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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 21 August 2026 Niger's Council of Ministers, under the presidency of General Abdourahamane Tiani, awarded two large-scale uranium exploitation permits. The In Azaoua perimeter (Arlit Commune, Agadez Region) — the ground previously worked by the Orano-majority Société des Mines de l'Aïr (SOMAÏR), nationalised June 2025 — was granted to TSUMCO SA (Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company), the wholly state-owned successor operator created in May 2026. The Madaouela I permit (Arlit Urban Commune), previously held by Canada's GoviEx Uranium before reverting to the public domain on 31 July 2024, was re-attributed to Madaouela Mining Company (MAMICO), now 60%-held by Australia's Atomic Eagle (GoviEx's restructured successor) and 40% by the Nigerien State — up from a prior minority state stake. MAMICO paid a $10 million redevance forfaitaire to the state and committed to roughly 1,000 local jobs and local-content procurement.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 30 of 2026 on July 24, 2026, adding 14 EU-based entities to the Export Control Management List under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The listing bars Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to the named entities, bars any overseas party from transferring or providing China-origin dual-use items to them, and orders ongoing related transactions to stop immediately; exporters may apply to MOFCOM for case-by-case exemption. It is the first MOFCOM entity-list action ever to target EU-domiciled entities and the first ever to name a university (Wrocław University of Science and Technology). The 14 entities span Germany (Rheinmetall AG, Sindlhauser Materials GmbH, Antraco Chemie-Handelsgesellschaft mbH), Italy (Lafert S.p.A., Garnet S.r.l.), France (InPACT S.A., III-V LAB, Cavok UAS), Poland (Vigo Photonics S.A., Politechnika Wrocławska), the Netherlands (IHC Merwede Holding B.V.), Czechia (TATRA TRUCKS a.s.), Bulgaria (Opticoelectron Group) and Lithuania (Ekspla UAB) — defence, drone, photonics, laser, semiconductor and maritime-engineering firms and research institutes. The action came roughly 24 hours after the EU's 21st Russia sanctions package (adopted July 23, 2026) added Chinese and Hong Kong dual-use-trading entities to its own restricted list, and is widely read as a reciprocal countermeasure.
At the 52nd G7 Summit in Évian-les-Bains (June 15–17, 2026, under France's G7 Presidency), the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued a dedicated leaders' declaration committing to secure supply chains for critical minerals by diversifying sourcing, reducing excessive dependencies on any single foreign supplier, and coordinating investment and market-development tools across G7 members. The declaration references the Partnership On Wide Energy and Resources Resilience Asia (POWERR Asia) as a named allied cooperation vehicle, and calls for stronger G7 coordination on emergency supply-chain response and private-capital mobilisation for critical mineral projects outside of concentrated supplier states. This is the first standalone G7 leaders' declaration specifically dedicated to critical minerals supply-chain security, moving beyond language embedded in broader summit communiqués.
On 1 April 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and President Emmanuel Macron held a Tokyo summit and signed a bilateral roadmap on cooperation in critical minerals — the first formal Japan-France instrument on supply-chain resilience for rare earths and other critical materials. The centrepiece is joint government support for Caremag, a heavy rare-earths refining project in southern France due to begin operations in late 2026, with backing from Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC), Iwatani Corporation, and the French government; the project targets approximately 20% of Japan's future demand for dysprosium and terbium (heavy rare-earth oxides used in EV motors, offshore-wind turbines, and electronic components). The two leaders also launched parallel high-level dialogues on dual-use AI, quantum technologies, space (including debris mitigation), cybersecurity, and a joint declaration on startups and innovation, expressing "serious concerns" over export controls on critical minerals and other materials affecting global supply chains — an explicit reference to China's tightening rare-earths export regime.
The European Commission approved France's €1.1 billion state aid scheme (SA.120765) under Section 6.1 of the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF), authorising a tax credit (Crédit d'Impôt Industrie Verte — C3IV) for strategic investments that add new cleantech manufacturing capacity in solar PV, onshore and offshore wind technologies, heat pumps, and battery technologies. The scheme is available across the whole of France until 31 December 2028 and is the eighth CISAF cleantech-manufacturing- capacity approval, bringing cumulative CISAF cleantech support to over €10 billion. It is the first CISAF approval delivered via a tax-credit instrument, distinct from the grant-based architectures used in the parallel Germany SA.121215, Greece SA.117469, and Luxembourg SA.120921 approvals.
President Trump signed a Presidential Proclamation on 20 February 2026 invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132) to impose a temporary 10% ad-valorem import surcharge on articles imported into the United States, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 24 February 2026. The proclamation was issued within hours of the US Supreme Court's 20 February 2026 ruling in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to set tariffs and vacated the IEEPA-based reciprocal-tariff regime previously in effect. The Section 122 surcharge is statutorily limited to 150 days (terminates 24 July 2026 absent Congressional extension) and the statute caps any such surcharge at 15% ad valorem. Goods qualifying as USMCA originating from Canada or Mexico are exempt; CAFTA-DR textile/apparel articles meeting specified rules of origin are exempt; and a substantial product-exception list excludes critical minerals, energy products, certain pharmaceuticals, electronics, vehicles, aerospace products, specified agricultural goods, and goods already subject to Section 232 duties (the Section 122 duty does not stack on Section 232).
France's third Programmation Pluriannuelle de l'Énergie (PPE3), adopted by Décret n° 2026-76 of 12 February 2026 and published in the Journal Officiel on 13 February 2026, sets the framework for public energy policy in metropolitan continental France from 2026 to 2035. The decree codifies a 60% decarbonised-energy-consumption target by 2030 (from 42% in 2023), a 34% electrification share (585 TWh), and a reduction of fossil fuels to 40% of final energy consumption by 2030 (from 58% in 2023). It also formalises the EPR2 new-build programme (6 + 8 optional reactors) within the long-range generation-mix architecture, pairs with the Stratégie Nationale Bas-Carbone (SNBC3) for a net-zero-2050 trajectory, and includes an annex on clean-mobility development (SDMP).
Presidential Decree No. 1012 of 31 December 2025 amends the standing Decree No. 302 (25 April 2023) list of foreign-owned assets under "temporary management," adding 100 percent of the shares in Can-Pak LLC (owned by Poland's Canpack S.A.) and Can-Pak Packaging Plant LLC (owned by Tapon France) — the two Russian operating subsidiaries of the CANPACK Group's aluminium-beverage-can business — and transferring control to StalElement LLC, a newly formed Russian administrator. The decree entered into force on its date of official publication (13 January 2026) despite being signed two weeks earlier, and covers Can-Pak's Volokolamsk (Moscow region) and Novocherkassk plants, which together hold an estimated 25-35% share of Russia's aluminium-can market. It is one of a running series of company-specific amendments to Decree 302, Russia's mechanism for placing Russian assets of "unfriendly state" companies under state administration in reciprocal response to Western sanctions and asset freezes.
The French state, through the Agence des participations de l'État (APE), injected EUR 749.3 million into satellite operator Eutelsat's EUR 1.5 billion rights-issue capital increase, completed in two tranches (late November and early December 2025). The investment lifts the French state's stake to 29.65%, making it Eutelsat's largest shareholder. The Ministry of Economy framed the operation as reinforcing "industrial and digital sovereignty," financing Eutelsat's expansion into low-earth-orbit (LEO) constellations and its role in the EU's IRIS² sovereign satellite programme, positioned as a European counterweight to Starlink.
Bpifrance Assurance Export, France's state export credit agency, guaranteed GBP 5 billion (~EUR 5.68bn) of lending arranged by a pool of 13 international banks (HSBC Corporate and Institutional Banking as lead/coordinator) to support the construction of the Sizewell C nuclear power plant in Suffolk, England. The guarantee covers up to 95% of the non-payment risk on export contracts held by French companies (led by EDF, a Sizewell C equity partner) involved in the project. It was announced alongside the project's financial close on 4 November 2025, complementing a GBP 36.6bn term loan facility from the UK's National Wealth Fund that forms the bulk of the project's debt financing.
France's Ministry of Industry and Energy, under Minister Marc Ferracci, announced a EUR 200 million green-industry tax credit (crédit d'impôt au titre des investissements dans l'industrie verte, C3IV) for Imerys' EMILI project at Échassières (Allier) — France's first domestic lithium mining and refining operation. The award was made as the project's total construction cost was revised up to EUR 1.8 billion. Once operational (targeted 2030), the site is expected to produce 34,000 tonnes of lithium hydroxide per year, enough to supply around 700,000 electric vehicles and cover over 20% of French battery factories' lithium needs. The award was announced alongside a wider package of C3IV support: seven critical-metals projects received a combined ~EUR 809 million in tax credits, part of ~EUR 5.4 billion in supported critical raw materials investment nationally.
Presidential Decree No. 606 of 29 August 2025 amends the standing list of foreign-owned Russian assets under "temporary management" (established by Decree No. 302 of 25 April 2023) to add the shares of Air Liquide's Russian subsidiaries, transferring control to M-Logistika LLC, a Russian company. Reported affected entities include Air Liquide's joint venture with steelmaker Severstal and regional operating units (Alabuga, Balakovo, Lipetsk, Ryazan, Kstovo, Kuzbass, Sever Liquid Gas), covering the bulk of the French industrial-gas group's Russian footprint. The decree entered into force on its date of official publication and is one of a running series of company-specific amendments to Decree 302, Russia's reciprocal-response mechanism for placing "unfriendly state" companies' Russian assets under state administration.
The French state, via the Agence des participations de l'État (APE), signed a contract on 1 August 2025 to acquire Atos's Advanced Computing division — encompassing the High Performance Computing & Quantum and Business Computing & AI units, commercially known as Bull — for an enterprise value of up to EUR 410 million (later adjusted to up to EUR 404 million after scope changes). The division employs over 2,500 people, mostly in France, generates roughly EUR 800 million in expected 2025 revenue, and operates Europe's only supercomputer manufacturing plant (Angers), including delivery of the EuroHPC JUPITER exascale system. The Ministry of Economy and Finance framed the acquisition as keeping "strategic industrial activities and key technologies" in French hands; the deal closed on 31 March 2026 with the French state as Bull's sole shareholder.
On 27 July 2025, President Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reached political agreement at Turnberry, Scotland, on a Framework Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair and Balanced Trade. The framework was formalised in a Joint Statement published on 21 August 2025 by the White House and DG TRADE. The deal establishes a 15% all-inclusive (MFN + Section 232) US tariff ceiling on the vast majority of EU originating goods — including autos, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber, and chemicals — replacing the threatened 20-30% reciprocal tariff trajectory under EO 14257 (April 2025). Steel and aluminium are excluded from the 15% ceiling and remain at the 50% Section 232 rate pending negotiation of a quota solution. In return, the EU commits to: (i) eliminate tariffs on all US industrial goods, (ii) preferential market access for a wide range of US agricultural and seafood products, (iii) suspension of its rebalancing countermeasures under Reg 2025/778 (suspension effective 7 August 2025), (iv) expected energy offtake of $750bn (LNG, oil, nuclear) through 2028, (v) at least $40bn in US AI chip purchases, and (vi) facilitation of $600bn in additional EU corporate investment into the US through 2028. Effective from 1 September 2025, the US applies MFN-only treatment (no 15% top-up) to: aircraft and parts, generic pharmaceuticals and ingredients, chemical precursors, cork, and certain unavailable natural resources. The framework is not legally binding but anchors the bilateral architecture; it is the largest-economy ART-programme deal alongside US-UK, US-Japan, US-Korea, US-Taiwan, and US-Indonesia.
On July 12, 2025, French and New Caledonian political parties signed the Bougival Accord ("Accord pour l'Avenir de la Nouvelle-Calédonie"), establishing a Pacte de Refondation Économique et Sociale that commits the French state to €2 billion+ over five years for territorial reconstruction, paired with a dedicated strategic nickel plan to rescue New Caledonia's three severely stressed metallurgical plants — SLN/Doniambo (Eramet), KNS/Koniambo (shut since August 2024), and Prony Resources/Goro. An interministerial mission under the Prime Minister was established to coordinate the recovery. New Caledonia holds approximately 25% of known global nickel reserves and supplies roughly 8% of world mine output, making the fate of its three processing plants a material chokepoint for battery-grade and aerospace-alloy nickel supply chains.
The French government, sole shareholder of state-owned IN Groupe, backed IN Groupe's acquisition of IDEMIA Smart Identity (ISI) with a capital increase, completed 2025-07-01. The deal — IN Groupe's largest since its creation, with press estimates as high as EUR 1 billion though terms were not officially disclosed — creates a combined entity with over 4,000 employees and consolidated turnover above EUR 1 billion, making IN Groupe the world's largest provider of physical/digital identity cards and second-largest passport provider. The Ministry framed the operation as building a "global champion" in identity documents to secure French/ European sovereignty over the identity and biometrics value chain.
On 19 June 2025 the Council of Ministers of Niger, presided over by the head of the CNSP transition government, adopted a draft ordonnance nationalising the Société des Mines de l'Aïr (SOMAÏR SA), the joint venture that operates Niger's only currently producing uranium mine at Arlit. The communiqué transfers all SOMAÏR shares and assets to the Nigerien State and provides for compensation to existing shareholders net of legal obligations including mining-site rehabilitation costs. SOMAÏR was 63.40% owned by Orano (the French state-controlled nuclear fuel-cycle company, ex-AREVA) and 36.60% by state-owned SOPAMIN; the government cited "irresponsible, illegal and disloyal" conduct by Orano, the expiry of the prior mining convention on 31 December 2023, and a finding that Orano had taken 86.3% of cumulative production between 1971 and 2024 versus its 63.4% shareholding. The same Council of Ministers also nationalised the electricity utility NIGELEC. Orano announced the same day that it would seek full compensation through arbitration and reserved criminal-action rights against third parties acquiring SOMAÏR uranium stock.
On 16 June 2025 the European Investment Bank (EIB) signed a EUR 1.6 billion loan facility with French and Spanish transmission-system operators RTE and Red Eléctrica to finance the Bay of Biscay electricity interconnection, the first submarine power link between the two countries. First tranches totalling EUR 1.2 billion were signed at EIB headquarters in Luxembourg; the project separately holds a EUR 578 million EU Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) grant. The 400 km link (300 km submarine, connecting Cubnezais, France to Gatika, Spain) will raise cross-border exchange capacity from 2,800 MW to 5,000 MW and is expected to enter service in 2028.
The Gabonese Council of Ministers on 30 May 2025 adopted a decision prohibiting all exports of raw (crude) manganese ore effective 1 January 2029, requiring that all manganese mined in Gabon be processed domestically before export. A Commission has been established to draft the implementing regulation, and the Ministry of Industry and Local Transformation is working with COMILOG (Eramet) on transition modalities including the planned Moanda ferromanganese plant (300 kt/yr capacity). The measure applies to the world's #2 manganese producer (~25% of global reserves; ~8 Mt/yr current output, the bulk via COMILOG-Eramet), forcing upstream beneficiation onto Eramet/COMILOG, CITIC, and Ningbo Steel. The ban is the flagship industrial-policy instrument of the "Gabon Industriel 2035" national strategy under President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema.
France updated its 2020 National Low-Carbon Hydrogen Strategy at the Comité interministériel de l'Innovation on 10 April 2025, releasing SNH II under the direction of the Prime Minister and Industry Minister Marc Ferracci. The 2025 actualisation revises capacity targets to 6.5 GW of low-carbon hydrogen production by 2030 and 10 GW by 2035, funded within the France 2030 plan's €9 billion hydrogen envelope (€4 bn for electrolysers, €1.5 bn for end-uses, €2 bn for IPCEI Hy2Tech/Hy2Use French share). A new €4 billion price-support mechanism guarantees low-carbon hydrogen competitiveness against fossil hydrogen for 15 years; the strategy aligns France's "décarboné" taxonomy to include both nuclear-electricity-based and renewable-electricity-based hydrogen, distinct from EU RFNBO additionality rules.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14257 on 2 April 2025 declaring a national emergency over US trade deficits and imposing a baseline 10% ad-valorem tariff on imports from nearly all trading partners effective 5 April, with higher country-specific "reciprocal" rates effective 9 April. The rate schedule was constructed from a formula tied to bilateral goods-trade deficits and ranged from 10% (UK, Singapore, Brazil, Australia, others) through 20% (EU), 24% (Japan), 25% (Korea), 32% (Taiwan, Indonesia, Switzerland), 34% (China, later raised to 84% then 125% during the April escalation), 46% (Vietnam), 49% (Cambodia). Multiple subsequent EOs paused the country-specific rates for 90 days for non-China destinations on 9 April while keeping the 10% baseline, pending bilateral negotiations.
President Trump signed Proclamation 10908 "Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United States" on 26 March 2025, invoking Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose a 25% ad valorem tariff on imports of finished passenger vehicles and light trucks effective 12:01 a.m. EDT on 3 April 2025, with the duty extended to key automobile parts (engines and engine parts, transmissions and powertrain components, electrical components) effective 12:01 a.m. EDT on 3 May 2025. USMCA-origin automobiles receive an interim deduction equal to the value of US-origin content; USMCA-origin parts that satisfy the agreement's rules of origin are temporarily exempt from the parts duty pending a Commerce-administered process. The proclamation is the first Section 232 instrument applied to finished automobiles in US history and the largest-by-trade-volume Section 232 measure of the second Trump administration, covering roughly USD 460 billion of annual auto and auto-parts imports.
On 25 March 2025 the European Commission adopted the first list of 47 Strategic Projects inside the EU under Article 7 of the Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252), followed on 4 June 2025 by 13 Strategic Projects located in third countries — 60 designations in total. The 47 EU projects span 13 Member States and 14 strategic raw materials, with an expected EUR 22.5bn capital-investment envelope; the 13 third-country projects require a further EUR 5.5bn. Designation triggers fast-track permitting (max 27 months for extraction, 15 months for processing/recycling), preferential access to EU/EIB/EBRD finance, and Member State priority status, operationalising the CRMA's 2030 benchmarks (≥10% extraction, ≥40% processing, ≥25% recycling, ≤65% single-country dependence).
President Trump signed two Presidential Proclamations on 11 February 2025 reinstating a universal 25% ad-valorem tariff on all steel-mill products and raising the aluminum tariff from 10% to 25% on all imports into the United States, effective 12 March 2025. The proclamations revoked every bilateral exclusion and quota arrangement negotiated by the Biden administration with the EU, UK, Japan, Korea, Australia, and others under the 2021-2022 "alternative measures" frameworks, returning all trading partners to the baseline Section 232 rate without product-level or country-level carve-outs.
On 20–21 June 2024 Niger's Ministry of Mines, acting under the CNSP military-transition government, formally notified the Director General of Imouraren SA (the Orano subsidiary holding the Imouraren uranium permit) that the perimeter of the "IMOURAREN Permit" returned to the public domain of Niger and was freed of all derived rights, in application of articles 59 and 61 of Ordinance no. 93-16 of 2 March 1993 (Niger Mining Law). The decision followed a 7 June 2024 ministerial "note d'information" giving Orano until 19 June to engage development works under the earlier 19 March 2024 mise en demeure, and the Ministry's finding that Orano's 26 April 2024 exploitation plan "did not meet our expectations". Imouraren is one of the world's largest known uranium deposits at ~200,000 t U (Orano-disclosed reserves, originally permitted to AREVA in January 2009 with mine-build paused after the 2011 Fukushima uranium-price collapse). Orano had held 63.4% of Imouraren SA against 36.6% by Niger state-owned Sopamin. Orano notified the public on 20 June 2024 that it took note of the decision, and on 4 December 2024 initiated ICSID arbitration against the Niger state contesting the revocation. The action is the first leg of the 2024–2025 Niger-Orano break (followed by the December 2024 announcement of loss of operational control over Somaïr / Cominak / Imouraren and the June 2025 Somaïr nationalisation announcement).
Loi n° 2024-449 of 21 May 2024, known as the SREN law (Sécuriser et Réguler l'Espace Numérique), was definitively adopted by the French Parliament on 10 April 2024, validated in part by the Conseil Constitutionnel on 17 May 2024 (Decision n° 2024-866 DC), promulgated by the President on 21 May 2024, and published in the Journal Officiel on 22 May 2024. SREN is France's digital-sovereignty omnibus statute: it transposes parts of the EU Digital Services Act (Regulation 2022/2065), Digital Markets Act (Regulation 2022/1925), and Data Governance Act (Regulation 2022/868) into French law and layers national-level instruments on top — most consequentially a data-localisation hook for sensitive public-sector data tied to the ANSSI SecNumCloud sovereign-cloud certification scheme, an ARCOM-enforced age-verification regime for adult-content sites (with €250k or 2%-of-turnover fines and account-closure powers), an "anti-scam" cybersecurity filter requiring browsers and DNS resolvers to block ANSSI-designated fraudulent domains, a jeux-en-ligne (JONUM) regime for cryptoasset-adjacent gaming, and a coordination framework between CSA, CNIL, ARCOM, and the Autorité de la concurrence. SREN is one of the first EU member-state digital omnibus statutes anchoring national public-sector data-hosting rules to a sovereign-cloud certification scheme.
Ministerial order signed by the French Minister of Economy on 2 February 2024 and published in JORF n°0034 of 10 February 2024 establishing France's first national export-control list under Article 9 of EU Regulation 2021/821 on dual-use goods. The arrêté requires prior authorisation for exports to non-EU third countries of (i) quantum computers and their enabling technologies (qubit devices, control systems, measurement equipment) and (ii) equipment for the design, development, production, test and inspection of advanced electronic components, plus associated software and technology. The annex was substantively replaced by the Arrêté du 27 mars 2025 (explicit technical thresholds including ≥34-qubit systems with C-NOT error ≤10⁻⁴, HBM 6000+ processing performance, cryogenic cooling, dry-etch and EUV-mask tooling, and Si-28/Si-30/Ge isotopically-controlled materials) and is repealed by the Arrêté du 10 mars 2026 with entry into force 11 May 2026.
Décret n° 2023-1293 of 28 December 2023 and the accompanying Arrêté of the same date amend France's foreign-investment control regime (Code monétaire et financier, Art. R.151-3 list of sectors requiring prior authorisation). They add activities of extraction, transformation and recycling of critical raw materials, and activities essential to the security of penitentiary establishments, to the controlled sectors; make permanent the control on crossing the 10% voting-rights threshold in listed companies by non-European investors; and extend control to takeovers of French branches of foreign entities carrying out a sensitive activity. The changes entered into force on 1 January 2024.
France's first dedicated critical-minerals industrial-finance instrument: a €500m state contribution to a critical metals and rare materials investment fund, jointly announced by the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Ecological Transition on 11 May 2023, targeting €2bn total fundraising including private capital. Managed by InfraVia Capital Partners with Caisse des Dépôts as state operator, the fund invests as minority partner across extraction, processing and recycling — in France, Europe and globally — prioritising off-take agreements for French and European industry. The fund operationalises the Stratégie Nationale Métaux Critiques framework (Varin Report delivered 10 January 2022) alongside the OFREMI critical-minerals observatory at BRGM and the inter-ministerial delegate for strategic-metals supply security.
Loi n° 2023-973 du 23 octobre 2023 relative à l'industrie verte (the Green Industry Law) is France's first comprehensive industrial-policy framework since France 2030 (2021). Published in the Journal officiel on 24 October 2023, it pursues three objectives: (i) accelerate the siting of strategic industrial projects on French territory, (ii) channel public procurement toward "virtuous" companies, and (iii) mobilise private savings for green-industrial CapEx. Its centrepiece is the new "Projet d'intérêt national majeur" (PINM) status, an exceptional procedure that fast-tracks urban planning, environmental permitting, and grid connection for projects deemed strategic for ecological transition or national sovereignty (gigafactories, hydrogen electrolysers, advanced semiconductor fabs). The law also creates the Plan d'épargne avenir climat (PEAC), a long-duration retail savings product reserved for under-21s and earmarked for European green-industrial financing, and codifies a 2023-2030 national green-industry strategy.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.
France 2030 is a €54 billion public investment plan unveiled by President Emmanuel Macron on 12 October 2021 to fund breakthrough innovation and reindustrialisation across ten strategic priorities — small modular nuclear reactors, green hydrogen, low-carbon transport (incl. two million EVs/year), food/agritech, twenty drug therapies for cancer and chronic disease, cultural industries, space, deep-sea exploration, semiconductors and electronic components, and robotics/digital (AI/cloud). Two cross-cutting rules require 50% of investment to flow to decarbonisation and 50% to emerging innovative players. Operationalised from the 2022 budget law, the plan is coordinated by the Secrétariat général pour l'investissement (SGPI) under the Prime Minister and delivered by ANR, ADEME, Bpifrance and Caisse des Dépôts / Banque des Territoires.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding sixty entities under sixty-one entries to the Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744), effective August 27, 2020. The designated entities, spanning China, Hong Kong, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Switzerland, and the UAE, were found to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. The rule also revised five existing entries under Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Iran, and the UAE.
The modern French FDI-screening regime is codified in Code monétaire et financier (CMF) Art. L151-1 to L151-7, substantially restructured by Loi PACTE n° 2019-486 du 22 mai 2019 (Art. 152-158) and operationalised by Décret n° 2019-1590 du 31 décembre 2019 (in force 1 April 2020) with implementing Arrêté du 31 décembre 2019. The regime requires prior authorisation from DG Trésor for non-EU/EEA acquisitions reaching ≥25% of a French target's voting rights across 17 sensitive sectors enumerated in CMF Art. R151-3, and for ≥10% acquisitions in listed-company targets (threshold made permanent by Décret 2023-1293 from 1 January 2024, having been originally introduced during COVID-19 by Décret 2020-892). Approximately 310 notifications are received annually; the regime closes the last major G7 EU-member-state FDI-screening parent-statute gap after DE AWG §§55-62, IT Golden Power DL 21/2012, NL Wet Vifo, UK NSI Act 2021, US CFIUS, JP FEFTA, AU FATA, and CH IPG.