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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 29 July 2026 Allied Gold Corporation (TSX/NYSE: AAUC) and Zijin Gold International Company Ltd. terminated their previously announced C$5.5B (~US$3.9-4B) arrangement agreement, under which Zijin Gold would have acquired 100% of Allied Gold, after concluding the deal's closing conditions would not be satisfied by the 29 July 2026 outside date. Trade press (ION Analytics/Dealreporter, Investing News Network, Ecofin Agency) reports the transaction stalled because China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) required in-depth review over two concerns: the premium Zijin was paying relative to Allied's market valuation, and geopolitical-risk concentration from Allied's exposure to Mali, which supplies roughly half of Allied's gold output (via the Sadiola mine). In place of the full takeover, Zijin Gold agreed same-day to a non-brokered private placement subscribing for ~12.8 million Allied common shares at C$32.55/share (~US$295M gross proceeds), taking a 9.2% stake expected to close on or about 10 August 2026. This is the first Chinese outbound mining M&A the register has logged since 2025-04-23, following a roughly 16-month gap, and marks an outbound-investment-screening precedent constraining a Chinese SOE-adjacent acquirer's exposure to Sahel political risk.
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed Executive Order No. 113 on April 13, 2026, promulgating the 13th Regular Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL) — the first FINL update in four years, superseding the 12th FINL under EO 175 (2022). The order retains the constitutionally mandated 40% foreign equity ceiling on exploration, development, and utilisation of natural resources (including large-scale mining), and reserves small-scale mining 100% for Filipino nationals. It codifies liberalisations from RA 11659 (Public Service Act), RA 11595 (Retail Trade Liberalisation Act), and RA 11647 (Foreign Investments Act amendments), formally reclassifying telecommunications, airlines, domestic shipping, and railways as sectors open to up to 100% foreign ownership.
Law No. 4 of 15 January 2026 (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 15 of 20 January 2026, in force 21 January 2026) converted with amendments Decree-Law No. 175 of 21 November 2025 ("Transizione 5.0"). During parliamentary conversion the Camera dei Deputati inserted a new Article 2-bis that materially expands Italy's Golden Power foreign-investment screening regime (DL 21/2012) into the financial, credit, and insurance sectors — the first explicit statutory inclusion of banking and insurance qualifying-holding transactions inside the Golden Power perimeter. The amendment introduces "national economic and financial security" as a public-order criterion alongside the traditional security and public-order profiles, and conditions exercise of special powers in the financial sector on the prior conclusion of pending European prudential and competition proceedings (ECB / EIOPA / EU Commission).
Cyprus Law 194(I)/2025 "The Establishment of a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments Law of 2025" was enacted by the House of Representatives and published in the Official Gazette on 14 November 2025, entering into force on 2 April 2026. It establishes Cyprus's first-ever mandatory pre-approval FDI screening regime, designating the Ministry of Finance as the competent Screening Authority and applying to non-EU/EEA/Swiss investors acquiring ≥25% equity or voting rights in Cyprus entities valued at ≥€2 million across covered strategic sectors. The regime implements EU Regulation 2019/452 and includes a Cyprus-specific sectoral extension covering tourism and real estate — addressing golden-passport-era concerns about non-EU capital flows into the island's financial and hospitality economy.
Act L of 2025 (2025. évi L. törvény) is the Hungarian National Assembly statute that elevates a set of war-emergency government decrees — including the foreign-investment screening regime previously embedded in Government Decree 561/2022 — to permanent statutory level. Promulgated in Magyar Közlöny and entered into force on 19 August 2025, the Act preserves Hungary's "Second Regime" of FDI screening operating in parallel with the General Regime (which implements EU Reg 2019/452 since 2019). The Second Regime applies to a broad set of strategic sectors — energy, transport, communications, telecoms, pharmaceuticals, food processing, defence, financial services and healthcare — and requires approval from the Minister of National Economy for qualifying acquisitions (direct or indirect majority, ≥5% interest, ≥3% in listed companies, or ownership/operation of strategic infrastructure) where transaction value reaches HUF 350 million (~EUR 890,000). Notification is due within 10 days of signing; the MoE originally had 30 business days (extendable +15 calendar days). The Act also entrenches the Hungarian state right of first refusal on photovoltaic generation companies (NACE 35.11'08, excluding sub-50 kVA household installations), exercised through MNV Zrt. The Special Regime is structurally distinct from the General Regime and represents Hungary's peer to the German AWG §§55-62, French Décret 2014-479, Dutch Wet Vifo, and Italian Golden Power. Amended by Act XCIII of 2025 (in force 17 December 2025), which extended the MoE screening deadline to 45 business days and excluded bank-financing security arrangements from notification.
Mongolia's State Great Khural adopted Resolution No. 62 on 2 July 2025, establishing a Temporary Oversight Committee chaired by MP O. Batnairamdal to investigate the state's ownership interest and percentage in the Oyu Tolgoi Strategic Group of Deposits, including the valuation of JV License areas (Shivee Tolgoi and Javkhlant) held by Entrée LLC for the Entrée/OTLLC joint venture. The Committee conducted three-day public hearings in early December 2025, summoning approximately 300 witnesses including former Mongolian Prime Ministers and Presidents, and Rio Tinto CEO Stephen Scott. On 19 December 2025, the Committee submitted a draft resolution to Parliament, which was referred to the Standing Committee on Economics for further consideration ahead of government negotiations. The investigation creates material uncertainty for Rio Tinto's Oyu Tolgoi underground ramp-up (~480 kt/y Cu at peak) and Entrée Resources' JV License renewal, with the 2009 Investment Agreement potentially subject to renegotiation.
Decree-Law No. 104 of 10 August 2023 ("Decreto Asset" / Omnibus Decree, GU n.186 of 10 Aug 2023, in force 11 Aug 2023) was converted with amendments into Law No. 136 of 9 October 2023 (GU n.236 of 9 Oct 2023). The conversion law materially expanded Italy's "Golden Power" foreign-direct-investment screening regime (DL 21/2012). Two key extensions: (i) intra-group transactions involving entities outside the EU are no longer exempt from the exercise of special powers — only the prior notification carve-out was preserved; (ii) acts, resolutions and operations concerning intellectual-property rights in artificial intelligence, semiconductor production, cybersecurity, aerospace, energy storage, quantum and nuclear technologies, and food production technologies fall within scope when one or more counter-parties sit outside the EU. The Prime Minister also obtained an explicit veto power over transactions creating "exceptional situations" not already covered by sectoral or EU prudential / merger rules, including those touching qualifying holdings in the financial sector.
Denmark's foundational cross-sector horizontal FDI screening statute. Lov nr 842 of 10 May 2021 — investeringsscreeningsloven — was adopted by the Folketing on 4 May 2021, signed on 10 May 2021, and entered into force on 1 July 2021 (with application to transactions implemented from 1 September 2021). The Act is administered by Erhvervsstyrelsen (Danish Business Authority) and combines (i) a mandatory pre-closing authorisation regime for foreign investments in "particularly sensitive sectors" — defence, dual-use products, IT-security functions/services, critical technology, critical infrastructure — triggered at 10% ownership / voting rights or equivalent control, with (ii) a voluntary notification scheme (typically engaged at 25%+) for foreign investments and special economic agreements in other sectors. Enforcement runs through blocking orders, unwinding orders, and criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment. Structural peer of the US CFIUS regime, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, the Italian Golden Power Decree, and the Swedish FDI screening regime.
The Investitionskontrollgesetz (InvKG, "Investment Control Act") is Austria's horizontal, statutory FDI screening regime. Published as Article 1 of the Federal Law BGBl. I Nr. 87/2020 on 24 July 2020 and entering into force on 25 July 2020, the Act replaced the previous narrow §§25a–25e Außenwirtschaftsgesetz 2011 (Foreign Trade Act) regime — under which fewer than 10 permits were issued from 2013 to mid-2020 — and transposes EU Regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. The InvKG introduces mandatory ex-ante notification and approval of non-EU / non-EEA / non-Swiss acquisitions where the acquirer crosses any of the 10% / 25% / 50% voting-rights thresholds in an Austrian target operating in the critical sectors listed in Annex Part 1 (especially sensitive: defence, energy / water / telecoms critical infrastructure, dual-use technology, cybersecurity, AI, quantum technology, robotics, semiconductors, biotech, health, vaccines) and 25% / 50% in the sectors listed in Annex Part 2 (broader, including media, food-security, electronic communications infrastructure, financial infrastructure). Administered by the Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Wirtschaft (BMAW), with case decisions taken in coordination with the Komitee für Investitionskontrolle (inter-ministerial Investment Control Committee) and, where the case is escalated to the EU cooperation mechanism, the Commission and EU peer Member States. The InvKG is Austria's functional peer of US CFIUS / FIRRMA, UK NSI Act 2021, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., Italy Golden Power Decree, Netherlands Wet Vifo, Denmark investeringsscreeningsloven, and Belgium ISC. Sunset clause: originally limited to 30 June 2022 under §17(2) InvKG; permanently extended by BGBl. I Nr. 80/2022 of 14 July 2022.
The modern French FDI-screening regime is codified in Code monétaire et financier (CMF) Art. L151-1 to L151-7, substantially restructured by Loi PACTE n° 2019-486 du 22 mai 2019 (Art. 152-158) and operationalised by Décret n° 2019-1590 du 31 décembre 2019 (in force 1 April 2020) with implementing Arrêté du 31 décembre 2019. The regime requires prior authorisation from DG Trésor for non-EU/EEA acquisitions reaching ≥25% of a French target's voting rights across 17 sensitive sectors enumerated in CMF Art. R151-3, and for ≥10% acquisitions in listed-company targets (threshold made permanent by Décret 2023-1293 from 1 January 2024, having been originally introduced during COVID-19 by Décret 2020-892). Approximately 310 notifications are received annually; the regime closes the last major G7 EU-member-state FDI-screening parent-statute gap after DE AWG §§55-62, IT Golden Power DL 21/2012, NL Wet Vifo, UK NSI Act 2021, US CFIUS, JP FEFTA, AU FATA, and CH IPG.
Decreto-Legge 15 marzo 2012 n. 21 (GU n. 63 of 15 March 2012), converted with amendments into Legge 11 maggio 2012 n. 56 (GU n. 111 of 14 May 2012), establishes Italy's "Golden Power" special-powers regime — the foundational statute authorising the Italian Government to impose conditions on, veto, or prescribe remedies for corporate transactions in strategic sectors. The decree marked Italy's transition from a golden-share model (applicable only to privatised companies) to a sector-wide golden-power model applicable to any company carrying out activities of strategic relevance. Administered by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (DICA), the regime has been progressively extended from its original defence + national-security + energy/transport/ communications scope to cover 5G, cloud, critical-raw-materials, financial-credit-insurance, agri-food, healthcare, media, space, and AI through a series of amending decrees from 2019 to 2026.