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On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense published its annual update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies (CMIC) list, adding 65 entities (17 new parent companies and 48 subsidiaries), bringing the total to approximately 188–200 designated entities. Major additions span EV and battery manufacturing (BYD, NIO, CATL), consumer internet (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent), semiconductors (SMIC, YMTC, CXMT), solar (JA Solar, Trina Solar), biotech (BGI Genomics, WuXi AppTec), drones/robotics (DJI, Unitree, RoboSense), and telecoms (TP-Link). Effective June 30, 2026, DoD is prohibited from procuring goods, services, or technology directly from listed entities; effective June 30, 2027, the ban extends to indirect supply-chain procurement through prime contractors and all sub-tiers.

Japan's Diet passed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) 2026 Amendment on 29 May 2026; the law was promulgated on 5 June 2026. The amendment represents the most significant overhaul of Japan's inbound FDI screening regime since FEFTA was first applied to national-security transactions in 2019. Three structural additions: (1) indirect-acquisition screening — extends mandatory prior-notification to acquisitions of Japanese sensitive-sector companies effected through intermediate holding structures or offshore parent vehicles, closing the principal gap exploited by Chinese and GCC SWF investors via SPV chains; (2) call-in powers — grants the Minister of Finance authority to open a review up to ten years retroactively where an acquisition was not pre-notified or where circumstances have materially changed since clearance, directly analogous to CFIUS § 721(b)(1)(D) retroactive jurisdiction; (3) cross-ministerial "Japan CFIUS" consultation framework — formally institutionalises a standing inter-agency committee (Finance, METI, MoD, NPA, MIAC) modelled on the US CFIUS committee, replacing the prior ad-hoc inter-ministerial process. Cross-ministerial and indirect-acquisition provisions entered into force immediately on promulgation (5 June 2026); remaining Cabinet-Order-level implementing provisions to follow within one year.

China's State Council signed Order No. 837 on May 5, 2026, publishing the Regulations on Outbound Investment by Enterprises on June 1, 2026, effective July 1, 2026. The 34-article framework introduces full-process supervision of all outbound direct investment (ODI) by Chinese enterprises and individuals, requiring combined MOFCOM and export-control clearance for projects involving controlled technologies. The regulations authorise countermeasures against foreign governments that discriminate against Chinese outbound investors and establish a national ODI information-reporting system with real-time monitoring.

On 19 May 2026, Treasurer Jim Chalmers announced a further overhaul of Australia's foreign investment framework under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975. The package introduces a performance target of processing all low-risk applications within 30 days from 1 January 2027, expands the exemption-certificate regime for repeat low-risk investors, and eliminates approval requirements for certain low-risk transaction types. Countervailing measures tighten the framework: enhanced compliance and enforcement powers are added for avoidance and non-compliance, and screening requirements are explicitly increased for sensitive sectors including critical minerals, critical infrastructure, critical technology, sensitive data, and defence-site-proximate assets.

On 17 May 2026, Treasurer Jim Chalmers signed the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers (Disposal of Interests in Northern Minerals Limited) Orders (No. 1) 2026 (F2026N00326), directing six China-linked foreign investors to divest a combined 1,678,895,780 shares in Northern Minerals Limited (ASX: NTU) within 14 days of the Orders commencing on 18 June 2026. The six named investors are: Real International Resources Limited (619.1m shares), Qogir Trading and Service Co. Limited (523.5m), Vastness Investment Group Limited (271.3m), Chuanyou Cong (130.1m), Hong Kong Ying Tak Limited (95.3m), and Zhongxiong Lin (39.7m), together representing approximately 17.6% of NTU's total shares. NTU owns the Browns Range Heavy Rare Earths Project in Western Australia, one of the few ex-China commercial-scale dysprosium and terbium deposits. These orders are the second tranche of Treasurer-forced divestment of Chinese shareholders in NTU, distinct from the AUD 14 million Federal Court penalty imposed on Indian Ocean International Shipping in January 2026 for non-compliance with the June 2024 disposal orders.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed Executive Order No. 113 on April 13, 2026, promulgating the 13th Regular Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL) — the first FINL update in four years, superseding the 12th FINL under EO 175 (2022). The order retains the constitutionally mandated 40% foreign equity ceiling on exploration, development, and utilisation of natural resources (including large-scale mining), and reserves small-scale mining 100% for Filipino nationals. It codifies liberalisations from RA 11659 (Public Service Act), RA 11595 (Retail Trade Liberalisation Act), and RA 11647 (Foreign Investments Act amendments), formally reclassifying telecommunications, airlines, domestic shipping, and railways as sectors open to up to 100% foreign ownership.

India's Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) issued Press Note 2 of 2026 on March 15, 2026 (following Cabinet approval on March 10, 2026), recalibrating the Press Note 3 (2020) FDI framework for investments from countries sharing a land border with India. Global investors with up to 10% non-controlling Chinese (or other land-border) shareholding can now invest in India under the automatic route across sectors, while entities domiciled in China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Afghanistan continue to require prior government approval. For 40 designated strategic sub-sectors — including rare earth permanent magnets, polysilicon and ingot-wafer manufacturing, printed circuit boards, electronic capital goods, Li-ion batteries and machine tools — proposals will be decided within a binding 60-day window, with majority Indian ownership and control mandated at all times. Effective from the date of the corresponding amendment to the FEMA Non-Debt Instruments Rules.

On 12 March 2026 the UK Cabinet Office (Investment Security Unit) published its Government Response to the consultation on reform of the Notifiable Acquisition Regulations (NARs) under the National Security and Investment Act 2021 — the first major substantive overhaul of the NSI mandatory-notification schedules since the regime took effect on 4 January 2022. The reform splits Critical Minerals out of the existing Advanced Materials schedule into a standalone mandatory schedule covering all 34 minerals on the Critical Minerals Intelligence Centre's latest criticality assessment; splits Semiconductors into its own standalone schedule (capturing advanced packaging and specific chip-design processes); creates a brand-new Water sector schedule covering the 17 regional water and sewerage undertakers in England and Wales; refocuses Artificial Intelligence on entities that create or materially modify AI systems (excluding routine end-use); and refines Communications, Critical Suppliers to Government, Data Infrastructure, Energy and Suppliers to Emergency Services to reduce low-risk capture. An implementing Statutory Instrument is expected later in 2026; the existing NARs remain in force until that SI takes effect.

On 30 January 2026, Justice Perram of the Federal Court of Australia ordered Indian Ocean International Shipping and Service Company Ltd and its sole director Ms Jing Tian to pay a combined AUD 14 million civil penalty (Indian Ocean AUD 10 million; Ms Tian AUD 4 million) for contravening a June 2024 Treasurer disposal order under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth). The disposal order had directed Indian Ocean to divest its 613.5 million shares in Northern Minerals Limited (ASX: NTU) — operator of the Browns Range heavy-rare-earth dysprosium and terbium project in Western Australia — by September 2024 on national security grounds. Instead, Indian Ocean transferred its NTU shares to Ms Tian in August 2024, who briefly returned then re-received them before Ms Tian transferred all 100 of her Indian Ocean shares to Ms Ning Lyu and resigned as director. The court ruled these transfers constituted a breach of the disposal order. This is the first civil-penalty action brought by an Australian Treasurer under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act since its introduction in 1975, and the first FIRB enforcement penalty outside the residential real estate sector.

Law No. 4 of 15 January 2026 (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 15 of 20 January 2026, in force 21 January 2026) converted with amendments Decree-Law No. 175 of 21 November 2025 ("Transizione 5.0"). During parliamentary conversion the Camera dei Deputati inserted a new Article 2-bis that materially expands Italy's Golden Power foreign-investment screening regime (DL 21/2012) into the financial, credit, and insurance sectors — the first explicit statutory inclusion of banking and insurance qualifying-holding transactions inside the Golden Power perimeter. The amendment introduces "national economic and financial security" as a public-order criterion alongside the traditional security and public-order profiles, and conditions exercise of special powers in the financial sector on the prior conclusion of pending European prudential and competition proceedings (ECB / EIOPA / EU Commission).

Australia's Treasury applied its annual 1 January indexation to the monetary screening thresholds under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975, effective 1 January 2026. Most thresholds move with CPI (the 2026 update reflects roughly a 2.3% rise in the June-quarter CPI), producing country-specific changes where thresholds are set relative to free-trade agreement status or country-specific baselines — Global Trade Alert logged threshold decreases for Chile, New Zealand and the United States and increases for India, Hong Kong and Peru in this cycle. Fixed ($0) national- security, residential-land, media and foreign-government-investor thresholds and the non-indexed agricultural-land thresholds ($15m cumulative general; $50m for Thailand) are unchanged.

The Overseas Investment (National Interest Test and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2025 (No 81 of 2025) is the largest rewrite of New Zealand's Overseas Investment Act 2005 since the 2018 residential-land amendment. The Bill (Government Bill 171) was introduced by the Minister of Finance in June 2025, passed all three readings in the House of Representatives, received Royal Assent on 19 December 2025, and was brought into force on 6 March 2026 by the Overseas Investment (National Interest Test and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2025 Commencement Order 2026 (SL 2026/2). The Act replaces the OIA's residual "investor test" discretion with a single statutory national-interest test applied to all "sensitive asset" transactions, introduces a new s 29B repeat-investor mechanism (Treasury does not re-litigate investor risk factors on subsequent applications outside strategically important businesses), creates new military / dual-use technology call-in transactions and critical-direct-supplier call-in transactions (amended s 85), and adds a no-change-of-control transaction category. Administered by The Treasury (policy lead) and Toitū Te Whenua LINZ (operations / case handling), with consent decisions issued by the responsible Ministers.

On 19 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Assembly adopted in final vote the Federal Act on the Screening of Foreign Investments (Bundesgesetz über die Prüfung ausländischer Investitionen, Investitionsprüfgesetz / IPG; popularly the "Lex China", parliamentary business 22.035). The Act introduces Switzerland's first general ex-ante FDI-screening regime: acquisitions of control over Swiss companies active in security-critical sectors by foreign state-controlled investors require prior approval by SECO, with escalation to the Federal Council. The optional- referendum window runs until 17 April 2026; entry into force is not expected before 2027 once implementing ordinances are adopted. Critical sectors named in the Act include military and dual-use goods, electricity grids and generation, water supply, pharma and health, telecommunications, transport infrastructure and financial-market infrastructure.

Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 2012 of 12 December 2025 sets a temporary quantitative restriction on imports of agricultural seeds (potato, wheat, rye, barley, corn, soybean, rapeseed, sunflower, and sugar beet) from countries Russia classifies as "unfriendly," effective 1 January to 31 December 2026. The total quota is cut to 15,000 tonnes for 2026 (from 18,300 tonnes in 2025), with potato seed receiving the largest single allocation (10,000 tonnes) while wheat, rye, barley, and soybean seed quotas remain at zero — effectively barring those categories from unfriendly-country suppliers. The measure extends a policy first introduced in January 2024 to stimulate domestic Russian plant breeding and seed production.

On 11 December 2025 the Council of the EU presidency, the European Parliament, and the European Commission reached provisional political (trilogue) agreement on the revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union, concluding interinstitutional negotiations on the Commission's proposal of 24 January 2024. The revised regime upgrades the 2019 cooperation-mechanism-only framework into a hybrid harmonised/mandatory regime: all 27 Member States must establish FDI screening mechanisms (replacing the current patchwork in which some Member States have no mechanism at all); mandatory minimum sectoral scope is set EU-wide and covers dual-use items, military equipment, hyper-critical technologies (general-purpose AI with space/defence relevance, quantum technologies, semiconductors), critical raw materials, critical entities in energy/transport/digital infrastructure, electoral infrastructure, and certain financial-system entities; foreign investments routed through EU subsidiaries fall within the perimeter; a shared database prevents Member-State arbitrage; and an optional single electronic-filing portal becomes available if requested by at least nine Member States. Screening decisions remain the exclusive responsibility of the Member State in which the investment is made. Once the Regulation enters into force (after Council and Parliament formal adoption and OJ publication, both pending as of the political-agreement date), the new rules will apply after an 18-month transition period — implementation expected toward the end of 2027.

On 26 November 2025, Scotland's Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Economy and Gaelic, Kate Forbes MSP, wrote to the Scottish Parliament's Economy and Fair Work Committee confirming that the preferred bidder for Glasgow Prestwick Airport had withdrawn from the sale process after a "robust commercial deal" had been negotiated. The letter discloses that the proposed acquisition was subject to mandatory notification to the UK Government under the National Security and Investment Act 2021, a reserved matter on which Scottish Ministers cannot comment. Media reporting (Global Trade Alert; Daily Business) identifies the withdrawn bidder as Turkish conglomerate Limak Holding and attributes the collapse directly to the UK national-security review process ("Westminster officials opening an investigation"). The airport, which employs over 500 people directly and anchors an Ayrshire aerospace cluster, remains in Scottish Government public ownership.

Cyprus Law 194(I)/2025 "The Establishment of a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments Law of 2025" was enacted by the House of Representatives and published in the Official Gazette on 14 November 2025, entering into force on 2 April 2026. It establishes Cyprus's first-ever mandatory pre-approval FDI screening regime, designating the Ministry of Finance as the competent Screening Authority and applying to non-EU/EEA/Swiss investors acquiring ≥25% equity or voting rights in Cyprus entities valued at ≥€2 million across covered strategic sectors. The regime implements EU Regulation 2019/452 and includes a Cyprus-specific sectoral extension covering tourism and real estate — addressing golden-passport-era concerns about non-EU capital flows into the island's financial and hospitality economy.

On 10 November 2025 the European Commission conditionally approved, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), the c. €14.7bn acquisition of German polymer and polyurethane producer Covestro AG by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The Phase II investigation identified foreign-subsidy distortions including an unlimited UAE State guarantee covering ADNOC and a committed capital increase by ADNOC's state-backed parent into Covestro. To clear the transaction, ADNOC committed to remove the State guarantee, Covestro committed to maintain existing R&D cooperation agreements with EU competitors, and Covestro committed to license its present and future sustainability-related patents (c. 200 patents) to qualifying EU market participants on pre-established transparent terms for ten years. This is the second-ever FSR Phase II conditional clearance (after the September 2024 e&/PPF Telecom decision) and the first FSR remedy package to deploy sustainability-IP licensing as a structural commitment.

The Hrvatski sabor (Croatian Parliament) unanimously adopted the Act on Screening of Foreign Direct Investments on 24 October 2025; the law was published in Narodne Novine 136/2025 and entered into force on 13 November 2025. It establishes Croatia's first-ever statutory horizontal FDI-screening regime, implementing EU Regulation 2019/452 in Croatian law. The Act captures direct or indirect acquisitions by non-EU investors of at least 10 % of share capital, voting rights or property rights in Croatian entities operating in sensitive sectors (defence, dual-use, critical infrastructure, critical minerals, emerging tech, sensitive personal data, energy, transport, health, digital infrastructure, media, financial services). The reviewing authority must decide within 120 days, exceptionally 150 days, of a complete application. Croatia was one of the last EU Member States without a horizontal screening law.

DOE's Loan Programs Office restructured the terms of its USD 2.23 billion Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing loan to Lithium Nevada LLC (Lithium Americas Corp.'s subsidiary) for the Thacker Pass lithium project in Nevada, in exchange for a direct government equity stake. The DOE received warrants for a 5% equity stake in Lithium Americas Corp. and a 5% economic stake in the Lithium Americas/General Motors joint venture, both at a nominal USD 0.01 exercise price, in consideration for deferring USD 184 million of scheduled debt service from the loan's first five repayment years to later maturity. Lithium Americas in turn agreed to contribute an additional USD 120 million to DOE loan reserve accounts within 12 months, and the restructuring unlocked the loan's first USD 435 million drawdown, disbursed October 20, 2025.

President Trump signed Executive Order "Saving TikTok While Protecting National Security" on September 25, 2025, certifying a restructuring plan as a "qualified divestiture" under the 2024 PAFACA law and directing the Attorney General not to enforce the Act for 120 days while the transaction closes. The plan creates TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC, valued at roughly $14 billion, with a new US-investor consortium (Oracle, Silver Lake and MGX at 15% each, plus other investors, totaling 50%), affiliates of existing ByteDance investors holding 30.1%, and ByteDance itself retaining 19.9%. Oracle will run US data storage and algorithm retraining/oversight; the deal closed January 22, 2026.

Act L of 2025 (2025. évi L. törvény) is the Hungarian National Assembly statute that elevates a set of war-emergency government decrees — including the foreign-investment screening regime previously embedded in Government Decree 561/2022 — to permanent statutory level. Promulgated in Magyar Közlöny and entered into force on 19 August 2025, the Act preserves Hungary's "Second Regime" of FDI screening operating in parallel with the General Regime (which implements EU Reg 2019/452 since 2019). The Second Regime applies to a broad set of strategic sectors — energy, transport, communications, telecoms, pharmaceuticals, food processing, defence, financial services and healthcare — and requires approval from the Minister of National Economy for qualifying acquisitions (direct or indirect majority, ≥5% interest, ≥3% in listed companies, or ownership/operation of strategic infrastructure) where transaction value reaches HUF 350 million (~EUR 890,000). Notification is due within 10 days of signing; the MoE originally had 30 business days (extendable +15 calendar days). The Act also entrenches the Hungarian state right of first refusal on photovoltaic generation companies (NACE 35.11'08, excluding sub-50 kVA household installations), exercised through MNV Zrt. The Special Regime is structurally distinct from the General Regime and represents Hungary's peer to the German AWG §§55-62, French Décret 2014-479, Dutch Wet Vifo, and Italian Golden Power. Amended by Act XCIII of 2025 (in force 17 December 2025), which extended the MoE screening deadline to 45 business days and excluded bank-financing security arrangements from notification.

Czech Act No. 265/2025 Sb., promulgated in the Sbírka zákonů on 4 August 2025 and entering into force on 1 November 2025, is the first material amendment of the Czech Republic's foundational FDI screening statute (Act No. 34/2021 Sb.) since its enactment. The amendment broadens the perimeter of mandatory pre-closing FDI screening by cross-referencing the simultaneously-enacted Cybersecurity Act (Act No. 264/2025 Sb., transposing NIS2 Directive 2022/2555): entities designated as providers of "regulated services" under the Cybersecurity Act's "regime of higher obligation" automatically fall within mandatory FDI-screening scope, extending screening reach beyond the prior military-material / dual-use / critical-infrastructure perimeter to cover a broad sweep of digital, technology, healthcare, energy, and financial-services operators. The amendment also adds a confidentiality-sharing channel between MPO and NÚKIB, enabling coordinated supply-chain-security assessments for high-risk-vendor reviews under the new Cybersecurity Act.

Federal Law No. 351-FZ, signed 31 July 2025, amends the 2009 Federal Law "On the Basics of State Regulation of Trade Activities in the Russian Federation" (No. 381-FZ) to bar foreign persons from conducting commodity-market research inside Russia. The prohibition covers foreign states, international organisations, foreign legal entities and individuals, stateless persons, and Russian legal entities in which foreign participation exceeds 20%; it also reaches dual-national Russian citizens. Data on Russian commodity-market structure collected under the law may only be processed at facilities located inside Russia. The measure takes effect 1 March 2026; a temporary exemption mechanism was subsequently clarified in mid-2026.

The Assembly of Albania (Kuvendi i Republikës së Shqipërisë) adopted Law No. 56/2025 on 11 July 2025, published in Fletorja Zyrtare (Official Gazette) No. 124 of the same date, amending Article 10 of Law No. 7764/1993 "On Foreign Investments" to introduce Albania's first-ever mandatory FDI screening mechanism. The law requires investors to submit applications for screening of any foreign investment "related to or affecting critical public infrastructure, critical technologies, dual-use goods, supply of critical inputs, access to sensitive information, or media freedom" — categories aligned with EU Regulation 2019/452 — while delegating thresholds, timelines, and procedural safeguards to a forthcoming Decision of the Council of Ministers (DCM). Albania becomes the first country in the Western Balkans to establish an investment-screening regime aligned with EU Regulation 2019/452, opening a new issuer-country code (AL) on the IPTM register and anchoring a regional cluster that currently stands at RS=1, MK=0, BA=0, ME=0, XK=0.

The Polish Sejm passed the Act of 9 July 2025 amending the Act of 24 July 2015 on the Control of Certain Investments, signed by the President on 21 July 2025 and effective 24 July 2025. The amendment removes the time-limited "Specialised Rules" tier (introduced in 2020 under the Anti-COVID Shield) and makes Poland's FDI screening regime permanent. Review competence is transferred from the President of UOKiK (the competition authority) to the minister responsible for economic affairs (currently the Minister of Finance and Economy), and a new trigger covering "an international situation distorting the market or competition" is added alongside the existing public-order, security and health grounds.

On 2025-07-08 President Trump issued a Section 721 (Defense Production Act) order retroactively prohibiting Hong Kong-based Suirui International Co., Ltd.'s 2020 acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC, a US video-wall and audio-visual technology maker, from Foxconn. CFIUS found the transaction posed a national security risk because a Chinese military company holds an indirect interest in Suirui Group and can appoint one of its directors, creating a risk that Jupiter's products — used in military and critical- infrastructure environments — could be compromised. The order requires Suirui to fully divest all interests and rights in Jupiter within 120 days of the order (extendable at CFIUS's discretion) and bars Jupiter from holding interests in Suirui-linked Asian subsidiaries formed after the 2020 deal.

Mongolia's State Great Khural adopted Resolution No. 62 on 2 July 2025, establishing a Temporary Oversight Committee chaired by MP O. Batnairamdal to investigate the state's ownership interest and percentage in the Oyu Tolgoi Strategic Group of Deposits, including the valuation of JV License areas (Shivee Tolgoi and Javkhlant) held by Entrée LLC for the Entrée/OTLLC joint venture. The Committee conducted three-day public hearings in early December 2025, summoning approximately 300 witnesses including former Mongolian Prime Ministers and Presidents, and Rio Tinto CEO Stephen Scott. On 19 December 2025, the Committee submitted a draft resolution to Parliament, which was referred to the Standing Committee on Economics for further consideration ahead of government negotiations. The investigation creates material uncertainty for Rio Tinto's Oyu Tolgoi underground ramp-up (~480 kt/y Cu at peak) and Entrée Resources' JV License renewal, with the 2009 Investment Agreement potentially subject to renegotiation.

On June 27, 2025, the Government of Canada, by the Governor in Council, ordered Hikvision Canada Inc. — the Canadian subsidiary of Chinese video-surveillance manufacturer Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co. — to wind up its Canadian business and cease all operations within 120 days, following a national security review under the Investment Canada Act. The order requires Hikvision Canada to immediately stop sales, marketing and after-sales support, and to terminate staff and contracts within the wind-up window. Alongside the order, the government prohibited federal departments, agencies and Crown corporations from purchasing or using Hikvision products and directed audits to remove existing installations from federal facilities.

Government Decree 163/2025 (VI. 23.) amends the emergency-era Decree 561/2022 (XII. 23.) on economic-protection deviations, making two operative changes to Hungary's FDI screening regime: it extends the review period from 30 to up to 135 working days (45-day base plus three 30-workday extensions) and introduces a state pre-emption right, exercisable within 90 calendar days of a prohibition decision, allowing MNV Zrt. (Hungarian National Asset Management Company) or a designated entity to acquire the blocked target on the same terms as the original parties. The decree applies retroactively to all notification procedures pending at the time of entry into force (24 June 2025) and expands the screening scope from a solar-sector focus to broad strategic sectors. It served as an interim bridge — in force from 24 June to 18 August 2025 — until superseded by the permanent statutory codification in Act L of 2025.

Greece enacted Law 5202/2025 on 22 May 2025, published in Government Gazette ΦΕΚ A' 84 on 23 May 2025 and effective the same day, establishing the country's first national mandatory and suspensory foreign direct investment screening mechanism, aligned with Regulation (EU) 2019/452. The Interministerial Committee for the Control of Foreign Direct Investment (ICC-FDI), with initial procedure run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reviews non-EU acquisitions in "sensitive" sectors (energy, transportation, healthcare, ICT, digital infrastructure) and "particularly sensitive" sectors (national security, defence, cybersecurity, AI, ports and critical subsea infrastructure, borderland tourism). A two-phase review applies — 30 days Phase I, up to 150 days Phase II with EU Cooperation Mechanism notification — and the regime became fully operational on 11 November 2025.

India's Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) revoked, with immediate effect, the security clearance of Celebi Airport Services India Pvt Ltd and its associated Celebi group companies, citing national-security grounds. The clearance — originally granted by the Director General, BCAS on 21 November 2022 under the Ground Handling Agency category — had authorised Celebi to provide ground-handling, cargo, and passenger-services operations at nine major Indian airports (Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Chennai, Ahmedabad, Goa, Cochin, and Kannur). The revocation followed days after Turkiye publicly backed Pakistan and criticised India's Operation Sindoor strikes, and Celebi is a Turkiye-headquartered aviation-services group. The Ministry of Civil Aviation stated it was coordinating with airport operators to maintain seamless passenger and cargo handling during the transition.

Thailand's Cabinet approved in principle on 22 April 2025 the urgent revision of the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999), directing the Ministry of Commerce to overhaul the foundational 25-year-old statute governing foreign participation in Thai economic activities, explicitly shifting the guiding principle from "protection" of domestic entrepreneurs to "enhancing competitiveness." In January 2026, the Department of Business Development operationalised the reform by announcing a 10-sector List-3 delisting package — including telecommunications services not owning network infrastructure, software development, financial-services categories (treasury centres, derivatives agency, collateralised lending, credit guarantee), petroleum drilling services, management services for affiliated companies, and domestic agricultural commodity trading — that would allow wholly-foreign-owned subsidiaries without a Foreign Business Licence (FBL). Simultaneously, the revision introduces a shift from a legal-shareholding test to an actual-control / beneficial-ownership test in nominee-shareholder enforcement, tightening the anti-front-company architecture while liberalising legitimate foreign-investment routes. Full statutory enactment via parliamentary process is expected mid-to-late 2026.

The Legislative Yuan of Taiwan (ROC) passed amendments to Article 22 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation (產業創新條例) and added a new Article 67-3 on third reading on 18 April 2025, promulgated by Presidential Decree on 7 May 2025. The package establishes for the first time a Taiwanese OUTBOUND-investment screening regime under the Statute: outbound investments by Taiwanese entities meeting the amount threshold (NTD 1.5bn, or lower as determined) OR involving designated countries/regions OR specific industries or technologies must obtain prior approval from the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) before implementation. The competent authority may deny approval (in whole or in part) or impose conditional approval where particular circumstances are identified — including risks to national security, harm to economic development or supply-chain resilience, conflict with international treaties, or violation of labour-standards law. The new Article 67-3 establishes enforcement penalties ranging from NTD 50,000 to NTD 1,000,000 for initial non-compliance violations and NTD 500,000 to NTD 10,000,000 per violation for failure to comply with conditions, restrictions, or undertakings imposed by MOEA under Article 22 Paragraph 3. Effective dates of implementing provisions are to be determined by Executive Yuan secondary legislation; the package is structurally novel for Taiwan — the first horizontal outbound-investment-security instrument and the structural parallel to the US Treasury Final Rule on Outbound Investment in Countries of Concern (28 October 2024 / effective 2 January 2025), the EU Commission Recommendation 2025/63, and Korea's MOTIE NCT regime.

Japan's Cabinet approved an amendment to the Cabinet Order on Inward Direct Investment under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) on 1 April 2025; the order was promulgated 4 April 2025 and entered into force 19 May 2025. The amendment introduces two new investor categories — Type-A (investors legally or contractually obligated to share information with foreign governments) and Type-B (investors effectively in a comparable position without formal legal obligation) — and eliminates or narrows exemptions from mandatory prior-notification screening for both categories. The primary driver is concern over minority-stake acquisitions by Chinese investors in Japanese listed companies operating in sensitive sectors including cloud computing, telecommunications infrastructure, semiconductor equipment, and advanced electronics. The reform is structurally distinct from the outbound FEFTA catch-all controls overhaul (2025-10-09) and from the Economic Security Promotion Act (2022-05-18); it is the inbound FDI-screening complement to that framework.

On 27 February 2025, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted Law No. 33/2025 amending Law No. 174/2021 on the mechanism for examining investments of importance for state security. The law entered into force on 20 April 2025 after publication in Monitorul Oficial Nr. 144-147 of 20 March 2025 (promulgated by Presidential Decree No. 118-X of 17 March 2025). Key operative changes expand the protected-sector perimeter to explicitly enumerate 17 categories covering data processing and storage, AI, robotics, cybersecurity, semiconductors, quantum, nanotechnology and biotechnology alongside the pre-existing energy, transport, communications, defence and aerospace pillars; add new grounds for refusal (money-laundering suspicion, corruption convictions, foreign-government control, cybersecurity risk, access to personal data of citizens); introduce enhanced Council powers including retroactive review of previously approved investments and fines of up to 5% of annual turnover (capped at MDL 5 million); and carve out intra-group transactions, asset sales below EUR 1 million, and state-owned-enterprise dealings. The Screening Council became operational in July 2025.

Commission Recommendation (EU) 2025/63 of 15 January 2025, published in the Official Journal on 16 January 2025 (CELEX 32025H0063), is the first EU-level instrument operationalising outbound-investment screening. It is a legally non-binding act that asks Member States to designate a Single Contact Point and competent national authorities by 15 March 2025 and to review outbound transactions by EU investors into third countries in three strategic sectors — advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum technologies — covering acquisitions, mergers, joint ventures, greenfield investments, asset/IP transfers, and venture-capital instruments completed since 1 January 2021. Member States must submit an interim update by 15 July 2025 and a comprehensive report on review outcomes and identified risks by 30 June 2026, feeding into the EU's broader Economic Security Strategy and the binding outbound-investment legislative instrument the Commission has signalled for 2026-2027.

The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea passed on 27 December 2024 a comprehensive amendment to the Act on Prevention of Divulgence and Protection of Industrial Technology (산업기술의 유출방지 및 보호에 관한 법률, the "ITA" or "Industrial Technology Protection Act"), effective 22 July 2025. The amendment grants MOTIE direct statutory authority to block or reverse unapproved exports and overseas transactions involving National Core Technologies (NCTs) — including M&As, technology-transfer transactions, and foreign-investment events — without requiring interdepartmental coordination that was necessary under prior enforcement-decree authority. Entities already verified as NCT holders must complete formal registration with MOTIE within six months of the effective date (by approximately 22 January 2026). Punitive damages for wilful NCT infringement are raised from 3x to 5x actual damages, and criminal fines for overseas NCT leakage are raised from KRW 1.5 billion to KRW 6.5 billion.

South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), in coordination with the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, announced on 15 November 2024 amendments to the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act and the Industrial Technology Protection Act introducing a notification + review regime for outbound investments by Korean firms in advanced semiconductor manufacturing or critical-component production in "strategic concern" jurisdictions, principally China. The regulation, effective 1 April 2025, requires Korean firms whose technology is designated as a "national core technology" (NCT) to obtain MOTIE approval before establishing or expanding overseas manufacturing facilities using that technology. The list includes Samsung's HBM, SK Hynix's DRAM/NAND advanced-node processes, and certain silicon-wafer technologies.

Decreto Supremo N° 020-2024-EM, published in El Peruano on 29 October 2024, declares private investment in mining activity to be of "public necessity" (necesidad pública) under Article 71 of the Peruvian Constitution, authorising GLOBETROTTERS RESOURCES PERU S.A.C. — a foreign-invested mining company — to acquire and hold mining concessions within Peru's constitutionally-restricted fifty-kilometre border zone. The decree sets procedural precedent for Article 71 case-by-case FDI carve-outs in large-scale mining and signals MINEM's operational posture on foreign-investor access to border-proximate mineral projects in the 2024-2026 Peruvian copper, silver, and zinc capex cycle.

Bahrain's Ministry of Industry and Commerce issued Decision No. 53 of 2024, amending the conditions governing foreign ownership in commercial activities, effective 18 October 2024. The reform permits 100% foreign ownership of commercial enterprises — including wholesale and retail trade and authorized distribution — without a mandatory Bahraini local partner, where the foreign company operates in at least 10 countries or generates annual revenue above EUR 750 million. It simultaneously reduces the minimum capital requirement for foreign-owned companies in Bahrain by 95%, from BHD 2,000,000 (~EUR 5m) to BHD 100,000 (~EUR 240,000), materially expanding the addressable foreign-investor pool to mid-market commercial enterprises.

The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania adopted Law No. XIV-2985 on 26 September 2024, amending the Law on the Protection of Objects of Importance to Ensuring National Security (NSU Act), registered in the Teisės aktų registras (TAR) on 3 October 2024 and entering into force on 18 October 2024. The amendments expand the list of strategically important economic activities subject to FDI screening by the Commission for the Coordination of Protection of Objects of Importance to National Security to include the issuance of electronic money, electronic money tokens, asset-referenced tokens, and the provision of crypto-asset services (CASPs) as defined under EU MiCA Regulation 2023/1114, aligning Lithuania's screening perimeter with the EU crypto-assets regulatory framework. The law also refines core definitional concepts — "persons acting in concert," "controlling person," and "manager of critical information infrastructure" — to tighten beneficial-ownership and control analysis under the regime.

On 24 September 2024 the European Commission issued its first-ever final decision under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), conditionally approving (Case FS.100011) the acquisition of PPF Telecom Group B.V. by Emirates Telecommunications Group Company PJSC (e&, majority-owned by the Emirates Investment Authority, Abu Dhabi). The Commission found that e& received prohibited foreign subsidies — principally an unlimited state guarantee via the EIA and preferential financing instruments — that risked post-transaction competitive distortion within the EU's five-country PPF footprint (Czechia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia; 10+ million subscribers). Conditions imposed require e& to remove the unlimited state guarantee, prohibit financing PPF's EU operations from EIA or e& group treasury, and mandate notification of future EU acquisitions above the FSR thresholds. The non-confidential version of the decision was published 4 April 2025.

On 4 July 2024 the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry (François-Philippe Champagne) issued a ministerial statement on Investment Canada Act net-benefit reviews of Canadian critical-minerals companies. Acquisitions of control of important Canadian mining companies engaged in significant critical-minerals operations, including large Canadian-headquartered firms, will be found of net benefit only "in the most exceptional of circumstances." The statement extends the October 2022 state-owned-enterprise policy to foreign capital generally for this class of target. It states no size threshold and no effective date beyond the announcement.

On 2 June 2024, Treasurer Jim Chalmers signed the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers (Disposal of Interests in Northern Minerals Limited) Orders 2024 (F2024N00475), directing five China-linked foreign investors to divest a combined 613,573,632 shares in Northern Minerals Limited (ASX: NTU) to non-associates by 2 September 2024 on national-security grounds. The five named investors are Yuxiao Fund Pte Ltd, Black Stone Resources Limited, Indian Ocean International Shipping and Service Company Limited, Ms Ximei Liu, and Mr Xi Wang, together holding approximately 10.4% of NTU's total shares. NTU owns the Browns Range Heavy Rare Earths Project in the East Kimberley region of Western Australia — one of the few commercial-scale dysprosium and terbium deposits outside China. This is the foundational FATA s.69(2) disposal-order instrument; non-compliance led to an AUD 14 million Federal Court penalty in January 2026 and a second tranche of disposal orders against six further China-linked investors in May 2026.

The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA), enacted as Division H of P.L. 118-50 (21st Century Peace through Strength Act), prohibits app stores and internet hosting services from distributing, maintaining, or updating "foreign adversary controlled applications" — defined explicitly to include ByteDance Ltd and its subsidiaries (TikTok). ByteDance was given 270 days from enactment (until January 19, 2025) to execute a "qualified divestiture" — selling TikTok to an owner with no operational relationship with a foreign adversary — or face a nationwide distribution ban. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the law's constitutionality in TikTok, Inc. v. Garland (January 17, 2025), rejecting First Amendment challenges and affirming the national-security rationale grounded in data-collection concerns.

Latvia's Saeima adopted on 27 March 2024 amendments to the National Security Law (Nacionālās drošības likums), entering into force on 24 April 2024, that widen the perimeter of foreign-investment and ownership transactions subject to Cabinet of Ministers pre-clearance over "companies of significance to national security." The amendments expand the universe of regulated subjects beyond registered companies to include foundations and associations, tighten the rules on beneficial-ownership disclosure, and bring additional sensitive activities — energy security including LNG-terminal acquisitions, electronic communications, cybersecurity, and critical-raw-materials processing — under the regime, while clarifying Cabinet authority to impose conditions or unwind transactions retroactively. The law functions as Latvia's horizontal FDI-screening instrument under the EU-wide cooperation framework of Regulation 2019/452.

Bill C-34, the National Security Review of Investments Modernization Act, received Royal Assent on 22 March 2024 — the first major overhaul of the Investment Canada Act (ICA) national-security review regime since 2009. Non-regulatory provisions came into force on 3 September 2024 by Order Fixing P.C. 2024-826 (SI/TR-32, Canada Gazette Part II). The Act creates a pre-implementation filing obligation for investments in prescribed "sensitive sectors" (final list set by regulation), gives the Minister of Innovation new authority to extend reviews and impose interim conditions or accept undertakings without a Governor-in-Council order, raises monetary penalties, and establishes information-sharing authorities with allied screening regimes. ISED's updated NSR Guidelines (5 March 2025) elevate "economic security" to a standalone factor and align the prescribed-sector list with the Sensitive Technology List (STL).

Bulgaria's National Assembly adopted on 22 February 2024 amendments to the Investment Promotion Act establishing the country's first horizontal foreign direct investment screening mechanism, published in State Gazette No. 20 on 8 March 2024 and entering into force on 12 March 2024. The regime implements EU Regulation 2019/452 by creating an Interdepartmental Screening Council with a 45-day decision window over non-EU investments meeting a 10 % equity stake or €2 million threshold in critical-infrastructure, dual-use, advanced-technology, media, and financial-infrastructure sectors, with no threshold for investments by Russian or Belarusian persons or in oil and petroleum activities. Non-compliance and false declarations carry fines of 5 % of investment value, with a minimum BGN 50,000.