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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 18 September 2026 the President signed a proclamation extending Proclamation 10973 (originally issued 19 September 2025), which conditions issuance/entry on new H-1B specialty-occupation petitions on a $100,000 payment by the sponsoring employer, for a further 12 months through 21 September 2027 (exceptions remain at DHS Secretary discretion for national-interest cases). Alongside it the President signed a companion executive order, "Enhancing Program Integrity and Interagency Coordination in the Administration of the H-1B Nonimmigrant Visa Program," directing DHS, State and Labor to coordinate review of H-1B petitions and consult Commerce, Education and SBA on employment data, with heightened scrutiny for employers with recent or planned US-worker layoffs. The accompanying fact sheet cites a 92% drop in H-1B registrations by the largest IT-outsourcing firms (24,946 to 2,055) and a ~97% decrease in consular H-1B processing requests since the original 2025 proclamation. ## Severity basis Quant anchor from the primary source: $100,000 flat fee per covered H-1B petition, extended for a further 12-month term (through 2027-09-21); a measured 92% reduction in H-1B registrations by the largest IT-outsourcing filers (24,946 → 2,055) and a ~97% drop in consular H-1B processing requests attributed to the fee regime since its 2025 introduction. Severity 4/5: a binding, renewed cost barrier with a demonstrated order-of-magnitude effect on offshore-staffing-dependent filers, not a one-off or symbolic measure.
President Trump signed H.R. 5334, the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, into law on 18 September 2026, after the House concurred in Senate amendments on 16 September 2026 (262-159) and the Senate passed it on 7 August 2026 (86-11). The Act authorizes a 500% tariff on all US imports of Russian-origin goods and up to 100% tariffs on the top five importers of Russian oil and gas and the top five countries supporting Russia's oil "shadow fleet," alongside sanctions on Russian banks, the Russian financial system, and shadow-fleet vessels. It also extends the Iran Sanctions Act through 2031. All tariff/sanctions authority is discretionary: the President may decline to impose it by certifying to Congress that doing so serves the national interest, and may terminate it if Russia agrees to a durable peace with Ukraine. The Act sunsets five years after enactment.
The US Department of Commerce issued a preliminary affirmative determination (case A-570-228) that tin mill products from China are being sold in the US at less than fair value, finding a China-wide dumping margin of 136.52% based on adverse facts available (no Chinese producer/exporter responded to the investigation), adjusted to a 130.17% cash deposit rate after offsetting the parallel countervailing-duty determination. Commerce also made a preliminary affirmative finding of critical circumstances, extending provisional measures and cash-deposit collection retroactively. The investigation was petitioned by United States Steel Corporation and the United Steelworkers union; final determinations are scheduled for around 1 December 2026.
The US Department of Commerce issued a preliminary affirmative countervailing duty determination (case C-570-229) finding that producers/exporters of tin mill products from China received countervailable subsidies at a rate of 66.61% ad valorem, applied both to the individually-examined respondents (Shougang Holding Trade (Hong Kong) Ltd. and Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.) and to the all-others rate, based on facts available with adverse inferences after non-cooperation. Commerce also made a preliminary affirmative finding of critical circumstances, and directed CBP to suspend liquidation and collect cash deposits on entries from the date of publication. The final CVD determination is aligned to issue alongside the companion antidumping determination, currently scheduled no later than 2026-11-30.
On September 14, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company under Executive Order 13902 (Iran financial-sector sanctions), citing correspondent banking relationships VTB built with sanctioned Iranian financial institutions and settlement systems VTB created for bilateral rial/ruble trade that Treasury says moved frozen Iranian assets. VTB was already designated under EO 13662 (2025) and EO 14024 (2022) for Russia-related conduct; this action adds an Iran-sanctions legal basis and SDN listing, part of the broader "Operation Economic Outcast" campaign Secretary Bessent announced August 24, 2026. No specific dollar figure for the moved assets was disclosed.
On 9 September 2026 President Trump signed five proclamations under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 responding to Canada's 8 September 2026 retaliatory tariffs on roughly $20bn of US exports (steel, dairy, agricultural equipment). The proclamations impose outright import bans on certain Canadian alcoholic-beverage and dairy products that had been subject to the 50% Section 338 duties imposed 22 August 2026 (following Canada's continued discrimination against US alcohol and dairy commerce), and separately exclude certain Canadian motor-vehicle-sector products from importation for the same reason. The proclamations also modify the product scope of the July 20, 2026 Section 338 tariff actions, removing items such as rock salt and cement and adding others, including all-terrain vehicles and additional dairy products. The import bans take effect 29 September 2026; the product-list modifications take effect 15 September 2026. The duties/bans apply regardless of USMCA origin and stack on top of Section 232 tariffs.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14420 on 26 August 2026, declaring a national emergency under IEEPA and the National Emergencies Act over foreign threats to the US bulk-power system. The order generally prohibits the acquisition, import, transfer, or installation of foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment — transformers, inverters, battery storage, generators, circuit breakers, turbines, and industrial control systems, including associated software and remote-access capabilities — where a transaction involves a "Covered Foreign Entity" and poses a risk of sabotage, unauthorized access, or catastrophic disruption to critical infrastructure. Local electric distribution facilities are excluded. No countries or companies are named in the order itself; DOE must publish implementing rules within 120 days (by 24 December 2026) identifying covered equipment and entities, and submit recommended Federal Acquisition Regulation revisions within 180 days.
Canada's Department of Finance published an updated list of over 700 US-origin products subject to counter-tariffs effective 2026-09-08, covering CA$27.6 billion of US imports across steel, aluminium, dairy, appliances, agricultural equipment, pulp/paper and electronics. Rates (15%, 25% or 50% depending on product) are matched dollar-for-dollar to the corresponding US Section 338/232 tariffs on the same goods, explicitly countering the United States' 22 August 2026 decision to impose a 50% tariff on CA$27.6 billion of Canadian goods. Steel and aluminium flat-rolled products carry the top 50% counter-rate.
On 24 August 2026, the Director of OFAC, in consultation with the Department of State and pursuant to 31 CFR 560.802, determined that section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13902 shall apply to the aviation, digital asset, gold, shipping, and technology sectors of the Iranian economy, effective the same day and formally published in the Federal Register on 27 August 2026 (FR Doc 2026-17487). The determination — part of a Treasury campaign publicly branded "Operation Economic Outcast" — exposes any person operating in, or knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer of significant goods or services to or from, these five sectors to secondary-sanctions and SDN-listing risk under E.O. 13902, and extends potential correspondent/ payable-through account restrictions to foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate such transactions. OFAC did not publish sector definitions and concurrently suspended several general licenses covering educational exchange, personal remittance, conference, and academic/ sports-exchange activity with Iran (administered separately via GL AA and GL BB, wind-down through 8 September 2026).
President Trump signed a Section 232 proclamation on 13 August 2026 (published in the Federal Register 19 August 2026, FR doc 2026-16979) imposing tariffs on unmanned aircraft systems (UAS/drones) and components, following a Commerce Department finding that US reliance on foreign-produced (chiefly Chinese, e.g. DJI/Autel) drones and critical components creates supply-chain and cybersecurity national- security risk. A 100% ad valorem tariff applies to Annex I items (drones with maximum takeoff weight over 25kg, thermal-imaging drones, docking stations, and listed critical components); a 25% ad valorem tariff applies to Annex II items (other listed UAS). Qualifying-origin content from the EU, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan and Liechtenstein is capped at 15%; UK-origin content is capped at 10%. UAS duties take effect 3 September 2026; component duties take effect 9 February 2027. The proclamation also authorizes Commerce to set up an onshoring program giving temporary relief to firms committing to build or expand US production of covered drones and components.
The White House announced over $2 billion in direct federal investment across eight critical-minerals and battery-material companies, funded through the Department of War (formerly DOD), the Export-Import Bank, and the Development Finance Corporation. The largest awards are $1.4 billion to Sila Nanotechnologies for silicon-carbon battery anodes and lithium-ion cell manufacturing, $400 million to Sunrise Energy Metals for a scandium value chain, and $150 million to Niron Magnetics for rare-earth-free permanent magnet production in Minnesota. An additional $180 million was committed to mining-workforce education across 17 schools.
BIS published a temporary final rule under DPA section 101 (following a Presidential Determination dated July 30, 2026 that recoverable critical minerals and materials are scarce and essential to national defense) requiring U.S. persons to allocate 100 percent of their monthly sales of black mass (shredded lithium-ion battery scrap containing lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese and graphite) and tungsten waste and scrap to other U.S. persons, effectively barring export of these materials without an explicit BIS adjustment or exception. The order takes effect August 27, 2026, runs for one year through August 27, 2027, and BIS is accepting public comments through November 4, 2026 on whether additional sales requirements are needed. This is the first US DPA/export-control action targeting the recycling and secondary-materials stage of the critical minerals supply chain, rather than primary mining or refining.
BIS published a final rule removing the UAE from Export Administration Regulations Country Groups D:3 and D:4 and adding it to Country Group A:5 — the tier reserved for the closest US allies. The change unlocks License Exception STA (military items, commercial satellites/spacecraft, and dual-use goods for oil/gas, desalination and civil nuclear power) plus several other license exceptions, and grants the UAE government and BIS-preapproved entities (currently G42 and Core42 only, per Supplement No. 8) license-free export of advanced computing items. Preapproved private entities have a 270-day window to become majority US-owned or lose automatic eligibility; other private UAE entities must still petition BIS case-by-case.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 23 of 2026 on June 22, 2026, adding 10 US entities to the Export Control Management List under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The listing prohibits Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to these entities and bars any global party from transferring China-origin dual-use goods to them; ongoing transactions are suspended pending MOFCOM approval. The 10 entities include the two largest non-Chinese rare earth producers — MP Materials Corp. (Mountain Pass, CA) and USA Rare Earth Inc. (Round Top, TX) — as well as eight US defence firms (Aveox, Red Cat Holdings, Teal Drones, IMSAR, Jaia Robotics, Ball Aerospace, Oshkosh Defense, L3Harris Maritime). MOFCOM explicitly framed the action as retaliation for the US DoD's June 8, 2026 update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies list, which added ~80 Chinese parent firms and 188 affiliates.
On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense published its annual update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies (CMIC) list, adding 65 entities (17 new parent companies and 48 subsidiaries), bringing the total to approximately 188–200 designated entities. Major additions span EV and battery manufacturing (BYD, NIO, CATL), consumer internet (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent), semiconductors (SMIC, YMTC, CXMT), solar (JA Solar, Trina Solar), biotech (BGI Genomics, WuXi AppTec), drones/robotics (DJI, Unitree, RoboSense), and telecoms (TP-Link). Effective June 30, 2026, DoD is prohibited from procuring goods, services, or technology directly from listed entities; effective June 30, 2027, the ban extends to indirect supply-chain procurement through prime contractors and all sub-tiers.
On 8 May 2026 the US Department of Commerce and South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIR) signed the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Initiative (KUSPI) MOU, establishing a standing bilateral platform covering commercial shipbuilding cooperation, workforce development, industrial modernisation, and maritime manufacturing investment. The agreement creates the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center in Washington D.C. (expected operational later in 2026) as the permanent coordination mechanism for technical exchanges, shipyard productivity improvement projects, FDI into the US maritime industrial base, and joint workforce training. KUSPI operationalises the $150 bn Korean investment sub-pledge to US shipbuilding — itself a tranche of the broader $350 bn / $20 bn-annual-cap commitment under the December 2025 US-Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal — and structurally positions the US-ROK allied axis as the coordinated civilian shipbuilding counterweight to China's dominant global shipyard share.
On 2 May 2026, MOFCOM issued Announcement No. 21 of 2026 — the first concrete prohibition order ever issued under China's 2021 "Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures" (Blocking Rules) and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL). The order prohibits any Chinese organisation, individual, or foreign party operating in China from recognising, enforcing, or complying with US sanctions imposed under Executive Orders 13902 and 13846 against five Chinese independent ("teapot") refineries — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refining Co., Ltd., Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd., Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group Co., Ltd., Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd., and Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. — all designated by OFAC for purchasing Iranian crude. The announcement is the first operational test of the framework built up across the AFSL (2021), the AFSL Implementation Regulations (Order 803, March 2025), and State Council Order 835 on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (April 2026), and creates a direct compliance conflict for banks, insurers, traders, and shipping companies operating in or with China that had been winding down their exposure to the listed refineries.
On May 1, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated China-based independent ("teapot") refinery Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. — described as China's second-largest teapot — together with approximately 40 shipping firms and vessels operating as part of Iran's shadow fleet. OFAC sanctioned 19 shadow-fleet vessels (crude, LPG, and petrochemical tankers) as blocked property of designated owners or managers. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors) in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. Treasury press release SB0472. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License W authorising the wind-down of transactions involving the persons newly blocked on May 1, 2026, and published a structurally novel Iran-related Alert, "Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage." The Alert states that payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC — directly or indirectly — for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz are not authorised for US persons (including US financial institutions) or US-owned/-controlled foreign entities. OFAC also issued new FAQ 1250 to accompany the Alert and GL W. The wave is one of the largest single-day Iran enforcement actions of the Trump 2.0 administration. Treasury characterises it as part of a campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The Strait of Hormuz Alert is the operational US response to Iranian regulatory threats against the ~20% of global oil and ~25% of global LNG transiting Hormuz, putting tanker owners, P&I clubs, flag states, and oil-buyer compliance teams on direct notice.
The Office of the United States Trade Representative released the 2026 Special 301 Report on 30 April 2026, designating Vietnam as a Priority Foreign Country (PFC) — the most severe category under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2242). This is the first PFC designation since Ukraine held the status from 2013 through 2015, a gap of approximately 11 years. The PFC designation triggers a statutory 30-day window (expiring ~30 May 2026) within which USTR must decide whether to initiate a Section 301 investigation under 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A), which could lead to tariffs, withdrawal of trade benefits, or other Section 301 enforcement remedies against Vietnam. Separately, the EU was added to the Watch List for the first time, citing AI training-data, geographical-indications, and customs-enforcement concerns.
On April 24, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added 19 entities and 19 vessels to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. The action is the first OFAC designation of a Chinese independent ("teapot") refinery — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., described as one of Iran's largest single customers for crude oil and petroleum products, having purchased billions of US dollars' worth since at least 2023 from cargoes brokered by Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (the oil sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff, controlled by the Ministry of Defense / MODAFL). Co-designations span shipping firms and vessels registered in China, Hong Kong, Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Vietnam. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License V authorising a 30-day wind-down (through May 24, 2026) of transactions involving Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. and certain majority-owned entities. Treasury press release SB0472 ("Economic Fury Targets Global Network Fueling Iran's Oil Trade and Shadow Fleet") frames the action as part of the maximum-pressure campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The April 24 designations directly triggered the first-ever operational use of China's Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Announcement No. 21 of May 2, 2026) and preceded a second OFAC Iran wave on May 1, 2026 (General License W + Strait of Hormuz Sanctions Risk Alert).
The US Department of Commerce published preliminary affirmative antidumping duty (AD) determinations on April 23, 2026 (Federal Register publication April 28, 2026), finding that crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (whether or not assembled into modules) from India, Indonesia, and Laos are being sold in the US at less than fair value. Preliminary dumping margins are 123.04% for India, 35.17% for Indonesia, and 22.46% for Laos, with Commerce ordering US Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting AD cash deposits at those rates (107.77% adjusted cash-deposit rate for India; 22.06% for Laos). This runs parallel to, and stacks on top of, the CVD case on the same merchandise and countries (see responds_to), meaning combined AD+CVD cash-deposit burdens on subject imports now exceed 100% for all three origins. Final AD determinations are due July 13, 2026 (India, Indonesia) and September 9, 2026 (Laos).
President Trump issued five Presidential Determinations on 20 April 2026 under Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. § 4533), invoking the authority granted by Executive Order 14156 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency, signed 20 January 2025). The five determinations cover: (1) domestic petroleum production, refining, and logistics; (2) large-scale energy and energy-related infrastructure development, manufacturing, and deployment; (3) natural gas transmission, processing, storage, and LNG capacity; (4) coal supply chains and baseload power generation; (5) grid infrastructure, equipment, and supply chain. Each determination authorises the relevant Cabinet Secretary (primarily Energy) to use DPA §303 powers — direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase commitments, and equity investments — to expand domestic capacity in the named category.
On 2 April 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 ("Adjusting Imports of Pharmaceuticals and Pharmaceutical Ingredients into the United States") imposing a 100% ad valorem tariff on imports of patented pharmaceutical products listed in the FDA Orange Book and Purple Book, together with the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and key starting materials used to make them. The base rate takes effect at 12:01 a.m. EDT on 31 July 2026 for the 17 manufacturers identified in Annex III, and on 29 September 2026 for all other companies. The proclamation adopts findings of the Section 232 investigation initiated by the Department of Commerce on 14 April 2025 into pharmaceuticals and APIs as a national- security supply-chain risk. The instrument is structured around a multi-tier rate ladder rather than a flat tariff: concessionary 15% rates for EU/Japan/South Korea/Switzerland/Liechtenstein under reciprocal-deal tracks, 10% for the UK with a pathway to 0% under the pending UK pharmaceutical agreement, a "+20%" surcharge for companies operating under a Commerce-approved onshoring plan (until 2 April 2030), and a 0% pathway for companies that combine an approved onshoring plan with an MFN-pricing agreement with HHS (until 20 January 2029). Generics, biosimilars and their ingredients, orphan drugs, nuclear medicines, plasma-derived therapies, fertility treatments, and cell/gene therapies are carved out.
On 19 March 2026, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, METI, and Ministry of Finance jointly released the "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" — the operational follow-on to the 27 October 2025 US-Japan Framework. The Action Plan formally commits both governments to develop a plurilateral trade initiative in critical minerals "supported by price floors or other measures", to consult on embedding "border-adjusted price floors" in a binding plurilateral agreement, and to identify specific mining/processing/manufacturing projects in the US, Japan, or third countries for prioritised joint financing. It is the first formal US/Japan trade-policy commitment to administered floor-pricing as an instrument of critical-minerals trade governance, and explicitly invites third countries to join the contemplated plurilateral.
On 11 March 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated parallel Section 301 investigations into the acts, policies, and practices of 16 economies — China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India — relating to structural excess capacity and overproduction in manufacturing sectors. The Federal Register notice (FR doc 2026-05214; dockets USTR-2026-0067 and USTR-2026-0068) was published on 17 March 2026. Covered sectors include aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, energy goods, glass, machine tools, machinery, paper, plastics, processed food and beverages, robotics, satellites, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, steel, and transportation equipment. Written comments were due by 15 April 2026; USTR held the public hearing beginning 5 May 2026. This is the most sweeping multi-economy Section 301 initiative since the 2018 China investigation and is structurally distinct from the China-only 2024-05-14 §301 tariff hikes and the 2025-07-15 Brazil §301 investigation.
The European Commission on 4 March 2026 adopted COM(2026) 100 final, the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), the central horizontal industrial- policy instrument of the 2024-29 Commission term. The proposal targets raising EU manufacturing's share of GDP from 14.3% (2024) to at least 20% by 2035 via three pillars: (i) demand-side "Made in EU" and low-carbon public-procurement preferences for strategic sectors; (ii) FDI conditionality on investments above €100 million from countries with >40% global manufacturing share in batteries, EVs, solar PV or critical raw materials; (iii) accelerated permitting through a one-stop-shop and member-state-designated Industrial Acceleration Areas. The IAA is a proposal — co-decision adoption is expected mid-to-late 2027.
The US Department of Commerce published preliminary affirmative countervailing duty (CVD) determinations on February 26, 2026, finding that producers and exporters of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (whether or not assembled into modules) from India, Indonesia, and Laos received countervailable government subsidies. Preliminary subsidy rates are 125.87% for India; 85.99%–143.30% by individual Indonesian producer (104.38% all-others rate); and a uniform 80.67% for Laos. Commerce ordered US Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting cash deposits at these rates on subject imports pending a parallel antidumping investigation and final determinations later in 2026. The case originated from a petition filed in August 2025 by US crystalline silicon PV manufacturers.
President Trump signed Executive Order "Ending Certain Tariff Actions" on 20 February 2026 (Federal Register doc 2026-03832, published 25 February 2026), terminating the additional ad-valorem duties imposed under nine prior IEEPA-based executive orders. The order followed within hours of the US Supreme Court's 6-3 decision the same day in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President to impose tariffs and vacating the Trump 2.0 IEEPA tariff regime. The EO directs CBP to cease collection "as soon as practicable"; CSMS guidance set the collection-end date at 12:00 a.m. eastern on 24 February 2026. The order explicitly preserves all underlying national-emergency declarations and all non-IEEPA trade actions — Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Section 301 of the Trade Act, Section 122 of the Trade Act, and Section 201 — so the Section 232 cascade and the paired Section 122 10% temporary surcharge (effective 24 Feb 2026) remain in force. This is the first SCOTUS-driven repeal of a presidential tariff regime in the modern era and recalibrates the entire post-2024 US tariff architecture by removing IEEPA as a legal pillar.
President Trump signed a Presidential Proclamation on 20 February 2026 invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132) to impose a temporary 10% ad-valorem import surcharge on articles imported into the United States, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 24 February 2026. The proclamation was issued within hours of the US Supreme Court's 20 February 2026 ruling in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to set tariffs and vacated the IEEPA-based reciprocal-tariff regime previously in effect. The Section 122 surcharge is statutorily limited to 150 days (terminates 24 July 2026 absent Congressional extension) and the statute caps any such surcharge at 15% ad valorem. Goods qualifying as USMCA originating from Canada or Mexico are exempt; CAFTA-DR textile/apparel articles meeting specified rules of origin are exempt; and a substantial product-exception list excludes critical minerals, energy products, certain pharmaceuticals, electronics, vehicles, aerospace products, specified agricultural goods, and goods already subject to Section 232 duties (the Section 122 duty does not stack on Section 232).
On 19 February 2026 Presidents Trump and Prabowo finalised the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) between the United States and Indonesia. The deal locks the US reciprocal tariff on Indonesian imports at 19% (down from the 32% threatened in April 2025), with 0% on a defined list of products and a textile/apparel quota benchmarked to US-cotton/MMF inputs. Indonesia commits to remove export restrictions on all industrial commodities — explicitly including critical minerals across the full value chain — and to grant US investors national treatment in mineral exploration, mining, processing and export. Indonesia also agrees to eliminate tariff barriers on >99% of US-origin goods, while a Freeport-McMoRan MOU extends the Grasberg copper-mine licence (~USD 10bn/yr revenue, world's 2nd largest copper mine) and a parallel commercial package totalling ~USD 33bn (energy USD 15bn, aerospace incl. Boeing USD 13.5bn, agriculture USD 4.5bn) is signed alongside.
On 12 February 2026, Ambassador Jamieson Greer of the Office of the United States Trade Representative oversaw the signing of the US-Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) in Washington, DC. The instrument was signed under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO). Headline terms: (i) US IEEPA reciprocal-tariff rate on Taiwan reduced from 20% to 15% and Section 232 auto-parts/timber/lumber rate cut from 25% to 15%; (ii) Taiwan eliminates or reduces 99% of its tariff barriers on US goods, most immediately and the remainder phased over three years; (iii) Taiwan side commits ~USD 85bn in directed purchases through 2029 (USD 44.4bn LNG/crude, USD 15.2bn civil aircraft and engines, USD 25.2bn power equipment); (iv) sectoral chapters covering tariffs, non-tariff barriers, digital trade, economic security, and high-tech supply-chain resilience. Operationally linked to the 15 January 2026 AIT-TECRO Memorandum of Understanding on investment, under which Taiwan pledges USD 250bn in direct Taiwanese-enterprise investment in the US plus USD 250bn in Taiwan-government credit guarantees (USD 500bn total) to fund US-side industrial parks/clusters in advanced semiconductors, energy, and AI manufacturing. Entry into force is conditional on Taiwan's Legislative Yuan completing its review.
On 10 February 2026 in Baku, US Vice President JD Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership — a foundational bilateral instrument covering five cooperation tracks: economy and trade, energy, connectivity and digital development (including AI), security and defense, and critical-minerals transit. The Charter commits both governments to facilitate the transit of critical minerals via the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor to global markets, and formally recognises the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) as the multi-modal connectivity link between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The instrument builds on the 8 August 2025 MoU signed in Washington during the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Summit that established the Strategic Working Group tasked with drafting the Charter, and marks the first US Vice-Presidential visit to Azerbaijan since Dick Cheney in 2008.
On 6 February 2026 Presidents Trump and Modi announced a framework for an Interim Trade Agreement that resets the bilateral tariff posture installed in 2025. Two operative instruments: (i) an executive order signed 6 February eliminating, effective 7 February 2026, the additional 25% IEEPA "Russian-oil" duty on Indian imports imposed by EO 14329 (27 August 2025), conditional on India's commitment to cease buying Russian crude and to expand defence cooperation; and (ii) reduction of the EO 14257 reciprocal-tariff rate on India from 25% to 18% on listed product categories (textiles and apparel, leather and footwear, plastics and rubber, organic chemicals, home décor, artisanal products, certain machinery), to take effect on finalisation of the Interim Agreement. India commits to eliminate or reduce tariffs on all US industrial goods and a wide range of agricultural products (DDGs, red sorghum, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, soybean oil, wine, spirits) and to purchase >USD 500bn of US energy, ICT, coal, aircraft and aircraft parts, and precious-metals products over five years. The framework also commits the parties to negotiating "robust, ambitious, and mutually beneficial digital trade rules" and to addressing non-tariff barriers in medical devices, ICT import licensing, and food/agricultural standards. US tariff reductions on Indian generic pharmaceuticals, gems, diamonds, aircraft parts, and certain automotive components are flagged as contingent on completion of the full Interim Agreement.
On 4 February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio launched the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) at the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, DC, attended by representatives from 54 countries and the European Commission. FORGE is the successor to the 2022 Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and is structured as a plurilateral coalition that creates a preferential trade-and-investment zone for critical minerals, including coordinated price-floor mechanisms designed to counter adversarial market manipulation — explicitly framed against Chinese mineral-supply dominance. The Republic of Korea chairs FORGE through June 2026. Eleven bilateral critical-minerals frameworks/MoUs were signed simultaneously (Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, UAE, UK, Uzbekistan), and FORGE is paired with Project Vault, an EXIM Bank direct loan facility of up to USD 10 billion to back FORGE-aligned critical-mineral projects.
On 2 February 2026 the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) Board approved a Direct Loan of up to USD 10 billion to an independently governed public-private partnership establishing the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve ("Project Vault"), alongside nearly USD 2 billion of private-sector investment for an envelope of approximately USD 12 billion. The reserve will physically stockpile the 60 minerals on the USGS 2025 Critical Minerals List across multiple US storage facilities, with participating original equipment manufacturers (Clarios, GE Vernova, Western Digital, Boeing) committing to specific volumes and grades and trading partners (Hartree Partners, Mercuria Americas, Traxys) handling sourcing. EXIM characterises the transaction as the largest single financing in its 92-year history and the first use of EXIM authority as the financing vehicle for a domestic strategic-minerals stockpile rather than for export-credit insurance abroad.
The US Department of Commerce's CHIPS Program Office, invoking authority under the CHIPS and Science Act, signed a non-binding letter of intent on 2026-01-26 to provide USA Rare Earth with up to $277 million in direct federal funding and a $1.3 billion senior secured loan. The funding backs a "mine-to-magnet" vertically integrated supply chain: a rare earth mine at Round Top, Texas (commercial production targeted 2028) and a neodymium-iron-boron magnet and rare-earth-metals manufacturing facility in Stillwater, Oklahoma. In exchange, Commerce receives roughly 16.1 million USAR common shares and warrants for a further 17.6 million shares. The agreements were finalized as definitive on 2026-06-03, unlocking access to up to $1.6 billion combined with the federal award, alongside a separately raised $1.5 billion in private capital.
On 2026-01-26 the US Department of Commerce initiated countervailing duty (anti-subsidy) investigations covering van-type trailers and subassemblies thereof from Canada, China, and Mexico, companion to the antidumping investigation covering the same product and countries. On 2026-06-05 Commerce published preliminary affirmative CVD determinations: China received an 82.37% subsidy rate for CIMC Baowell Industries/Qingdao CIMC Reefer Trailer and all other exporters, and a 128.78% adverse-inference rate for non-responsive companies; Mexico received rates of 1.90-1.95% for cooperating respondents (Hyundai de Mexico, Utility Trailer Manufacturing de México) and a 62.67% adverse-inference rate for five non-responsive companies. The Canada CVD investigation was terminated on 2026-05-27 after the petitioner withdrew that portion of the petition. Cash deposits at the preliminary rates began on Federal Register publication; final CVD determinations are scheduled for 2026-08-24 (China) and 2026-10-13 (Mexico).
On 16 January 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 individuals and entities and identified one vessel for transferring oil products, procuring weapons and dual-use equipment, and providing financial services to Iran-backed Ansarallah (the Houthis). Designated parties — oil-trading and exchange companies, a shipping/logistics facilitator, and front-company operatives — are based in Yemen, Oman, and the UAE, and are accused of running an oil-sales and financial- facilitation network that Treasury says generates the Houthis over $2 billion in annual illicit revenue. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on a multi-year cadence of prior OFAC designations against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and weapons-procurement suppliers.
The US Department of Commerce issued affirmative preliminary countervailing duty (CVD) determinations on hardwood and decorative plywood from China, Indonesia, and Vietnam, finding countervailable government subsidies in all three countries. Preliminary subsidy rates are 81.34% for China, 2.40% to 128.66% for Indonesia (case-by-case, non-cooperating producer PT Mustika Buana Sejahtera at the top of the range), and 4.37% to 26.75% for Vietnam. Commerce published the determinations in the Federal Register on 22 January 2026, triggering CBP collection of cash deposits at these rates pending final determinations. A parallel antidumping (AD) investigation on the same product and countries runs on a separate track (see responds_to) with preliminary AD margins of 187.27% (China), up to 84.94% (Indonesia), and 196.14% (Vietnam) announced 25 February 2026 — AD and CVD duties stack cumulatively.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 18 individuals and entities that make up the "rahbar" shadow-banking networks of sanctioned Iranian banks Bank Melli and Shahr Bank, including Singapore-based Golden Mist PTE Ltd, UAE-based Empire International Trading FZE and HMS Trading FZE, Iran-based Nikan Pezhvak Aria Kish Company and Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm, and UK-based Nanshan Ltd. Separately, OFAC designated senior Iranian security officials, including SCNS Secretary Ali Larijani, for their role in the regime's violent crackdown on peaceful protesters that began in December 2025. The financial designations were made under E.O. 13902 (Iran's financial/petroleum/petrochemical sectors) and the human-rights designations under E.O. 13553 and E.O. 13876, in furtherance of NSPM-2; Treasury noted it sanctioned more than 875 persons, vessels, and aircraft under the same maximum-pressure campaign in 2025.
On 14 January 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 titled "Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States". Unlike the parallel 14 January 2026 semiconductor proclamation and the subsequent April 2026 pharmaceutical proclamation, the PCMDP proclamation does NOT immediately impose tariffs. Instead it directs the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to jointly negotiate bilateral and plurilateral supply agreements with trading partners, with an initial 180-day status report due 13 July 2026. The proclamation reserves residual authority to impose tariffs if negotiations fail or prove ineffective, and explicitly contemplates "price floors" on PCMDP imports as a negotiated instrument.
On 14 January 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 imposing a 25% ad valorem tariff on imports of certain advanced computing chips and their derivative products, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 15 January 2026. The measure adopts findings of the Section 232 investigation initiated 1 April 2025 (Department of Commerce report transmitted 22 December 2025) into semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and derivative products. Coverage is narrowly drawn to high-performance AI accelerators meeting specified technical parameters (publicly characterised as covering devices in the NVIDIA H200 / AMD MI325X performance tier), with broad use-based exemptions for chips going into US data centres, US R&D, US repairs, and other uses deemed to strengthen domestic supply chains.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule (RIN 0694-AK43, 91 FR 1684, signed 13 January 2026, effective 15 January 2026) revising the EAR license-review policy for exports of certain advanced-computing integrated circuits to end-users in China and Macau from a presumption of denial to case-by-case review. Eligibility is limited to commodities controlled under ECCN 3A090.a and 3A090.b with a Total Processing Performance (TPP) below 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth below 6,500 GB/s — the band that covers NVIDIA H200 and AMD MI325X-equivalents and below. To qualify, exporters must certify (i) sufficiency of US supply such that the export will not delay domestic orders or divert foundry capacity, (ii) that aggregate TPP of advanced-node ICs exported to China or Macau will not exceed 50% of domestic shipments, (iii) compliance with end-use and end-user prohibitions, and (iv) prior performance review by a qualified independent third-party testing lab headquartered in the United States. The rule is the first material rollback of the October 2022 / October 2023 / December 2024 advanced-computing export-control architecture and operationalises the Trump-administration policy of trading H200-class chip access against Chinese cooperation on critical minerals, fentanyl precursors and Taiwan-strait restraint.
The US Department of Energy announced $2.7 billion in task-order funding over ten years to rebuild domestic uranium enrichment capacity: $900 million each to American Centrifuge Operating and General Matter to develop high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) enrichment capacity, $900 million to Orano Federal Services to expand low-enriched uranium (LEU) enrichment capacity, and $28 million to Global Laser Enrichment for next-generation enrichment technology. DOE frames the awards as reducing US reliance on foreign — chiefly Russian — enriched uranium supply and securing fuel for the country's 94 commercial reactors and future advanced-reactor deployment, with funds distributed under a milestone-based accountability framework.
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 26 December 2025 that it is imposing countermeasures under Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 15 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign Sanctions against 20 US defense-related companies and 10 senior executives, in response to the Trump administration's 18 December 2025 announcement of roughly $11.1bn in arms sales to Taiwan — the largest single US weapons package for the island to date. Measures freeze the named entities' assets within China, prohibit organizations and individuals in China from transacting or cooperating with them, and deny visas/entry to the named executives. This is a Foreign Ministry Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law designation, distinct in legal basis from MOFCOM's parallel Unreliable Entity List mechanism used in prior 2025 Taiwan-arms-sale tranches (e.g. the 9 April 2025 six-firm UEL listing).
On 22 December 2025 the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau released Public Notice DA-25-1086, adding to the Covered List (under section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA) all unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country, plus communications and video-surveillance equipment/services produced by DJI Technologies and Autel Robotics (and their subsidiaries, affiliates, and licensing/JV partners). The designation is comprehensive by scope — every foreign-made drone from consumer quadcopters to large uncrewed systems, with no size/performance carve-out — and blocks the FCC from granting any new equipment authorization to covered UAS/components going forward. Previously authorized models already in the US market are not revoked. A follow-on Public Notice (DA-26-22, 7 January 2026) narrowed the scope with a temporary exemption (see amendments).
Section 851 of the FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 119-60), signed December 18, 2025, prohibits US federal agencies from procuring biotechnology equipment or services from designated "biotechnology companies of concern" (BCCs), and bars federal contractors from using such equipment/services in work performed under federal contracts, grants, or loans. The final enacted text ties initial BCC designations to DoD's existing §1260H Chinese-military-company list (which currently includes BGI and MGI, but not WuXi AppTec or WuXi Biologics) and directs OMB to designate additional BCCs within one year of enactment; operational prohibitions activate 60-90 days after FAR revision, with a five-year grandfather period for pre-existing contracts — enforcement is expected to begin in 2027-28. The legislation is the successor to H.R.8333 (118th Congress, House-passed September 2024 but stalled in the Senate before adjournment) and represents the first enacted US federal-procurement biotech-supply-chain-resilience statute.
President Trump signed the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 119-60) into law on 18 December 2025, incorporating the bipartisan DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act of 2025 (originating as H.R. 5299). The act reauthorizes the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation for six years, through 31 December 2031, and raises its Maximum Contingent Liability lending cap from $60 billion to $205 billion — an increase of over 300%. It also creates a new $5 billion Equity Revolving Fund at the Treasury Department, giving DFC a dedicated capital stream for direct equity investment (previously scored as a loss-making grant expenditure under budget rules), and raises DFC's permitted minority-equity stake in a portfolio company from 30% to 40%.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), signed into law on 18 December 2025, expands the Department of Defense's existing "covered materials" domestic- sourcing restriction (which already barred DoD contracting for SmCo/NdFeB magnets, tantalum and tungsten sourced from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea) to add gallium, germanium and molybdenum under Section 844. Restrictions on materials "melted or produced" in a covered nation take effect 31 December 2026, widening on 1 January 2027 to also cover materials "mined, refined, or separated" in a covered nation; the gallium/germanium additions specifically phase in on 18 December 2027. The same NDAA bundles two related supply-chain provisions: Section 867 gives DoD broader authority (contracts, grants, other-transaction agreements, equity-style investments, and anti-market-manipulation subsidies) to invest in the domestic industrial base for critical minerals, microelectronics, machine tools and other defense-relevant capacity, and Section 842 bars DoD from procuring advanced batteries whose cells or key components are owned, sourced, refined or produced by a foreign entity of concern, phased in 2028-2031.
On 11 December 2025 the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit, held in Washington D.C. on 12 December 2025, at which the United States, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Israel signed the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration. The declaration commits signatories to coordinate "trusted" supply chains across the full technology stack — software, frontier foundation models, network infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transportation logistics, minerals refining and processing, and energy — explicitly to reduce "coercive dependencies." The coalition has since expanded to add the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Qatar, Sweden and India (signed 20 February 2026 at the India AI Impact Summit), and on 26 March 2026 State announced a USD 250 million Pax Silica Fund intended to catalyse trusted-capital co-investment in critical-minerals processing and semiconductor supply chains.