Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

FinCEN published the Beneficial Ownership Information Access and Safeguards Final Rule (FR Doc 2023-27973, 88 FR 88732, December 22, 2023; effective February 20, 2024), implementing the access and disclosure provisions of Section 6403(c) of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) enacted as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. The rule defines six categories of authorized recipients permitted to access the FinCEN BOI database — US federal agencies engaged in national security/intelligence/law enforcement, state/local/tribal law enforcement, foreign law enforcement and competent authorities (via intermediary federal agency), financial institutions using BOI for customer due diligence (CDD), federal functional regulators assessing financial-institution CDD compliance, and Treasury officers/employees. Access is to be phased in, beginning with a 2024 pilot for key federal agencies before extending to financial institutions and their supervisors. The rule establishes data-security standards, re-disclosure prohibitions, and oversight mechanisms governing each recipient category.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL), all located in the People's Republic of China, on the basis that BIS was unable to verify their bona fides through end-use checks. UVL placement suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. A grace period applies for items already in transit: shipments commenced before 18 January 2024 may proceed under prior conditions. Published 20 December 2023 (88 FR 87897, FR Doc 2023-27928); effective 19 December 2023.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed four Chinese entities from the Unverified List (UVL) effective 15 December 2023, after successfully verifying their bona fides pursuant to § 744.15(c)(2) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The four entities span oscillator electronics (Chengde), heavy industrial machinery (Erzhong), laser systems (Ningbo), and new-energy manufacturing (Xinjiang). Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and eliminates the requirement for a signed UVL Statement before US exporters ship EAR-subject items to these parties.

On December 15, 2023, BIS published a procedural notice (88 FR 86821) extending the public comment deadline for two major October 25, 2023 interim final rules: the Semiconductor Manufacturing Items IFR (88 FR 73424) and the Advanced Computing / Supercomputer Semiconductor End-Use IFR (88 FR 73458). The original comment deadline of December 18, 2023 was extended by 30 days to January 17, 2024, to allow stakeholders additional time to review the complex regulatory changes and submit substantive input. The document contains no amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and no changes to export-control parameters.

On 8 December 2023 the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a direct final rule (88 FR 85479; FR Doc 2023-26532) making two export-liberalisation amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). First, BIS removes Chemical and Biological Weapons (CB) proliferation column controls from the Commerce Country Chart for exports of certain pathogens and toxins (ECCNs 1C351, 1C353, and 1C354) when destined to Australia Group (AG) member countries, on the basis that AG members operate equivalent domestic CBW-export controls. Second, the rule revises the Crime Control and Detection (CC) column entries for Austria, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland, reflecting the updated US assessment of those countries' law-enforcement export-control standards. Both changes are effective on publication and reduce US export-licensing burdens for allied-country destinations without altering controls for non-allied markets.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex agreed at Technical Experts Meetings in 2018, 2019, and 2021, revising six ECCNs (1C111, 2A101, 2B119, 6A107, 9A101, and 9E515). The rule simultaneously expands license exception eligibility for MT-controlled items — adding one new authorization and broadening four existing exceptions — for exports to allies and partners not in Country Groups D:4 or D:5. BIS estimates the changes will reduce MT-related license applications by approximately 400 per year, easing compliance burden on defence and aerospace exporters dealing with allied governments.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 42 entities under 44 entries to the Entity List, effective December 7, 2023. The majority — 28 entities in Russia — are sanctioned for procuring or contracting on behalf of Russia's defense sector, including avionics, military-grade drones, and military electronics. Fourteen additional entities across Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, China, and the UAE were added for operating diversion and transshipment networks that supply U.S.-origin items to Russian military end-users. All listed entities face a license requirement for all EAR-controlled items with a presumption of denial.

FinCEN published a final rule (FR Doc 2023-26399, 88 FR 83499, November 30, 2023; effective January 1, 2024) extending the initial beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting deadline under the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) for reporting companies created or registered in calendar year 2024. Rather than the default 30-day window, these companies receive 90 calendar days from the date of receiving actual or public notice of creation or registration becoming effective to file their initial BOI reports with FinCEN. Companies created before January 1, 2024 retain their original deadline of January 1, 2025; companies created on or after January 1, 2025 revert to the standard 30-day window.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding four entities under nine entries to the Entity List, effective November 21, 2023 (FR Doc. 2023-25684). Three entities — Aerofalcon S.L. (Spain), Novax Group S.A. (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Russia, Venezuela), and Zero Waste Global SA (Panama, Venezuela) — were listed for circumventing US sanctions by supplying Nicolás Maduro's government with US-origin aircraft parts using fraudulent export documentation. A fourth entity, Si2 Microsystems Private Limited (India), was listed for supplying Russian defense-sector consignees with US-origin integrated circuits in violation of Section 746.5(a)(1)(ii) Russia/Belarus export restrictions. All entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR items with a presumption of denial.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reached a $968,618,825 settlement with Binance Holdings, Ltd. — a Cayman Islands–domiciled virtual-currency exchange — to resolve civil liability for 1,667,153 apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs (Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and the Crimea region of Ukraine) committed between August 2017 and October 2022. OFAC determined the apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and that Binance's conduct was egregious; the settlement requires a five-year independent compliance monitor and was announced concurrently with parallel DOJ, FinCEN, and CFTC resolutions totaling approximately $4.3 billion in aggregate (including criminal forfeiture and BSA/AML penalties), alongside a separate criminal plea by founder Changpeng Zhao. The settlement is the largest civil monetary penalty in OFAC's history.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security published a correction on 8 November 2023 to a rule it had issued on 17 October 2023 revising the Validated End-User (VEU) authorisations for Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd. and SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd. in the People's Republic of China. The correction fixes two omissions from the October rule: a missing word in the description of eligible items for SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd., and a failure to remove the standalone VEU entry for SK hynix Semiconductor (Wuxi) following its merger into SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd. No substantive policy change is introduced; this is a technical and clerical correction only.

FinCEN published a final rule (FR Doc 2023-24559, 88 FR 76995, November 8, 2023; effective January 1, 2024) specifying when and how entities required to report beneficial ownership information (BOI) under the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) may use another entity's FinCEN identifier in lieu of disclosing the underlying individual beneficial owners. A reporting company may substitute a related entity's FinCEN ID when: (1) that entity has obtained a FinCEN identifier and provided it to the reporting company, (2) the individual is a beneficial owner solely through an ownership interest in the other entity, and (3) the beneficial owners of both entities are the same. Any change to beneficial ownership of the other entity requires an updated BOI report, after which the entity FinCEN identifier may no longer be used until recertified.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added thirteen entities to the Entity List effective November 2, 2023 — twelve in Russia and one in Uzbekistan — for posing a significant risk of supporting Russia's war against Ukraine through the procurement, development, and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The designated group includes ZALA Aero Group, the Kalashnikov Concern-linked maker of the Lancet loitering munition and Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone. A license requirement now applies to all items subject to the EAR exported, reexported, or transferred to these parties, with a license review policy of denial for everything except food and medicine designated EAR99 (case-by-case), and the Russia/Belarus Military End User Foreign Direct Product rule applies.

On 25 October 2023 the Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule (88 FR 73424; FR Doc 2023-23055) making substantive revisions to the October 7 2022 advanced-computing IFR, incorporating 43 public comments covering 78 topics. The rule replaced the prior TOPS-based performance metric with a new "Total Processing Performance" (TPP) / performance-density dual-threshold structure for ECCN 3A090, splitting the control into tiers 3A090.a (full licence requirement for highest-capability datacenter AI chips) and 3A090.b (new License Exception NAC with 25-day prior notification for the intermediate tier). Geographic scope was expanded from China-and-Macau to Country Groups D:1/D:4/D:5 to block diversion via third-country intermediaries and offshore datacenters.

BIS implements December 2022 Wassenaar Arrangement plenary decisions by amending Commerce Control List ECCNs 9A001, 9A003, 9E001, 9E002, and 9E003 via an interim final rule effective October 18, 2023. The rule moves technology for developing supersonic-capable aero gas turbine engine components from ECCN 9E001 to a new paragraph 9E003.k, preserving development-phase controls even after an engine obtains civil certification. BIS simultaneously extends to supersonic engines the civil-certification release from 9A001 to 9A991 already available for subsonic engines, and opens a 45-day public comment period (deadline December 4, 2023) on whether to restrict Strategic Trade Authorization eligibility for ECCN 9E003.k for certain Country Group A:5 partner-country destinations.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued an interim final rule on 17 October 2023 that substantially expanded the advanced-computing and semiconductor manufacturing controls first imposed in October 2022. The rule closed the performance-threshold workaround that NVIDIA had used to ship China-specific A800/H800 GPUs, replacing it with a "performance density" metric and adding a new "Notified Advanced Computing" licence category. It expanded controls on chipmaking equipment (additional ECCNs covering deposition, etch, metrology), pulled 21 additional countries (mostly Middle East / Central Asia) into a regional licensing scheme to prevent transshipment, and added 13 Chinese entities to the Entity List including AI-chip designers.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security revised the Validated End-User (VEU) authorizations for Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd. (Xi'an NAND fab) and SK Hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd. (Wuxi DRAM fab) on 17 October 2023, expanding each from its previous restricted eligible-items list to cover "all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations." Both authorizations exclude EUV equipment and related components: Samsung China is barred from EUV items for NAND production; SK Hynix is barred from EUV items for DRAM production. The revision was published simultaneously with the broader October 2023 advanced- computing chip controls (FR Doc 2023-22560), giving the two South Korean memory fabs a calibrated safe harbour under the newly tightened regime.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List, effective October 11, 2023. The bulk of additions — 42 of 49 — are Chinese entities determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, predominantly for supplying US-origin integrated circuits to Russian defense-sector consignees after March 1, 2023 in violation of export controls. Remaining entities span Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Turkey, UAE, and the United Kingdom and were designated on similar Russia-diversion or end-use violation grounds. All listed parties face a license requirement for all EAR-subject items, reviewed under a presumption of denial.

BIS added 28 entities to the EAR Entity List across seven countries, targeting four distinct threat clusters: a Russia GRU/UAV diversion network spanning China, Finland, Germany, and Russia; an Iran Shahed-series UAV procurement chain operating through Chinese front companies (designated under the Russia/Belarus Military End User FDP Rule); Pakistan-linked suppliers procuring for unsafeguarded nuclear activities; and two Oman-based entities supporting Yemen's Houthi forces. Russia's dominant titanium producer VSMPO-AVISMA was also added as a military end user. One Chinese entity (Zhejiang Perfect New Material) was simultaneously removed from the Military End User List.

BIS amended §§ 734.15 and 734.19 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to clarify that a "release of software" for purposes of the transfer-of-access-information provision includes both source code and object code. A cross-reference was also added from § 734.15 to § 734.19. The practical effect is that providing a decryption key, password, or other access credential to a foreign person to unlock controlled software requires an export licence to the same degree as exporting the software itself would.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule (FR Doc 2023-18772; 88 FR 59927) amending 15 CFR 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to create an additional option for the renewal of Temporary Denial Orders (TDOs). Under the new provision, BIS may request the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement renew a TDO for up to one year — rather than the standard maximum of 180 days — where the record demonstrates a pattern of repeated, ongoing, and/or continuous apparent violations. The rule was motivated by the sustained TDO enforcement campaign against Russian and Belarusian civil aviation entities that began in April 2022 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Published August 29, 2023, this correction amends the Commerce Country Chart table (15 CFR Part 738, Supplement No. 1) to restore entries for the People's Republic of China and Macau under the Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP) column 2 that were erroneously omitted or mis-rendered in the August 21, 2023 correction notice (FR Doc 2023-18047). The correction is technically procedural but operationally significant: it formally establishes the NP2 "X" markings for China and Macau that trigger BIS licensing requirements for items in ECCNs 1A290, 1C298, 2A290, 2A291, 2D290, 2E001, 2E002, and 2E290. Prior to the underlying August 14, 2023 final rule, neither China nor Macau was subject to NP2 controls in the EAR.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a determination pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 14014 identifying the jet fuel sector of the Burmese economy as a sanctions-eligible sector. The determination means that foreign persons who operate in Burma's jet fuel sector — including activities related to importation, exportation, reexportation, sale, supply, or transport of jet fuel in or involving Burma — may be designated and sanctioned by OFAC. Issued on the OFAC website on August 23, 2023 and formally published in the Federal Register on September 25, 2023 (FR Doc 2023-20713), the action was accompanied by concurrent SDN designations targeting key figures in the SAC junta's jet-fuel supply network.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed 35 persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective 22 August 2023, spanning seven destinations: 27 entities in China, plus one each in Indonesia, Singapore, Turkey, and UAE; two in Pakistan; and two Russian entities removed as a conforming change after being escalated to the more restrictive Entity List. The 33 cooperative removals follow successful completion of end-use checks verifying each party's bona fides under §744.15(c)(2) of the EAR. Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and eliminates the UVL Statement requirement for US exporters shipping EAR-subject items to these parties.

Published August 21, 2023, BIS issued this correction to its August 14, 2023 final rule (FR Doc 2023-17243, 88 FR 55021) that expanded Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP2) licensing requirements for exports to the People's Republic of China and Macau. The correction addressed a typographical error in the Commerce Country Chart table (15 CFR Part 738, Supplement No. 1) as it appeared in the original Federal Register publication. The corrected tabular presentation introduced a secondary error that was subsequently fixed by a second correction notice (C1-2023-18047) published August 29, 2023; the substantive policy — NP2 licensing requirements for ECCNs 1A290, 1C298, 2A290, 2A291, 2D290, 2E001, 2E002, and 2E290 destined for China and Macau — was established by the original August 14 rule and remained unchanged throughout the erratum chain.

BIS published a final rule on August 18, 2023, amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions reached at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) plenary meetings in Nur-Sultan (June 2019) and Warsaw (June 2022). The rule revises five existing Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to align with multilateral commitments made by NSG participating governments. Changes include decontrolling water-hydrogen sulfide exchange tray columns from ECCN 1B22, clarifying isotope purification scope in ECCN 1B231, and updating mass-unit terminology in ECCN 3A233. The rule takes effect immediately upon publication.

Effective August 11, 2023, BIS amended 15 CFR Parts 738 and 742 to add the People's Republic of China and Macau to Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP2) licensing requirements under the Export Administration Regulations. The rule inserts NP2 "X" column markings for China and Macau in the Commerce Country Chart, subjecting exports of eight ECCN families (1A290, 1C298, 2A290, 2A291, 2D290, 2E001, 2E002, 2E290) to a BIS licence requirement. The measure was motivated by China's military modernisation, military-civil fusion strategy, and nuclear force expansion; prior to this rule, neither China nor Macau was subject to NP2 controls in the EAR.

President Biden signed Executive Order 14105 on 9 August 2023, "Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern", establishing the first dedicated US outbound-investment screening regime. The EO directs Treasury to prohibit or require notification of US investments in Chinese (and Hong Kong, Macau) entities engaged in three categories of technology: (1) semiconductors and microelectronics, (2) quantum information technologies, (3) artificial intelligence systems. After a public-comment process, Treasury issued the final rule (31 CFR Part 850) on 28 October 2024, effective 2 January 2025.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (88 FR 46071, Doc 2023-15343) adding four entities to the Entity List effective July 18, 2023. Intellexa S.A. (Greece) and Intellexa Limited (Ireland) — the corporate architecture behind the "Predator" commercial spyware platform — and Cytrox Holdings Zrt. (Hungary) and Cytrox AD (North Macedonia) — the developer of the underlying spyware technology — were listed for "trafficking in cyber exploits used to gain access to information systems, thereby threatening the privacy and security of individuals and organizations worldwide." All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for all four entities, effectively cutting off access to US-origin hardware, software, and technology.

OFAC issued the Hostages and Wrongful Detention Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 526, as a final rule effective July 11, 2023, implementing the portions of Executive Order 14078 ("Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home", July 19, 2022) administered by the Treasury. The regulations authorise blocking of the property and interests in property of any foreign person determined by the Secretary of State to be responsible for, or complicit in, the hostage-taking or wrongful detention of a US national abroad, with IEEPA as the underlying authority. This is a framework/enabling regulation: it codifies the prohibitions, the 50% ownership rule, evasion-prohibition, and the licensing architecture — individual designations under the program appear on the SDN List.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR, 15 CFR Part 710) to lower the concentration threshold above which mixtures containing a Schedule 2A chemical trigger declaration and export/import reporting obligations — from 30% to 10% by weight or volume. The three affected Schedule 2A chemicals are Amiton (a nerve-agent precursor), PFIB (a fluoromonomer byproduct), and BZ (an incapacitating agent). The change implements OPCW Conference of States Parties Decision C-14/DEC.4 (2009) and takes immediate effect on publication; 10% is the statutory floor set by the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA).

BIS issued a correcting amendment to the EAR Entity List to add China Aviation Development Harbin Bearing Co., Ltd. — an AVIC subsidiary and specialist precision-bearing manufacturer — that was included in the preamble of the June 14, 2023 final rule (88 FR 38739) but inadvertently omitted from the regulatory text. The entity was designated for acquiring and attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of China's military modernization, including hypersonic weapons development, air-to-air missiles, and weapon lifecycle management using Western software. All EAR-subject items require a licence with a presumption of denial; retroactive effective date of June 16, 2023.

BIS published a final rule adding 43 entities under 50 entries to the EAR Entity List and removing one entity (Fiber Optic Solutions, Latvia), effective June 12, 2023. The additions span ten countries — China (31 entities), UAE (5), Pakistan (4), South Africa (3), UK (2), and one each in Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand — targeting four principal threat clusters: China's military modernization and hypersonic-weapons supply chain, an international network of flight-training academies (TFASA and affiliates) providing Western pilot training to Chinese military personnel, Pakistan-linked procurement for unsafeguarded ballistic-missile programs, and UAE/South Africa-based dual-use diversion networks. All listed entities require a BIS licence, with most subject to a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule on 19 May 2023 strengthening existing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The rule expands the Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule — which applies EAR jurisdiction to foreign-made items produced with US technology or equipment — to cover the temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine. It also revises controls targeting Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, closing loopholes identified in prior rounds of Russia-Ukraine-related export-control rulemaking.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities to the Entity List effective May 19, 2023, as part of the continuing US export-control response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Of the 71 additions, 69 are Russian entities (aircraft repair plants, ammunition and gunpowder manufacturers, shipyards, tractor and automobile factories, and engineering centres), one is Armenian, and one is Kyrgyz — the latter two for facilitating diversion of controlled goods to Russia. The majority of Russian entities received "footnote 3" designations as Russian or Belarusian military end users, triggering the Russia/Belarus Military End-User FDP Rule and subjecting them to a license review policy of denial.

OFAC replaced the abbreviated July 2014 South Sudan Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 558) with a comprehensive final rule that adds interpretive guidance, definitions, and general licenses while implementing the full set of prohibitions in Executive Order 13664 of April 3, 2014. The rule does not expand the underlying blocking authority or add new designations; it codifies the existing program in a complete regulatory framework accessible to the public and regulated community. Target: persons threatening South Sudan's peace, security, or stability, obstructing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or responsible for human rights abuses or conflict-mineral trade that finances armed groups.

OFAC adopted a final rule (FR Doc 2023-08870) correcting a typographical error in the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR § 560.528, "insure" → "ensure") and two cross-reference errors in the Western Balkans Stabilization Regulations (31 CFR §§ 588.307 and 588.405). Most substantively, the rule properly incorporates the nongovernmental organizations general license (GL 1) into the WBSR at § 588.512 — that GL was originally issued as a standalone web action on 21 December 2022 but failed to codify due to an error in the amendatory instructions. No new prohibitions or designations are created; the rule formalises existing authorisations and corrects drafting errors.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 28 entities under 32 entries to the Entity List effective April 12, 2023, targeting front companies and logistics networks attempting to evade US export controls to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military and defense industrial base. Twelve of the entities are Chinese electronics and semiconductor distributors operating as procurement intermediaries; ten are Russian logistics and trading firms; six are spread across Armenia, Malta, Singapore, Spain, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Uzbekistan as diversion facilitators. All listed entities are subject to a license review policy of denial for virtually all EAR-controlled items.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eleven entities across Burma, China, Nicaragua, and Russia to the Entity List, effective March 28, 2023, under a human rights foreign policy rationale. Three Burmese trading companies and two Russian aviation-parts suppliers were designated for selling, procuring, and servicing military equipment enabling the Burmese military regime's attacks on civilians; five Xinjiang-based electronics manufacturers were added for activities contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests; and the Nicaraguan National Police was designated for serious human rights abuses. The rule simultaneously codified in the EAR that protection of human rights worldwide is an explicit basis for Entity List designations — a precedent-setting regulatory amendment extending the existing national-security and foreign-policy framework.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 32 persons across 13 countries to the Unverified List (UVL) on the basis that BIS was unable to verify their bona fides through end-use checks. The largest concentration is in China (14 entities), followed by the UAE (5) and Turkey (4), with single entries in Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, and Singapore. UVL placement suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement and file Electronic Export Information in the Automated Export System before shipping any item subject to the EAR. Published 24 March 2023 (88 FR 17706, FR Doc 2023-06171); effective 24 March 2023.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 37 entities under 38 entries to the Entity List, effective March 2, 2023, spanning six destinations: China (28), Pakistan (4), Burma (3), Russia (1), Belarus (1), and Taiwan (1). The China tranche — the largest — targets entities supporting the People's Liberation Army's military modernization, including BGI Research and Forensic Genomics International (genomic surveillance/data risk), Inspur Group Co. Ltd. (cloud servers supplied to Chinese military), and Loongson Technology (domestic CPU developer). Three Burmese entities, including the Ministry of Transport and Communications, are designated for providing surveillance equipment enabling the military junta's tracking and targeting of civilians. Pakistani entities Abdul Razaq Asim, Add-On Technology, and Dynamic Engineers are added for contributing to Pakistan's ballistic missile programs; Russian DMT Electronics and Belarusian DMT Trading LLC for export-control evasion. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR, with the review policy being presumption of denial for the majority of Chinese entries.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 76 Russian entities to the Entity List effective February 24, 2023, spanning three rationale categories: (1) biometric surveillance technology enabling Russian filtration operations in occupied Ukraine; (2) illicit acquisition of U.S.-origin controlled items; and (3) the Russian military-industrial complex encompassing missiles, aviation, shipbuilding, semiconductors, telecom, and defense electronics. All 76 entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption of denial; 66 entities receive footnote-3 designation as Russian military end-users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus Military End-User Foreign Direct Product Rule under §734.9(g). Four existing Entity List entries were simultaneously revised with additional aliases and tightened to a policy of denial. Notable designations include KAMAZ, the Skolkovo Foundation, Skoltech, Ilyushin Aviation Complex, and the State Missile Center Named After Akademika V.P. Makeyev.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) established a new Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule and created Supplement No. 7 to Part 746 of the EAR, effective 24 February 2023, to address Iran's supply of UAVs to Russia for use against Ukraine. The rule adds twelve HTS-6 codes covering UAV-relevant components — aircraft engines, processors, capacitors, memories, and radio navigation equipment — many of which are EAR99 items outside existing ECCNs, requiring a new licence for exports and reexports to Iran. Simultaneously, the rule expands the existing Russia/Belarus FDP rule to cover these same items, closing a gap where foreign-produced items derived from US technology could transit to Russia via Iran without triggering EAR licence requirements.

The Bureau of Industry and Security expanded EAR sanctions against Russia and Belarus effective 24 February 2023, adding 322 HTS-6 industrial items to Supplement No. 4 to Part 746 (oil-and-gas equipment, flat-rolled steel, pumps, turbines, marine and aviation engines) and 276 luxury goods to Supplement No. 5. Supplement No. 6 was amended to add biological and chemical-synthesis equipment including bioreactors, peptide synthesizers, and nucleotide reagents, targeting Russia's biodefence and dual-use procurement pathway. The rule also migrated Supplement No. 2 from Schedule B to HTS-6 identifiers to align with allied partner frameworks, added Taiwan to the list of countries excluded from licence requirements, and extended Section 744.7 end-use restrictions to cover in-country transfers inside Russia and Belarus.

BIS amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions agreed at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, revising 16 ECCNs across computing, electronics, lasers, sensors, and aerospace domains. The most operationally significant change raised the Adjusted Peak Performance (APP) threshold for digital computers under ECCN 4A003.b from 29 to 70 Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT), reducing the licensing burden for high-performance computing exports to Wassenaar partner countries while preserving controls to non-partners. Corresponding revisions to License Exception APP (15 CFR Part 740) and License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) align the broader EAR framework with the updated multilateral thresholds.

On 24 February 2023, the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the US Department of State announced a package of sanctions designations under the executive order blocking property of persons engaged in harmful foreign activities of the Russian government (E.O. 14024). The State Department describes designating over 60 individuals and entities, including Russian officials and entities in Russia's advanced-technology sector, three enterprises that develop and operate Russia's nuclear weapons, and three civil nuclear entities within the Rosatom structure. The Treasury Department announced parallel designations, including four entities in the metals and mining sector.

On 24 February 2023 the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions on 22 individuals and 83 entities, which Treasury describes as targeting key sectors, evasion efforts and military supplies. Treasury issued a determination under Executive Order 14024 identifying the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy as a sector subject to sanctions, and designated 11 Russian financial institutions, including Credit Bank of Moscow, plus Russian defence and advanced-materials enterprises and third-country evasion facilitators. General Licenses 60 and 61 authorise wind-down of dealings with newly blocked entities through 25 May 2023.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (88 FR 9380; FR Doc 2023-03193), effective February 10, 2023, added six Chinese entities to the Entity List for supporting China's military modernisation, specifically the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) aerospace programs including airships, high-altitude balloons, and related components. The rule imposed a licence requirement of "all items subject to the EAR" with a review policy of presumption of denial and no licence exceptions available. The action directly followed the PRC high-altitude balloon (HAB) incursion into US airspace in late January–early February 2023 and was one of the first regulatory responses in the balloon-surveillance episode.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Myanmar Mining Enterprise No. 1 (Monywa, Sagaing Region) and Myanmar Mining Enterprise No. 2 (Myitkyina, Kachin State) as Specially Designated Nationals pursuant to Executive Order 14014, finding both to be political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities of the Government of Burma. Both enterprises are wholly owned by Burma's Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. The designations represent the first OFAC mining-sector SDN listings under the Burma sanctions program, completing the resource-sector sanctions picture that previously covered military conglomerates (MEHL/MEC), the gems enterprise (MGE), and oil and gas (MOGE via Directive 1). Mining Enterprise No. 2 in Kachin State is the state authority administering formal mining licensing across Burma's primary heavy rare-earth and jade production zone.