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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On June 2, 2026, USTR published final actionability findings in 60 parallel Section 301(b) investigations — the largest simultaneous Section 301 action in US history — determining that all 60 economies maintain unreasonable acts, policies, or practices by failing to impose or effectively enforce a prohibition on imports produced with forced labor. USTR proposed two additional duty rates: 10% on the 14 economies with partial forced-labor regimes (Canada, Ecuador, EU, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Malaysia, Taiwan, UK) and 12.5% on the remaining 46 economies. Tariff rates remain proposed pending a July 7, 2026 public hearing and subsequent finalization; the actionability determination is final.
India's Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) issued Press Note 2 of 2026 on March 15, 2026 (following Cabinet approval on March 10, 2026), recalibrating the Press Note 3 (2020) FDI framework for investments from countries sharing a land border with India. Global investors with up to 10% non-controlling Chinese (or other land-border) shareholding can now invest in India under the automatic route across sectors, while entities domiciled in China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Afghanistan continue to require prior government approval. For 40 designated strategic sub-sectors — including rare earth permanent magnets, polysilicon and ingot-wafer manufacturing, printed circuit boards, electronic capital goods, Li-ion batteries and machine tools — proposals will be decided within a binding 60-day window, with majority Indian ownership and control mandated at all times. Effective from the date of the corresponding amendment to the FEMA Non-Debt Instruments Rules.
On 26 January 2026 Vietnam's Ministry of Industry and Trade issued Circular No. 04/2026/TT-BCT, setting the 2026 in-quota tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for raw-tobacco imports (HS 2401) at 79,199 tonnes, a roughly 5% increase over the 2025 quota of 75,427 tonnes. The circular took effect 15 March 2026 and runs through 31 December 2026, with allocation administered via import licences under Decree No. 69/2018/NĐ-CP and Circular No. 12/2018/TT-BCT. The annual increase follows Vietnam's WTO tariff-rate-quota commitment schedule for raw tobacco rather than a discretionary policy shift.
Pakistan's Directorate General of Customs Valuation (Karachi), acting under the Federal Board of Revenue, issued Valuation Ruling No. 2035/2026 on 16 January 2026 under Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969, fixing revised minimum customs (C&F) values for 62 models of old and used branded mobile phones (Apple, Samsung, Google Pixel, OnePlus) imported in commercial quantity without original packaging or accessories, conditional on the device having been activated at least six months before export. The revision was a downward rationalization — press reporting cites benchmark values ranging from US$25 (iPhone SE, 1st/2nd generation) up to US$460 (iPhone 15 Pro Max) — bringing declared-value floors back in line with a documented decline in global secondary-market prices for older-generation devices. Global Trade Alert logs China as the principal origin affected.
Pakistan's Directorate General of Customs Valuation (DGCV), acting under the Federal Board of Revenue, issued Valuation Ruling No. 2036/2026 on 16 January 2026 under Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969, fixing revised minimum customs (assessable) values for imported ammunition. The ruling supersedes the prior ammunition valuation ruling (No. 1995/2025, dated 28 March 2025) after the Directorate found that declared transaction values no longer reflected prevailing international market prices. Global Trade Alert logs China, Oman and Turkiye as the principal ammunition-exporting origins affected by the revised benchmark. No specific per-unit values or an aggregate trade value were disclosed in the sources reviewed, so this is filed as a qualitative severity rating pending disclosure of the underlying value schedule.
Pakistan's Directorate General of Customs Valuation (Karachi), acting under the Federal Board of Revenue, issued Valuation Ruling No. 2029/2025 on 3 December 2025, fixing new minimum customs values for imports of eleven aroma and aromatic chemicals used in perfumes and cosmetics — Citronellol, Coumarin, Dihydro Myrcenol, Eugenol, Geraniol, Linalool, Musk Ambrette, Sandela, Eucalyptus Oil, Peppermint Oil, and Vanillin — sourced primarily from China. The ruling was triggered by representations from domestic importer M/s Franscent (Pvt.) Ltd., which alleged systematic under-invoicing of these products, and was determined under Section 25(9) read with Sections 25(5) and 25(6) of the Customs Act, 1969, after the Directorate found transaction-value and comparable-goods valuation methods unworkable due to sparse and inconsistent import data. Clearance Collectorates were instructed to enforce accurate CAS-number and chemical-identity declarations to prevent misclassification against the new benchmark values.
Pakistan's Directorate General of Customs Valuation (Karachi), acting under the Federal Board of Revenue, issued Valuation Ruling No. 2024/2025 on 24 November 2025 (C.No. Misc/54/2021-III/1115), superseding Valuation Ruling No. 1822/2023 and setting fresh minimum customs values (C&F, US$/kg) for latex rubber threads across four count-range bands, differentiated by origin: China at US$2.69-3.53/kg and Malaysia/Thailand at US$2.85-3.66/kg, rising with thread count (30-44, 45-55, 56-63, 64-90 counts). The Directorate rationalized the values downward at stakeholders' request, citing a documented downward trend in prevailing international prices; the ruling functions as an enforceable minimum-value floor under Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969, applied when declared invoice values fall below the benchmark.
Pakistan's Directorate General of Customs Valuation (Karachi), acting under the Federal Board of Revenue, issued Valuation Ruling No. 2023/2025 on 5 November 2025 (C.No. Misc/12/2025-I/1073), fixing new minimum customs values under Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969 for imported Zirconium Silicate (PCT 2530.9020): US$2.084/kg (C&F) for China, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam-origin shipments, and US$2.200/kg for Europe/USA-origin shipments. The ruling followed a finding that declared import values — as low as US$0.35/kg from China against a China/Europe international benchmark of US$1.70-1.82/kg for the constituent raw material (Zircon Sand) — were substantially below prevailing international market prices, and names China as the "global benchmark" origin used to set the floor.
Pakistan's Federal Board of Revenue notified SRO 1898(I)/2025 on 1 October 2025, imposing a 40% regulatory duty (RD) on the commercial import of used vehicles under PCT headings 8702, 8703, 8704 and 8711, limited to vehicles less than five years old. The measure operationalises a Ministry of Commerce scheme (SRO 1895(I)/2025, 30 September 2025) that for the first time authorises a commercial (dealer-run) import channel for used vehicles, which had previously been restricted to the non-commercial personal-baggage/gift/transfer-of-residence schemes. The Economic Coordination Committee approved the scheme on 18 September 2025 and it was ratified by the federal cabinet; imports also remain subject to Engineering Development Board environmental, safety and quality certification. The Tariff Policy Board's published trajectory reduces the RD by 10 percentage points per year after 30 June 2026, reaching 0% by FY2029-30.
Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) revised its Foreign End-User List (外国ユーザーリスト) — the reference list of foreign organisations for which WMD/missile or, for the first time, conventional-weapons development concerns cannot be excluded, used to trigger catch-all export-licence requirements. The revision adds 92 entities (from China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and the UAE) and removes 5 entities (from China, Iran and India), taking the list to 835 entities across 15 countries and regions — a net increase of 87. The revised list applies from 9 October 2025, the same date Japan's broader catch-all conventional-weapons supplementary export-control review took effect.
On 8 September 2025 at Prime Minister House in Islamabad, U.S. Strategic Metals (USSM, Missouri) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan's Frontier Works Organization (FWO, Pakistan Army-affiliated and the country's largest miner of critical minerals) committing to an initial USD 500 million investment programme covering antimony, copper, gold, tungsten, and rare-earth elements, with an envisaged poly-metallic refinery inside Pakistan. Embassy Islamabad Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Zach Harkenrider attended the signing. The first shipment of rare earths and other critical minerals from Pakistan to the United States was dispatched on 2 October 2025, marking the operational start of the partnership. The instrument forms the strategic- minerals limb of a broader Pakistan–U.S. realignment paired with U.S. EXIM Bank's USD 1.25 billion financing commitment for the Reko Diq copper-gold project (announced 10 December 2025) — a single coherent bilateral package positioning Pakistan as a non- PRC source of refined critical minerals to the United States.
The European Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1206 on 19 June 2025, suspending GSP+ tariff preferences on non-fuel ethanol (CN codes 2207 10 and 2207 20, excluding TARIC-coded fuel-use ethanol) imported from Pakistan, effective 21 June 2025 for two years. The measure invokes the safeguard clause (Article 30 of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012) after finding that a surge in duty-free Pakistani ethanol — 27% of all EU non-fuel ethanol imports in 2024 (roughly 215,929 tonnes), priced around 25% below EU producer prices — caused serious injury to the EU bioethanol industry. Reinstated Common Customs Tariff duties are approximately EUR 243/tonne (CN 2207 10) and EUR 129/tonne (CN 2207 20).
Pakistan's Ministry of Industries and Production, through the Engineering Development Board, launched the National Electric Vehicle (NEV) Policy 2025-2030 on 19 June 2025. The policy targets 30% of all new vehicles sold in Pakistan to be electric by 2030 and allocates an initial subsidy of PKR 9 billion for FY2025-26 to facilitate 116,053 electric two-wheelers and 3,171 electric three-wheelers (with 25% of the subsidy reserved for women applicants), alongside a build-out of 40 EV charging stations on motorways at 105 km average spacing. The policy is Pakistan's first horizontal EV industrial-policy framework, projected by government to save 2.07 billion litres of fuel annually and roughly USD 1 billion in foreign-exchange outflows on petroleum imports.
Pakistan's National Tariff Commission (NTC) issued a final determination in anti-dumping case ADC-65, imposing a definitive 13.84% average ad valorem duty on imports of Polyester Filament Yarn — Drawn Textured Yarn (PFY-DTY, HS 5402.33) originating from the People's Republic of China. The investigation, initiated on petitions from domestic producers Gatron Industries Limited and Rupali Polyester Limited, found injurious dumping of Chinese PFY-DTY causing material injury to Pakistan's domestic polyester-yarn industry. Provisional duties of a lower rate were first imposed on 15 November 2024 for a four-month period; the higher definitive rate was confirmed and published in the final determination notice of 19 June 2025.
Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs International Trade Administration (MOEA-ITA) amended the Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) export-control Entity List on 10 June 2025 (announced 15 June 2025) under Article 13 of the Trade Act, adding 601 new entities — including Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC) plus 599 additional entities domiciled in China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Myanmar. Taiwanese exporters (TSMC, UMC, ASE, KYEC and downstream suppliers) must obtain pre-export government licences for direct or third-party shipments of any SHTC-listed item to the listed entities; the action expands Taiwan's total entity-list population to ~10,844 entities. Two follow-on amendments tightened the regime further: a +279-entity expansion on 18 September 2025 and an 18-item commodity-list expansion on 18 November 2025 covering advanced 3D printers, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, electron microscopes and quantum-computing hardware.
Pakistan's Federal Cabinet approved the National Tariff Policy 2025-30 (NTP 2025-30) in June 2025, with operative tariff reforms incorporated into the Finance Act 2025 effective 1 July 2025. The NTP restructures Pakistan's customs duty (CD) slab architecture from five slabs (0/3/11/16/20%) to four flatter slabs (0/5/10/15%) by FY2029-30, while phasing out Regulatory Duties (RDs) and Additional Customs Duties (ACDs) on 7,000+ tariff lines over four to five years. The policy targets cutting the trade-weighted average tariff from ~10.6% to below 6% and the simple-average tariff from 19% to 9.5% by 2030, underpinned by GTAP projections of 10–14% export growth and 5–6% import growth. Prepared in coordination with IMF technical assistance under the USD 7 billion EFF, the NTP is the statutory anchor for the sequence of Finance-Act SRO-based sectoral tariff revisions covering textiles/MMF, iron-and-steel, and chemicals/intermediates through FY2029-30.
Pakistan's National Tariff Commission (NTC) issued its final determination in anti-dumping case ADC-66, imposing a definitive 26.76% ad valorem duty on imports of biaxially oriented polypropylene (BOPP) self-adhesive tapes in jumbo rolls (PCT 3919.9010 / 3919.9090) originating from China, effective for five years from January 31, 2025. The investigation, initiated on the petition of domestic manufacturer M/s Universal Coating Films (Pvt.) Limited, found that Chinese-origin BOPP tapes were being dumped into Pakistan at injuriously low prices, causing material injury to the domestic packaging-tape industry. The measure supersedes the provisional 14.99% duty imposed in January 2025 and was announced in the final determination report published on 24 May 2025.
Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce issued Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) 750(I)/2025 on 4 May 2025 under Section 3(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950 (XXXIX of 1950), prohibiting (i) the import into Pakistan of goods of Indian origin by third countries via sea, land, and air; (ii) the transit through Pakistan of goods imported from India by third countries via sea and air; and (iii) exports from third countries to India via Pakistani sea, land, and air routes. The SRO was published in the Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary (Part I) and took effect immediately. A clarification memorandum issued by the Ministry of Commerce on 8 May 2025 confirmed exemptions for Reshipment-on- Board (RoB) cargo and for shipments where the bill of lading or letter of credit was issued before 4 May 2025. The 10 May 2025 India–Pakistan ceasefire did not lift the SRO; it remains in force.
India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade issued Notification No. 06/2025-26 on 2 May 2025, inserting new Para 2.20A into the Foreign Trade Policy 2023: direct or indirect import or transit of all goods originating in or exported from Pakistan is prohibited with immediate effect, until further orders, regardless of whether the goods are otherwise freely importable. The government cited national security and public policy grounds; any exception requires prior Government of India approval. The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs followed on 3 May 2025 with Instruction No. 07/2025-Customs directing field formations to enforce the ban. The measure followed the 22 April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack and preceded a brief India-Pakistan military exchange in early May 2025.
Pakistan launched the National Minerals Harmonisation Framework 2025 and the Mines & Minerals Act 2025 at the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum (Islamabad, 8–9 April 2025), consolidating six regulatory frameworks, eight legislative instruments, and 36 rule sets into a unified federal-provincial licensing system. The framework — convened by the SIFC and Deputy PM Ishaq Dar — establishes a two-tier licensing structure (large-scale: PKR 500M+; small-scale: PKR 25M–500M), mandatory appellate tribunal, and a "Mines and Minerals Force" to counter illegal mining in Sindh and Balochistan. Fiscal-incentive reforms aim to raise investor IRR from 14.5% to approximately 18%, underpinned by Reko Diq as the flagship precedent for future large-scale foreign-capital mineral projects.
In its first major export-regulatory action of the second Trump administration, BIS amended the EAR to add 70 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (42), Iran (2), Pakistan (19), South Africa (3), and the United Arab Emirates (4), and modified four existing entries (France, Iran, Senegal, UK). New listings carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions available. Stated objectives include restricting China's acquisition of high-performance computing and quantum technologies for military use, impeding hypersonic-weapons development, disrupting Iran's UAV and defense procurement, and impairing Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. The rule also targets the Test Flying Academy of South Africa for using U.S.-origin items to train Chinese military pilots.
On 14 March 2025, the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan passed the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025 in a swift, sparsely debated session. The Act establishes the Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority (MIFA) under Section 22, a body composed of provincial and federal members but operating under the umbrella of the federal Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC). MIFA is empowered to designate "strategic" minerals with federal oversight, override provincial mining-department decisions, and channel licensing for the Reko Diq, Saindak and broader Chagai-belt copper-gold-REE deposits to investment vehicles aligned with the Foreign Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act 2022. The Act drew sharp criticism for recentralising mineral authority that the 18th Constitutional Amendment had devolved to provinces, and for omitting any community-participation mechanism. On 23 September 2025 Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti announced suspension of the Act by executive order pending re-tabling for further deliberation, after a joint meeting with opposition leaders.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List, listed under the destinations of Burma (1), China (11), and Pakistan (1). The PRC additions concentrate on the optics/photonics, RF/microwave, and military-civil-fusion research-institute layer of China's military-modernization stack — including CAS Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP), Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOM), Peng Cheng Laboratory, Ji Hua Laboratory, and the Yaguang/Chengdu RML defense-electronics cluster — with explicit references to support for hypersonic-weapons development. The Burma entity is Telecom International Myanmar (Mytel), added for providing surveillance services and financial support to the post-coup military regime; the Pakistan entity (Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd) was added for contributions to Pakistan's ballistic-missile programme. All 13 entries carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions. The rule was effective on publication, January 6, 2025, with a savings clause through February 5, 2025 for goods already en route.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations to impose a new "Regional Stability – Pakistan" (RS-PAK) licence requirement on exports, reexports, and in-country transfers to Pakistan of items classified under six previously-uncontrolled-for-Pakistan ECCNs: 1B999, 2A992, 2B999 (excluding 2B999.h.2), 3A992, 3A999, and 6A996. The covered items — process-control equipment, high-pressure piping and valves, oscilloscopes, electronic test equipment, magnetometers, and related dual-use industrial gear — are associated with unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile end-uses. Licence applications are reviewed case-by-case to assess diversion risk to Pakistan's nuclear weapons or ballistic missile programmes, and to entities already on the Entity List or front companies acting on their behalf. Issued as a final rule under ECRA §1762(a) (no notice-and-comment); originally effective 25 November 2024 with the corresponding amendatory instructions, with the substantive licence requirement effective 26 December 2024 (post C1-2024-27648 correction published 29 November 2024).
In two consecutive sectoral notifications, Pakistan's Special Technology Zones Authority (STZA) — a federal body under the Cabinet Division — formally declared two additional Special Technology Zones. The Khanpur Industrial Project (Mumrial, Khanpur, District Haripur, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; ~197 acres / 199,174 sq ft of existing and proposed infrastructure) was notified on 12 September 2024. The LEOS Technology Zone (Lehtrar Road, Nilore, Islamabad; 19.23 acres / 225,562 sq ft) was notified on 8 November 2024. Both zones operate under the Special Technology Zones Authority Act, 2021 incentive regime, which provides Zone Enterprises and Zone Developers a 10-year exemption from income tax, customs duty on capital-goods imports, and sales tax (under the Customs Act 1969, Income Tax Ordinance 2001 and Sales Tax Act 1990), together with eligibility for Special Forex Accounts under State Bank of Pakistan regulations (no requirement to convert USD inflows to PKR). The umbrella incentive window for the STZA regime runs until 30 June 2035, with each zone enterprise's 10-year clock starting from the date the zone developer certifies commercial operation.
Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 84460, Doc 2024-24562) adding 26 entities to the Entity List across four destinations: six in China (aviation simulation for PLA modernisation; procurement for Iran WMD/UAV programs; evasive conduct), one in Egypt and three in the UAE (acquiring US civil aircraft parts for Russian buyers post-Ukraine invasion), and sixteen in Pakistan (nine front companies of Advanced Engineering Research Organization for Pakistan's cruise-missile and strategic-UAV programs, plus seven contributing to Pakistan's ballistic- missile program). The rule also removes two existing entries. All additions are licensed under a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 8 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 2. Of the 8 additions, 3 are under China, 2 under Germany, 1 under Pakistan, and 2 under Türkiye. Of the 2 removals, 1 is under Saudi Arabia and 1 under China. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 16 October 2024 (89 FR 83428, FR Doc 2024-23638).
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (89 FR 80064; FR doc 2024-22587) amending the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR 748.15) to expand the Validated End User (VEU) program with a new "Data Center VEU Authorization" pathway. The rule lets BIS pre-authorize specified data-center operators in third countries to receive advanced computing integrated circuits (ECCNs 3A090, 4A090 and related) and related technology without individual export licenses, conditional on vetted security plans, end-use monitoring, and reporting. Country Group D:5 destinations — China, Russia, Iran, Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba and 17 other arms-embargoed states — are categorically excluded. Eligible destinations include Egypt, Laos, Moldova, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and the UAE — extending the US chip-equipment perimeter into a managed trusted-data-center channel for Gulf, MENA, and Central Asian AI build-out.
BIS published a Code of Federal Regulations technical correction restoring two entries to supplement no. 4 to 15 CFR part 744 (the Entity List) that had been inadvertently omitted from the most recent annual CFR revision. The restored entries are Kapil Raj Arora under the destination of the Netherlands and Orion Eleven Pvt. Ltd. under the destination of Pakistan. Both entries carry the previously imposed license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption of denial. The rule is editorial and does not impose new substantive restrictions.
BIS added 28 entities to the EAR Entity List across seven countries, targeting four distinct threat clusters: a Russia GRU/UAV diversion network spanning China, Finland, Germany, and Russia; an Iran Shahed-series UAV procurement chain operating through Chinese front companies (designated under the Russia/Belarus Military End User FDP Rule); Pakistan-linked suppliers procuring for unsafeguarded nuclear activities; and two Oman-based entities supporting Yemen's Houthi forces. Russia's dominant titanium producer VSMPO-AVISMA was also added as a military end user. One Chinese entity (Zhejiang Perfect New Material) was simultaneously removed from the Military End User List.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed 35 persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective 22 August 2023, spanning seven destinations: 27 entities in China, plus one each in Indonesia, Singapore, Turkey, and UAE; two in Pakistan; and two Russian entities removed as a conforming change after being escalated to the more restrictive Entity List. The 33 cooperative removals follow successful completion of end-use checks verifying each party's bona fides under §744.15(c)(2) of the EAR. Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and eliminates the UVL Statement requirement for US exporters shipping EAR-subject items to these parties.
Pakistan's Cabinet Committee on Energy approved the Oil Refining Policy 2023 for Upgradation of Existing/Brownfield Refineries on 7 August 2023, with Federal Cabinet ratification on 9 August 2023 and Petroleum Division notification to OGRA and refineries shortly thereafter. The policy provides a 7.5% deemed-duty incentive on locally-refined motor spirit (petrol) and high-speed diesel (with an additional 2.5% incremental incentive on HSD during the upgrade period) deposited into OGRA-managed escrow accounts to fund up to 27.5% of upgradation project cost, against a commitment by Pakistan's five brownfield refineries (PRL, NRL, ARL, PARCO, Cnergyico) to invest an estimated USD 4.5-6 billion to produce Euro-V compliant fuels. CCoE-approved amendments on 6 February 2024 extended the deemed-duty horizon to 20 years (or until petroleum-product price deregulation, whichever comes first) and tightened the framework for refineries that decline to sign Upgrade Agreements.
On 17 June 2023, the Prime Minister's Office issued a formal notification establishing the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), an apex civil-military body chaired by the Prime Minister with the Chief of Army Staff and federal/ provincial leadership as members. SIFC operates as a "single window" to fast-track foreign direct investment in five strategic sectors: Defence Production, Agriculture and Livestock, Minerals, IT and Telecommunication, and Energy. The council is the principal vehicle through which Pakistan is channelling Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sovereign capital — Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain — into headline projects including the Reko Diq copper-gold restart, Saudi/UAE minerals MoUs, and the 2025 Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum. SIFC received statutory backing on 18 August 2023 via the Board of Investment (Amendment) Act, 2023, which inserted Chapter II-A giving SIFC overriding authority over other laws.
BIS published a final rule adding 43 entities under 50 entries to the EAR Entity List and removing one entity (Fiber Optic Solutions, Latvia), effective June 12, 2023. The additions span ten countries — China (31 entities), UAE (5), Pakistan (4), South Africa (3), UK (2), and one each in Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand — targeting four principal threat clusters: China's military modernization and hypersonic-weapons supply chain, an international network of flight-training academies (TFASA and affiliates) providing Western pilot training to Chinese military personnel, Pakistan-linked procurement for unsafeguarded ballistic-missile programs, and UAE/South Africa-based dual-use diversion networks. All listed entities require a BIS licence, with most subject to a presumption of denial.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 37 entities under 38 entries to the Entity List, effective March 2, 2023, spanning six destinations: China (28), Pakistan (4), Burma (3), Russia (1), Belarus (1), and Taiwan (1). The China tranche — the largest — targets entities supporting the People's Liberation Army's military modernization, including BGI Research and Forensic Genomics International (genomic surveillance/data risk), Inspur Group Co. Ltd. (cloud servers supplied to Chinese military), and Loongson Technology (domestic CPU developer). Three Burmese entities, including the Ministry of Transport and Communications, are designated for providing surveillance equipment enabling the military junta's tracking and targeting of civilians. Pakistani entities Abdul Razaq Asim, Add-On Technology, and Dynamic Engineers are added for contributing to Pakistan's ballistic missile programs; Russian DMT Electronics and Belarusian DMT Trading LLC for export-control evasion. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR, with the review policy being presumption of denial for the majority of Chinese entries.
The Bureau of Industry and Security added 24 entities across 26 entries to the Entity List, effective December 8, 2022, covering Latvia, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates. Three distinct enforcement clusters are addressed: Russian defense-electronics firms and their foreign affiliates supporting Russia's military-industrial base post-Ukraine invasion; Singapore-based front companies that supplied controlled items to PASNA, an Iran-based Specially Designated National; and Pakistani and Emirati entities engaged in unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic-missile proliferation. One entity (Safe Technical Supply Co., LLC) was simultaneously removed from three entries covering Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 36 entities under 41 entries to the Entity List, effective June 28, 2022. The entities — located across China, Lithuania, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, the UAE, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam — were designated for acting contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Key grounds include support for China's military modernization and AI-enabled surveillance programs, Pakistan-based proliferation concerns, and supply-chain facilitation for Russia amid the Ukraine invasion. The rule also revised eleven existing entries (Belarus, China, Russia, Slovakia) and corrected one entry (Pakistan).
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding seven entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 14, 2022, on nuclear nonproliferation and national security grounds. Five Pakistani engineering and chemical companies, one Chinese metal-powder manufacturer (Jiangsu Tianyuan Metal Powder Co. Ltd.), and one UAE-based trading company (Odyssey General Trading FZC) were determined to be acting contrary to US foreign policy or national security interests. All seven entries impose a license requirement covering all EAR-jurisdiction items, with no license exceptions available; the license review policy is presumption of denial for the Chinese entity and per 15 CFR § 744.2(d) for the Pakistani and UAE entities.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eight entities to the Entity List — six based in Pakistan and two in the UAE — on grounds that they were acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests through involvement in proliferation to unsafeguarded nuclear activities. All EAR items destined for these entities require a license with a presumption of denial; no license exceptions are available. Separately, one China-based entity (Molecular Devices Shanghai Corporation) was removed from the Military End-User (MEU) List, and a second China MEU entry was renamed (Hutchison Optel Telecom Technology → Chongqing Optel Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.).
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 47 entities across 51 entries to the EAR Entity List effective 22 September 2020, covering entities in China, Hong Kong, Iran, Pakistan, Canada, Malaysia, Oman, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK. All 47 entities were determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. For 39 of the 47 entities BIS imposed a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption-of-denial review policy; the remaining eight face case-by-case review. The round targeted Iranian dual-use procurement networks, Chinese military-affiliated research institutes, and Pakistan-linked proliferators, reinforcing the layered export-control perimeter across multiple adversary programs simultaneously.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding sixty entities under sixty-one entries to the Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744), effective August 27, 2020. The designated entities, spanning China, Hong Kong, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Switzerland, and the UAE, were found to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. The rule also revised five existing entries under Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Iran, and the UAE.