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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: defence. Company profile →
L3Harris Technologies (NYSE: LHX) is a US defence and aerospace-electronics prime contractor formed from the 2019 merger of L3 Technologies and Harris Corporation. It operates across four segments: Space & Airborne Systems ("SAS" — satellite payloads and mission solutions, intel & cyber, mission avionics, threat warning and countermeasures), Integrated Mission Systems ("IMS" — airborne ISR and passive sensing/targeting, maritime and undersea systems, electro-optical), Communication Systems ("CS" — software-defined tactical radios, SATCOM terminals, battlefield networking, integrated night vision — including the AN/PVS-14 Gen III image-intensifier monocular), and Aerojet Rocketdyne ("AR" — propulsion, power and armament, acquired July 2023, whose product line includes the RS-25 Space Shuttle/SLS main engine and the RL10 upper-stage engine). FY2024 revenue was ~$21 bn with a record backlog of $34 bn; 76% of revenue came from US government customers in fiscal 2023.
The company is one of the world's leading producers of electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor systems. <!-- corrected 2026-08-17 (overnight audit topic 01, F2): two contradictions of the cited FY2023 10-K. (1) Segment structure read "three segments: Space & Mission Systems … Integrated Mission Systems … and Communication Systems" — wrong count and a segment name L3Harris does not have. The 10-K says: "we report the financial results of our continuing operations in four operating segments, which are also our reportable segments: Space & Airborne Systems ("SAS"); Integrated Mission Systems ("IMS"); Communication Systems ("CS"); and Aerojet Rocketdyne ("AR"), established in connection with the fiscal 2023 acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc." Segment sub-descriptions above are now taken from the 10-K's own business-sector lists. (2) US-government share read "~78%". The 10-K says "the percentage of our revenue that was derived from sales to U.S. Government customers, including foreign military sales funded through the U.S. Government, whether directly or through prime contractors, was 76%, 74% and 75%, in fiscal 2023, 2022 and 2021, respectively." Restated as 76% and explicitly year-labelled, because the only 10-K in ## Sources is the FY2023 one; the cited FY2024 BusinessWire release returns HTTP 403 from this host and could not be read to obtain an FY2024 figure. -->
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where L3Harris Technologies, Inc. produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Tantalum / Tin / Tungsten — L3Harris's own SEC Form SD conflict-minerals report (3TG, FY2024 reporting period) confirms these three metals were "necessary to the functionality or production of many of the products manufactured by L3Harris." Consistent with known use cases: tantalum electrolytic capacitors in tactical radios, radar processors and satellite bus ele…
Gallium / Nickel / Silver — component-level, product-specific exposures (not sector-template inference). L3Harris's own Gen III image-intensifier tubes (e.
Copper — RF waveguides, wiring harnesses, and PCBs across L3Harris electronics; also the base metal of NARloy-Z (Cu-Ag-Zr), the regeneratively-cooled combustion-chamber liner alloy in Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 engine.
Tantalum / Tin / Tungsten — L3Harris's own SEC Form SD conflict-minerals report (3TG, FY2024 reporting period) confirms these three metals were "necessary to the functionality or production of many of the products manufactured by L3Harris." Consistent with known use cases: tantalum electrolytic capacitors in tactical radios, radar processors and satellite bus ele…
Gallium / Nickel / Silver — component-level, product-specific exposures (not sector-template inference). L3Harris's own Gen III image-intensifier tubes (e.
Chromium / Niobium — alloying elements in the Inconel 718 (Ni-Cr-Nb superalloy) structural shell of Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 main combustion chamber.
Tantalum / Tin / Tungsten — L3Harris's own SEC Form SD conflict-minerals report (3TG, FY2024 reporting period) confirms these three metals were "necessary to the functionality or production of many of the products manufactured by L3Harris." Consistent with known use cases: tantalum electrolytic capacitors in tactical radios, radar processors and satellite bus ele…
Chromium / Niobium — alloying elements in the Inconel 718 (Ni-Cr-Nb superalloy) structural shell of Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 main combustion chamber.
Gallium / Nickel / Silver — component-level, product-specific exposures (not sector-template inference). L3Harris's own Gen III image-intensifier tubes (e.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copperniobium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Copper — RF waveguides, wiring harnesses, and PCBs across L3Harris electronics; also the base metal of NARloy-Z (Cu-Ag-Zr), the regeneratively-cooled combustion-chamber liner alloy in Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 engine.
Chromium / Niobium — alloying elements in the Inconel 718 (Ni-Cr-Nb superalloy) structural shell of Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 main combustion chamber.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Brazil supplies 93% of world niobium mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: niobium supply outside BR is 🇨🇦 CA 80%, 🇨🇩 CD 13%, 🇷🇺 RU 4.0% (shares renormalised after removing BR); copper supply outside BR is 🇨🇱 CL 26%, 🇨🇩 CD 16%, 🇵🇪 PE 13% (shares renormalised after removing BR).
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copperniobiumtantalum · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Copper — RF waveguides, wiring harnesses, and PCBs across L3Harris electronics; also the base metal of NARloy-Z (Cu-Ag-Zr), the regeneratively-cooled combustion-chamber liner alloy in Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 engine.
Chromium / Niobium — alloying elements in the Inconel 718 (Ni-Cr-Nb superalloy) structural shell of Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 main combustion chamber.
Tantalum / Tin / Tungsten — L3Harris's own SEC Form SD conflict-minerals report (3TG, FY2024 reporting period) confirms these three metals were "necessary to the functionality or production of many of the products manufactured by L3Harris." Consistent with known use cases: tantalum electrolytic capacitors in tactical radios, radar processors and satellite bus ele…
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
copper — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇱 CL 26% · 🇨🇩 CD 16% · 🇵🇪 PE 13% · 🇨🇳 CN 8.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
niobium — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇧🇷 BR 93% · 🇨🇦 CA 5.4% · 🇨🇩 CD 0.9% · 🇷🇺 RU 0.3% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Copper — RF waveguides, wiring harnesses, and PCBs across L3Harris electronics; also the base metal of NARloy-Z (Cu-Ag-Zr), the regeneratively-cooled combustion-chamber liner alloy in Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 engine.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
DR Congo supplies 14% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇨🇱 CL 31% · 🇵🇪 PE 16% · 🇨🇳 CN 10% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.7% — shares renormalised after removing CD.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 72d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Copper — RF waveguides, wiring harnesses, and PCBs across L3Harris electronics; also the base metal of NARloy-Z (Cu-Ag-Zr), the regeneratively-cooled combustion-chamber liner alloy in Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 engine.
China supplies 7.8% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇨🇱 CL 29% · 🇨🇩 CD 17% · 🇵🇪 PE 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.1% — shares renormalised after removing CN.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches coppernickelniobium · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Copper — RF waveguides, wiring harnesses, and PCBs across L3Harris electronics; also the base metal of NARloy-Z (Cu-Ag-Zr), the regeneratively-cooled combustion-chamber liner alloy in Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 engine.
Gallium / Nickel / Silver — component-level, product-specific exposures (not sector-template inference). L3Harris's own Gen III image-intensifier tubes (e.
Chromium / Niobium — alloying elements in the Inconel 718 (Ni-Cr-Nb superalloy) structural shell of Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 main combustion chamber.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel S…
Minister of Finance, acting under s.
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
If enacted, chrome ore export tax and/or quota would disrupt South Africa's ~2.
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Indonesia = ~20% of global refined tin exports (Bangka Belitung); a ban on refined-tin exports would force downstream solder/semiconductor-packaging manufacturing domestically; disrupts global electr…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
VP Constantino Chiwenga announced at the Zimbabwe-China Business Forum (Hangzhou) that Zimbabwe will no longer issue new mining licences for operations that extract only one mineral from a deposit —…
Zimbabwean officials have signalled intent ("raw chrome exports obsolete") to expand the 25-Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed) to cover chrome CONCENTRATE specifically — conc…
The 12 July 2025 Bougival Accord (13-page political agreement creating a "State of New Caledonia" within France, pending a 2026 referendum + French organic law) contains an economic-rebuilding pact t…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
Indonesia = ~50% global nickel mine supply and dominant producer of NPI/ferronickel/MHP; export duty on downstream nickel products (NPI, ferronickel, nickel matte, MHP) would add a material cost laye…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…
Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
3 of 88 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (defence) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+1 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+5 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+56 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+10 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+34 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+2 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+35 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.