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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
Energy Transition Minerals Ltd (ASX: ETM, formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd), headquartered in West Perth, Australia, is an exploration and development company assembling a portfolio of critical-mineral assets outside China. Its flagship is the Kvanefjeld rare-earth–uranium–zinc deposit in southern Greenland, ranked among the largest undeveloped rare-earth resources outside Chinese-controlled jurisdictions — but the project is currently blocked: Greenland's 2021 Uranium Act bans exploitation of deposits above 100ppm U3O8, Kvanefjeld's ore runs ~250-360ppm, and on 26 June 2026 Greenland's government rejected ETM's application to renew the exploration licence, on the grounds that further exploration was unlikely to yield a deposit exploitable under that Act. ETM is separately pursuing ~US$11.
5bn in compensation from the Greenlandic and Danish governments. In August 2025 the company diversified by acquiring Penouta, an operating tin-tantalum-niobium mine in Galicia, Spain, and it also holds the nearby Villarubias lithium-tantalum-niobium-tin project and two early-stage lithium exploration projects (Solo, Good Setting) in James Bay, Quebec.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld) produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium (rare earths) — Kvanefjeld hosts one of the world's largest undeveloped light+heavy rare-earth resources, feedstock for permanent magnets, but development is currently frozen by Greenland's uranium ban and the June 2026 licence non-renewal — a live case of a single co-deposited material's regulatory status overriding an entire resource's…
Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium (rare earths) — Kvanefjeld hosts one of the world's largest undeveloped light+heavy rare-earth resources, feedstock for permanent magnets, but development is currently frozen by Greenland's uranium ban and the June 2026 licence non-renewal — a live case of a single co-deposited material's regulatory status overriding an entire resource's…
Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium (rare earths) — Kvanefjeld hosts one of the world's largest undeveloped light+heavy rare-earth resources, feedstock for permanent magnets, but development is currently frozen by Greenland's uranium ban and the June 2026 licence non-renewal — a live case of a single co-deposited material's regulatory status overriding an entire resource's…
Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium (rare earths) — Kvanefjeld hosts one of the world's largest undeveloped light+heavy rare-earth resources, feedstock for permanent magnets, but development is currently frozen by Greenland's uranium ban and the June 2026 licence non-renewal — a live case of a single co-deposited material's regulatory status overriding an entire resource's…
Lithium — Villarubias (Salamanca, Spain; lithium-tantalum-niobium-tin aplite-pegmatite) and the Solo/Good Setting projects in James Bay, Quebec are early-stage exploration assets, not yet resource-defined or in production.
Uranium — co-deposited with the REE at Kvanefjeld at roughly 250-360ppm U3O8, above Greenland's Act No. 20 100ppm ceiling; it is this uranium content itself, not the rare-earth grade, that has stalled the project and driven ETM's compensation claim against Greenland/Denmark.
Tin, tantalum, niobium — Penouta (Galicia, Spain), acquired August 2025 and confirmed as preferred buyer by the Spanish insolvency court in October 2025, is described by the company as Europe's only developed tin-tantalum-niobium mine — one of very few in-EU sources of tantalum and niobium concentrate, both on the EU/US critical-raw-material lists with supply…
Tin, tantalum, niobium — Penouta (Galicia, Spain), acquired August 2025 and confirmed as preferred buyer by the Spanish insolvency court in October 2025, is described by the company as Europe's only developed tin-tantalum-niobium mine — one of very few in-EU sources of tantalum and niobium concentrate, both on the EU/US critical-raw-material lists with supply…
Tin, tantalum, niobium — Penouta (Galicia, Spain), acquired August 2025 and confirmed as preferred buyer by the Spanish insolvency court in October 2025, is described by the company as Europe's only developed tin-tantalum-niobium mine — one of very few in-EU sources of tantalum and niobium concentrate, both on the EU/US critical-raw-material lists with supply…
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymiumlithiumuraniumniobiumtantalum · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium (rare earths) — Kvanefjeld hosts one of the world's largest undeveloped light+heavy rare-earth resources, feedstock for permanent magnets, but development is currently frozen by Greenland's uranium ban and the June 2026 licence non-renewal — a live case of a single co-deposited material's regulatory status overriding an entire resource's…
Lithium — Villarubias (Salamanca, Spain; lithium-tantalum-niobium-tin aplite-pegmatite) and the Solo/Good Setting projects in James Bay, Quebec are early-stage exploration assets, not yet resource-defined or in production.
Uranium — co-deposited with the REE at Kvanefjeld at roughly 250-360ppm U3O8, above Greenland's Act No. 20 100ppm ceiling; it is this uranium content itself, not the rare-earth grade, that has stalled the project and driven ETM's compensation claim against Greenland/Denmark.
+2 more touched materials — see the composition section (3) above.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymiumlithiumniobium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 109d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium (rare earths) — Kvanefjeld hosts one of the world's largest undeveloped light+heavy rare-earth resources, feedstock for permanent magnets, but development is currently frozen by Greenland's uranium ban and the June 2026 licence non-renewal — a live case of a single co-deposited material's regulatory status overriding an entire resource's…
Lithium — Villarubias (Salamanca, Spain; lithium-tantalum-niobium-tin aplite-pegmatite) and the Solo/Good Setting projects in James Bay, Quebec are early-stage exploration assets, not yet resource-defined or in production.
Tin, tantalum, niobium — Penouta (Galicia, Spain), acquired August 2025 and confirmed as preferred buyer by the Spanish insolvency court in October 2025, is described by the company as Europe's only developed tin-tantalum-niobium mine — one of very few in-EU sources of tantalum and niobium concentrate, both on the EU/US critical-raw-material lists with supply…
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymiumniobiumtantalum · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 54d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium (rare earths) — Kvanefjeld hosts one of the world's largest undeveloped light+heavy rare-earth resources, feedstock for permanent magnets, but development is currently frozen by Greenland's uranium ban and the June 2026 licence non-renewal — a live case of a single co-deposited material's regulatory status overriding an entire resource's…
Tin, tantalum, niobium — Penouta (Galicia, Spain), acquired August 2025 and confirmed as preferred buyer by the Spanish insolvency court in October 2025, is described by the company as Europe's only developed tin-tantalum-niobium mine — one of very few in-EU sources of tantalum and niobium concentrate, both on the EU/US critical-raw-material lists with supply…
Tin, tantalum, niobium — Penouta (Galicia, Spain), acquired August 2025 and confirmed as preferred buyer by the Spanish insolvency court in October 2025, is described by the company as Europe's only developed tin-tantalum-niobium mine — one of very few in-EU sources of tantalum and niobium concentrate, both on the EU/US critical-raw-material lists with supply…
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
niobium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
US · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches neodymium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Framework agreed "in principle" between Trump and Xi following June 5, 2026 call and subsequent negotiations; Trump stated June 11, 2026 "Our deal with China is done, subject to final approval with President Xi and me" — China to supply "full magnets, and any necessary rare earths, up front" to US; if formally enacted, would suspend or ease China's April 2025 rare earth export licensing regime (filed 2025-04-04-china-mofcom-rare-earth-export-licensing) for US-bound shipments; China's Vice Commerce Minister Li Chenggang confirmed "in principle" framework consensus from the June 5 Trump-Xi call; tariff framework: US 55% / China 10%; China April 2025 rare earth controls (heavy/medium REEs, including Dy/Tb NdFeB magnets, SmCo magnets) remain formally active — no MOFCOM suspension announcement found as of June 15, 2026; the deal is political but not yet implemented as a formal regulation or bilateral MOU
source ↗Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium (rare earths) — Kvanefjeld hosts one of the world's largest undeveloped light+heavy rare-earth resources, feedstock for permanent magnets, but development is currently frozen by Greenland's uranium ban and the June 2026 licence non-renewal — a live case of a single co-deposited material's regulatory status overriding an entire resource's…
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
KZ · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymiumuranium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 99d pending
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No. 125-VI ZRK): (1) raises the mandatory local (domestic) content share in works and services from 50% to 70% during exploration and extraction of solid minerals INCLUDING URANIUM — a material new in-country-value obligation on the world's #1 uranium producer (Kazatomprom) and its JV partners (Cameco, Orano, CGN/CNNC, Uranium One); (2) digitises geological data and expands electronic auctions for granting subsoil-use rights; (3) grants strategic investors implementing large industrial/innovation projects (>14. 5M MCI) a priority right to explore and extract solid minerals. Re-prices the cost base and access regime for Kazakh uranium, copper, chromium and the country's emerging rare-earth deposits.
source ↗Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium (rare earths) — Kvanefjeld hosts one of the world's largest undeveloped light+heavy rare-earth resources, feedstock for permanent magnets, but development is currently frozen by Greenland's uranium ban and the June 2026 licence non-renewal — a live case of a single co-deposited material's regulatory status overriding an entire resource's…
Uranium — co-deposited with the REE at Kvanefjeld at roughly 250-360ppm U3O8, above Greenland's Act No. 20 100ppm ceiling; it is this uranium content itself, not the rare-earth grade, that has stalled the project and driven ETM's compensation claim against Greenland/Denmark.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
neodymium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
uranium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax…
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Under the RESourceEU action plan (COM(2025) 945, adopted 3 Dec 2025 and already filed as 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945), the European Commission committed to PROPOSE, by Q2 2026,…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Indonesia = ~20% of global refined tin exports (Bangka Belitung); a ban on refined-tin exports would force downstream solder/semiconductor-packaging manufacturing domestically; disrupts global electr…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency oblig…
At Myanmar military-government head Min Aung Hlaing's early-June-2026 New Delhi visit (his first India visit since the 2021 coup), critical minerals and rare earths featured explicitly on the formal…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
7 of 96 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 9 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of dysprosium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the dysprosium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of terbium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the terbium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of neodymium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the neodymium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of praseodymium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the praseodymium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of lithium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the lithium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of uranium. Restrictions by 🇷🇺 RU push buyers toward ex-RU producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the uranium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of tin. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tin chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of niobium. Restrictions by 🇧🇷 BR push buyers toward ex-BR producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the niobium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of tantalum. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tantalum chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.