, published in BGBl. 2026 I Nr. 66 on 16 March 2026, in force from 17 March 2026.

On 27 January 2026 the European Union and India announced the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement at the EU-India summit hosted at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, attended by PM Narendra Modi, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Council President António Costa. The deal — described by both leaders as the "mother of all deals" — covers ~25% of world GDP and ~2 billion people. The EU eliminates duties on 91% of tariff lines (covering 99.3% of bilateral trade by value); India eliminates duties on 86% of lines (covering 96.6% by value). Headline cuts include Indian tariffs on EU wines (150% → 75% at entry into force, falling to 20%), olive oil (45% → 0% over five years) and processed agri-food (up to 50% eliminated); EU tariffs are reduced/eliminated on Indian textiles, leather/footwear, gems and jewelry, marine products, tea, coffee, spices and certain agricultural and steel products. The agreement still requires Council adoption, European Parliament consent and approval by India's Union Council of Ministers; entry into force is expected in early 2027. Companion instruments concluded at the same summit include an EU-India Security and Defence Partnership and a Mobility and Migration Agreement.

On 16 January 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 individuals and entities and identified one vessel for transferring oil products, procuring weapons and dual-use equipment, and providing financial services to Iran-backed Ansarallah (the Houthis). Designated parties — oil-trading and exchange companies, a shipping/logistics facilitator, and front-company operatives — are based in Yemen, Oman, and the UAE, and are accused of running an oil-sales and financial- facilitation network that Treasury says generates the Houthis over $2 billion in annual illicit revenue. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on a multi-year cadence of prior OFAC designations against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and weapons-procurement suppliers.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 18 individuals and entities that make up the "rahbar" shadow-banking networks of sanctioned Iranian banks Bank Melli and Shahr Bank, including Singapore-based Golden Mist PTE Ltd, UAE-based Empire International Trading FZE and HMS Trading FZE, Iran-based Nikan Pezhvak Aria Kish Company and Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm, and UK-based Nanshan Ltd. Separately, OFAC designated senior Iranian security officials, including SCNS Secretary Ali Larijani, for their role in the regime's violent crackdown on peaceful protesters that began in December 2025. The financial designations were made under E.O. 13902 (Iran's financial/petroleum/petrochemical sectors) and the human-rights designations under E.O. 13553 and E.O. 13876, in furtherance of NSPM-2; Treasury noted it sanctioned more than 875 persons, vessels, and aircraft under the same maximum-pressure campaign in 2025.

The US Department of Energy announced $2.7 billion in task-order funding over ten years to rebuild domestic uranium enrichment capacity: $900 million each to American Centrifuge Operating and General Matter to develop high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) enrichment capacity, $900 million to Orano Federal Services to expand low-enriched uranium (LEU) enrichment capacity, and $28 million to Global Laser Enrichment for next-generation enrichment technology. DOE frames the awards as reducing US reliance on foreign — chiefly Russian — enriched uranium supply and securing fuel for the country's 94 commercial reactors and future advanced-reactor deployment, with funds distributed under a milestone-based accountability framework.

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan passed the Artificial Intelligence Basic Act (人工智慧基本法) on third reading on 23 December 2025, and President Lai Ching-te promulgated the 20-article statute on 14 January 2026, bringing it into force immediately. The Act designates the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) as the central AI-policy competent authority and codifies seven governance principles — sustainability and well-being, human autonomy, privacy protection and data governance, cybersecurity and safety, transparency and explainability, fairness and non-discrimination, and accountability — that apply to all public-sector AI procurement and high-risk sectoral applications. The statute establishes a statutory foundation for the Taiwan AI Action Plan 2.0, mandates an Executive Yuan National AI Strategy Committee, and provides authority for sector-specific implementing regulations by FSC, NCC, MOHW, and MOTC across finance, telecoms, medical, and autonomous-vehicle AI within a two-year window. As the first national AI governance statute in the Greater China region and the third globally after the EU AI Act and South Korea's AI Basic Act, it frames regulatory expectations for the companies at the heart of the global AI hardware supply chain — TSMC, NVIDIA ODM partners, and advanced-packaging incumbents — that are headquartered or operate substantially in Taiwan.

On 22 December 2025 the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau released Public Notice DA-25-1086, adding to the Covered List (under section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA) all unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country, plus communications and video-surveillance equipment/services produced by DJI Technologies and Autel Robotics (and their subsidiaries, affiliates, and licensing/JV partners). The designation is comprehensive by scope — every foreign-made drone from consumer quadcopters to large uncrewed systems, with no size/performance carve-out — and blocks the FCC from granting any new equipment authorization to covered UAS/components going forward. Previously authorized models already in the US market are not revoked. A follow-on Public Notice (DA-26-22, 7 January 2026) narrowed the scope with a temporary exemption (see amendments).

Section 851 of the FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 119-60), signed December 18, 2025, prohibits US federal agencies from procuring biotechnology equipment or services from designated "biotechnology companies of concern" (BCCs), and bars federal contractors from using such equipment/services in work performed under federal contracts, grants, or loans. The final enacted text ties initial BCC designations to DoD's existing §1260H Chinese-military-company list (which currently includes BGI and MGI, but not WuXi AppTec or WuXi Biologics) and directs OMB to designate additional BCCs within one year of enactment; operational prohibitions activate 60-90 days after FAR revision, with a five-year grandfather period for pre-existing contracts — enforcement is expected to begin in 2027-28. The legislation is the successor to H.R.8333 (118th Congress, House-passed September 2024 but stalled in the Senate before adjournment) and represents the first enacted US federal-procurement biotech-supply-chain-resilience statute.

On 11 December 2025 the Council of the EU presidency, the European Parliament, and the European Commission reached provisional political (trilogue) agreement on the revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union, concluding interinstitutional negotiations on the Commission's proposal of 24 January 2024. The revised regime upgrades the 2019 cooperation-mechanism-only framework into a hybrid harmonised/mandatory regime: all 27 Member States must establish FDI screening mechanisms (replacing the current patchwork in which some Member States have no mechanism at all); mandatory minimum sectoral scope is set EU-wide and covers dual-use items, military equipment, hyper-critical technologies (general-purpose AI with space/defence relevance, quantum technologies, semiconductors), critical raw materials, critical entities in energy/transport/digital infrastructure, electoral infrastructure, and certain financial-system entities; foreign investments routed through EU subsidiaries fall within the perimeter; a shared database prevents Member-State arbitrage; and an optional single electronic-filing portal becomes available if requested by at least nine Member States. Screening decisions remain the exclusive responsibility of the Member State in which the investment is made. Once the Regulation enters into force (after Council and Parliament formal adoption and OJ publication, both pending as of the political-agreement date), the new rules will apply after an 18-month transition period — implementation expected toward the end of 2027.

On 10 December 2025 the National Assembly of Vietnam adopted Law No. 134/2025/QH15 on Artificial Intelligence (8 chapters, 35 articles), Vietnam's first dedicated AI statutory framework and one of the first comprehensive horizontal AI laws in Southeast Asia. The law establishes a three-tier risk-based regulatory architecture (high / medium / low) for the research, development, provision, deployment, and use of AI systems; defines the rights and obligations of providers, deployers, importers, distributors, and users; and mandates state oversight via the Ministry of Information & Communications and Ministry of Science & Technology. Prohibited acts include systematic deception, manipulation of human perception, generation of fake content endangering national security, exploitation of vulnerable populations, and obstruction of human-supervision mechanisms. The law applies to Vietnamese agencies, organizations, and individuals as well as foreign organizations and individuals involved in AI-related activities in Vietnam, taking effect 1 March 2026 with 12-18 month transition windows for existing systems depending on sector.

Vietnam's National Assembly passed Law on Cybersecurity No. 116/2025/QH15 on 10 December 2025 (434 of 443 deputies in favour), effective 1 July 2026. The law supersedes both the 2018 Cybersecurity Law (Law 24/2018/QH14) and the 2015 Law on Cyber Information Security, consolidating cybersecurity, cyber-information-security, and network-information-security into a unified Ministry of Public Security-led framework. It retains data-localization obligations for foreign digital-service providers handling personal data, user-generated content, and relationship graphs of Vietnamese users (minimum 24-month retention), introduces 6-hour urgent / 24-hour standard content take-down windows on MPS request, expressly prohibits AI/deepfake forgery of images, voices, and videos for illegal purposes, and mandates child-safety platform measures.

On 26 November 2025 Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a package of measures to protect Canada's steel and softwood lumber industries, effective 26 December 2025. For steel, Canada tightened the tariff-rate quota (TRQ) available to countries without a Canada free trade agreement from 50% to 20% of 2024 import levels, and cut the TRQ for FTA partners outside CUSMA (i.e. not the US/Mexico) from 100% to 75% of 2024 levels; imports above quota face a 50% surtax. A new 25% tariff on the full value of listed steel-derivative products (doors, windows, fasteners, structural components and related goods) applies to all countries, covering an estimated CAD 10 billion+ of derivative imports. For softwood lumber, Canada added CAD 500 million to the BDC Softwood Lumber Guarantee Program (bringing it to CAD 1.2 billion) and earmarked a further CAD 500 million under the Large Enterprise Tariff Loan facility for lumber-sector liquidity support.

On 20 November 2025 the White House and US Department of Commerce / Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) authorised Abu Dhabi AI holding company G42 to import advanced computing chips — equivalent to approximately 35,000 Nvidia GB300 Blackwell processors — under the UAE-pioneered Regulated Technology Environment (RTE) compliance framework. The RTE is an Emirati-designed technology governance and audit architecture, developed by G42 and approved under BIS guidelines, with binding UAE-side controls to prevent onward diversion to foreign adversary nations. The authorisation accelerates the Stargate UAE project — a 1 GW AI compute cluster being built by G42 for OpenAI in partnership with Oracle, Cisco, NVIDIA, and SoftBank Group — and represents the first concluded major country-level advanced-compute authorisation following the May 2025 rescission of the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule.

On 18 November 2025, the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, ESMA, and EIOPA) jointly designated 19 Critical ICT Third-Party Providers (CTPPs) under DORA Article 31, with immediate effect — the first-ever exercise of direct EU financial-regulator supervision over hyperscale cloud and infrastructure providers. The designated entities include Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, Deutsche Telekom, Oracle, SAP, IBM, Bloomberg LP, London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), Tata Consultancy Services, and Orange, among others. Designation triggers direct oversight by a lead ESA (EBA for banking-critical, ESMA for capital-markets-critical, EIOPA for insurance-critical) via Joint Examination Teams (JETs), with powers to conduct investigations, carry out on-site inspections, and impose fines of up to 1% of average daily worldwide turnover per day for non-compliance.

India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) notified the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 via Gazette notification G.S.R. 846(E) on 13 November 2025, operationalising the 2023 DPDP Act. The Rules introduce a "negative list" cross-border personal-data transfer regime under Rule 14, verifiable parental consent, breach-notification windows, and tiered penalties up to INR 250 crore. Implementation is phased: Data Protection Board provisions in force on notification, Consent Manager rules from 13 Nov 2026, and core data-fiduciary / cross-border-transfer obligations from 13 May 2027.

On 13 November 2025, the United States and the Republic of Korea released a Joint Fact Sheet reaffirming the July 2025 announcement of the Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal — the first standalone US-Korea trade-and-investment agreement since the 2012 KORUS FTA. USTR issued the implementing Federal Register notice (90 FR 55964, Notice 2025-21940) on 3 December 2025, effective 4 December 2025, with retroactive HTSUS application to 1 November 2025 for autos and auto parts and to 14 November 2025 for reciprocal-tariff goods, timber, lumber, derivatives, and certain aircraft and aircraft parts. On the US tariff side: (i) the country-specific IEEPA reciprocal tariff on Korean originating goods is set at the higher of the KORUS FTA / MFN rate or 15% (parallel to the Japan and EU framework deals); (ii) the Section 232 tariffs on autos, auto parts, timber, lumber and wood derivatives are reduced to 15% (no incremental duty when the pre-existing KORUS/MFN rate already meets or exceeds 15%); (iii) Korean exports of qualifying goods on the Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners (PTAAP) list are exempt from reciprocal tariffs (covering generic pharmaceuticals and unavailable natural resources); (iv) Section 232 pharmaceuticals capped at 15%; semiconductors granted MFN-style "no less favourable" treatment in any future sectoral deal. On the investment side, Korea commits to a USD 350bn package: USD 150bn into US shipbuilding ("Approved Investments") plus USD 200bn into US strategic industries via a separate Strategic Investments MOU, with annual currency-funding cap of USD 20bn. Non-tariff commitments include streamlined US biotech approvals on the Korean side, US meat and cheese market access, fair treatment for US digital services, removal of Korea's 50,000-unit cap on US vehicles meeting FMVSS, and joint WTO support for the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions.

Germany's transposition of EU Directive 2022/2555 (NIS2), enacted as the "Gesetz zur Umsetzung der NIS-2-Richtlinie und zur Regelung wesentlicher Grundzüge des Informationssicherheitsmanagements in der Bundesverwaltung." Bundestag passage 13 November 2025; Bundesrat approval 21 November 2025; published as BGBl. I 2025 Nr. 301 on 5 December 2025; entered into force 6 December 2025. The statute designates the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) as the central national supervisory authority over an estimated 29,500 covered entities across 18 critical and important sectors, introduces a mandatory 24h initial / 72h detailed / 1-month final cyber-incident reporting cascade, establishes board-level personal liability for senior management, and applies to SME critical- infrastructure suppliers — with no transitional grace period from entry into force.

At the APEC Busan summit on 30 October 2025, Presidents Trump and Xi reached the "Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," subsequently implemented on the US side by the executive order "Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement" (issued 4 November 2025; effective 12:01 am EST on 10 November 2025; published in the Federal Register on 7 November 2025 as 90 FR 50729 / 2025-19826) and on the Chinese side by a series of MOFCOM and State Council Tariff Commission announcements (notably MOFCOM 2025 No. 90 of 8–9 November 2025). The arrangement is structurally parallel to the already-filed US-Japan, US-Korea and US-Taiwan framework deals but uniquely material because it freezes the highest-stakes bilateral tariff and export-control confrontation of the post-2024 reset. Core US commitments: (i) reciprocal-tariff "additional ad valorem rate of duty" on PRC-origin goods reduced from a prior 20% IEEPA-fentanyl + 10% IEEPA-reciprocal stack to a 10% rate (i.e., the prior 24% / 34% scheduled escalation is suspended), extended through 10 November 2026; (ii) US BIS suspends the so-called "affiliates rule" expanding entity-list controls to majority-owned subsidiaries of listed Chinese firms; (iii) USTR pauses Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding / logistics countermeasures against Chinese vessels for one year. Core PRC commitments: (i) MOFCOM suspends for one year (until 10 November 2026) the 9 October 2025 extraterritorial rare-earth export-control package — including controls on REE processing equipment, lithium-battery manufacturing equipment, and superhard materials; (ii) PRC suspends retaliatory tariffs on a broad swath of US agricultural products through 31 December 2026; (iii) commitment to purchase ≥25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans annually in 2026-2028 and to resume sorghum and log imports; (iv) suspension of MOFCOM antitrust and "unreliable-entity" probes against named US semiconductor and chip-equipment companies; (v) cooperation on fentanyl precursor enforcement. The arrangement does not repeal underlying authorities (IEEPA tariffs, MOFCOM export-control list, Entity List) — it is a calibrated mutual freeze with a one-year sunset and quarterly review checkpoints.

On 26 October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur, on the margins of the ASEAN Summit, President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim signed two complementary instruments structuring the US-Malaysia economic relationship: (i) a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation to Diversify Global Critical Minerals Supply Chains and Promote Investments, establishing quarterly working-level meetings on bilateral exploration, extraction, processing, refining, manufacturing, and recycling, plus shared commitments on streamlined permitting and protection from non-market policies; and (ii) a legally-binding Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) covering goods (chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, metals, vehicles, dairy, horticulture, poultry, pork, rice, fuel ethanol), digital trade, services, and investment. Under the ART, the United States maintains a 19% reciprocal tariff on Malaysian imports (with carve-outs for products receiving 0% under EO 14346) while Malaysia commits to refrain from banning or quota-restricting exports of critical minerals or rare earths to the US, ensure no restrictions on rare-earth magnet sales to US firms, and grant extended operating licenses to US partners. The ART enters into force 60 days after exchange of notifications of completed domestic procedures.

The Hrvatski sabor (Croatian Parliament) unanimously adopted the Act on Screening of Foreign Direct Investments on 24 October 2025; the law was published in Narodne Novine 136/2025 and entered into force on 13 November 2025. It establishes Croatia's first-ever statutory horizontal FDI-screening regime, implementing EU Regulation 2019/452 in Croatian law. The Act captures direct or indirect acquisitions by non-EU investors of at least 10 % of share capital, voting rights or property rights in Croatian entities operating in sensitive sectors (defence, dual-use, critical infrastructure, critical minerals, emerging tech, sensitive personal data, energy, transport, health, digital infrastructure, media, financial services). The reviewing authority must decide within 120 days, exceptionally 150 days, of a complete application. Croatia was one of the last EU Member States without a horizontal screening law.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

FinCEN issued a final rule under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (31 U.S.C. § 5318A) prohibiting US covered financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent account for, or on behalf of, Cambodia-based Huione Group, a foreign financial institution found to be of primary money-laundering concern. Treasury determined that Huione Group and its subsidiaries — including Haowang Guarantee, Huione Pay PLC, and Huione Crypto — laundered at least $4 billion of illicit proceeds between August 2021 and January 2025, including funds tied to North Korean cyber-heist actors and Southeast Asian "pig-butchering" investment-scam compounds. The rule also imposes a special-due-diligence requirement on US covered institutions to guard against indirect access via foreign correspondent accounts. Effective November 17, 2025.

On 26 June 2026 the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) issued a final injury finding in Inquiry NQ-2025-008, determining that dumped and subsidized imports of thermoformed molded fibre tableware from China have caused material injury to the Canadian domestic industry. Final anti-dumping duties ranging from 81.7% to 332.4% of export price, plus countervailing (subsidy) duties ranging from 0.5% to 18.9%, are now collected by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) on goods released on or after 26 June 2026. The case originated from a complaint by CKF Inc. (Hantsport, Nova Scotia).

On 15 October 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 39 entities and specified 51 vessels — including, for the first time, Russia's two largest integrated oil majors PJSC Rosneft Oil Company and PJSC Oil Company Lukoil — for supporting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. 51 vessels (44 identified as "shadow fleet" tankers) were specified for transporting Russian crude oil and LNG in evasion of the G7 price cap. The package also introduced a ban on importing oil products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude, closing a refined-product loophole in the price-cap regime.

Italy enacted Legge 23 settembre 2025, n. 132 — "Disposizioni e deleghe al Governo in materia di intelligenza artificiale" — published in Gazzetta Ufficiale Serie Generale n. 223 of 25 September 2025 (atto 25G00143) and entered into force on 10 October 2025. The statute makes Italy the first EU member state to enact a comprehensive national AI law complementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (EU AI Act), designating AgID (Agency for Digital Italy) and ACN (National Cybersecurity Agency) as national oversight authorities under Presidency-of-the-Council-of-Ministers coordination. It sets sectoral rules for healthcare, labour, intellectual professions, public administration and the judiciary; authorises up to €1 billion in state-backed venture capital (via CDP Venture Capital) for AI, cybersecurity and telecoms; creates criminal penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for harmful deepfakes; mandates parental consent for under-14 users; and delegates secondary legislation to the Government across multiple domains.

On 18 September 2025 Brazil's federal government published Medida Provisória (Provisional Measure) 1318/2025, creating REDATA — the Special Taxation Regime for Datacenter Services — alongside a parallel IT-export regime (REPES). REDATA zeroes federal taxes on servers, storage, networking, cooling and other datacenter capital equipment for qualifying operators from 1 January 2026, conditioned on 100% renewable/zero-carbon energy sourcing, a 2% of investment R&D-in-Brazil commitment, and preferential use of Brazilian- manufactured components. The Finance Ministry projects R$5.2 billion in forgone-tax incentives in 2026 alone, with potential to unlock up to R$2 trillion in private datacenter investment over ten years. REDATA is framed as implementing the National Datacenter Policy (PNDC) under the Nova Indústria Brasil industrial-policy umbrella.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two Iranian financial facilitators — Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand — along with more than a dozen Hong Kong- and UAE-based individuals and entities for operating a shadow-banking network that laundered proceeds from Iranian oil sales through front companies and cryptocurrency. The designated addresses account for over $600 million in total inflows, including more than $100 million in cryptocurrency purchases tied to oil sales between 2023 and 2025. Proceeds are alleged to benefit the IRGC-Qods Force and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This is the second round of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran's shadow-banking infrastructure since National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) directed a maximum-pressure campaign on Iran in February 2025.

Indonesia's Ministry of Industry issued Permenperin No. 35 of 2025 on 11 September 2025, signed by Minister Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita, on the Provisions and Procedures for Certification of Local Content Level (TKDN) and Company Benefit Weight (BMP). The regulation takes effect on 11 December 2025 and revokes Permenperin No. 16/2011 along with Permenperin No. 46/2022. It unifies TKDN and BMP into a single certificate, standardises a 5-year validity period (previously 3 years), expands scope to industrial services and mixed goods-service activities (e.g. EPC), introduces a 20-percentage-point bonus for R&D-intensive / Industry-4.0 producers, and accelerates issuance via accredited Independent Verification Institutes (Lembaga Verifikasi Independen / LVI) to roughly 10 working days for general industry and 4 working days for SMEs (IKM).

On 11 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities and identified four vessels in what Treasury described as its broadest sanctions action to date against Iran-aligned Ansarallah (Houthi) support networks. The designated network — companies, owners, and operatives located in Yemen, China, the UAE, and the Marshall Islands — is accused of running oil and commodity smuggling through Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports, laundering the proceeds, and using them to finance a global weapons procurement supply chain of front companies and shipping facilitators. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on nine prior 2024-2025 OFAC actions against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and suppliers.

South Korea's National Assembly passed an amendment to the Korea Development Bank (KDB) Act on 2025-08-27 (428th session, 3rd plenary sitting, 164-1 with 164 votes in favour of 165 cast), raising KDB's statutory capital ceiling from KRW 30 trillion to KRW 45 trillion and creating a new "Advanced Strategic Industry Fund" inside KDB. The fund is capitalised at KRW 50 trillion or more over five years via low-rate government-guaranteed bonds and is earmarked for the ten officially designated advanced strategic industries (AI, semiconductors, bio/vaccines, defense, robotics, hydrogen, secondary batteries, displays, future mobility) via cheap loans and equity investment. KDB intends to use the fund as seed capital for a wider "National Growth Fund" that blends in private and pension capital to reach KRW 100 trillion+ in total strategic-industry financing over five years.

Act L of 2025 (2025. évi L. törvény) is the Hungarian National Assembly statute that elevates a set of war-emergency government decrees — including the foreign-investment screening regime previously embedded in Government Decree 561/2022 — to permanent statutory level. Promulgated in Magyar Közlöny and entered into force on 19 August 2025, the Act preserves Hungary's "Second Regime" of FDI screening operating in parallel with the General Regime (which implements EU Reg 2019/452 since 2019). The Second Regime applies to a broad set of strategic sectors — energy, transport, communications, telecoms, pharmaceuticals, food processing, defence, financial services and healthcare — and requires approval from the Minister of National Economy for qualifying acquisitions (direct or indirect majority, ≥5% interest, ≥3% in listed companies, or ownership/operation of strategic infrastructure) where transaction value reaches HUF 350 million (~EUR 890,000). Notification is due within 10 days of signing; the MoE originally had 30 business days (extendable +15 calendar days). The Act also entrenches the Hungarian state right of first refusal on photovoltaic generation companies (NACE 35.11'08, excluding sub-50 kVA household installations), exercised through MNV Zrt. The Special Regime is structurally distinct from the General Regime and represents Hungary's peer to the German AWG §§55-62, French Décret 2014-479, Dutch Wet Vifo, and Italian Golden Power. Amended by Act XCIII of 2025 (in force 17 December 2025), which extended the MoE screening deadline to 45 business days and excluded bank-financing security arrangements from notification.