Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2666 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense published its annual update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies (CMIC) list, adding 65 entities (17 new parent companies and 48 subsidiaries), bringing the total to approximately 188–200 designated entities. Major additions span EV and battery manufacturing (BYD, NIO, CATL), consumer internet (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent), semiconductors (SMIC, YMTC, CXMT), solar (JA Solar, Trina Solar), biotech (BGI Genomics, WuXi AppTec), drones/robotics (DJI, Unitree, RoboSense), and telecoms (TP-Link). Effective June 30, 2026, DoD is prohibited from procuring goods, services, or technology directly from listed entities; effective June 30, 2027, the ban extends to indirect supply-chain procurement through prime contractors and all sub-tiers.

President Trump signed an Executive Order on June 3, 2026 restructuring the entire US customs-entry compliance architecture for global importers. Key provisions impose heightened bonding minimums and domestic-asset requirements for foreign importers of record (IORs), require CAATSA-compliance and supply-chain-disclosure certifications, restrict foreign IORs to formal entry only (creating a de facto US-IOR monopoly on informal entry), establish a "good standing" requirement for IOR eligibility, and sharply curtail CBP's mitigation authority while setting enhanced penalty floors. DHS/CBP is directed to implement penalty-floor, export-documentation, and disposal provisions within 90 days (~September 2026) and the IOR structural reforms within 180 days (~November 2026). The EO is structurally distinct from tariff-rate instruments (Section 232 Proclamations 11021/11032), trade-remedy channels (USTR Section 301), statutory forced-labor enforcement (UFLPA), and targeted-sanctions channels (BIS/OFAC) — it reshapes the foundational compliance architecture through which all goods enter the US market.

On 26 May 2026 in Yerevan, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed a Critical Minerals Framework ("Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths") alongside a Strategic Partnership Charter and the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) Framework Agreement, elevating US-Armenia relations to a "comprehensive strategic partnership." The critical-minerals framework commits both governments to cooperation across mining, processing and supply-chain security, naming molybdenum explicitly and signalling intent to extend to tungsten, tantalum and rare-earths, and to the transit-corridor logistics the TRIPP framework is meant to open across the South Caucasus.

President Trump issued five Presidential Determinations on 20 April 2026 under Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. § 4533), invoking the authority granted by Executive Order 14156 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency, signed 20 January 2025). The five determinations cover: (1) domestic petroleum production, refining, and logistics; (2) large-scale energy and energy-related infrastructure development, manufacturing, and deployment; (3) natural gas transmission, processing, storage, and LNG capacity; (4) coal supply chains and baseload power generation; (5) grid infrastructure, equipment, and supply chain. Each determination authorises the relevant Cabinet Secretary (primarily Energy) to use DPA §303 powers — direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase commitments, and equity investments — to expand domestic capacity in the named category.

On 16 January 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 individuals and entities and identified one vessel for transferring oil products, procuring weapons and dual-use equipment, and providing financial services to Iran-backed Ansarallah (the Houthis). Designated parties — oil-trading and exchange companies, a shipping/logistics facilitator, and front-company operatives — are based in Yemen, Oman, and the UAE, and are accused of running an oil-sales and financial- facilitation network that Treasury says generates the Houthis over $2 billion in annual illicit revenue. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on a multi-year cadence of prior OFAC designations against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and weapons-procurement suppliers.

On 11 December 2025 the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit, held in Washington D.C. on 12 December 2025, at which the United States, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Israel signed the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration. The declaration commits signatories to coordinate "trusted" supply chains across the full technology stack — software, frontier foundation models, network infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transportation logistics, minerals refining and processing, and energy — explicitly to reduce "coercive dependencies." The coalition has since expanded to add the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Qatar, Sweden and India (signed 20 February 2026 at the India AI Impact Summit), and on 26 March 2026 State announced a USD 250 million Pax Silica Fund intended to catalyse trusted-capital co-investment in critical-minerals processing and semiconductor supply chains.

On 4 December 2025, the United States and the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement on Trade and Investment, executed at a White House trilateral ceremony alongside the parallel U.S.-Rwanda framework and witnessed by President Trump, President Tshisekedi (DRC), and President Kagame (Rwanda). The Agreement creates a Strategic Minerals Reserve (SMR) and a Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) under DRC sovereignty, gives U.S. persons preferential access to SAR assets, and commits DRC and its state-owned enterprises to route at least 30% of their commercialised cobalt volumes through the Sakania-Lobito Corridor within five years. A Joint Steering Committee (JSC) co-chaired by State and DRC's Ministry of Economy holds its inaugural meeting on 4-5 February 2026, designating the initial SAR asset list and launching implementation. The DFC announced a proposed equity investment in a Gécamines-Mercuria copper/cobalt joint venture as the first commercial vehicle under the framework.

At the APEC Busan summit on 30 October 2025, Presidents Trump and Xi reached the "Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," subsequently implemented on the US side by the executive order "Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement" (issued 4 November 2025; effective 12:01 am EST on 10 November 2025; published in the Federal Register on 7 November 2025 as 90 FR 50729 / 2025-19826) and on the Chinese side by a series of MOFCOM and State Council Tariff Commission announcements (notably MOFCOM 2025 No. 90 of 8–9 November 2025). The arrangement is structurally parallel to the already-filed US-Japan, US-Korea and US-Taiwan framework deals but uniquely material because it freezes the highest-stakes bilateral tariff and export-control confrontation of the post-2024 reset. Core US commitments: (i) reciprocal-tariff "additional ad valorem rate of duty" on PRC-origin goods reduced from a prior 20% IEEPA-fentanyl + 10% IEEPA-reciprocal stack to a 10% rate (i.e., the prior 24% / 34% scheduled escalation is suspended), extended through 10 November 2026; (ii) US BIS suspends the so-called "affiliates rule" expanding entity-list controls to majority-owned subsidiaries of listed Chinese firms; (iii) USTR pauses Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding / logistics countermeasures against Chinese vessels for one year. Core PRC commitments: (i) MOFCOM suspends for one year (until 10 November 2026) the 9 October 2025 extraterritorial rare-earth export-control package — including controls on REE processing equipment, lithium-battery manufacturing equipment, and superhard materials; (ii) PRC suspends retaliatory tariffs on a broad swath of US agricultural products through 31 December 2026; (iii) commitment to purchase ≥25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans annually in 2026-2028 and to resume sorghum and log imports; (iv) suspension of MOFCOM antitrust and "unreliable-entity" probes against named US semiconductor and chip-equipment companies; (v) cooperation on fentanyl precursor enforcement. The arrangement does not repeal underlying authorities (IEEPA tariffs, MOFCOM export-control list, Entity List) — it is a calibrated mutual freeze with a one-year sunset and quarterly review checkpoints.

On 20 October 2025, President Donald J. Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed at the White House the "United States-Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths" — a non-binding common-policy instrument committing both governments to provide at least USD 1 billion each in financing within six months (USD 3bn+ joint commitment against an USD 8.5bn project pipeline and a stated USD 53bn recoverable-resource pipeline). The framework establishes a US-Australia Critical Minerals Supply Security Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Australian Minister for Resources, mandates streamlined permitting for mining/separation/processing projects, and explicitly couples the US demand-side architecture (DPA Title III + Defense Logistics Agency stockpile) to Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve. Concurrent with signing, EXIM issued seven Letters of Interest totalling USD 2.2bn (unlocking up to USD 5bn) to Arafura Rare Earths, Northern Minerals, Graphinex, La Trobe Magnesium, VHM, RZ Resources, and Sunrise Energy Metals; the US Department of War separately committed to a 100 metric-ton-per-year advanced gallium refinery in Western Australia, and Australia took USD 200m concessional equity in the Alcoa-Sojitz Wagerup gallium project and USD 100m equity in the Arafura Nolans rare-earths project.

On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 entities and 17 individuals across three procurement networks supplying Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and its subordinate weapons producers. The networks sourced ballistic-missile guidance components (accelerometers, gyroscopes, MEMS) for the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group and Shahid Hemmat Space Group, dual-use radar/missile-guidance electronics routed through Hong Kong and China for Shiraz Electronics Industries, and helicopter parts — including a US-origin helicopter — routed through Germany, Türkiye, Portugal and Uruguay for Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA). The action is Treasury's first nonproliferation-sanctions tranche following the 27 September 2025 UN Security Council "snapback" reimposing pre-JCPOA sanctions on Iran.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two Iranian financial facilitators — Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand — along with more than a dozen Hong Kong- and UAE-based individuals and entities for operating a shadow-banking network that laundered proceeds from Iranian oil sales through front companies and cryptocurrency. The designated addresses account for over $600 million in total inflows, including more than $100 million in cryptocurrency purchases tied to oil sales between 2023 and 2025. Proceeds are alleged to benefit the IRGC-Qods Force and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This is the second round of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran's shadow-banking infrastructure since National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) directed a maximum-pressure campaign on Iran in February 2025.

On 3 September 2025, OFAC announced a civil penalty settlement with Fracht FWO Inc. — a Houston, Texas-based freight forwarder and US subsidiary of Switzerland-headquartered Fracht AG — under which the company agreed to pay USD 1,610,775 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of multiple OFAC sanctions programs. The violations arose from Fracht FWO's brokering of cargo shipments involving EMTRASUR, a wholly owned subsidiary of OFAC-designated Venezuelan state airline CONVIASA, on a Mexico-to-Argentina route on which Iranian crew members were subsequently discovered. Fracht self-initiated a voluntary disclosure to OFAC after learning of the Iranian crew involvement, triggering mitigating credit, and undertook extensive remedial compliance measures. The settlement resolves apparent violations of the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (VSR), Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations (WMDPSR), Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR).

President Trump signed Executive Order 14324, "Suspending Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment for All Countries," on 30 July 2025 (published in the Federal Register on 5 August 2025 as FR doc 2025-14897, 90 FR 37775). The order eliminated the Section 321(a)(2)(C) administrative exemption that had allowed shipments valued at $800 or less to enter the United States duty-free, applying the suspension to all countries of origin rather than the China/Hong Kong-only carve-out imposed earlier in 2025. DHS/CBP published a Notice of Implementation on 2 September 2025 (FR doc 2025-16802) modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule so that covered low-value goods must be entered via formal or informal ACE entry types and pay applicable duties; goods shipped through the international postal network were instead made subject to a new flat ad valorem or specific per-item duty rate set by HTSUS annex. The suspension took effect for entries on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on 29 August 2025. A DHS/CBP rule published 24 June 2026 (FR doc 2026-12670) converted the non-postal suspension from time-limited to indefinite and closed the remaining international-postal-network exemption to formal/ informal entry procedures as well.

On 1 May 2025 the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), jointly with FinCEN, designated two Mexican nationals — Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva and J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez — and nine entities they own or control, pursuant to Executive Order 14059 (illicit drug trade) and E.O. 13224 (as amended), for facilitating a Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) fuel-theft and cross-border smuggling scheme ("huachicol fiscal") that falsifies customs documentation to evade Mexico's IEPS fuel-import tax. FinCEN concurrently issued a supplemental alert on fuel-smuggling and fiscal fuel-theft red flags. All property and interests in property of the designees within US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally barred from transacting with them.

Senators Mark Kelly (D-AZ) and Todd Young (R-IN) introduced S.1541 on 30 April 2025 and Representatives John Garamendi (D-CA) and Trent Kelly (R-MS) introduced the companion H.R.3151 on 1 May 2025 — the Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security for America (SHIPS for America) Act. The bill sets a national goal of 250 US-flag commercial vessels within 10 years via a Strategic Commercial Fleet Program, establishes a Maritime Security Trust Fund (US $50 million per year FY2026-2035), creates a 25 % investment tax credit for qualified shipyard capital expenditures, and mandates cargo-preference requirements (100 % of US-government cargo; 10 % of China-origin imports) on US-flag vessels. Status as of 2026-05-13: introduced in both chambers; not enacted (GovTrack enactment probability <3 %).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 18 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 5. Of the 18 additions, 5 are under China, 6 under Finland, 3 under Türkiye, 2 under Kazakhstan, 1 under Italy, and 1 under the United Kingdom — a geographic distribution dominated by Russia-adjacent diversion corridors. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends use of EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 25 April 2025 (90 FR 17339).

USTR concluded its Section 301 investigation (initiated 17 April 2024) into China's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance and on 17 April 2025 issued a Notice of Action imposing tiered port-entry service fees on Chinese-owned, -operated, and Chinese-built vessels arriving at U.S. ports starting 14 October 2025 (USD 50/net ton escalating to USD 80/NT in Apr 2026, USD 110/NT in Apr 2027, and USD 140/NT in Apr 2028; capped at 5 charges per vessel per year). The action also proposed a 100% tariff on China-built or China-component ship-to-shore cranes and additional 20-100% tariffs on China-origin shipping containers, truck chassis, and chassis parts. The entire action was subsequently suspended for one year (10 Nov 2025 through 9 Nov 2026) by USTR Modification Notice (FR 2025-19873) at presidential direction following the 1 Nov 2025 Trump-Xi trade deal.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14269 on 9 April 2025 (FR publication 15 April 2025), launching the first whole-of-government US shipbuilding and maritime industrial-policy instrument since the 1996 Maritime Security Program. The order directs development of an America's Maritime Action Plan (MAP) under APNSA leadership within 210 days (released 13 February 2026) and tasks DoD, DoT, DHS, Commerce, USTR, and OMB with a sequenced set of reviews covering deregulation of the domestic commercial maritime fleet, expansion of the Maritime Industrial Base, mariner workforce development, Maritime Prosperity Zones, and Office of Strategic Capital loan deployment to commercial shipyards. The EO is the cross-government industrial-policy umbrella; the simultaneously-developed USTR Section 301 China Maritime/Logistics/Shipbuilding action (filed 17 April 2025) is the China-specific tariff-track instrument.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 8 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 2. Of the 8 additions, 3 are under China, 2 under Germany, 1 under Pakistan, and 2 under Türkiye. Of the 2 removals, 1 is under Saudi Arabia and 1 under China. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 16 October 2024 (89 FR 83428, FR Doc 2024-23638).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 8. Additions are under five destinations: China (8), Türkiye (2), Cyprus (1), Kyrgyzstan (1), and the United Arab Emirates (1). Removals span China (6), UAE (1) and Russia (1). The single Russian entry (EFO Ltd.) was removed from the UVL because BIS simultaneously moved it to the Entity List, allowing BIS to delete Russia entirely as a UVL destination. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting items subject to the EAR. Published and effective the same day, 3 July 2024 (89 FR 55036, FR Doc 2024-14642).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed three persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective January 19, 2024 because BIS was able to verify their bona fides pursuant to § 744.15(c)(2) of the EAR. The three removed parties are Skymount Drones (Canada), Plexus (Xiamen) Co., Ltd. (China), and Delma Industrial Supply & Marine Services (UAE). Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and removes the requirement for a signed UVL Statement before US exporters ship items subject to the EAR to these parties.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL), all located in the People's Republic of China, on the basis that BIS was unable to verify their bona fides through end-use checks. UVL placement suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. A grace period applies for items already in transit: shipments commenced before 18 January 2024 may proceed under prior conditions. Published 20 December 2023 (88 FR 87897, FR Doc 2023-27928); effective 19 December 2023.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 28 entities under 32 entries to the Entity List effective April 12, 2023, targeting front companies and logistics networks attempting to evade US export controls to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military and defense industrial base. Twelve of the entities are Chinese electronics and semiconductor distributors operating as procurement intermediaries; ten are Russian logistics and trading firms; six are spread across Armenia, Malta, Singapore, Spain, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Uzbekistan as diversion facilitators. All listed entities are subject to a license review policy of denial for virtually all EAR-controlled items.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 32 persons across 13 countries to the Unverified List (UVL) on the basis that BIS was unable to verify their bona fides through end-use checks. The largest concentration is in China (14 entities), followed by the UAE (5) and Turkey (4), with single entries in Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, and Singapore. UVL placement suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement and file Electronic Export Information in the Automated Export System before shipping any item subject to the EAR. Published 24 March 2023 (88 FR 17706, FR Doc 2023-06171); effective 24 March 2023.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed three persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective January 11, 2021 after completing successful end-use checks that verified their bona fides under §744.15(c)(2) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The three removed parties are DMA Logistics GmbH (Germany), Halm Elektronik GmbH (Germany), and Integrated Production and Test Engineering / IPTE (Mexico). Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and eliminates the requirement for US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before shipping items subject to the EAR to these parties.