Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

BIS issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR) on 21 January 2026 (effective 20 January 2026) easing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls on certain civil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technology. The IFR makes two changes: (i) ECCN 9A012.a.1 commercial UAVs with maximum endurance under one hour can now be exported License-Free (NLR) to most Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States (Country Group A:1, excluding Malta, Russia, Ukraine), versus the prior limitation to UK / Australia / Canada only; and (ii) License Exception STA (Strategic Trade Authorization) is expanded to cover certain MT-controlled UAVs that cannot deliver a 500kg payload to 300+ km — including long-range cargo-delivery drones and ECCN 9A120 agricultural-spraying UAVs — for export to Country Group A:5 partners and allies. The IFR implements the export-promotion directive in §6 of EO 14307 (Unleashing American Drone Dominance, 6 June 2025). Comment period closes 19 February 2026.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 32 entities to the Entity List, with the largest bloc — 23 entries — under the destination of China, plus India (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2). The rule also removed two addresses from one Russian entry (Intertech Rus LLC) and made 27 typographical corrections to existing entries. Several Chinese additions — including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, Sino IC Technology, GMC Semiconductor (Wuxi), and Chinese Academy of Sciences units (National Time Service Center; Aerospace Information Research Institute) — were given footnote 4 designations, extending the EAR's foreign-direct-product (FDP) reach to non-US-origin items destined for Russian military end use. Three Turkish entries (Atempo, EB Teknoloji, Dentun Elektronik) and one Indian entry (AR Sales Pvt Ltd) were footnote-3 Russian Procurement Entity designations. The rule is a final rule effective September 12, 2025; all listed parties are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

On 2 September 2025 the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule (90 FR 42315; FR Doc 2025-16724) revising the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to substantially relax export and reexport controls on Syria, consistent with Executive Order 14312 ("Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions", 30 June 2025) and the parallel post-Assad sanctions architecture (PAARSS, OFAC, 25 Sep 2025). The rule (i) revises previously restrictive licence-application review policies for items subject to the EAR to be more favourable, (ii) extends the geographic eligibility of existing license exceptions to Syria, and (iii) adds new license exceptions for Syria including for EAR99 items. The rule is effective on publication; section 6 of EO 14312 had already waived application of section 5(a)(1) of the Syria Accountability Act with respect to items on the Commerce Control List, and section 7 waived CBW Act sections 307(a)(5) and 307(b)(2)(C) restrictions on EAR-subject exports to Syria.

In its first major export-regulatory action of the second Trump administration, BIS amended the EAR to add 70 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (42), Iran (2), Pakistan (19), South Africa (3), and the United Arab Emirates (4), and modified four existing entries (France, Iran, Senegal, UK). New listings carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions available. Stated objectives include restricting China's acquisition of high-performance computing and quantum technologies for military use, impeding hypersonic-weapons development, disrupting Iran's UAV and defense procurement, and impairing Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. The rule also targets the Test Flying Academy of South Africa for using U.S.-origin items to train Chinese military pilots.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 87261; FR Doc 2024-25411) added 40 entities under 42 entries plus four addresses to the Entity List under the destinations China (11), India (5), Malaysia (2), Russia (13), Singapore (1), and Turkey (14), and modified 52 existing entries across China, Estonia, Finland, India, Turkey, the UAE and the UK. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish, Indian, Malaysian and Singaporean entities listed for transshipping controlled US-origin items to Russian defense end users; the 13 Russia entries cover chemical and biological warfare R&D and defense procurement networks. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy/presumption of denial; four China addresses get the narrower "CCL + EAR99 supp. 7" scope. Effective on publication 2024-11-01.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 84460, Doc 2024-24562) adding 26 entities to the Entity List across four destinations: six in China (aviation simulation for PLA modernisation; procurement for Iran WMD/UAV programs; evasive conduct), one in Egypt and three in the UAE (acquiring US civil aircraft parts for Russian buyers post-Ukraine invasion), and sixteen in Pakistan (nine front companies of Advanced Engineering Research Organization for Pakistan's cruise-missile and strategic-UAV programs, plus seven contributing to Pakistan's ballistic- missile program). The rule also removes two existing entries. All additions are licensed under a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items.

In a final rule published at 89 FR 84766 (FR Doc 2024-23932), the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove BIS licence requirements on certain spacecraft and related items — including remote-sensing spacecraft and on-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (OSAM) items — for exports and reexports to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The rule is effective immediately on publication (23 October 2024) and is part of a three-rule package modernising the US space-related export-control regime (companion IFR 2024-23958 broadens controls relief for ~40 additional destinations; companion proposed rule 2024-23975 floats a new License Exception Commercial Space Activities). The AU/CA/UK carve-out builds on the trilateral National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) framework.

In an interim final rule (IFR) published at 89 FR 84770 (FR Doc 2024-23958), the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to revise controls on spacecraft and related items. The rule shifts the reasons for control on "specially designed" parts, components, accessories, and attachments under ECCNs 9A004.x and 9A515.x from National Security Column 1 / Regional Stability Column 1 (NS1/RS1) to NS2/RS2 — eliminating BIS licensing requirements for roughly 40 destinations that only face NS2/RS2 controls on the Commerce Country Chart. The IFR also broadens License Exception STA-related provisions and expands support for NASA cooperative programmes. It is one of three companion rules (with FR Doc 2024-23932 and a parallel proposed rule on a new License Exception Commercial Space Activities) issued the same day to modernise the US space-related export-control regime.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule expanding the scope of the Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the "No Technology for Terror Act" (Public Law 118-50, Division N), signed by President Biden on April 24, 2024. The expanded rule extends EAR jurisdiction to additional foreign-produced items destined for Iran — including a broader set of items derived from U.S.-origin technology or software, or produced by plants/components that are themselves direct products of U.S.-origin technology — and requires a BIS license for their export, reexport, or in-country transfer to Iran. The rule also provides specified exclusions from the otherwise-applicable license requirements. The rule became effective on July 23, 2024 (publication July 26, 2024).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 55033; FR Doc 2024-14635) added six entries to the Entity List under the destinations of the People's Republic of China (2), South Africa (1), the United Arab Emirates (2), and the United Kingdom (1). The two PRC-based entries (Global Training Solutions Limited; Smartech Future Limited) were added for ties to an existing Entity List party and for training elements of the PRC military. The two UAE-based entries (Mega Fast Cargo LLC; Mega Technique General Trading) were added for repeated dilatory or evasive conduct during BIS end-use checks, including the provision of false, misleading, or incomplete information. The South Africa and United Kingdom entries were added for shipping or attempting to ship US export-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy of presumption of denial. The rule is effective on publication, 2024-07-03.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 8. Additions are under five destinations: China (8), Türkiye (2), Cyprus (1), Kyrgyzstan (1), and the United Arab Emirates (1). Removals span China (6), UAE (1) and Russia (1). The single Russian entry (EFO Ltd.) was removed from the UVL because BIS simultaneously moved it to the Entity List, allowing BIS to delete Russia entirely as a UVL destination. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting items subject to the EAR. Published and effective the same day, 3 July 2024 (89 FR 55036, FR Doc 2024-14642).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 41706; FR Doc 2024-10485) added 37 entities under 37 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of the People's Republic of China. BIS designated these parties for one or more of three rationales: (i) shipping US-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls, (ii) attempting to acquire US-origin items to support China's military modernisation or quantum-technology capabilities, and (iii) ties to the PRC high-altitude balloon that overflew the United States in late January–early February 2023. The designations span PRC technology companies (predominantly quantum-computing firms), manufacturing companies, and research institutes. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy of presumption of denial and no license exceptions available. The rule is effective 2024-05-09, with publication in the Federal Register on 2024-05-14.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule (FR Doc 2024-08622; Docket 240417-0112; 89 FR 30119) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the product scope of two Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules — the Iran FDP rule and the Russia/Belarus/Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine FDP rule in 15 CFR 734.9(f) — to cover the entirety of the Common High Priority List (CHPL), an HTS-6 list developed jointly with the EU, Japan and the UK that identifies items used in Russian weapons production. The CHPL scope adds basic commercial-grade microelectronics (integrated circuits, RF transceiver modules), test/manufacturing equipment for electronic components, and CNC machine tools to the perimeter, requiring a BIS licence when these foreign-produced items are exported, reexported or transferred to Iran, Russia, Belarus or occupied Crimea. The rule was issued in response to Iran's 13 April 2024 attack on Israel and Iran's ongoing military support for the Russian war in Ukraine; it became effective 18 April 2024 (Federal Register publication 22 April 2024) with a transit grace period for in-flight shipments until 20 May 2024.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 25503; FR Doc 2024-07760) added 11 entries to the Entity List under China (6), Russia (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2), effective 2024-04-11. The primary rationale for the Russia and UAE tranches — and at least one China entity (Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology) — is procurement of US-controlled dual-use aerospace and UAV components for Iran's Shahed- series UAV programme via the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); those drones have been used against oil tankers in the Middle East and deployed by Russia in Ukraine. The remaining five China entities were designated for acquiring US-origin items to support China's military modernisation. The rule also adds one alias to the existing entry for Shanghai Biren Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. This action was the first Entity List final rule published after BIS implemented the 50 Percent Rule for controlling foreign subsidiaries of listed entities.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 14385; FR Doc 2024-03969; Docket 240215-0050; RIN 0694-AJ54) added 93 entities under 95 entries to the Entity List, effective 23 February 2024, with destinations Russia (63), Turkey (16), China (8), UAE (4), Kyrgyzstan (2), India (1), and South Korea (1). The dominant rationale is enforcement of Russia-diversion controls: 46 Russian defense manufacturers are designated as military end users acquiring US-origin items for Russia's armed forces, five Chinese entities (including Dennex Enterprises Limited and Shenzhen Speed Industrial Materials Co.) are cited for facilitating diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia, and 16 Turkish firms are cited as procurement hubs obtaining US-origin items of importance to Russia's war effort. Four UAE entities are designated for transshipment networks serving both Russia and Iran. All entities are subject to a presumption of denial for EAR-controlled items; Russian military end users are additionally subject to the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (15 CFR 734.9(g)).

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-01408, 89 FR 4804, effective 23 January 2024) strengthens the EAR sanctions architecture against Russia and Belarus by adding 94 HTS-6 entries to the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions (§746.5/§746.8) — covering hand tools, parachutes, aircraft training simulators, and airplane/helicopter components — and expands the de minimis threshold for foreign-made goods incorporating US-origin 600-series and 9×515 items destined for Russia or Belarus. A parallel provision targets Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia by adding HTS code 852910 (antennas and antenna reflectors) to the §746.7 Iran export-control list. The rule also refines Crimea licensing to permit exports supporting Ukrainian Armed Forces deployments in occupied territories.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed three persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective January 19, 2024 because BIS was able to verify their bona fides pursuant to § 744.15(c)(2) of the EAR. The three removed parties are Skymount Drones (Canada), Plexus (Xiamen) Co., Ltd. (China), and Delma Industrial Supply & Marine Services (UAE). Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and removes the requirement for a signed UVL Statement before US exporters ship items subject to the EAR to these parties.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex agreed at Technical Experts Meetings in 2018, 2019, and 2021, revising six ECCNs (1C111, 2A101, 2B119, 6A107, 9A101, and 9E515). The rule simultaneously expands license exception eligibility for MT-controlled items — adding one new authorization and broadening four existing exceptions — for exports to allies and partners not in Country Groups D:4 or D:5. BIS estimates the changes will reduce MT-related license applications by approximately 400 per year, easing compliance burden on defence and aerospace exporters dealing with allied governments.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding four entities under nine entries to the Entity List, effective November 21, 2023 (FR Doc. 2023-25684). Three entities — Aerofalcon S.L. (Spain), Novax Group S.A. (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Russia, Venezuela), and Zero Waste Global SA (Panama, Venezuela) — were listed for circumventing US sanctions by supplying Nicolás Maduro's government with US-origin aircraft parts using fraudulent export documentation. A fourth entity, Si2 Microsystems Private Limited (India), was listed for supplying Russian defense-sector consignees with US-origin integrated circuits in violation of Section 746.5(a)(1)(ii) Russia/Belarus export restrictions. All entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR items with a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added thirteen entities to the Entity List effective November 2, 2023 — twelve in Russia and one in Uzbekistan — for posing a significant risk of supporting Russia's war against Ukraine through the procurement, development, and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The designated group includes ZALA Aero Group, the Kalashnikov Concern-linked maker of the Lancet loitering munition and Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone. A license requirement now applies to all items subject to the EAR exported, reexported, or transferred to these parties, with a license review policy of denial for everything except food and medicine designated EAR99 (case-by-case), and the Russia/Belarus Military End User Foreign Direct Product rule applies.

BIS implements December 2022 Wassenaar Arrangement plenary decisions by amending Commerce Control List ECCNs 9A001, 9A003, 9E001, 9E002, and 9E003 via an interim final rule effective October 18, 2023. The rule moves technology for developing supersonic-capable aero gas turbine engine components from ECCN 9E001 to a new paragraph 9E003.k, preserving development-phase controls even after an engine obtains civil certification. BIS simultaneously extends to supersonic engines the civil-certification release from 9A001 to 9A991 already available for subsonic engines, and opens a 45-day public comment period (deadline December 4, 2023) on whether to restrict Strategic Trade Authorization eligibility for ECCN 9E003.k for certain Country Group A:5 partner-country destinations.

BIS added 28 entities to the EAR Entity List across seven countries, targeting four distinct threat clusters: a Russia GRU/UAV diversion network spanning China, Finland, Germany, and Russia; an Iran Shahed-series UAV procurement chain operating through Chinese front companies (designated under the Russia/Belarus Military End User FDP Rule); Pakistan-linked suppliers procuring for unsafeguarded nuclear activities; and two Oman-based entities supporting Yemen's Houthi forces. Russia's dominant titanium producer VSMPO-AVISMA was also added as a military end user. One Chinese entity (Zhejiang Perfect New Material) was simultaneously removed from the Military End User List.

BIS issued a correcting amendment to the EAR Entity List to add China Aviation Development Harbin Bearing Co., Ltd. — an AVIC subsidiary and specialist precision-bearing manufacturer — that was included in the preamble of the June 14, 2023 final rule (88 FR 38739) but inadvertently omitted from the regulatory text. The entity was designated for acquiring and attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of China's military modernization, including hypersonic weapons development, air-to-air missiles, and weapon lifecycle management using Western software. All EAR-subject items require a licence with a presumption of denial; retroactive effective date of June 16, 2023.

BIS published a final rule adding 43 entities under 50 entries to the EAR Entity List and removing one entity (Fiber Optic Solutions, Latvia), effective June 12, 2023. The additions span ten countries — China (31 entities), UAE (5), Pakistan (4), South Africa (3), UK (2), and one each in Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand — targeting four principal threat clusters: China's military modernization and hypersonic-weapons supply chain, an international network of flight-training academies (TFASA and affiliates) providing Western pilot training to Chinese military personnel, Pakistan-linked procurement for unsafeguarded ballistic-missile programs, and UAE/South Africa-based dual-use diversion networks. All listed entities require a BIS licence, with most subject to a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule on 19 May 2023 strengthening existing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The rule expands the Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule — which applies EAR jurisdiction to foreign-made items produced with US technology or equipment — to cover the temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine. It also revises controls targeting Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, closing loopholes identified in prior rounds of Russia-Ukraine-related export-control rulemaking.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities to the Entity List effective May 19, 2023, as part of the continuing US export-control response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Of the 71 additions, 69 are Russian entities (aircraft repair plants, ammunition and gunpowder manufacturers, shipyards, tractor and automobile factories, and engineering centres), one is Armenian, and one is Kyrgyz — the latter two for facilitating diversion of controlled goods to Russia. The majority of Russian entities received "footnote 3" designations as Russian or Belarusian military end users, triggering the Russia/Belarus Military End-User FDP Rule and subjecting them to a license review policy of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) established a new Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule and created Supplement No. 7 to Part 746 of the EAR, effective 24 February 2023, to address Iran's supply of UAVs to Russia for use against Ukraine. The rule adds twelve HTS-6 codes covering UAV-relevant components — aircraft engines, processors, capacitors, memories, and radio navigation equipment — many of which are EAR99 items outside existing ECCNs, requiring a new licence for exports and reexports to Iran. Simultaneously, the rule expands the existing Russia/Belarus FDP rule to cover these same items, closing a gap where foreign-produced items derived from US technology could transit to Russia via Iran without triggering EAR licence requirements.

BIS amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions agreed at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, revising 16 ECCNs across computing, electronics, lasers, sensors, and aerospace domains. The most operationally significant change raised the Adjusted Peak Performance (APP) threshold for digital computers under ECCN 4A003.b from 29 to 70 Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT), reducing the licensing burden for high-performance computing exports to Wassenaar partner countries while preserving controls to non-partners. Corresponding revisions to License Exception APP (15 CFR Part 740) and License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) align the broader EAR framework with the updated multilateral thresholds.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (88 FR 9380; FR Doc 2023-03193), effective February 10, 2023, added six Chinese entities to the Entity List for supporting China's military modernisation, specifically the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) aerospace programs including airships, high-altitude balloons, and related components. The rule imposed a licence requirement of "all items subject to the EAR" with a review policy of presumption of denial and no licence exceptions available. The action directly followed the PRC high-altitude balloon (HAB) incursion into US airspace in late January–early February 2023 and was one of the first regulatory responses in the balloon-surveillance episode.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding seven Iranian entities to the Entity List effective 31 January 2023, for contributing to Russia's military and defense industrial base through the production and transfer of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used by Russia in Ukraine. The entities — including Shahed Aviation Industries, Qods Aviation Industry, and arms of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — are subject to a license requirement with a presumption of denial for all EAR-jurisdiction items. The rule applies the Russia/Belarus Military End User Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule to all seven entities, extending its reach to foreign-produced items destined for or routed through these Iranian UAV producers.

The Bureau of Industry and Security added 36 entities — 35 in China, 1 in Japan — to the Entity List under a presumption of denial for all EAR-controlled items, effective December 16, 2022. The most consequential additions are Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC, simultaneously removed from the Unverified List), eight Cambricon AI-chip subsidiaries, and Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), China's sole domestic lithography producer. Three existing entries were revised: CETC 13 and two affiliates gained a Footnote 3 Russian-military-end-user designation, bringing them under the Russia/Belarus Foreign Direct Product rule with a blanket denial policy.

The Bureau of Industry and Security added 24 entities across 26 entries to the Entity List, effective December 8, 2022, covering Latvia, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates. Three distinct enforcement clusters are addressed: Russian defense-electronics firms and their foreign affiliates supporting Russia's military-industrial base post-Ukraine invasion; Singapore-based front companies that supplied controlled items to PASNA, an Iran-based Specially Designated National; and Pakistani and Emirati entities engaged in unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic-missile proliferation. One entity (Safe Technical Supply Co., LLC) was simultaneously removed from three entries covering Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

The Bureau of Industry and Security added 57 entities under 57 entries to the Entity List, effective September 30, 2022, in direct response to Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Ukrainian regions. Of the 57 entities, 56 are listed under Russia and one (Subsidiary Sevastopol Naval Plant of Zvezdochka Shipyard) under the Crimea Region of Ukraine. The additions span aviation repair and overhaul facilities, aerospace R&D institutes, naval propulsion, ballistic-missile producers, advanced-materials and quantum science institutes, and the federal metrology agency; 50 of the 57 receive footnote 3 designations as Russian military end users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus-Military End User Foreign Direct Product Rule. All are added with a license review policy of denial for all EAR-subject items except food and medicine designated EAR99.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added seven Chinese entities — under seven entries — to the Entity List, effective August 24, 2022, for acquiring or attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China's military modernization efforts. The entities span China's state-owned aerospace, space-technology, electronics, and control-systems research institutes. All seven entries carry a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement four emerging and foundational technology decisions agreed at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, pursuant to ECRA Section 1758. The rule adds new export controls on ultra-wide bandgap semiconductor substrates (gallium oxide Ga₂O₃ and diamond), ECAD software for Gate-All- Around Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET) integrated circuit development, and Pressure Gain Combustion (PGC) technology for advanced gas turbine engines. Controls require a licence for items destined to countries listed in the NS:1 and AT:1 columns of the Commerce Country Chart; ECAD software controls (ECCN 3D006) have a delayed compliance date of October 14, 2022.

The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities — 70 Russian and 1 Belarusian — to the Entity List, effective June 2, 2022, in direct response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The entities were designated as military end users acquiring or attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military, and are subject to a policy of denial for all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Sixty-six entities receive a "footnote 3" military end-user designation, while five face outright denial with no license exceptions available beyond humanitarian food and medicine.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule expanding license requirements under the EAR for all items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) destined for Russia and Belarus, retroactively effective April 8, 2022. The rule also removes certain license exceptions that previously allowed aircraft-related transactions involving Belarus to proceed without authorization. Issued in direct response to Russia's continued aggression in Ukraine and Belarus's role in enabling it, this measure substantially tightens the multilateral export- control perimeter first established by BIS in late February 2022.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 120 entities under 120 entries to the Entity List, effective 1 April 2022 and published in the Federal Register on 7 April 2022. All 120 entities — located in Russia and Belarus — were determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests in the context of Russia's further invasion of Ukraine beginning 24 February 2022. The rule imposes a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items and prohibits all license exceptions for exports, reexports, or in-country transfers to the listed parties. Ninety-five of the 120 entities are additionally designated under Footnote 3 of the Entity List as military end users, triggering the Russian/Belarusian Military End User foreign-produced direct product rule (MEU FDP Rule), extending US extraterritorial reach to non-US items made with US-origin technology.

The Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 91 entities (across 96 entries) to the Entity List under 15 CFR Part 744, in direct response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The listed entities span ten destinations — Belize, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malta, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom — and include Russian military research institutes, shipbuilding facilities, aerospace and electronics manufacturers, and suspected front companies in third countries used to circumvent EAR controls. A license is required for all items subject to the EAR; the review policy is denial for 86 entities and case-by-case (for US Government-supported space programs) for five.

Effective 2 March 2022, the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) extended to Belarus the same sweeping EAR sanctions imposed on Russia following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The rule adds Commerce Control List (CCL)-based license requirements for Belarus with a policy of denial across virtually all categories, extends both the Russia Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule and the Russia Military End User (MEU) FDP rule to cover Belarus and Belarusian military end users, and aligns Belarus with Russia's license review policy. The action was triggered by Belarus's active enablement of the Russian military operation from its territory.

Effective 24 February 2022 — the date of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine — the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (87 FR 12226, FR Doc 2022-04300) adding sweeping new export license requirements under a new § 746.8 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The rule requires a licence for any item in CCL Categories 3–9 (electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors, lasers, navigation/avionics, marine, aerospace, propulsion) exported, reexported, or transferred to Russia, with a review policy of denial. Two new Russia-specific Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules extend US jurisdiction to foreign-manufactured goods: the Russia FDP Rule (§ 734.9(f)) covers all foreign-made items using US technology/equipment destined for Russia, and the Russia-MEU FDP Rule (§ 734.9(g)) covers items destined to 47 designated military-end-user (MEU) entities with no licence exceptions available. All three restrictions carry a presumption of denial, making this the most sweeping peacetime expansion of the EAR since its modern codification.

Effective 3 February 2022, the Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule (87 FR 6231, FR Doc 2022-02302) consolidating all existing Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules from scattered locations in EAR Parts 736 and 744 into a single new section, 15 CFR §734.9, under Part 734 (Scope of the EAR). The rule made no substantive changes to existing controls — it reorganised four pre-existing FDP rules (National Security, 9x515, 600 Series, and Entity List) into a clean §734.9(b)–(e) architecture, clarified the definition of "major component" at §734.9(a), and corrected a drafting ambiguity that had obscured the U.S.-origin technology trigger for three of the four rules. The newly created §734.9 structure became the vehicle used by BIS to add the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (§734.9(f)) just 21 days later, on 24 February 2022.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.

BIS amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions agreed at the December 2019 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, revising 22 ECCNs across nine CCL categories — including nuclear and conventional arms-related items, materials, manufacturing equipment, semiconductors, laser/sensor systems, and aerospace. The rule harmonises US controls with those of Wassenaar Participating States, maintaining competitive parity among allied exporters while preserving national-security licensing for non-partner destinations. Separately, the rule eliminated email notification and self-classification reporting obligations for most mass-market encryption products and publicly available encryption source code, reducing associated compliance submissions by an estimated 60–80%.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding China National Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd. (CNOOC) to the Entity List on the basis of its involvement in the PRC's unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea and efforts to intimidate and coerce other South China Sea coastal states. In the same rule, Beijing Skyrizon Aviation Industry Investment Co., Ltd. was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List, while two Russian entities (Vsmpo-Avisma and Molot Oruzhie) were removed from the MEU List as duplicate entries. The rule took effect January 14, 2021, one day before publication in the Federal Register.