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On 2025-07-08 President Trump issued a Section 721 (Defense Production Act) order retroactively prohibiting Hong Kong-based Suirui International Co., Ltd.'s 2020 acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC, a US video-wall and audio-visual technology maker, from Foxconn. CFIUS found the transaction posed a national security risk because a Chinese military company holds an indirect interest in Suirui Group and can appoint one of its directors, creating a risk that Jupiter's products — used in military and critical- infrastructure environments — could be compromised. The order requires Suirui to fully divest all interests and rights in Jupiter within 120 days of the order (extendable at CFIUS's discretion) and bars Jupiter from holding interests in Suirui-linked Asian subsidiaries formed after the 2020 deal.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 746, dated 3 July 2025 and published in the Diário Oficial da União on 4 July 2025, amending Annex I of Resolução Gecex nº 323/2022 — the Ex-Tarifário regime for information-technology and telecommunications-goods tariff lines. The amendment excludes a set of existing duty-free Ex-Tarifário codes from the annex (reverting those lines to the standard MFN import duty) while including new codes granting temporary duty relief (typically to 0%) on lines with no equivalent domestic production; Global Trade Alert's tracking of the underlying state act counts 27 IT/telecom product lines affected in total, split between roughly 22 new/renewed duty-free grants (revoking 31 December 2025 absent renewal) and 5 exclusions reverting to standard duty. The amendment took effect 11 July 2025, seven days after publication. GTA classifies the measure "Red" (trade- restrictive/discriminatory), consistent with its treatment of GECEX's narrow, discretionary Ex-Tarifário product-line grants as favouring specific importers rather than liberalising trade economy- wide.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 748, signed 3 July 2025 and published in the Diário Oficial da União on 4 July 2025, revoking Ex-Tarifário (temporary import-duty exemption) status for 7 tariff-line codes previously granted duty-free treatment under the regime: 5 capital-goods lines, 1 information-technology/telecommunications line, and 1 automotive product classified as capital goods. The affected lines revert from 0% Ex-Tarifário rates to their standard MFN import duty. The change took effect 4 August 2025, one month after publication. Global Trade Alert flags Canada, China and Czechia among the trading partners most exposed by historical trade volume in the affected computing-machinery lines and classifies the measure "Red" (trade-restrictive).

Brazil's national development bank BNDES approved a BRL 100 million (~USD 18 million) financing package for BRQ Digital Solutions, funded through the BNDES Mais Inovação program, to build 17 technical accelerators for the company's proprietary generative-AI platform "Fusion BRQ." The operation is aligned with Mission 4 (Digital Transformation) of Nova Indústria Brasil, the federal government's industrial policy, and is projected to create roughly 60 new R&D jobs. The AI platform targets accelerated software development across finance, healthcare, energy, insurance, retail, agriculture and telecom client sectors.

On 1 July 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Aeza Group, a St. Petersburg, Russia-based "bulletproof hosting" (BPH) provider, along with two affiliated companies and four Aeza Group leaders (Arsenii Penzev, Yuri Bozoyan, Vladimir Gast, Igor Knyazev), for supplying server infrastructure that shielded ransomware operators, infostealer groups, and darknet drug marketplaces from law-enforcement takedown. In coordination with the UK's National Crime Agency, OFAC also designated Aeza International Ltd., a UK front company Aeza used to lease IP addresses to cybercriminals. The action was taken under Executive Order 13694 (as amended by E.O. 14144 and E.O. 14306) and builds on OFAC's February 2025 designation of BPH provider ZServers.

Government Decree 163/2025 (VI. 23.) amends the emergency-era Decree 561/2022 (XII. 23.) on economic-protection deviations, making two operative changes to Hungary's FDI screening regime: it extends the review period from 30 to up to 135 working days (45-day base plus three 30-workday extensions) and introduces a state pre-emption right, exercisable within 90 calendar days of a prohibition decision, allowing MNV Zrt. (Hungarian National Asset Management Company) or a designated entity to acquire the blocked target on the same terms as the original parties. The decree applies retroactively to all notification procedures pending at the time of entry into force (24 June 2025) and expands the screening scope from a solar-sector focus to broad strategic sectors. It served as an interim bridge — in force from 24 June to 18 August 2025 — until superseded by the permanent statutory codification in Act L of 2025.

The UK's state-owned National Wealth Fund (NWF), wholly owned by HM Treasury, committed £50 million as part of a wider capital raise for Wessex Internet, a regional full-fibre operator serving rural Dorset, Somerset, Hampshire and Wiltshire. The financing, alongside existing shareholder Aberdeen Investments and an extended Triodos loan, backs Wessex's expansion from roughly 40,000 to 137,000 connected premises and underpins £72 million of BDUK Project Gigabit subsidy contracts already awarded to the company.

The Chips Joint Undertaking, via Horizon Europe grant agreement 101213727 signed 19 June 2025, is co-funding "PIXEurope" (Advanced Photonic Integrated Circuits Pilot Line for Europe), the fifth EU Chips Act pilot line, coordinated by Fundació Institut de Ciències Fotòniques (ICFO, Spain) with a 19-entity, multi-country consortium. Total project cost is EUR 176.05m against EUR 88.03m in EU/Chips JU contribution, running 1 June 2025 to 31 May 2030. TNO (Netherlands) is a lead participant, receiving EUR 13.47m in net EU contribution (EUR 26.94m total eligible cost) to build a 6-inch indium-phosphide photonic-chip pilot manufacturing line at High Tech Campus Eindhoven — part of a wider EUR 193m Dutch national co-investment (Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Chips JU, TNO, TU Eindhoven, University of Twente) targeting technological independence in photonic chips for telecom/6G, AI, quantum, defence and medical-diagnostics applications. Global Trade Alert logs a EUR 10.1m figure for the TNO tranche as a "red" state-act intervention (financial grant) on competitive-distortion grounds; this filing anchors on the CORDIS-published grant-agreement figures as the authoritative primary-source numbers.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 730, signed 20 May 2025 and published in the Diário Oficial da União on 21 May 2025, removing 125 tariff-line codes from Ex-Tarifário (temporary import-duty exemption) coverage: 104 capital goods lines, 18 information-technology/telecommunications lines, and 3 automotive products classified as capital goods. The affected lines revert from preferential Ex-Tarifário rates to their standard MFN import duty, effective 20 July 2025, two months after publication. Global Trade Alert classifies the measure "Red" (trade-restrictive) and flags Austria, Belgium and Bulgaria among the trading partners most exposed by historical trade volume in the affected computing- machinery, special-purpose machinery and electric-motor lines.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 727, signed 20 May 2025, amending Annex I of Resolution No. 323 (4 April 2022) to modify import duties on 21 information- technology and telecommunications tariff lines. Twenty of the lines have their import duty temporarily eliminated (reduced to zero) and one line has its duty increased, effective 28 May 2025. The duty elimination on the 20 lines is temporary, with a stated revocation (reversion) date of 31 December 2025. Global Trade Alert classifies the measure "Red" and flags China, Germany and Indonesia among the trading partners most exposed by historical trade volume in the affected lines.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 732, dated 20 May 2025 and published in the Diário Oficial da União on 21 May 2025, amending Annexes II and VI of Resolução Gecex nº 272/2021 — the instrument that adapted Brazil's Common Mercosur Nomenclature (NCM) and Common External Tariff (TEC) to the 2022 Harmonized System revision. The amendment recomposes the TEC toward its full bound level for products on the IT/telecom (LEBIT) and capital-goods (BK) special-tariff exception lists, while carving out roughly 925 NCM codes across some 585 six-digit HS subheadings from the recomposition; secondary reporting describes the net effect as duty cuts on select data-processing and telephone equipment paired with duty increases across the broader excepted product set. Global Trade Alert classifies the measure as a "Red" (trade-restrictive) import-tariff intervention.

Thailand's Cabinet approved in principle on 22 April 2025 the urgent revision of the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999), directing the Ministry of Commerce to overhaul the foundational 25-year-old statute governing foreign participation in Thai economic activities, explicitly shifting the guiding principle from "protection" of domestic entrepreneurs to "enhancing competitiveness." In January 2026, the Department of Business Development operationalised the reform by announcing a 10-sector List-3 delisting package — including telecommunications services not owning network infrastructure, software development, financial-services categories (treasury centres, derivatives agency, collateralised lending, credit guarantee), petroleum drilling services, management services for affiliated companies, and domestic agricultural commodity trading — that would allow wholly-foreign-owned subsidiaries without a Foreign Business Licence (FBL). Simultaneously, the revision introduces a shift from a legal-shareholding test to an actual-control / beneficial-ownership test in nominee-shareholder enforcement, tightening the anti-front-company architecture while liberalising legitimate foreign-investment routes. Full statutory enactment via parliamentary process is expected mid-to-late 2026.

On 21 April 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed Presidential Resolution No. PP-145 "On the Privatization of Large Enterprises with State Participation on International Markets," establishing the 2025–2028 roadmap for selling minority equity stakes (10–25%) in 12 major state-owned enterprises via IPO/SPO on international and domestic exchanges, and full/near-full stakes in 29 further enterprises through competitive public tenders. The resolution introduced a three-tier asset-segmentation framework — large SOEs (IPO/SPO with international advisor mandates), medium SOEs (domestic stock-exchange sale), and small assets/real estate (e-platform sale) — and mandated engagement of international investment banks and a State Privatization Commission to oversee implementation. It was issued the same day as the sister Presidential Decree UP-70 "On the Privatization Program for 2025," which approved a 2025 annual program targeting 30 trillion UZS (~USD 2.4 bn) in state-asset disposals across 115 companies, 659 real-estate properties, and 6,100 hectares of land.

Japan's Cabinet approved an amendment to the Cabinet Order on Inward Direct Investment under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) on 1 April 2025; the order was promulgated 4 April 2025 and entered into force 19 May 2025. The amendment introduces two new investor categories — Type-A (investors legally or contractually obligated to share information with foreign governments) and Type-B (investors effectively in a comparable position without formal legal obligation) — and eliminates or narrows exemptions from mandatory prior-notification screening for both categories. The primary driver is concern over minority-stake acquisitions by Chinese investors in Japanese listed companies operating in sensitive sectors including cloud computing, telecommunications infrastructure, semiconductor equipment, and advanced electronics. The reform is structurally distinct from the outbound FEFTA catch-all controls overhaul (2025-10-09) and from the Economic Security Promotion Act (2022-05-18); it is the inbound FDI-screening complement to that framework.

The Nigeria Data Protection Commission issued the General Application and Implementation Directive (GAID) 2025 on 20 March 2025, the principal implementing directive of the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA). The GAID came fully into force on 19 September 2025, replacing the Nigeria Data Protection Regulation (NDPR) 2019 as the operative enforcement instrument. It applies extraterritorially to any data controller or processor established outside Nigeria that processes personal data of Nigerian data subjects, imposes a tripartite cross-border transfer framework (adequacy decisions, Transfer Instruments, and statutory exceptions), mandates Data Protection Impact Assessments for AI and high-risk technologies, and carries a civil-penalty ceiling of 2% of annual gross revenue or NGN 10 million for designated data controllers and processors of major importance (DCPMIs), whichever is greater.

On 24 February 2025 President Prabowo Subianto launched Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara), Indonesia's new state investment-management agency, consolidating around USD 900bn–1tn of Indonesian state-owned-enterprise assets — including Pertamina, PLN, Bank Mandiri, BRI, BNI, Telkom, MIND ID, Antam and Inalum — into a single super-holding modelled on Singapore's Temasek. Danantara was created by the Third Amendment to the BUMN Law (Law No. 1 of 2025, enacted 24 February 2025) and Government Regulation No. 10 of 2025 on its organisation and governance, with board appointments formalised by Presidential Regulation No. 30 of 2025. The agency reports directly to the President, bypassing the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, and is mandated to deploy SOE balance-sheet capacity into Prabowo's 8% growth target via co-investment in mineral downstreaming, refinery and EV-battery build-out, food security, and semiconductor / data-centre infrastructure.

Joint Communication JOIN(2025) 9 final, adopted 21 February 2025, establishes the EU's first cable-infrastructure-specific resilience framework. It introduces a four-pillar Cable Security Toolbox (prevention, detection, response/recovery, deterrence), designates Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs) for priority public funding, and allocates €347 million under the Connecting Europe Facility Digital programme for cross-border subsea cable diversification, redundancy, and repair-ship capacity. The plan also formalises EU-NATO Task Force on Resilience of Critical Undersea Infrastructure follow-on workstreams and establishes an attribution and diplomatic-response framework for cable-sabotage incidents, referencing Baltic Sea cable-cutting events from 2023 to 2025.

Japan's National Diet enacted the Cyber Response Capability Enhancement Act (重要電子計算機に対する不正な行為による被害の防止に関する法律, Law No. 42 of 2025) on 16 May 2025, together with companion arrangement legislation. Commonly known as the Active Cyber Defense (ACD) Law, the statute authorises (i) government monitoring of foreign-origin internet traffic transiting designated Japanese communication infrastructure for national-security threat indicators, (ii) pre-emptive access and neutralisation operations against attacker infrastructure abroad by the National Police Agency and the Self-Defense Forces under unified command, and (iii) mandatory cyber-incident reporting and government cooperation duties on critical-infrastructure operators. Implementation is phased through November 2027, with the NISC reorganised into the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) under the Cabinet Secretariat from July 2025.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List, listed under the destinations of Burma (1), China (11), and Pakistan (1). The PRC additions concentrate on the optics/photonics, RF/microwave, and military-civil-fusion research-institute layer of China's military-modernization stack — including CAS Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP), Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOM), Peng Cheng Laboratory, Ji Hua Laboratory, and the Yaguang/Chengdu RML defense-electronics cluster — with explicit references to support for hypersonic-weapons development. The Burma entity is Telecom International Myanmar (Mytel), added for providing surveillance services and financial support to the post-coup military regime; the Pakistan entity (Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd) was added for contributions to Pakistan's ballistic-missile programme. All 13 entries carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions. The rule was effective on publication, January 6, 2025, with a savings clause through February 5, 2025 for goods already en route.

Malaysia's Personal Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2024 (Act A1727), gazetted 17 October 2024, enters its third and final commencement phase on 1 June 2025 per commencement order P.U.(B) 522/2024. Phase 3 activates sections 6 and 9 of the amending Act, which impose mandatory Data Protection Officer (DPO) appointment thresholds, a 72-hour breach-notification duty to the Commissioner, and a statutory data-portability right, bringing Malaysia's PDPA broadly into alignment with GDPR and the ASEAN Model AI Governance Framework.

On 22 December 2024 the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam, under General Secretary Tô Lâm, issued Resolution 57-NQ/TW designating science, technology, innovation, and national digital transformation as Vietnam's "top strategic breakthrough" through 2030 with vision to 2045. The resolution targets ≥50% digital-economy share of GDP, top-30 global ranking in innovation and digital transformation, and at least 10 globally-competitive Vietnamese digital-technology enterprises by 2030. It identifies data, AI, blockchain, and IoT as priority bottlenecks and operates as the parent/umbrella authority under which all subsequent Government, National Assembly, Prime-Ministerial and Ministerial tech-industrial instruments are formulated. Operational implementation runs through Government Resolution 03/NQ-CP of 9 January 2025 (action programme).

FinCEN published a final rule (FR Doc 2024-23920, 89 FR 83782, effective on publication October 18, 2024) clarifying the public-utility exemption to the Corporate Transparency Act's beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting rule. The amendment to 31 CFR 1010.380(c)(2)(xv) corrects a drafting cross-reference so the exemption explicitly covers any regulated public utility under 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(33)(A) *or* (D) that provides telecommunications services, electrical power, natural gas, or water and sewer services within the United States. The change codifies FinCEN's June 10, 2024 telecommunications-provider guidance and is effective immediately upon publication; it neither expands nor restricts the underlying universe of reporting companies beyond aligning the rule text with the CTA statute.

On 24 September 2024 the European Commission issued its first-ever final decision under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), conditionally approving (Case FS.100011) the acquisition of PPF Telecom Group B.V. by Emirates Telecommunications Group Company PJSC (e&, majority-owned by the Emirates Investment Authority, Abu Dhabi). The Commission found that e& received prohibited foreign subsidies — principally an unlimited state guarantee via the EIA and preferential financing instruments — that risked post-transaction competitive distortion within the EU's five-country PPF footprint (Czechia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia; 10+ million subscribers). Conditions imposed require e& to remove the unlimited state guarantee, prohibit financing PPF's EU operations from EIA or e& group treasury, and mandate notification of future EU acquisitions above the FSR thresholds. The non-confidential version of the decision was published 4 April 2025.

On 6 September 2024 China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) jointly issued Order No. 23, the Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for Foreign Investment Access (2024 Edition), effective 1 November 2024. The 2024 list reduces nationwide restrictions from 31 to 29 entries, removing the last two manufacturing- sector restrictions (publication printing must be Chinese-controlled; investment in TCM-decoction steaming/roasting/calcination processes and confidential-formula proprietary Chinese-medicine production prohibited). Restrictions remain in services (telecommunications value-added, healthcare, education) and in 21 prohibited categories (news publishing, postal monopoly, fishing, gene therapy, tobacco). The 2021 edition is repealed on the same date.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (FR Doc. 2024-15810) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) so that certain "releases" of technology and software during "standards-related activities" are no longer subject to the EAR. The rule revises 15 CFR §734.10 and consolidates the patchwork of prior carve-outs (May 2019 Huawei 5G TGL, June 2020 IFR, September 2022 Entity-List-wide IFR) into a single activity-based exclusion. The change enables US firms to participate in international standards bodies (IEEE, 3GPP, ITU, ISO, IEC) alongside Entity-Listed parties — most consequentially Huawei — without licence exposure. Comments were due September 16, 2024.

The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA), enacted as Division H of P.L. 118-50 (21st Century Peace through Strength Act), prohibits app stores and internet hosting services from distributing, maintaining, or updating "foreign adversary controlled applications" — defined explicitly to include ByteDance Ltd and its subsidiaries (TikTok). ByteDance was given 270 days from enactment (until January 19, 2025) to execute a "qualified divestiture" — selling TikTok to an owner with no operational relationship with a foreign adversary — or face a nationwide distribution ban. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the law's constitutionality in TikTok, Inc. v. Garland (January 17, 2025), rejecting First Amendment challenges and affirming the national-security rationale grounded in data-collection concerns.

BIS amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to clarify controls on radiation hardened integrated circuits (rad-hard ICs) and equipment — including computer and telecommunications devices — that incorporate them. The rule affirms the availability of License Exception GOV for rad-hard ICs acquired pursuant to an official written request or directive from the Department of Defense or Department of Energy. It also expands License Exception GOV to cover microelectronics exports, reexports, and in-country transfers made under U.S. Government contracts that explicitly provide for such transactions, removing export-control obstacles for official government business. Published at 89 FR 18353–59 (FR Doc 2024-05267), effective on publication date.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 14403, Doc 2024-03674) adding two entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 27, 2024. Sandvine Incorporated, a Canadian deep packet inspection vendor, is listed across six destinations (Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, UAE) because it supplies DPI technology to the Government of Egypt where it is used for mass web-monitoring and censorship. Chengdu Beizhan Electronics Co., Ltd. is listed under China for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items on behalf of the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), a PLA-affiliated institution already on the Entity List. All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for both entities. The rule also revises entries for two existing Chinese entities and removes one UAE entry.

Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024, published in the Official Journal on 8 March 2024, establishes the EU's first dedicated policy framework for the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructure. It creates an informal Submarine Cable Infrastructure Expert Group of Member State authorities chaired by the Commission with ENISA participation, introduces the Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEI) designation mechanism for priority Union funding, and mandates a consolidated Union-wide risk and vulnerability assessment culminating in a Cable Security Toolbox of mitigating measures. Scope covers cables, landing stations, terrestrial tail connections, repair centres, and cable-laying vessel capacity. The recommendation is non-binding under TFEU Article 292 but constitutes the foundational soft-law framework that the later 2025 Cable Security Action Plan (JOIN(2025) 9) operationalises with binding CPEI lists and €347M CEF Digital funding.

On 21 February 2024, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed Presidential Decree DP-37 approving the 2024 State Program for the Implementation of the "Uzbekistan-2030" Strategy under the slogan "Year of Support for Youth and Business". The decree converts the parent Uzbekistan-2030 doctrine (DP-158 of 11 September 2023) into binding annual execution targets covering SOE privatisation and IPO programmes (Navoi MMC, Almalyk MMC, Uzbekistan National Investment Fund), industrial localisation, sectoral investment lines, "green economy" and water-management benchmarks, and youth-business support measures. DP-37 functions as the master annual operationalisation instrument for Uzbekistan's 2024 industrial and investment policy stack, anchoring the downstream subsoil recodification (LRU-987, Oct 2024) and critical-minerals national programme (March 2025).

The Significant Investments Review Act 2024 (Act No. 1 of 2024) is Singapore's first horizontal, cross-sector statutory FDI screening regime. The Bill was passed by Parliament on 9 January 2024, assented to by the President on 6 February 2024 and gazetted on 14 February 2024; the Act commenced on 28 March 2024 under the SIRA 2024 (Commencement) Notification (S 228/2024), together with the Significant Investments Review Regulations 2024 (S 229/2024). The Act creates an "ownership-and-control" layer over a limited number of "designated entities" the Minister for Trade and Industry has identified as critical to Singapore's national-security interests, plus an "any entity" call-in power exercisable against firms that have acted against Singapore's national-security interests, regardless of whether they are designated. Acquisitions of ≥5% require post-closing notification within 7 days; acquisitions of ≥12% / ≥25% / ≥50% and cessations of ≥50% / ≥75% controller status require prior ministerial approval. Administered by the Office of Significant Investments Review (OSIR) within MTI. SIRA is the Singaporean structural peer of US CFIUS, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479, the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the Canada ICA national-security review.

Tunisia's Finance Law for 2024 (Loi Nº 2023-52, promulgated 22 December 2023) introduces a 4-year full exemption from corporate income tax (IS) and personal income tax (IR) for newly created enterprises that obtain an investment declaration certificate during 2024 or 2025. Qualifying enterprises must commence effective operations within 2 years of the declaration date and maintain Tunisian-standard accounts; excluded sectors include financial services, conventional energy, mining, real-estate promotion, commerce, and telecoms operators. The measure is Tunisia's principal post-Loi 2016-71 targeted investment-attraction instrument and opens the IPTM register's first Tunisia-issuer action, closing a full-geographic blank in MENA/Maghreb coverage.

Signed by President Javier Milei and the entire cabinet on 20 December 2023 and published in the Boletín Oficial extraordinario on 21 December 2023, Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia 70/2023 declares a public emergency across economic, financial, fiscal, administrative, pension, tariff, sanitary, and social matters until 31 December 2025 (Article 1) and enacts 366 articles across 16 titles that fundamentally restructure Argentina's regulatory framework. The DNU repeals or amends dozens of statutes to deregulate foreign trade (repealing the Compre Nacional buy-preference law Ley 18.875 and the price-control framework Ley 27.345), opens privatisation of state enterprises (Aerolíneas Argentinas, ENARSA, Banco Nación, Correo Argentino, Trenes Argentinos), dismantles the Ley de Abastecimiento price-control regime, liberalises civil aviation cabotage to foreign carriers, deregulates hydrocarbons export and mining permitting, and replaces the severance-pay regime with a capitalisation-fund system. It is the foundational enabling framework for all subsequent Milei-administration deregulatory instruments filed on the IPTM register, including RIGI (Law 27.742), Decreto 38/2025, Decreto 449/2025, and Decreto 563/2025.

Lov 2023-06-20 nr. 77 (Lov om endringer i sikkerhetsloven — eierskapskontroll og lovens virkeområde), adopted by the Storting on 9 June 2023, signed 20 June 2023, in force 1 July 2023, is Norway's first substantive overhaul of Chapter 10 (Eierskapskontroll / ownership control) of the 2018 Security Act (Sikkerhetsloven). The amendment widens the scope of undertakings that can be brought under ownership control beyond entities directly linked to a "grunnleggende nasjonal funksjon" (fundamental national function) to include businesses of vital importance to national-security interests and businesses of significant importance to fundamental national functions, lowers and adds notification thresholds, and equips the King in Council with enhanced powers to block, condition, or unwind qualifying acquisitions. The reform converts a narrow security-classified regime into a broad horizontal FDI-screening architecture for Norway, the host of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund and a NATO frontline state.

On 17 June 2023, the Prime Minister's Office issued a formal notification establishing the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), an apex civil-military body chaired by the Prime Minister with the Chief of Army Staff and federal/ provincial leadership as members. SIFC operates as a "single window" to fast-track foreign direct investment in five strategic sectors: Defence Production, Agriculture and Livestock, Minerals, IT and Telecommunication, and Energy. The council is the principal vehicle through which Pakistan is channelling Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sovereign capital — Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain — into headline projects including the Reko Diq copper-gold restart, Saudi/UAE minerals MoUs, and the 2025 Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum. SIFC received statutory backing on 18 August 2023 via the Board of Investment (Amendment) Act, 2023, which inserted Chapter II-A giving SIFC overriding authority over other laws.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 76 Russian entities to the Entity List effective February 24, 2023, spanning three rationale categories: (1) biometric surveillance technology enabling Russian filtration operations in occupied Ukraine; (2) illicit acquisition of U.S.-origin controlled items; and (3) the Russian military-industrial complex encompassing missiles, aviation, shipbuilding, semiconductors, telecom, and defense electronics. All 76 entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption of denial; 66 entities receive footnote-3 designation as Russian military end-users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus Military End-User Foreign Direct Product Rule under §734.9(g). Four existing Entity List entries were simultaneously revised with additional aliases and tightened to a policy of denial. Notable designations include KAMAZ, the Skolkovo Foundation, Skoltech, Ilyushin Aviation Complex, and the State Missile Center Named After Akademika V.P. Makeyev.

Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1903 amends Regulation (EU) 2022/263 so that its import ban and export restrictions, previously limited to the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, also cover the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine's Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. It was adopted on 6 October 2022 alongside the eighth Russia sanctions package and entered into force the day after publication in the Official Journal.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR, 87 FR 55241, FR Doc. 2022-19415) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to authorize the release of specified items to all entities on the Entity List without a licence when such release occurs in the context of a "standards-related activity." The IFR expanded a narrower June 2020 predecessor that had applied only to Huawei and its affiliates; this 2022 rule extended equivalent authorization to the full Entity List. Authorized items include EAR99 technology and software, items controlled solely for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons, and certain cryptographic technology (ECCNs 5D002 and 5E002) used in standards development. The rule amended 15 CFR §§ 734.10, 744.11, 744.16, and Part 772 and was superseded by a broader 2024 IFR that recasted the carve-out as an activity-based exclusion from EAR jurisdiction entirely.

Government Decree 53/2022/ND-CP, signed 15 August 2022 and effective 1 October 2022, implements Article 26 of Vietnam's 2018 Law on Cybersecurity. It mandates in-country storage of three categories of data — personal data of users in Vietnam, user-generated data, and user-relationship data — for both domestic and foreign cyberspace- service providers, with a minimum 24-month retention period. Foreign enterprises providing telecoms, data storage, domain names, e-commerce, online payments, social networks, online video games, or messaging services to users in Vietnam must establish a Vietnamese branch or representative office within 12 months of a Minister of Public Security written request. The decree closes a four-year implementation gap on the 2018 Cybersecurity Law and is the principal Vietnamese digital-trade barrier alongside Decree 13/2023/ND-CP (Personal Data Protection).

On 4 August 2022 OFAC formally published in the Federal Register nine general licenses (GLs 17–25) that had previously been made available only on OFAC's website under EO 14065 (Donetsk/Luhansk regions) and, for GL 25, also EO 13685 (Crimea). GL 17, which authorised wind-down of Donetsk/Luhansk transactions, had already expired on 23 March 2022. GLs 18–25 remain in force and authorise a structured set of humanitarian and civil-society carve-outs — covering agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices, telecommunications, official international organisation business, personal remittances, internet-based communications, NGO activities, civil maritime services, and journalistic activities — within the otherwise restricted territory of Crimea, the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), and the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR).

The Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule on 6 June 2022 (effective 2 June 2022) consolidating corrections, clarifications, and substantive amendments to the series of EAR Russia/Belarus rules issued between February and May 2022. The most significant substantive change eliminates the EAR99 food and medicine carve-out for 146 footnote-3-designated military end-user entities already on the Entity List, subjecting all items subject to the EAR — including previously exempt food and medicine — to licensing requirements with a policy of denial for the FSB, SVR, and GRU. Additional provisions clarify luxury goods value thresholds, oil refinery sector controls, and civil telecommunications license review policy, and correct cross-references in the Foreign Direct Product Rules for Russia and Belarus.

The Wet veiligheidstoets investeringen, fusies en overnames ("Vifo Act") is the Netherlands' cross-sector statutory FDI screening regime. Adopted by the States-General on 18 May 2022 (Stb. 2022, 215) and entered into force on 1 June 2023 together with two implementing decrees (Stb. 2023, 173 — main implementing decree; Stb. 2023, 172 — decree defining the scope of "sensitive technology"), the Act establishes mandatory pre-closing notification and a security review by the Bureau Toetsing Investeringen (BTI, part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate) for transactions affecting (i) "vital providers" in critical infrastructure sectors — energy, transport, telecoms, port operators, banking infrastructure — and (ii) Dutch undertakings active in "sensitive technology", defined to include EU Reg 2021/821 Annex I dual-use items, military goods, and additional national-security technologies. The regime applies retrospectively to transactions completed after 8 September 2020. It is the foundational instrument under which the Dutch national export-control measures on ASML DUV immersion lithography (filed: 2023-06-30 and 2024-09-07) operate, and the Dutch peer of US CFIUS, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., and the UK NSI Act 2021.

BIS published a technical correction to the Entity List (15 CFR Part 744, Supplement No. 4) fixing three errors in the February 14, 2022 final rule (87 FR 8180; FR Doc. 2022-03029) that added and revised Huawei entities. Two entries — Huawei Cloud Brazil (São Paulo) and Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (China, with 22+ affiliated addresses) — incorrectly cited §736.2(b)(3)(vi) as the Foreign Direct Product rule trigger instead of the correct §734.9(e) (the Huawei-specific FDP rule); a third error was a typographical fix to the footnote reference ("except for" → "EXCEPT\2\ for"). No new restrictions were created; the substantive export control status of all listed Huawei entities is unchanged, but exporters relying on the CFR text now have the correct regulatory citation for license requirement determinations.

Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations via SOR/2022-067, registered and in force 24 March 2022, establishing a new "Restricted Goods and Technologies List" and prohibiting any person in Canada, and any Canadian outside Canada, from exporting, selling, supplying or shipping any listed good or technology to Russia or to any person in Russia. The list is maintained and published separately by Global Affairs Canada and covers items with dual civilian/military applications across electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, marine, aerospace and transportation equipment.

On 28 February 2022, South Korea's government condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and announced it would strengthen export control review to block strategic items -- microelectronics, telecommunications equipment, sensors, navigation equipment, avionics, marine equipment, and aircraft components -- from reaching Russia. The statement also committed Korea to joining the exclusion of designated Russian banks from the SWIFT international payments system, with implementation details to follow through interagency consultation, alongside plans to release strategic petroleum reserves and divert LNG cargoes to Europe.

On 24 February 2022, hours after Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, the UK Foreign Secretary announced a full asset freeze on VTB, Russia's second-largest bank (£154bn in assets, 95,000 employees), alongside a freeze on all Russian bank assets in the UK and a ban on Russian companies raising finance on UK markets. The package designated more than 100 companies and individuals -- including five major defence firms (Rostec, Uralvagonzavod, Tactical Missile Corporation, United Aircraft Corporation, United Shipbuilding Corporation) and Putin-inner-circle figures such as Kirill Shamalov -- for asset freezes and travel bans. Aeroflot was banned from UK airspace and new export controls were imposed on electronics, telecommunications and aerospace goods to Russia.

Effective 24 February 2022 — the date of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine — the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (87 FR 12226, FR Doc 2022-04300) adding sweeping new export license requirements under a new § 746.8 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The rule requires a licence for any item in CCL Categories 3–9 (electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors, lasers, navigation/avionics, marine, aerospace, propulsion) exported, reexported, or transferred to Russia, with a review policy of denial. Two new Russia-specific Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules extend US jurisdiction to foreign-manufactured goods: the Russia FDP Rule (§ 734.9(f)) covers all foreign-made items using US technology/equipment destined for Russia, and the Russia-MEU FDP Rule (§ 734.9(g)) covers items destined to 47 designated military-end-user (MEU) entities with no licence exceptions available. All three restrictions carry a presumption of denial, making this the most sweeping peacetime expansion of the EAR since its modern codification.

The Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Ukraine Regions) Regulations 2022 (F2022L00179) apply to the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk the autonomous sanctions measures already in place for Crimea and Sevastopol, commencing 28 March 2022. DFAT describes the measures as prohibiting trade in the transport, energy, telecommunications, and oil, gas and minerals sectors of those regions. Foreign Minister Marise Payne announced Australia's response on 24 February 2022, alongside listings of Russian individuals and banks.

Council Regulation (EU) 2022/263 prohibits importing into the EU any goods originating in the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and bans the sale, supply, transfer or export of Annex II goods and technology (transport, telecommunications, energy, resource extraction) to those areas. It also bars new investment and financing there. It entered into force the day after adoption, 24 February 2022.