Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

The Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2021 (Act No. 43 of 2021), assented 30 December 2021 and in force from 1 January 2022, re-introduces the deductibility of Mineral Royalty Tax (MRT) paid under the Mines and Minerals Development Act, 2015 when computing a mining company's taxable income for corporate income tax purposes. The Act removes mineral royalty from the list of non-deductible expenditures in section 44 of the Income Tax Act, reversing a non-deductibility rule that had applied since a 2015-era amendment and that mining companies and industry stakeholders had argued produced double taxation of the same revenue stream. Deductibility is conditional on the royalty having actually been paid for the charge year.

On 27 December 2021 the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted Law No. 86-VII ZRK "On Industrial Policy" (Закон Республики Казахстан "О промышленной политике"), the horizontal framework statute that defines and governs the full toolkit of state-support instruments available to industrial entities — subsidies, in-kind grants, special economic zone (SEZ) regimes, industrial zone regimes, offtake guarantees, public-procurement preferences, long-term tariff agreements, and the "single card of industrialization" monitoring framework. The law replaced the earlier 2014 industrial-and-innovative-development statute and consolidated previously dispersed authority for the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development (now Ministry of Industry and Construction) as the policy owner, with the Bank for Development of Kazakhstan (BDK / DBK) as the principal industrial- finance vehicle and Samruk-Kazyna and Tau-Ken Samruk as the state-equity vehicles. It is the enabling parent instrument under which all downstream Kazakh industrial-policy programmes (the 2023-12-28 REE Comprehensive Plan, the 2025-12-26 Subsoil Code amendments, the 18 October 2024 Investment Policy Concept until 2029, and the SEZ / industrial-zone regimes hosting Western FDI) operate. The statute has been amended eleven times between July 2022 and September 2025, including by Law 86-VIII ZRK of 21 May 2024 which revised Article 24 (state-support measures).

FinCEN amended 31 CFR Part 1010 to remove civil penalty language that had become obsolete following the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA). The AJCA restructured FBAR (Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts) penalties, raising the maximum for willful violations beyond what the pre-existing regulation text authorised, creating an inconsistency between statute and regulation. The final rule is administrative in nature: it deletes superseded penalty provisions and aligns regulatory text with the statutory penalty structure already in force since 2004, imposing no new obligations on FBAR filers.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 37 entities under 40 entries to the Entity List, effective December 17, 2021. The additions span three distinct threat rationales: (1) support for Chinese military modernization across semiconductors, submarine cables, armored vehicles, and defense electronics; (2) the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and 11 affiliated institutes pursuing biotechnology processes for military end uses, including purported brain-control weaponry under EAR §744.11(b); and (3) a cross-border Iran sanctions-evasion network operating across China, Georgia, Malaysia, and Turkey that diverted US-origin items to Iran's defense industries and advanced conventional weapons programs. All 40 entries carry a presumption-of-denial licensing policy for all items subject to the EAR, with no license exceptions available.

In December 2021 Sinomine Resource Group (SHA:002738), a Chinese specialty mining company, agreed to acquire the Bikita lithium mine in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe, from Bikita Minerals (Pvt) Ltd for USD 180 million. The acquisition was completed in January 2022. Sinomine subsequently committed an additional USD 300 million to expand operations and construct a spodumene concentrate processing plant on-site. Bikita is one of Zimbabwe's largest and oldest lithium operations, with significant spodumene (hard rock) lithium mineralisation. Under Sinomine's ownership it became the most significant lithium producer in Zimbabwe, with concentrate output feeding Chinese battery-grade lithium hydroxide refineries. Zimbabwe holds one of Africa's largest lithium reserves, and the Bikita acquisition was the first of several Chinese acquisitions of Zimbabwean lithium assets in 2021-2023. The acquisition followed Zimbabwe's 2019 ban on raw lithium ore exports (requiring in-country beneficiation) — a policy that created a competitive moat for investors willing to build processing capacity on-site, which Chinese companies with integrated battery supply-chain incentives were better positioned to fund than Western juniors. Sinomine's acquisition was part of a broader Chinese consolidation of Zimbabwean lithium: Huayou Cobalt, Chengxin Lithium, and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt each acquired significant stakes in other Zimbabwean lithium projects over the same period, creating a near-monopoly on Zimbabwe's emerging lithium sector.

China's State Council Tariff Commission published its annual "2022 Tariff Adjustment Plan" (税委会〔2021〕18号) on 13 December 2021, effective 1 January 2022. Within the bundled annual schedule, the commission cancelled the 20% provisional preferential export tariff on ferrochrome (HS 72024100/72024900) that had applied since May 2021, reverting it to the standard 40% export rate — a doubling. Ferrosilicon (HS 72022100/72022900) continued at the 25% rate it had already moved to when its own preferential rate was cancelled in May 2021. Both are framed as measures to restrain export of energy- and emissions-intensive primary ferroalloy products and preserve domestic steelmaking input supply.

In a final rule effective December 9, 2021 (FR Doc 2021-26633), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add Cambodia to Country Group D:5 (US arms-embargoed destinations), consistent with a simultaneous Department of State final rule adding Cambodia to ITAR §126.1. The rule also subjects Cambodia to military end-use (MEU) controls under EAR §744.21 and military-intelligence end-use/end-user (MIEU) controls under EAR §744.22. The stated rationale was deepening Chinese military presence at Ream Naval Base, growing corruption, and human-rights abuses by the Cambodian government.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.

FinCEN issued a final rule (86 FR 62914, effective 15 November 2021) amending 31 CFR 1010.370 to align its Geographic Targeting Order (GTO) regulations with statutory amendments to 31 U.S.C. 5326 (Bank Secrecy Act). The principal change extends GTO authority to cover nonfinancial trades or businesses in addition to domestic financial institutions — broadening the pool of entities that FinCEN can subject to heightened transaction-reporting and recordkeeping requirements in a designated geographic area. The rule also updates the notification procedure (directing GTOs to chief executive officers) to conform to the amended statute. No new GTO was issued by this rule; it is a framework update enabling future GTO issuance to a wider class of obligees.

BIS published an interim final rule on October 21, 2021 establishing new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs 4A005, 4D004, 4E001.c, and 5A001.j) for intrusion software systems, command-and-control platforms, and IP network surveillance tools, implementing the Wassenaar Arrangement 2017 cybersecurity decisions into the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The rule simultaneously created License Exception ACE (Authorized Cybersecurity Exports), codified at § 740.22, to authorize exports to most destinations while imposing licence requirements — or outright prohibitions — for sales to Country Groups E:1/E:2 governments and certain D-group government end-users. Carve-outs for vulnerability disclosure and cyber-incident-response activities were included to protect legitimate security research. The effective date was subsequently delayed from January 19, 2022 to March 7, 2022 by a separate interim rule (FR 2022-00448), and the rule was finalized with revisions on May 26, 2022 (FR 2022-11282).

France 2030 is a €54 billion public investment plan unveiled by President Emmanuel Macron on 12 October 2021 to fund breakthrough innovation and reindustrialisation across ten strategic priorities — small modular nuclear reactors, green hydrogen, low-carbon transport (incl. two million EVs/year), food/agritech, twenty drug therapies for cancer and chronic disease, cultural industries, space, deep-sea exploration, semiconductors and electronic components, and robotics/digital (AI/cloud). Two cross-cutting rules require 50% of investment to flow to decarbonisation and 50% to emerging innovative players. Operationalised from the 2022 budget law, the plan is coordinated by the Secrétariat général pour l'investissement (SGPI) under the Prime Minister and delivered by ANR, ADEME, Bpifrance and Caisse des Dépôts / Banque des Territoires.

Austria's Federal Ministry of Finance published the Masterplan Rohstoffe 2030 on 8 October 2021 as the country's comprehensive national raw-materials strategy. The plan establishes a policy framework for securing Austria's primary and secondary mineral supply, aligning with EU Critical Raw Materials Act obligations, and promoting circular-economy principles to reduce supply-chain vulnerability. Annual Monitoringberichte (2024, 2025) track implementation progress against the plan's 2030 objectives across mining-permit frameworks, R&D priorities, and secondary-feedstock development.

On 6 October 2021 the governors of Salta, Jujuy and Catamarca signed an interprovincial treaty creating the "Región Minera del Litio" (Lithium Mining Region) across their shared salar basins, establishing a joint Comité Regional del Litio to coordinate provincial policy on lithium research, extraction, production, industrialisation and commercialisation, and to present unified investment terms to the national government and foreign investors. Each province separately ratified the treaty into provincial law: Salta via Ley N° 8.289 (Decreto N° 905/21, published in the Boletín Oficial on 22 December 2021), Jujuy via Ley N° 6.278, and Catamarca via Ley N° 5.756.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule, in conjunction with a companion NRC rulemaking, transferring export licensing authority for non-nuclear deuterium from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Commerce Department under the Export Administration Regulations. Deuterium and deuterium compounds (including heavy water) with a deuterium-to-hydrogen atom ratio exceeding 1:5000 that are intended for non-nuclear end use are added to ECCN 1C298 and made subject to Nuclear Proliferation (NP) controls on the Commerce Country Chart. Exports to NP column 2–controlled destinations require a BIS licence; deuterium for actual nuclear-reactor end use remains under NRC jurisdiction.

BIS amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the decision adopted at the Australia Group (AG) Virtual Implementation Meeting of May 2021, creating new ECCN 2D352 to control software designed for nucleic acid assemblers and synthesizers (ECCN 2B352.j) that is capable of designing and building functional genetic elements from digital sequence data. The rule also amends ECCN 2E001 to capture technology for the development of 2D352-controlled software. Exports to most non-allied destinations require a BIS licence under CB Column 2 and AT Column 1, and the classification of 2D352 software as a critical technology triggers mandatory CFIUS filing requirements for qualifying foreign investment.

The Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法 — PIPL) was adopted at the 30th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 20 August 2021 and entered into force on 1 November 2021, constituting the third and final pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Data Security Law (2021). The PIPL is China's comprehensive personal-information statute establishing consent-based and necessity-based legal bases for PI processing, a tiered cross-border personal-data transfer regime (CAC security assessment / PI protection certification / Standard Contractual Clauses), extraterritorial application (Art. 3) to non-Chinese controllers offering services to or analysing the behaviour of PRC residents, and a heightened protection regime for sensitive personal information and data of minors under 14. It mandates data-protection impact assessments, personal-information-protection-officer obligations at designated handlers, breach notification, and a full suite of data-subject rights including access, rectification, deletion, portability, objection, and automated- decision-making opt-out. Article 53 requires overseas controllers to establish a domestic representative or designated entity in China, providing a domestic enforcement counterparty.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding six Russian technology entities to the Entity List, all designated consistent with Executive Order 14024 on blocking property associated with harmful foreign activities of the Russian government. The designated entities operate in Russia's technology sector and have been determined to support Russian intelligence services, including notable cybersecurity firms and defense-innovation institutions. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence for export, reexport, or transfer to these parties, subject to a presumption-of-denial review policy with no licence exceptions available. The rule also corrects an existing FSB entry to reference updated General Licence No. 1B.

Germany's Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz (LkSG), promulgated 16 July 2021 (BGBl. I 2021 S. 2959), requires German-headquartered companies to conduct mandatory human-rights and environmental due diligence across their own operations and direct suppliers (with cause-based obligations extending to indirect suppliers). Enforced by BAFA with administrative fines up to EUR 8 million or 2% of global annual turnover for firms with revenue ≥ EUR 400 million. The act applies to ~3,000 German corporates from 1 January 2023 (≥3,000 employees) and was extended to ~5,000 firms from 1 January 2024 (≥1,000 employees). A September 2025 cabinet amendment removed the annual-reporting obligation and narrowed sanctionable omissions to serious violations.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 34 entities under 43 entries to the Entity List, effective July 12, 2021. The largest cluster — 14 Chinese entities — comprises suppliers of surveillance infrastructure enabling the Chinese government's human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, including video analytics firms, network equipment makers, and geolocation platforms deployed in the Uyghur Region. Six Russian individuals and entities were added for participation in military procurement networks acquiring US-origin electronics and components in violation of the EAR. Additional listings cover Iran sanctions evaders (Canada, Lebanon), a UAE-based nuclear-proliferation facilitator, and one entity elevated from the Unverified List to the Entity List under China. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence to export, re-export, or transfer in-country to the listed parties, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added four Burma-based entities to the Entity List effective July 6, 2021 under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), citing their support for the Myanmar State Administration Council (SAC) military that seized power on February 1, 2021. The listing covers King Royal Technologies Co., Ltd. (satellite communications services for the Burmese military) and three Wanbao-affiliated copper mining companies (Myanmar Wanbao Mining Copper Ltd., Myanmar Yang Tse Copper Ltd., and Wanbao Mining Ltd.) that maintain revenue-sharing arrangements with Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), a military conglomerate that funds Burma's Ministry of Defence. All four entities face a presumption-of-denial license policy with no exceptions permitted for any items subject to the EAR.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security added five Xinjiang-based entities to the Entity List on June 24, 2021, citing their roles in human rights violations and forced labor against Uyghur, Kazakh, and other Muslim minority populations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The five entities — four major polysilicon and silicon producers plus the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) paramilitary body — are subject to a presumption-of- denial licensing policy for most items. Together the four polysilicon companies supplied a significant fraction of global polysilicon feedstock used in solar panel manufacturing.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule (FR Doc. 2021-12751; 86 FR 31909) removing Satori Corporation from the Entity List under the destinations of France and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The entity had been added on 22 December 2020. The End-User Review Committee (ERC) made its removal decision based on a request submitted by or on behalf of Satori Corporation and its review of information provided pursuant to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) §744.16. No specific activity is identified in the public notice. Effective 15 June 2021.

The GCC Bureau of Technical Secretariat for Anti-Injurious Practices in International Trade (GCC-TSAIP) imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty of 33% on imports of aluminium alloy plates, sheets and strip (HS 7606.12.00 and 7606.92.00) originating in China, effective across all six GCC member states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman). The investigation was initiated 29 April 2020 and the definitive measure entered into force on 22 July 2021 (GAFT imposed date), with expiry on 21 July 2026. A sunset review was initiated on 21 April 2026; the duty remains in force pending its outcome.

The Law of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign Sanctions was adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th NPC on 10 June 2021 (Presidential Order No. 90, President Xi Jinping) and entered into force on the same day. Comprising 16 articles, it establishes the unified statutory framework for China's countermeasure regime against foreign states or organisations that "violate international law and basic norms of international relations" by imposing discriminatory restrictive measures against Chinese citizens and organisations — the parent authority under which every China countermeasure-list, Unreliable Entity List, blocking-statute, and supply-chain-security instrument in the IPTM register operates. Article 6 enumerates the countermeasure toolbox (visa denial, asset freezes, transaction prohibitions, and "other necessary measures"); Article 12 is the blocking-statute provision that prohibits PRC persons from implementing foreign discriminatory measures — first operationalised in May 2026 against five US-sanctions-compliant refineries.

The Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国数据安全法) was adopted at the 29th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 10 June 2021 and entered into force on 1 September 2021, constituting the second pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Personal Information Protection Law (2021). The DSL establishes a tiered data-classification regime — "important data" and "national core data" — with escalating security obligations including risk assessment, risk monitoring, breach reporting, and classified-protection requirements for data handlers. It introduces a data-export security review for "important data" generated or collected within China, the statutory parent authority operationalised by the 2024 CAC Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions, and enacts a §36 blocking statute prohibiting Chinese organisations and individuals from transferring data stored in China to foreign judicial or law-enforcement authorities without prior PRC government approval.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to formally recognise the United Arab Emirates' termination of participation in the Arab League Boycott of Israel, effective retroactively to 16 August 2020 — the date of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 4 of 2020. The rule removes UAE from the EAR's list of countries requiring cooperation with an international boycott (Supplement No. 1 to Part 760), meaning requests from UAE entities will no longer be presumed boycott-related under Part 760 antiboycott provisions. The BIS action follows parallel de-listing by the Department of the Treasury (April 2021) and the Department of State's certification to Congress (April 2021), completing the US regulatory alignment with the Abraham Accords normalisation of UAE-Israel relations.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eight entities to the Entity List — six based in Pakistan and two in the UAE — on grounds that they were acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests through involvement in proliferation to unsafeguarded nuclear activities. All EAR items destined for these entities require a license with a presumption of denial; no license exceptions are available. Separately, one China-based entity (Molecular Devices Shanghai Corporation) was removed from the Military End-User (MEU) List, and a second China MEU entry was renamed (Hutchison Optel Telecom Technology → Chongqing Optel Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.).

On June 1, 2021, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published FR Doc 2021-11585 (86 FR 29189) notifying the public that, effective May 26, 2021, BIS had assumed jurisdiction over certain firearms-related "technology" and "software" — specifically digital files (CAD/AMF/G-code) for 3D-printed firearms and CNC milling instruction files — under ECCNs 0D501 and 0E501 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The transfer was triggered by the Ninth Circuit's April 27, 2021 vacatur of a March 6, 2020 district-court preliminary injunction that had blocked the technology/software prong of the broader January 23, 2020 USML-to-CCL transfer rule. Internet posting of such files now requires a BIS license (review policy: denial), completing the full implementation of the January 2020 rule transferring USML Categories I–III (firearms, guns, and ammunition) from ITAR/State Department to EAR/Commerce jurisdiction.

Regulation (EU) 2021/821, adopted 20 May 2021 and applied from 9 September 2021, establishes the Union regime for controlling exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, repealing Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Annex I lists controlled items implementing internationally agreed dual-use controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG, and Chemical Weapons Convention. The regulation introduces a new catch-all control on cyber-surveillance technologies that could facilitate human-rights violations (Art. 5 and Annex IV), and strengthens cooperation between Member States and the European Commission, placing specific obligations on exporters. It serves as the statutory anchor for all EU export licences, every multilateral-regime transposition into EU law, and coordination mechanisms with US BIS, UK ECJU, JP METI, and KR MOTIE export-control regimes.

OFAC amends the Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 596) to implement the Secretary of State's December 14, 2020 rescission of Sudan's State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation, which Sudan had held since 1993. The rule removes references to the Government of Sudan and Sudanese nationals from §596.505 (the prohibition on financial transactions with SST-listed governments) and deletes §596.506 (which had required OFAC licensing for exports of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Sudan). The action reduces the US-Sudan sanctions perimeter by eliminating the TLGSR layer; the separate Darfur/ stabilization program (31 CFR Part 546) remains intact.

Denmark's foundational cross-sector horizontal FDI screening statute. Lov nr 842 of 10 May 2021 — investeringsscreeningsloven — was adopted by the Folketing on 4 May 2021, signed on 10 May 2021, and entered into force on 1 July 2021 (with application to transactions implemented from 1 September 2021). The Act is administered by Erhvervsstyrelsen (Danish Business Authority) and combines (i) a mandatory pre-closing authorisation regime for foreign investments in "particularly sensitive sectors" — defence, dual-use products, IT-security functions/services, critical technology, critical infrastructure — triggered at 10% ownership / voting rights or equivalent control, with (ii) a voluntary notification scheme (typically engaged at 25%+) for foreign investments and special economic agreements in other sectors. Enforcement runs through blocking orders, unwinding orders, and criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment. Structural peer of the US CFIUS regime, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, the Italian Golden Power Decree, and the Swedish FDI screening regime.

Sri Lanka's Imports and Exports (Control) Regulations No. 07 of 2021, published as Gazette Extraordinary No. 2226/48 on 6 May 2021, banned the import of mineral and chemical fertilisers and placed agrochemicals (pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, rodenticides and plant-growth regulators) under a Special Import Licence requirement, applying to shipments with bills of lading issued on or after 6 May 2021. The measure operationalised the government's declared policy of converting Sri Lanka to fully organic agriculture. Facing a sharp drop in crop yields and food insecurity, the government repealed the restrictions from 30 November 2021.

Government Resolution No. 172 of 30 April 2021 approved the State Program for the Development of the Geological Sector of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2021–2030, directing the Main Directorate of Geology (GST.TJ) to expand exploration and reserve quantification across the Pamir, Tian Shan, and Kuraminsky belts covering 28 priority critical and strategic minerals. The programme targets a US$2.6 billion investment envelope across 76 sectoral projects in the 2025–2028 implementation tranche, with an explicit mandate to develop domestic processing and refining capacity for lithium, tungsten, nickel, and antimony. Tajikistan holds an estimated 50% of Asian antimony reserves and the Rasht Valley niobium-tantalum belt (major discoveries confirmed by the Tajik Geological Survey in July 2025), making this programme the foundational state instrument for all subsequent TJ critical-minerals FDI inflows and bilateral minerals diplomacy.

The German Federal Government adopted the 17th amendment to the Außenwirtschaftsverordnung (AWV, Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance), published 30 April 2021 and entering into force 1 May 2021, aligning Germany's FDI screening regime with EU Regulation 2019/452. The amendment adds 16 further sectors to the sector-specific mandatory-notification regime, on top of the 11 already covered, bringing the total to 27 -- including AI, robotics, autonomous vehicles/drones, semiconductors, quantum technology, satellite systems, cybersecurity, and critical raw materials. Filing thresholds are voting-rights acquisitions of 10% or more by a non-EU/EFTA investor in the newly added sectors, with subsequent review triggers at 20%, 25%, 40%, 50% and 75%.

The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (c.25), receiving Royal Assent on 29 April 2021 and entering full force on 4 January 2022, created the UK's first standalone investment-screening regime, separating national-security review from the Competition and Markets Authority merger-control process. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to call in any acquisition of "control or influence" over a qualifying entity or asset on national-security grounds, and designates 17 sensitive sectors in which acquisitions crossing 25%/50%/75% share-or-voting-rights thresholds (or material influence) require mandatory pre-completion notification to the Investment Security Unit (Cabinet Office); completion before clearance is void and criminal sanctions of up to 5 years imprisonment apply to non-notifying parties. The Act is the structural peer of US CFIUS/FIRRMA (2018), EU Regulation 2019/452, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479, Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the broader allied FDI-screening parent-statute lattice, and the enabling statute under which all UK mandatory-notification schedule amendments operate.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added seven Chinese supercomputing entities to the Entity List, imposing a license requirement covering all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) with a presumption of denial. The entities were designated for procuring and building supercomputers used by China's military actors, supporting China's military modernization, and aiding the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and hypersonic weapons programs. This was the Biden administration's first Entity List action targeting China's supercomputing sector.

On 1 April 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 14022 terminating the national emergency declared by Trump EO 13928 (June 2020) that had authorised IEEPA-based asset-blocking sanctions against persons associated with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Following that termination, OFAC published a final rule effective 6 July 2021 (FR doc 2021-14337) striking 31 CFR Part 520 — the International Criminal Court-Related Sanctions Regulations — in full from the Code of Federal Regulations. No individual designations had been made under the program before its removal, and the administration concluded that financial sanctions were "not an effective or appropriate strategy" for addressing concerns about ICC jurisdiction over US personnel.

BIS amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions agreed at the December 2019 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, revising 22 ECCNs across nine CCL categories — including nuclear and conventional arms-related items, materials, manufacturing equipment, semiconductors, laser/sensor systems, and aerospace. The rule harmonises US controls with those of Wassenaar Participating States, maintaining competitive parity among allied exporters while preserving national-security licensing for non-partner destinations. Separately, the rule eliminated email notification and self-classification reporting obligations for most mass-market encryption products and publicly available encryption source code, reducing associated compliance submissions by an estimated 60–80%.

On 24 March 2021, Canada's Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry (François-Philippe Champagne) issued updated guidelines on the National Security Review of Investments under the Investment Canada Act. The revised guidelines (superseding 2016 guidance) identify four areas of heightened national-security concern in foreign direct investment review: sensitive personal data, sensitive technology, critical minerals, and investments by state-owned or state-influenced investors. The critical- minerals designation references the 31-mineral Critical Minerals List Canada had announced two weeks earlier (11 March 2021).

On 22 March 2021, UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum launched Operation 300bn at Qasr Al Watan in Abu Dhabi — a 10-year national industrial strategy delivered by the newly created Ministry of Industry and Advanced Technology (MoIAT, established July 2020). The strategy targets raising the industrial sector's annual GDP contribution from AED 133bn (~USD 36bn) to AED 300bn (~USD 82bn) by 2031, lifting R&D spend from AED 21bn to AED 57bn (1.3% → 2% of GDP), and supporting more than 13,500 industrial SMEs through an AED 30bn (~USD 8.2bn) Emirates Development Bank (EDB) financing portfolio. Eleven priority sub-sectors are organised into three baskets: Stimulating Growth (food/beverage, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment), Advanced Manufacturing (petrochemicals, rubber/plastics, machinery), and Industries of the Future (hydrogen, medical technology, space technology).

OFAC published a final rule on March 17, 2021 (86 FR 14534) adjusting the maximum civil monetary penalty (CMP) ceiling amounts across multiple statutory sanctions authorities as mandated by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (as amended by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015). The 2021 adjustment reflects the October 2019 to October 2020 CPI-U change (approximately 1.2%, reflecting COVID-suppressed inflation), raising the IEEPA ceiling from $307,922 to $311,562, the TWEA ceiling from $90,743 to $91,816, and the FNKDA maximum from $1,529,991 to $1,548,075. The rule is issued as a final rule effective on publication without prior notice and comment under the non-discretionary "good cause" exemption.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security added 14 entities across Russia, Germany, and Switzerland to the Entity List under 15 CFR Part 744, effective March 4, 2021. Ten Russian entities — including the 27th Scientific Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense (associated with Russia's chemical weapons activities) and nine members of the Chimmed Group distribution network (Chimmed Group, Femteco, Interlab, LabInvest, OOO Analit Products, OOO Intertech Instruments, Pharmcontract GC, Rau Farm, Regionsnab) — were listed for proliferation activities supporting Russia's WMD programs. Three German entities (Chimconnect GmbH, Pharmcontract GmbH, Riol-Chemie) and one Swiss entity (Chimconnect AG) were simultaneously listed as foreign-front nodes in the same procurement network. A license is required for all EAR-subject items; no license exceptions apply. The rule also corrects six pre-existing entries (one Germany, five China).

Czech Republic's foundational horizontal FDI screening statute. Zákon č. 34/2021 Sb., o prověřování zahraničních investic — adopted by Parliament in January 2021, published in Sbírka zákonů on 29 January 2021, and entered into force on 1 May 2021 — transposes the cooperation obligations of EU Regulation 2019/452 and creates the first cross-sector pre-clearance regime for non-EU investments into Czech firms. The Act is administered by the Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu (MPO) and combines (i) a mandatory ex-ante consent regime for non-EU investments acquiring ≥10% in companies producing military material, selected dual-use goods, or operating critical / critical-information infrastructure, with (ii) a discretionary ex-officio review available up to 5 years post-closing for any other "public-order or internal-security" sensitive investment. The Government decides on MPO's recommendation; remedies include conditions, prohibition, and forced divestment, with fines up to 1% of the global net turnover of the foreign investor.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule on January 15, 2021 substantially expanding the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Part 744 end-use and end-user control framework to cover military-intelligence entities in China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela. The rule created a new license requirement for exports of ANY EAR-subject item to named military-intelligence end-users — including EAR99-classified items — and separately imposed restrictions on U.S. persons worldwide providing "support" to military-intelligence end-uses or end-users without a BIS licence. It also broadened chemical and biological weapons controls from "will directly assist" to "will support," expanding the reach of §744.4 and §744.3 on WMD-delivery systems. A technical correction published March 17, 2021 (FR Doc 2021-05623) fixed a drafting error in Instruction 9 that would have inadvertently deleted §744.3(a)(3)(i)-(ii), the rocket systems and UAV provisions.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed three persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective January 11, 2021 after completing successful end-use checks that verified their bona fides under §744.15(c)(2) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The three removed parties are DMA Logistics GmbH (Germany), Halm Elektronik GmbH (Germany), and Integrated Production and Test Engineering / IPTE (Mexico). Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and eliminates the requirement for US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before shipping items subject to the EAR to these parties.

BIS amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Commerce Control List to clarify the scope of ECCN 1C991 (vaccines, immunotoxins, and related medical products containing or derived from controlled biological agents) consistent with release and exclusion notes adopted at the June 2019 Australia Group (AG) Plenary Meeting. The rule adds clarifying language specifying which vaccines and medical products fall inside versus outside the ECCN 1C991 control perimeter, ensuring that routine vaccines produced by standard manufacturing methods are properly excluded. The changes align US controls with the Australia Group Common Control Lists without introducing new country-specific restrictions or license requirements.