Loading…
Loading…
Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
Presidential Decree No. 1011 of 31 December 2025 amends the standing Decree No. 302 (25 April 2023) list of foreign-owned assets under "temporary management," adding 100 percent of the shares in Rockwool LLC and 68 percent of the shares in Rockwool-Volga LLC — the Russian operating subsidiaries of Danish insulation producer ROCKWOOL A/S — and transferring control to Construction Assets Development JSC (Развитие Строительных Активов, "RSA"), a newly formed Russian administrator. The decree entered into force on its date of official publication (13 January 2026) despite being signed two weeks earlier, and covers four ROCKWOOL factories (Moscow, Leningrad and Chelyabinsk regions, and Tatarstan) producing heat and sound insulation. ROCKWOOL A/S disclosed in a 13 January 2026 regulatory announcement to Nasdaq Copenhagen that it has determined it has lost control of the four plants.
Presidential Decree No. 1012 of 31 December 2025 amends the standing Decree No. 302 (25 April 2023) list of foreign-owned assets under "temporary management," adding 100 percent of the shares in Can-Pak LLC (owned by Poland's Canpack S.A.) and Can-Pak Packaging Plant LLC (owned by Tapon France) — the two Russian operating subsidiaries of the CANPACK Group's aluminium-beverage-can business — and transferring control to StalElement LLC, a newly formed Russian administrator. The decree entered into force on its date of official publication (13 January 2026) despite being signed two weeks earlier, and covers Can-Pak's Volokolamsk (Moscow region) and Novocherkassk plants, which together hold an estimated 25-35% share of Russia's aluminium-can market. It is one of a running series of company-specific amendments to Decree 302, Russia's mechanism for placing Russian assets of "unfriendly state" companies under state administration in reciprocal response to Western sanctions and asset freezes.
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and entities in Venezuela and Iran on 30 December 2025 for facilitating Iran's proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic-missile inputs. Venezuela-based Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA (EANSA) and its chair, Jose Jesus Urdaneta Gonzalez, were designated for negotiating directly with Iran's Qods Aviation Industries (QAI) and overseeing local assembly of QAI's Mohajer-series UAVs, re-branded in Venezuela as the ANSU series — an arrangement OFAC states has run since 2006. Separately, three Iran-based persons were designated for procuring sodium perchlorate, sebacic acid and nitrocellulose — precursor chemicals for ballistic-missile propellant and warhead production — on behalf of Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), a unit of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO). The action was taken under Executive Order 13382 (WMD proliferators and supporters) and Executive Order 13949 (Iran conventional-arms activities), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2.
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 26 December 2025 that it is imposing countermeasures under Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 15 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign Sanctions against 20 US defense-related companies and 10 senior executives, in response to the Trump administration's 18 December 2025 announcement of roughly $11.1bn in arms sales to Taiwan — the largest single US weapons package for the island to date. Measures freeze the named entities' assets within China, prohibit organizations and individuals in China from transacting or cooperating with them, and deny visas/entry to the named executives. This is a Foreign Ministry Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law designation, distinct in legal basis from MOFCOM's parallel Unreliable Entity List mechanism used in prior 2025 Taiwan-arms-sale tranches (e.g. the 9 April 2025 six-firm UEL listing).
The Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/2618 on 18 December 2025, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, to add 41 vessels to Annex XLII of the Russia sanctions regime. Of these, 36 vessels are designated for transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products while engaging in irregular and high-risk shipping practices characteristic of the "shadow fleet," 5 vessels are designated for transporting stolen Ukrainian grain and cultural property, and 1 vessel (GT HONOR) is designated for facilitating violation or circumvention of EU sanctions. Listed vessels are banned from access to EU member-state ports and locks and from a broad range of maritime-transport-related services, effective 19 December 2025. The measure is an incremental listing update between the 19th (Regulation 2025/2033, October 2025) and 20th (Regulation 2026/506, April 2026) numbered sanctions packages, rather than a new package itself.
HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a Russia-regime notice on 18 December 2025 designating five individuals and 19 entities under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Of the 19 entities, six are based in Russia, eight in the United Arab Emirates, four in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan — reflecting OFSI's continued focus on third-country intermediaries used to route sanctioned Russian trade and finance. Designated persons are subject to a full asset freeze and are barred from commercial transactions and investment instruments with UK persons.
On December 18, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 29 shadow-fleet vessels and 17 vessel-management/shipping firms — plus Egyptian businessman Hatem Elsaid Farid Ibrahim Sakr and two of his UAE-registered companies (Red Sea Ship Management LLC and High Seas Petroleum LLC) — under Executive Order 13902 for operating in Iran's petroleum sector. The vessels, flagged across Palau, Panama, Cook Islands, Barbados, Jamaica and unknown registries, are said to have transported "hundreds of millions of dollars'" worth of Iranian crude oil, fuel oil, bitumen, naphtha and condensate to buyers in Asia. Treasury frames the action as part of a campaign that has sanctioned more than 180 vessels since President Trump resumed office in January 2025, implementing NSPM-2 maximum-pressure policy.
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) entered into a $3,103,360 settlement with Exodus Movement, Inc., a U.S.-incorporated non-custodial / self-custody crypto wallet software company, to resolve 254 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR, 31 C.F.R. Part 560) committed between October 17, 2017 and January 4, 2019. Exodus customer-support staff provided technical and account-related support — and in 12 of the 254 instances recommended the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) to circumvent partner-exchange geoblocking controls — to users who self-identified as located in Iran, in violation of the ITSR's prohibition on the export of services to Iran (§ 560.204) and, for the 12 egregious cases, the facilitation prohibition (§ 560.203). OFAC deemed the 12 VPN-coaching cases "egregious" because Exodus personnel were generally aware of U.S. sanctions and the company's own terms of use prohibited Iran usage, yet support staff actively helped Iranian users evade controls. Exodus separately committed to invest $630,000 in additional sanctions compliance controls. The settlement is structurally novel as the first OFAC enforcement action against a Web3-infrastructure / non-custodial wallet-software vendor and establishes that OFAC will assert jurisdiction over self-custody software providers based on customer-support facilitation conduct, not just custodial flow control.
On 15 December 2025 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2588 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2594, giving effect to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (Ukraine territorial-integrity asset-freeze regime) by adding 9 new designations: 5 individuals who own or control companies enabling Russian oil shipments and controlling a significant share of Russia's "shadow fleet," and 4 shipping companies headquartered in Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam that manage shadow-fleet tankers and engage in irregular, high-risk shipping practices. Listed persons and entities are subject to an EU asset freeze (and, for the individuals, a travel ban); EU persons and companies are prohibited from making funds or economic resources available to them.
On 12 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Council adopted the first tranche of listings aligning with the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033, 23 October 2025), amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine and the Belarus Ordinance with effect from 13 December 2025. The decision adds asset freezes and entry/transit bans for 22 natural persons and 42 entities tied to Russia's military-industrial complex, energy sector and shadow-fleet vessel management; extends purchase/sale/insurance bans to over 100 additional tankers; imposes transaction restrictions on 5 Russian banks and 4 Russian-bank branches in Belarus and Kazakhstan for use of specialised financial-messaging services; sanctions Chinese and Hong Kong trading companies and refineries implicated in circumventing the G7 oil price cap; and designates 5 Belarusian persons linked to military-industrial activities. Divestment-exemption deadlines for Swiss persons winding down Russian holdings are extended to end-2026. This is a partial, listings-only tranche — the more substantive measures of the EU's 19th package (Russian LNG import ban, crypto-services prohibition, AI/HPC service bans) were not adopted until the Federal Council's follow-on decision of 25 February 2026.
On 11 December 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six shipping companies — registered in the Marshall Islands (4), British Virgin Islands (1), and the United Kingdom (1) — and their six crude-oil tankers as blocked property under Executive Order 13850 for operating in Venezuela's oil sector. The vessels (WHITE CRANE, KIARA M, MONIQUE, LATTAFA, H. CONSTANCE, and TAMIA) had loaded Venezuelan crude in September/October 2025 and allegedly used AIS spoofing and other deceptive shipping practices to evade detection. The same action separately designated four individuals — including two nephews of Cilia Flores (Nicolas Maduro's wife) under the counter-narcotics authority EO 14059, a former PDVSA official under EO 13692, and a Panamanian facilitator under EO 13850 — but the shipping-company/tanker designations are the action's primary trade-control component.
The UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office designated two China-based commercial cyber companies — Sichuan Anxun Information Technology Co Ltd (known as i-Soon) and Integrity Technology Group Incorporated — under the UK's Cyber sanctions regime, freezing their UK assets and imposing controls on commercial transactions and investment instruments involving them. i-Soon was designated for targeting over 80 government and private-sector IT systems worldwide, including UK public-sector and private-industry networks. Integrity Tech was designated for operating a covert botnet of more than 260,000 compromised devices globally and supplying access to it to enable unauthorised intrusion into UK public-sector systems.
The UK government designated Russian media entity Rybar LLC and its director-general Mikhail Zvinchuk, alongside Aleksandr Dugin, the Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond), and affiliated entities Euromore, Golos, and the Center for Geopolitical Expertise, under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The designations impose asset freezes and bans on commercial transactions and investment instruments with the named parties, on the basis that Rybar runs a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) network promoting Russian state interests and destabilising Ukraine. Pravfond's network was separately alleged to have moved funds across at least 11 EU member states to fund pro-Kremlin media outlets while concealing state ties.
OFAC settled civil liability of USD 1,092,000 with an unnamed individual (a former US government official and attorney) for 122 apparent violations of Russia-related sanctions programs spanning April 2018 to June 2022. The individual served as fiduciary and trustee of a US-based family trust established for the benefit of a sanctioned Russian oligarch (SDN-listed under EO 13662 and EO 14024) and in that capacity dealt in the blocked property of — and provided prohibited trust-administration services to — the oligarch without OFAC authorisation. OFAC assessed the conduct as non-egregious and not voluntarily self-disclosed, but credited substantial cooperation in fixing the penalty below the base amount.
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated four individuals and four entities under Executive Order 14098 ("Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition") for operating a transnational network that recruits former Colombian military personnel to fight for Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary. Designated persons include retired Colombian officer Alvaro Andres Quijano Becerra, his wife Claudia Viviana Oliveros Forero, the Colombia-based recruitment agency International Services Agency (A4SI), and Panama-based intermediary Talent Bridge, S.A. (formerly Global Staffing S.A.). All property and interests in property of the designated persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them.
On 4 December 2025, OFAC assessed a near-statutory-maximum civil monetary penalty of USD 7,139,305 against Gracetown Inc., a New York-based property-management company, for 24 apparent violations of Russia-related sanctions under EO 13660, EO 13661, and EO 14024 between April 2018 and May 2020, and for separately failing to report blocked assets for over 45 months in violation of 31 CFR §501.603. Gracetown was established in 2006 to manage three luxury real-estate properties in Manhattan and Washington DC ultimately owned by sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska; after Deripaska's April 2018 SDN designation — which OFAC communicated directly to Gracetown — the company continued processing 24 payments totalling USD 31,250 on behalf of a Deripaska-linked British Virgin Islands entity (Baufinanz). OFAC found the violations egregious and not voluntarily self-disclosed, driving the penalty to 80% of the USD 8,906,358 statutory ceiling; the ratio of penalty (USD 7.14M) to underlying transaction value (USD 31,250) underscores OFAC's strict liability approach to post-notice dealings.
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) entered into an $11,485,352 settlement with IPI Partners, LLC — a US private-equity data-center fund manager (~$10.5bn AUM) — to resolve 51 apparent violations of the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations between July 2018 and June 2022. IPI solicited and accepted two $25 million fund subscriptions in September 2017 and March 2018 from Definition Services, Inc. — a British Virgin Islands entity ultimately owned by Heritage Trust, a Delaware family trust established by sanctioned Russian oligarch Suleiman Kerimov — and continued processing 18 capital calls, 20 distributions, and 13 management-fee payments for four years after Kerimov's April 2018 SDN designation. OFAC simultaneously issued an unusually direct sectoral warning to the private-equity industry, marking the first major OFAC enforcement against a US PE-fund administrator in the data-center / AI-infrastructure segment and the second Kerimov-linked PE/VC settlement of 2025 (after the June 2025 $216M GVA Capital statutory-maximum penalty).
Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 870/2025 on 29 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 26 Russian legal entities involved in crude petroleum and natural gas extraction, petroleum-product refining, and related energy-sector activity. The decree imposes asset freezes and bars commercial transactions and investment dealings with the designated entities. It entered into force on 2 December 2025, the date of official publication.
Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 871/2025 on 29 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against a list of Russian legal entities and individuals identified by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) as involved in the production, supply, or operational support of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs/drones) used by Russia. The decree imposes asset freezes and restrictions on commercial transactions and investment instruments with the designated parties. It entered into force on 2 December 2025, the date of official publication.
Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 860/2025 on 25 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 41 legal entities that collectively own 56 maritime vessels. The vessels are alleged to have made illegal port calls at Sevastopol and Feodosia — Ukrainian ports under temporary Russian occupation — to load and export stolen Ukrainian wheat, sunflower seeds, and other food commodities between 2022 and 2025. The sanctions (asset freezes, restrictions on commercial transactions and transit, and foreign- customer limitations) apply for a term of 10 years and entered into force on 27 November 2025, the date of official publication.
On 24 November 2025, OFAC assessed a civil monetary penalty of USD 4,677,552 — the statutory maximum and the largest single OFAC penalty ever imposed against an individual — against an Atlanta-based real-estate investor operating through King Holdings LLC. Between April 2023 and March 2024 the respondent willfully purchased, mortgaged, renovated, and resold US residential property beneficially owned by a family member of a Russian oligarch sanctioned under EO 14024, in direct violation of a prior OFAC cease-and-desist order and in defiance of an administrative subpoena. OFAC found the violations egregious and non-self-disclosed; both aggravating factors drove the penalty to the statutory ceiling.
On 19 November 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in a coordinated action with Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, designated 5 individuals and 7 companies linked to two Russia-based "bulletproof hosting" (BPH) providers, Media Land and Aeza Group, under Executive Order 13694. Media Land and its subsidiaries (Media Land Technology, Data Center Kirishi, ML Cloud) supplied server infrastructure to ransomware groups including LockBit, BlackSuit and Play. The designations also targeted three companies Aeza Group used to evade its July 2025 OFAC designation and rebrand its infrastructure: Hypercore Ltd. (United Kingdom), Smart Digital Ideas DOO (Serbia), and Datavice MCHJ (Uzbekistan). All designated persons' U.S.-nexus assets are blocked and U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting with them.
Canada made SOR/2025-228, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered 2025-11-06 and announced by Minister Anand on 2025-11-12. The regulations add 13 individuals to Part 1 of Schedule 1, 11 entities to Part 2 of Schedule 1, and 100 vessels (by IMO number) to Schedule 1.1, freezing their Canadian assets and prohibiting dealings. Targets include Russian LNG-trading entities, drone-programme developers, cyber-infrastructure suppliers for hybrid operations against Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan-based financial enablers (including Capital Bank of Central Asia and the A7 payments platform) used to evade earlier Russia sanctions. The 100-vessel designation targets Russia's "shadow fleet" used to move crude oil, LNG and arms while evading the G7 price cap and flag-state controls.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities based in Iran, the UAE, Turkiye, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany and Ukraine for operating procurement networks that supply Iran's ballistic missile and UAV programmes, including missile propellant precursors and UAV components. The action is Treasury's second round of nonproliferation sanctions since the 27 September 2025 reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran ("snapback") over its non-compliance with international nuclear and missile commitments. Designated entities include Iran-based Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), which Treasury says has worked with the IRGC-Qods Force to advance Iran's UAV programme. All property and interests of the designated parties subject to US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them.
New Zealand's 33rd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 designated 65 "shadow fleet" tanker vessels involved in transporting Russian-origin crude oil, together with seven entities and two individuals based in Russia, Belarus, North Korea and Iran that refine or transport Russian oil or facilitate oil-related payments. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on the supply of services (including port access, insurance, chartering and cargo handling) by New Zealand persons. The measure targets the revenue chain funding Russia's war in Ukraine rather than imposing a new tariff or trade-flow control.
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated the Bhardwaj Human Smuggling Organization (Bhardwaj HSO), a Cancun, Mexico-based transnational criminal organization run by dual Indian-Mexican national Vikrant Bhardwaj, under Executive Order 13581 (as amended by EO 13863). The action names 21 designees in total — the organization, 4 individuals (including Bhardwaj's wife and a former Cancun airport police officer who provided access), and 16 front companies spanning Mexico, India and the UAE across real estate, construction, retail/hospitality, and tourism/transport sectors used to launder smuggling proceeds. The designation was coordinated with Homeland Security Investigations, the DEA, and Mexico's financial intelligence unit (UIF), and blocks all U.S. property and interests of the designees plus any entity 50%-or-more owned by them.
On 29 October 2025 the Swiss Federal Council amended the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), published as AS 2025 662, completing Switzerland's alignment with the remaining goods, finance and services elements of the EU's 18th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, 18 July 2025) and tightening the parallel Belarus regime. The amendment took effect 30 October 2025 and adds: an export ban covering additional structural-metal, general-purpose-machinery and machine-tool goods; an import ban on further petroleum-oil products and waste/scrap categories; and expanded controls on commercial transactions and investment instruments spanning financial services, investment banking, crude-petroleum trade and motor-vehicle/trailer goods. The Federal Department of Economic Affairs (WBF) had already taken over the measures within its own competence on 12 August 2025; this decision closes the remainder. In parallel, the Federal Council's asset-freeze annexes were extended to 14 individuals and 41 companies/organizations.
On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.
On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2040 (amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP), widening the EU's Belarus restrictive-measures regime in lockstep with the 19th Russia sanctions package adopted the same day. The package widens the export ban to industrial goods (salts, ores, rubber articles, tyres, millstones, construction materials, electronic components, rangefinders, propellant chemicals, metals/oxides/alloys), extends the import ban to all acyclic hydrocarbons, introduces a new prior-licensing requirement for services supplied to Belarus, its government, or public bodies, and mirrors the Russia regime's space, AI, and high-performance/ quantum-computing service restrictions. A companion instrument, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2039, adds 5 new asset-freeze listings (2 individuals + 3 entities, including JSC Holography Industry, Horizont Holding, and ICT Horizont). Entered into force 24 October 2025.
On October 22, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added Open Joint Stock Company Rosneft Oil Company ("Rosneft") and Lukoil OAO ("Lukoil") — together with dozens of named Russia-based subsidiaries — to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 14024 for "operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy." It is the first US designation of Russia's two largest integrated oil majors since the 2022 invasion-era sanctions architecture began. Under OFAC's 50% Rule, the blocking extends automatically to all entities owned 50% or more, directly or indirectly, by Rosneft or Lukoil — capturing a sprawling global subsidiary network including Lukoil retail/refining assets in Belgium, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Finland, the West Qurna-2 upstream stake in Iraq, and Lukoil Americas. Rosneft and Lukoil together account for roughly half of Russian crude exports (~5 mb/d combined production) and Lukoil holds a ~9% European retail-fuel market share. OFAC simultaneously issued General License 124 (Caspian Pipeline Consortium / Tengizchevroil / Karachaganak Kazakhstan-pipeline carve-out, no expiry), General License 125 (Lukoil retail service stations outside Russia, wind-down to November 21, 2025), General License 126 (general wind-down to November 21, 2025) and General License 127 (debt/equity divestment and derivatives wind-down to November 21, 2025). GL 131 (issued November 14, 2025) opened a divestment window for Lukoil International GmbH; subsequent GL 134/134A/134B extended cargo-offload authorisations through April–May 2026. The action was coordinated same-day with UK OFSI Rosneft/Lukoil designations and the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package adopted October 23, 2025 — the first major US-led Russia-energy escalation under the second Trump administration.
On 15 October 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 39 entities and specified 51 vessels — including, for the first time, Russia's two largest integrated oil majors PJSC Rosneft Oil Company and PJSC Oil Company Lukoil — for supporting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. 51 vessels (44 identified as "shadow fleet" tankers) were specified for transporting Russian crude oil and LNG in evasion of the G7 price cap. The package also introduced a ban on importing oil products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude, closing a refined-product loophole in the price-cap regime.
Russian Government Resolution No. 1545 of 6 October 2025 amends Resolution No. 851 (11 May 2022) to add Renault SAS to Russia's list of foreign legal entities subject to "special economic measures" tied to military-technical cooperation. Renault is listed as entry No. 75 and becomes subject to prohibitions on commercial transactions and on the use of investment instruments (securities/equity dealings) involving the company. The designation follows reporting that Renault planned to help manufacture unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) for Ukraine; a related GTA-tracked intervention imposes an export ban on the same entity under the same resolution.
China's Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism, led by MOFCOM, issued Announcement [2025] No. 10 on 9 October 2025 designating 14 foreign entities — Dedrone by Axon Inc., DZYNE Technologies Incorporated, Elbit Systems of America LLC, Epirus Inc., AeroVironment Inc., Exelis Inc., Alliant Techsystems Operations LLC, BAE Systems Inc., Teledyne FLIR LLC, VSE Corporation, Cubic Global Defense, Recorded Future Inc., the Halifax International Security Forum, and TechInsights Inc. (with nine named subsidiaries) — for engaging in military-technical cooperation with Taiwan, harmful statements concerning China, and assisting foreign governments in suppressing Chinese enterprises. The measures (i) prohibit the listed entities from China-related import-export activity, (ii) ban new investment in Chinese territory, and (iii) for the first time under the UEL framework explicitly prohibit Chinese organisations and individuals from transmitting data or providing sensitive information to the listed entities. Issued the same day as MOFCOM/GAC Announcements No. 61/62 extending rare-earth export controls extraterritorially under a 0.1% de minimis content rule, the package marks the first UEL deployment targeting counter-drone original equipment manufacturers and the first to introduce a data-transmission restriction.
On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.
Presidential Decree No. 710 of 6 October 2025 amends the standing list of foreign-owned assets under "temporary management" (established by Decree No. 302 of 25 April 2023) to add 100 percent of the shares in Vonorus LLC — the Russian operating subsidiary of Silgan Metal Packaging Mitterdorf GmbH, the Austrian unit of US-listed Silgan Holdings Inc. (NYSE: SLGN) — transferring control of the company to Rosimushchestvo. The decree entered into force on its date of official publication (6 October 2025) and is one of a running series of company-specific amendments to Decree 302, Russia's mechanism for placing Russian assets of "unfriendly state" companies under state administration in reciprocal response to Western sanctions and asset freezes.
On 6 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 8 Mexican individuals and 12 Mexico-based companies under Executive Order 14059 for supplying fentanyl precursor chemicals and laboratory equipment to the Sinaloa Cartel's "Los Chapitos" faction, led by fugitive brothers Archivaldo Ivan and Jesus Alfredo Guzman Salazar (sons of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera). The network is centred on Sumilab, a chemical and lab-equipment supplier previously sanctioned by OFAC in May 2023, which restructured through affiliated pharmaceutical, laboratory, chemical, cleaning-supply and real-estate front companies to continue operating after the earlier designation. All property and interests in property of the designated persons within US jurisdiction or held by US persons are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 entities and 17 individuals across three procurement networks supplying Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and its subordinate weapons producers. The networks sourced ballistic-missile guidance components (accelerometers, gyroscopes, MEMS) for the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group and Shahid Hemmat Space Group, dual-use radar/missile-guidance electronics routed through Hong Kong and China for Shiraz Electronics Industries, and helicopter parts — including a US-origin helicopter — routed through Germany, Türkiye, Portugal and Uruguay for Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA). The action is Treasury's first nonproliferation-sanctions tranche following the 27 September 2025 UN Security Council "snapback" reimposing pre-JCPOA sanctions on Iran.
China's MOFCOM Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism designated three US firms — Saronic Technologies, Aerkomm Inc., and Oceaneering International — on 25 September 2025, effective the same day, under Article 2 of the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2020) and citing the Foreign Trade Law, the National Security Law, and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. MOFCOM's stated trigger is the firms' "so-called military-technical collaboration with China's Taiwan region." Measures bar the designees from China-related import/export activity and new investment in mainland China, with entry/work-permit restrictions on relevant management personnel.
The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) renamed the Syria-Related Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 569) as the Promoting Accountability for Assad and Regional Stabilization Sanctions Regulations (PAARSS) and amended the renamed regulations to implement the January 15, 2025 Syria-related Executive order (which expanded the national emergency declared in E.O. 13894) and E.O. 14312 of June 30, 2025 ("Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions"). The final rule was effective on publication, 25 September 2025. Substantively, broad Syria-program sanctions are revoked while targeted sanctions remain on Bashar al-Assad and his associates, human rights abusers, Captagon traffickers, persons linked to Syria's past chemical-weapons or other proliferation activities, ISIS and Al-Qa'ida affiliates, and Iran and its proxies operating inside Syria.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Burma-based arms procurement company Royal Shune Lei Company Limited, its three Burmese executives, and two North Korean nationals linked to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) for operating an arms-trafficking and revenue-generation network supporting DPRK weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. Royal Shune Lei brokered sales of aerial bomb guidance kits, bombs, and airborne monitoring equipment to Burma's military junta on behalf of KOMID starting in 2022. Designations were made under Executive Order 13687 (DPRK), Executive Order 13551 (DPRK arms trade), and Executive Order 14014 (Burma), blocking all US-jurisdiction property of the six designated parties and barring US persons from transactions with them.
On 22 September 2025, OFAC designated Lex Instituto de Estudos Juridicos LTDA (Lex Institute) and Viviane Barci de Moraes — wife of Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF) Justice Alexandre de Moraes and the Institute's Managing Partner — pursuant to Executive Order 13818 (the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act authority). The Lex Institute is a family holding company that owns de Moraes' residence and other properties; Treasury designated it for materially supporting de Moraes, who was himself designated under the same authority on 30 July 2025 for authorizing arbitrary pre-trial detentions and suppressing freedom of expression, including in the prosecution of former President Jair Bolsonaro. All US property and interests of the designated persons are blocked and U.S. persons are generally barred from transacting with them.
On 22 September 2025, OFAC announced that ShapeShift AG — a now-defunct digital-asset exchange incorporated in Switzerland and operated from Denver, Colorado (ceased operations 2021) — agreed to pay USD 750,000 to settle potential civil liability for 17,183 apparent violations of four OFAC sanctions programs: the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR), and the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR). The violations occurred between 10 December 2016 and 9 October 2018, when ShapeShift's platform processed USD 12,570,956 in exchanges for users located in sanctioned jurisdictions. OFAC found that ShapeShift failed to implement any internal controls to screen users in sanctioned jurisdictions until after receiving an OFAC administrative subpoena, yielding a base penalty of USD 39,515,000 — reduced to USD 750,000 by mitigating factors including the entity's now-defunct status, the historical-period nature of the violations, voluntary cooperation after the subpoena, and a no-recidivism finding.
On 19 September 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office designated two Georgian nationals — Otar Partskhaladze and Levan Vasadze — and two companies, UK-based Aeza International Ltd and Russia-based HeliCo Group LLC, under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, citing their roles in supporting Russian disinformation and Georgia's Kremlin-aligned political network. In the same package OFSI proscribed two oil tankers, Bavly and Karakuz, for allegedly delivering Russian-origin crude to the port of Batumi, Georgia, barring both vessels from UK ports and the UK Ship Register. Designated individuals face asset freezes, travel bans and director-disqualification sanctions.
Australia aligned with the EU/G7's 18th-package price cap by lowering its own cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, and designated 95 additional "shadow fleet" tanker vessels used to circumvent the cap, under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. Foreign Minister Penny Wong framed the measure as intended to depress the market value of Russian crude and reduce war-financing oil revenue. The listings bring Australia's cumulative shadow-fleet vessel designations to over 150 since June 2025 and its total Russia-related sanctions actions since 2022 to roughly 1,600.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two Iranian financial facilitators — Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand — along with more than a dozen Hong Kong- and UAE-based individuals and entities for operating a shadow-banking network that laundered proceeds from Iranian oil sales through front companies and cryptocurrency. The designated addresses account for over $600 million in total inflows, including more than $100 million in cryptocurrency purchases tied to oil sales between 2023 and 2025. Proceeds are alleged to benefit the IRGC-Qods Force and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This is the second round of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran's shadow-banking infrastructure since National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) directed a maximum-pressure campaign on Iran in February 2025.
Japan lowered its price cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, effective for contracts concluded on or after 12 September 2025, aligning with the EU's July 2025 cut under its 18th sanctions package. The measure bars Japanese entities from importing, or providing shipping, insurance, financing or other services for, Russian crude priced above the new cap. In the same package Japan added 47 Russian entities and 9 individuals, 6 Crimea/Donbas-linked persons and entities, and 3 third-country entities to its asset-freeze list (transactions now require Ministry of Finance approval), and imposed export prohibitions on 2 Russian entities and 9 entities in third countries. Japan's own Russian crude imports are minimal (~0.1% of total crude imports, Jan-Jul 2025), so the measure is primarily a coalition-alignment and shipping/insurance-chokepoint action rather than a material change to Japan's own energy sourcing.
New Zealand's 32nd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 (Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 4) 2025, SL 2025/195) lowered the price cap on Russian-origin crude oil (HS 2709) from US$60/bbl to US$47.60/bbl, a roughly 21% cut, aligning New Zealand with the EU, UK and Canada's most recent price-cap reductions. The same instrument designated 19 individuals and entities plus 19 vessels, including Russia's GRU cyber unit 29155 (implicated in malware attacks on Ukrainian government networks), actors involved in chemical-weapons use and disinformation, additional "shadow fleet" tankers, alternative payment providers, and third-country facilitators based in North Korea and Iran supporting Russia's war effort.
On 12 September 2025 the UK government, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 3 individuals and 27 entities — 19 Russian, plus third-country intermediaries in Thailand (3), Hong Kong (3), India (1) and Türkiye (1) accused of supplying electronics, chemicals and explosives used in Russian missile and weapons production — and proscribed 70 vessels (oil tankers and cargo ships, identified by IMO number) linked to Russia's shadow fleet evading the G7 crude price cap. The package brings the UK's cumulative tanker designations to nearly 500, more than any other single jurisdiction.
On 11 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities and identified four vessels in what Treasury described as its broadest sanctions action to date against Iran-aligned Ansarallah (Houthi) support networks. The designated network — companies, owners, and operatives located in Yemen, China, the UAE, and the Marshall Islands — is accused of running oil and commodity smuggling through Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports, laundering the proceeds, and using them to finance a global weapons procurement supply chain of front companies and shipping facilitators. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on nine prior 2024-2025 OFAC actions against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and suppliers.
On 8 September 2025, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced a nine-measure package against Israel over the Gaza war, the centrepiece being urgent approval of a Royal Decree-Law to permanently codify in law the arms embargo Spain had applied de facto since October 2023 — a total ban on buying and selling arms, ammunition, military equipment and dual-use goods with Israel, plus a ban on port transit of fuel for the Israeli military and a ban on Israeli state aircraft carrying defence material transiting Spanish airspace. The package also bans importing, advertising and marketing products originating from Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. The Council of Ministers formally approved the measure as Real Decreto-ley 10/2025 on 23 September 2025; it was published in the BOE on 24 September 2025 (BOE-A-2025-18831) and validated by Congress on 8 October 2025 (178–169). Spain's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business separately disclosed that 219 defence-material export/import licences to Israel had been denied since October 2023, against a bilateral trade backdrop of roughly €50M in Spanish arms exports to Israel (Jan 2023–Jun 2024) and at least €54.4M in Spanish imports of Israeli arms/munitions (Oct 2023–May 2025, DataComex code 93).