Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2662 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense published its annual update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies (CMIC) list, adding 65 entities (17 new parent companies and 48 subsidiaries), bringing the total to approximately 188–200 designated entities. Major additions span EV and battery manufacturing (BYD, NIO, CATL), consumer internet (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent), semiconductors (SMIC, YMTC, CXMT), solar (JA Solar, Trina Solar), biotech (BGI Genomics, WuXi AppTec), drones/robotics (DJI, Unitree, RoboSense), and telecoms (TP-Link). Effective June 30, 2026, DoD is prohibited from procuring goods, services, or technology directly from listed entities; effective June 30, 2027, the ban extends to indirect supply-chain procurement through prime contractors and all sub-tiers.

Japan's Diet passed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) 2026 Amendment on 29 May 2026; the law was promulgated on 5 June 2026. The amendment represents the most significant overhaul of Japan's inbound FDI screening regime since FEFTA was first applied to national-security transactions in 2019. Three structural additions: (1) indirect-acquisition screening — extends mandatory prior-notification to acquisitions of Japanese sensitive-sector companies effected through intermediate holding structures or offshore parent vehicles, closing the principal gap exploited by Chinese and GCC SWF investors via SPV chains; (2) call-in powers — grants the Minister of Finance authority to open a review up to ten years retroactively where an acquisition was not pre-notified or where circumstances have materially changed since clearance, directly analogous to CFIUS § 721(b)(1)(D) retroactive jurisdiction; (3) cross-ministerial "Japan CFIUS" consultation framework — formally institutionalises a standing inter-agency committee (Finance, METI, MoD, NPA, MIAC) modelled on the US CFIUS committee, replacing the prior ad-hoc inter-ministerial process. Cross-ministerial and indirect-acquisition provisions entered into force immediately on promulgation (5 June 2026); remaining Cabinet-Order-level implementing provisions to follow within one year.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed Executive Order No. 113 on April 13, 2026, promulgating the 13th Regular Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL) — the first FINL update in four years, superseding the 12th FINL under EO 175 (2022). The order retains the constitutionally mandated 40% foreign equity ceiling on exploration, development, and utilisation of natural resources (including large-scale mining), and reserves small-scale mining 100% for Filipino nationals. It codifies liberalisations from RA 11659 (Public Service Act), RA 11595 (Retail Trade Liberalisation Act), and RA 11647 (Foreign Investments Act amendments), formally reclassifying telecommunications, airlines, domestic shipping, and railways as sectors open to up to 100% foreign ownership.

South Korea's 13th National Strategic Technology Special Committee (chaired by MSIT) adopted the 2026 Annual Implementation Plan for the First Basic Plan for National Strategic Technology Development (2024–2028), committing KRW 8.6 trillion in 2026 R&D investment — a ~30% YoY increase from KRW 6.5 trillion in 2025 — across 19 NEXT strategic-technology fields encompassing AI, semiconductors, quantum, displays, and secondary batteries, coordinated across 23 ministries. The plan is supplemented by KRW 46.6 trillion in policy finance delivered through Korea Development Bank (KDB), Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK), Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF), and Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KOTEC), providing the horizontal funding-coordination architecture that operationalises all sector-specific Korean strategic-technology legislative instruments.

The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (DOD, GSA, and NASA) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 17 February 2026 (FR Doc 2026-03065, 91 FR 7223) implementing Section 5949(a) of the NDAA FY2023 (Pub. L. 117-263), which bars executive agencies from acquiring electronic products or services containing semiconductor components designed, produced, or provided by SMIC, CXMT, YMTC, or their affiliates. A Part B prohibition extends the restriction to "critical systems" whose subsystems incorporate covered semiconductors regardless of COTS sourcing. The comment period closed 20 April 2026; proposed prohibitions take effect 23 December 2027.

On 6 February 2026, Texas Governor Greg Abbott announced a USD 14,076,031 grant from the Texas Semiconductor Innovation Fund (TSIF) to Coherent Corp. to accelerate scaled production of 6-inch Indium Phosphide (InP) wafers at its Sherman, Texas facility. The grant supports a broader USD 154 million capital-investment project that will establish what the announcement describes as the world's first 6-inch InP wafer fabrication plant, consolidating Coherent's North American semiconductor operations. InP wafers underpin photonics components used in data-center interconnects, telecommunications, AI compute networking, advanced sensing, and 6G wireless/satellite links. TSIF was established under the Texas CHIPS Act signed by Abbott in 2023.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 852, dated 4 February 2026 and published in the Diário Oficial da União on 5 February 2026, amending Annex VI of Resolução Gecex nº 272/2021 — the instrument that adapted Brazil's Common Mercosur Nomenclature (NCM) and Common External Tariff (TEC) to the 2022 Harmonized System revision. The measure realigns applied tariffs on roughly 1,249 NCM codes under the IT/telecom (LEBIT) and capital-goods (BK) special-tariff exception lists, per secondary reporting raising codes currently taxed below a 7.2% floor up to that rate, with other affected lines moving to higher bracket rates (reported figures include 12.6%, 20%, and other tiers depending on product). Aeronautical-sector products are explicitly excluded from the recomposition (Art. 2). Global Trade Alert classifies the measure as a "Red" (trade-restrictive) import tariff intervention.

Italy's Department for Digital Transformation (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri) and Invitalia S.p.A. signed an implementing agreement on 4-5 February 2026 establishing the EUR 733 million "Fondo Nazionale per la Connettività" (National Connectivity Fund), financed under PNRR Mission 1, Component 2, Investment 7. The fund provides non-repayable public grants to private telecom operators for ultra-broadband network build-out through 2029, targeting a minimum 1 Gbit/s download / 200 Mbit/s upload connection for covered property units, and requires a minimum 30% private co-financing share per project. Invitalia manages the fund through 31 December 2030.

Brazil's Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Gecex) approved Resolução nº 848, de 29 de janeiro de 2026, amending Annexes IV (supply-shortage tariff reductions), V (Letec exceptions list) and VI (LEBIT/BK — IT/telecom and capital-goods exceptions list) of the base tariff-nomenclature resolution (Gecex nº 272/2021). The measure grants a new 0% duty-free tariff-rate quota of 2,500 tonnes/year for poly(oxyethylene) methallyl ether (HPEG, NCM 3907.29.92) through 26 November 2026; adds 0% duty treatment for an esketamine hydrochloride nasal-spray medicine (NCM 3004.90.39) and several pharmaceutical active ingredients including amprenavir and efavirenz (NCM 3004.90.78); and adds cellular base-station antennas (NCM 8517.71.20, 25,000-unit quota through 19 August 2026), diesel-electric locomotives (NCM 8602.10.00, through 25 February 2027) and panoramic maxillary X-ray equipment (NCM 9022.13.11, at a 12.6% rate) to the LEBIT/BK exceptions list. Most changes take effect 1 February 2026 (some 2 February 2026); Article 7 directs SECEX to publish complementary quota-allocation criteria.

The European Investment Bank signed guarantee agreements with Banco Santander totalling EUR 450 million on 29 January 2026, announced by EIB Group President Nadia Calviño during the Group's results presentation in Brussels. The guarantees are expected to unlock around EUR 900 million in new supply-chain financing for European companies: EUR 400 million for security-and-defence manufacturers (cybersecurity, surveillance, resilience and defence-technology suppliers) under the EIB's EUR 3 billion pan-European intermediated financing instrument for the defence industrial base, and EUR 500 million for companies in clean technologies, telecommunications and digital infrastructure via reverse-factoring supply-chain-finance instruments. Santander is reported as the fourth major European bank to sign under the defence-supply-chain programme, and the clean-tech/digital tranche contributes to the EIB Group's TechEU initiative.

On 29 January 2026, European Council President António Costa and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính signed a Joint Statement in Hanoi upgrading EU-Vietnam bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) — the highest tier in Vietnam's diplomatic hierarchy, placing the EU on the same level as Vietnam's CSPs with China, Russia, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, France, and the United States. The CSP establishes a reinforced bilateral cooperation framework spanning critical raw materials, semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, trusted 5G infrastructure, climate and energy transition, security and defence (including cyber and maritime), and full implementation of the 2019 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) tariff-elimination schedule plus ratification of the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EVIPA). It is the EU's eleventh CSP globally and its second in Southeast Asia (after Singapore, 2024), and constitutes the foundational bilateral parent framework for all future EU-Vietnam cooperation under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) Article 13 third-country strategic-project designation pipeline, given Vietnam's approximately 22 Mt rare-earth reserves — the world's second-largest deposit after China.

NIB, the multilateral development bank owned by the eight Nordic and Baltic member states, signed a 7-year, EUR 50 million loan with TDC NET A/S to co-finance fibre broadband network rollout investments during 2025-2027, primarily expanding fibre-to-the-premises coverage and activation in the Greater Copenhagen area. This is NIB's second loan to TDC NET for fibre rollout, following a EUR 110 million facility signed in 2022 for 2022-2024 investments. NIB's below-market development-bank funding cost functions as a state-adjacent subsidy for Danish digital infrastructure buildout.

China's Ministry of Finance, NDRC, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, People's Bank of China and National Financial Regulatory Administration jointly issued Cai Jin [2026] No. 4 on 2026-01-19, establishing a central-fiscal loan interest-subsidy scheme for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) operating in 14 designated industrial-chain and emerging-industry sectors. Eligible loans originated from 2026-01-01 receive a 1.5-percentage-point annual interest subsidy for up to two years, capped at RMB 50 million in principal per enterprise (maximum subsidy RMB 1.5 million per enterprise). The policy is tentatively set to run one year with a possible extension.

Pakistan's Directorate General of Customs Valuation (Karachi), acting under the Federal Board of Revenue, issued Valuation Ruling No. 2035/2026 on 16 January 2026 under Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969, fixing revised minimum customs (C&F) values for 62 models of old and used branded mobile phones (Apple, Samsung, Google Pixel, OnePlus) imported in commercial quantity without original packaging or accessories, conditional on the device having been activated at least six months before export. The revision was a downward rationalization — press reporting cites benchmark values ranging from US$25 (iPhone SE, 1st/2nd generation) up to US$460 (iPhone 15 Pro Max) — bringing declared-value floors back in line with a documented decline in global secondary-market prices for older-generation devices. Global Trade Alert logs China as the principal origin affected.

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan passed the Artificial Intelligence Basic Act (人工智慧基本法) on third reading on 23 December 2025, and President Lai Ching-te promulgated the 20-article statute on 14 January 2026, bringing it into force immediately. The Act designates the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) as the central AI-policy competent authority and codifies seven governance principles — sustainability and well-being, human autonomy, privacy protection and data governance, cybersecurity and safety, transparency and explainability, fairness and non-discrimination, and accountability — that apply to all public-sector AI procurement and high-risk sectoral applications. The statute establishes a statutory foundation for the Taiwan AI Action Plan 2.0, mandates an Executive Yuan National AI Strategy Committee, and provides authority for sector-specific implementing regulations by FSC, NCC, MOHW, and MOTC across finance, telecoms, medical, and autonomous-vehicle AI within a two-year window. As the first national AI governance statute in the Greater China region and the third globally after the EU AI Act and South Korea's AI Basic Act, it frames regulatory expectations for the companies at the heart of the global AI hardware supply chain — TSMC, NVIDIA ODM partners, and advanced-packaging incumbents — that are headquartered or operate substantially in Taiwan.

On 22 December 2025 the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau released Public Notice DA-25-1086, adding to the Covered List (under section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA) all unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country, plus communications and video-surveillance equipment/services produced by DJI Technologies and Autel Robotics (and their subsidiaries, affiliates, and licensing/JV partners). The designation is comprehensive by scope — every foreign-made drone from consumer quadcopters to large uncrewed systems, with no size/performance carve-out — and blocks the FCC from granting any new equipment authorization to covered UAS/components going forward. Previously authorized models already in the US market are not revoked. A follow-on Public Notice (DA-26-22, 7 January 2026) narrowed the scope with a temporary exemption (see amendments).

Brazil's Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Gecex) approved Resolução nº 829/2025 at its 232nd ordinary meeting on 18 December 2025, imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty of USD 47.46 per kilogram on imports of single-mode optical fibres (core diameter < 11 micrometres; NCM 9001.10.11) originating in China for a period of up to five years effective from DOU publication on 22 December 2025. The measure concludes a SECEX/DECOM investigation opened in August 2024 on petition by Prysmian Cabos e Sistemas do Brasil S/A and Furukawa Electric Latam / Lightera (collectively the entire domestic production base), which found material injury caused by dumped Chinese imports that supplied over 70% of the Brazilian market during the period of investigation. Industry associations Telcomp, Abramulti, Feninfra, and Abrint publicly criticised the measure, estimating a 170% increase in imported-fibre costs with downstream implications for Brazilian broadband roll-out economics.

Brazil's Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Gecex) approved Resolução nº 837/2025 at its 232nd ordinary meeting on 18 December 2025, imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty of USD 2.42 per kilogram on imports of optical-fibre cables with or without connectorisation (NCM 8544.70.10) originating in China for a period of up to five years effective from DOU publication on 22 December 2025. Uniquely, the duty was set below the DECOM-recommended rate on explicit public-interest grounds under Decreto 8.058/2013, with MDIC citing downstream telecom-infrastructure cost-pass-through risk as justification for the moderation — making this a rare procedural outcome distinct from straight DECOM-rate adoption. Industry associations Abrint, Feninfra, Telcomp, and Abramulti publicly criticised the measure nonetheless, estimating a 50% increase in imported cable costs with material implications for Brazilian broadband rollout economics; Abrint formally requested reconsideration in January 2026.

The Overseas Investment (National Interest Test and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2025 (No 81 of 2025) is the largest rewrite of New Zealand's Overseas Investment Act 2005 since the 2018 residential-land amendment. The Bill (Government Bill 171) was introduced by the Minister of Finance in June 2025, passed all three readings in the House of Representatives, received Royal Assent on 19 December 2025, and was brought into force on 6 March 2026 by the Overseas Investment (National Interest Test and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2025 Commencement Order 2026 (SL 2026/2). The Act replaces the OIA's residual "investor test" discretion with a single statutory national-interest test applied to all "sensitive asset" transactions, introduces a new s 29B repeat-investor mechanism (Treasury does not re-litigate investor risk factors on subsequent applications outside strategically important businesses), creates new military / dual-use technology call-in transactions and critical-direct-supplier call-in transactions (amended s 85), and adds a no-change-of-control transaction category. Administered by The Treasury (policy lead) and Toitū Te Whenua LINZ (operations / case handling), with consent decisions issued by the responsible Ministers.

On 19 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Assembly adopted in final vote the Federal Act on the Screening of Foreign Investments (Bundesgesetz über die Prüfung ausländischer Investitionen, Investitionsprüfgesetz / IPG; popularly the "Lex China", parliamentary business 22.035). The Act introduces Switzerland's first general ex-ante FDI-screening regime: acquisitions of control over Swiss companies active in security-critical sectors by foreign state-controlled investors require prior approval by SECO, with escalation to the Federal Council. The optional- referendum window runs until 17 April 2026; entry into force is not expected before 2027 once implementing ordinances are adopted. Critical sectors named in the Act include military and dual-use goods, electricity grids and generation, water supply, pharma and health, telecommunications, transport infrastructure and financial-market infrastructure.

The European Investment Bank agreed to lend up to EUR 870 million to Nokia to accelerate research and development of next-generation mobile network technologies (5G-Advanced and 6G radio access network hardware and software). The facility is structured in two tranches of EUR 435 million each: the first was signed in December 2025, with the second expected to be signed in mid-2026. The financing is delivered under the EIB's TechEU initiative and backed by an InvestEU guarantee, explicitly framed around EU strategic autonomy in mobile-network technology and support for EU security and defence objectives given the cybersecurity features of the radio networks involved.

The French state, through the Agence des participations de l'État (APE), injected EUR 749.3 million into satellite operator Eutelsat's EUR 1.5 billion rights-issue capital increase, completed in two tranches (late November and early December 2025). The investment lifts the French state's stake to 29.65%, making it Eutelsat's largest shareholder. The Ministry of Economy framed the operation as reinforcing "industrial and digital sovereignty," financing Eutelsat's expansion into low-earth-orbit (LEO) constellations and its role in the EU's IRIS² sovereign satellite programme, positioned as a European counterweight to Starlink.

Vietnam's National Assembly passed Law on Cybersecurity No. 116/2025/QH15 on 10 December 2025 (434 of 443 deputies in favour), effective 1 July 2026. The law supersedes both the 2018 Cybersecurity Law (Law 24/2018/QH14) and the 2015 Law on Cyber Information Security, consolidating cybersecurity, cyber-information-security, and network-information-security into a unified Ministry of Public Security-led framework. It retains data-localization obligations for foreign digital-service providers handling personal data, user-generated content, and relationship graphs of Vietnamese users (minimum 24-month retention), introduces 6-hour urgent / 24-hour standard content take-down windows on MPS request, expressly prohibits AI/deepfake forgery of images, voices, and videos for illegal purposes, and mandates child-safety platform measures.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber Executive Committee (GECEX/CAMEX, under the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services) approved Resolução Gecex nº 824, dated 4 December 2025, rebalancing the country's ex-tarifário IT- and telecommunications-goods (BIT) duty-relief regime. The resolution excludes a batch of expired or superseded ex-tarifário codes from Annex I of the base Resolução Gecex nº 323/2022 — reverting those products to Brazil's standard import tariff — and adds a new batch of exemptions to the Anexo Único of Resolução Gecex nº 781/2025, extending duty relief on a different set of IT/telecom products (printing equipment, data-processing machines, telecom apparatus, network/fibre-optic components, mobile-phone components) through late 2027. Global Trade Alert's analysis counts 301 IT/telecommunications products as affected by the net exclusion/inclusion changes. Published in the Diário Oficial da União on 5 December 2025, the resolution entered into force seven days after publication (12 December 2025).

The Canadian federal government announced a Strategic Response Fund contribution of up to CAD 210 million (~USD 151 million) toward a CAD 662 million project to expand semiconductor advanced-packaging and R&D commercialisation capacity at IBM Canada's Bromont, Quebec facility and the MiQro Innovation Collaborative Centre (C2MI). The federal contribution covers roughly one-third of total project cost. Ministers Mélanie Joly (Industry) and Evan Solomon (AI and Digital Innovation) announced the investment on 2025-11-28, framing it around domestic supply-chain resilience for AI/HPC, aerospace and defence, telecommunications, and automotive end-markets. The project is projected to create 75 new highly-skilled jobs and sustain over 1,000 existing jobs in the Bromont region.

On 19 November 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in a coordinated action with Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, designated 5 individuals and 7 companies linked to two Russia-based "bulletproof hosting" (BPH) providers, Media Land and Aeza Group, under Executive Order 13694. Media Land and its subsidiaries (Media Land Technology, Data Center Kirishi, ML Cloud) supplied server infrastructure to ransomware groups including LockBit, BlackSuit and Play. The designations also targeted three companies Aeza Group used to evade its July 2025 OFAC designation and rebrand its infrastructure: Hypercore Ltd. (United Kingdom), Smart Digital Ideas DOO (Serbia), and Datavice MCHJ (Uzbekistan). All designated persons' U.S.-nexus assets are blocked and U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting with them.

On 10 November 2025 the European Commission conditionally approved, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), the c. €14.7bn acquisition of German polymer and polyurethane producer Covestro AG by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The Phase II investigation identified foreign-subsidy distortions including an unlimited UAE State guarantee covering ADNOC and a committed capital increase by ADNOC's state-backed parent into Covestro. To clear the transaction, ADNOC committed to remove the State guarantee, Covestro committed to maintain existing R&D cooperation agreements with EU competitors, and Covestro committed to license its present and future sustainability-related patents (c. 200 patents) to qualifying EU market participants on pre-established transparent terms for ten years. This is the second-ever FSR Phase II conditional clearance (after the September 2024 e&/PPF Telecom decision) and the first FSR remedy package to deploy sustainability-IP licensing as a structural commitment.

The European Commission granted EUR 11.3 million (~USD 13.3 million) to Bouygues Telecom SA for the "5mart Ho5pital" project, which installs a private/dedicated 5G network at the University Hospital Centre (CHU) of Bordeaux, France. The award was made under the Commission's Fourth CEF-Digital Call selection decision, formally adopted 3 November 2025 (56 projects, up to EUR 389 million combined, spanning submarine/ terrestrial backbone cables, 5G corridor and vertical-application pilots, and EuroQCI quantum-communication infrastructure), publicly announced by HaDEA on 20 November 2025.

The European Commission's Fourth CEF-Digital Call selection decision (Commission Implementing Decision C(2025)7293, adopted 3 November 2025) awarded EUR 20,000,000 to "East Aegean Network" (EAN), a project coordinated by Wings ICT Solutions Technologies AE (Greece) under the CEF Digital Gateways strand, for the protection and digital supervision of critical subsea cable infrastructure serving the Aegean islands. The award is the largest of four CEF Digital grants Wings secured in the same call round, and sits alongside the EU's other 2025 subsea-cable resilience grants (e.g. PISCES Phase 3, MEDUSA AFRICA 2) funded from the same EUR 389 million package.

The European Commission's Fourth CEF-Digital Call selection decision (adopted 3 November 2025, publicly announced by HaDEA on 20 November 2025) awarded EUR 10,137,584 (~USD 11.8 million) to "Multimodal-5G," a project coordinated by Wings ICT Solutions Technologies AE (Greece) to deploy 5G infrastructure along the GR-BG Corridor connecting Greece and Bulgaria for cross-border connected-transport and logistics use cases. The grant is one of six "5G Corridors" awards (EUR 53 million combined) under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Digital programme, administered by the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA).

The European Commission granted EUR 18.9 million (USD ~21.8 million) to McMahon Design and Management Limited (MDM), an Irish subsea-cable developer, for the third phase of the "PISCES" submarine cable system under the EU's Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Digital programme. PISCES is a ~2,100km+ subsea fibre system linking Ireland's west coast to Portugal, Spain and France, intended to diversify Ireland's digital connectivity away from its current near-total dependence on cables landing in the UK and France. The award was announced/implemented 3 November 2025.

The European Commission granted EUR 20 million (~USD 23.6 million) to Telecom Italia Sparkle S.p.A. for the GreenMed subsea cable system under the EU's Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Digital programme. GreenMed is a next-generation submarine cable crossing the Adriatic Sea to connect Italy with the Balkans and the Central-Eastern Mediterranean (with a later-announced extension via Jordan toward the Levant/Asia), engineered by Alcatel Submarine Networks and installed by Elettra Tlc. The award was part of the Commission's Fourth CEF-Digital Call selection decision, formally adopted 3 November 2025 (56 projects, up to EUR 389 million, spanning submarine/terrestrial backbone cables, 5G corridor pilots and EuroQCI quantum-communication infrastructure), publicly announced by HaDEA on 20 November 2025.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 811 on 23 October 2025, published in the Diário Oficial da União on 24 October 2025, revoking six "Ex-tarifário" temporary import-duty-reduction concessions — five under the capital-goods Ex-tarifário regime (GECEX Resolution 322/2022) and one under the IT/telecommunications-equipment regime (GECEX Resolution 323/2022). The revocation takes effect 60 days after publication (24 December 2025), after which imports under the affected NCM/Ex lines revert to the standard Mercosur Common External Tariff rate rather than the reduced Ex-tarifário rate. Global Trade Alert flags Austria, Belgium and Canada as affected trading partners and classifies the measure as a "Red" (trade-restrictive) import-tariff intervention.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 809 on 23 October 2025, published in the Diário Oficial da União on 24 October 2025, amending Annex I of the base IT and telecommunications-goods Ex-Tarifário regime (GECEX Resolution 323/2022) and the Single Annex of GECEX Resolution 781/2025. The resolution moves NCM tariff lines between the two annexes: items excluded from Annex I revert to Brazil's standard Mercosur Common External Tariff (TEC) rate, while items added to the 781/2025 Single Annex retain the reduced 0% Ex-tarifário rate. Global Trade Alert's intervention-level coding splits the rebalancing into a liberalising leg (116 products losing duty) and a restrictive leg (103 products across 26 six-digit NCM headings reverting to standard duty), while a Brazilian legal database separately estimates roughly 139 total Annex I line items affected (NCM range 8443.32.99– 9032.90.99), plus one item (NCM 8543.70.99, Ex 375, digital audio mixers) with updated technical specifications. The change took effect 31 October 2025, seven days after publication.

On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 794 on 25 September 2025, published in the Diário Oficial da União on 26 September 2025, revoking Ex-Tarifário duty exemptions on six specific tariff-line items spanning three prior ex-tarifário annexes: one Information Technology/Telecommunications line (NCM 9032.89.82, Ex 043, under Resolução Gecex 323/2022), and five Capital Goods lines covering mining-boring machinery (NCM 8430.41.20, Ex 015/025/050, under Resolução Gecex 311/2022), machine-tools for stone/ceramics working (NCM 8464.10.00, Ex 059), industrial washing/cleaning machinery parts (NCM 8450.90.10, Ex 029/032/033) and refrigeration-equipment parts (NCM 8418.99.00, Ex 048) (all under Resolução Gecex 322/2022). The affected lines revert from the reduced Ex-Tarifário rate (typically 0%) to Brazil's standard Mercosur Common External Tariff (TEC) rate, effective 60 days after publication (25 November 2025) — the date Global Trade Alert records as implementation.

President Trump signed Executive Order "Saving TikTok While Protecting National Security" on September 25, 2025, certifying a restructuring plan as a "qualified divestiture" under the 2024 PAFACA law and directing the Attorney General not to enforce the Act for 120 days while the transaction closes. The plan creates TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC, valued at roughly $14 billion, with a new US-investor consortium (Oracle, Silver Lake and MGX at 15% each, plus other investors, totaling 50%), affiliates of existing ByteDance investors holding 30.1%, and ByteDance itself retaining 19.9%. Oracle will run US data storage and algorithm retraining/oversight; the deal closed January 22, 2026.

Italy enacted Legge 23 settembre 2025, n. 132 — "Disposizioni e deleghe al Governo in materia di intelligenza artificiale" — published in Gazzetta Ufficiale Serie Generale n. 223 of 25 September 2025 (atto 25G00143) and entered into force on 10 October 2025. The statute makes Italy the first EU member state to enact a comprehensive national AI law complementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (EU AI Act), designating AgID (Agency for Digital Italy) and ACN (National Cybersecurity Agency) as national oversight authorities under Presidency-of-the-Council-of-Ministers coordination. It sets sectoral rules for healthcare, labour, intellectual professions, public administration and the judiciary; authorises up to €1 billion in state-backed venture capital (via CDP Venture Capital) for AI, cybersecurity and telecoms; creates criminal penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for harmful deepfakes; mandates parental consent for under-14 users; and delegates secondary legislation to the Government across multiple domains.

On 17 September 2025 the General Office of the Shanghai Municipal People's Government issued Hufubangui [2025] No. 8, a five-year (26 September 2025 - 25 September 2030) state-aid framework to accelerate frontier-technology innovation and cultivate "future industries" across six domains — future manufacturing, future information, future materials, future energy, future space and future health. Targeted technology areas include cell and gene therapy, brain-computer interfaces, biomanufacturing, embodied intelligence (humanoid robotics/AI hardware), fourth-generation semiconductors, silicon photonics, 6G, neuromorphic computing, quantum technology, controlled nuclear fusion and regenerative medicine. Support is disbursed as tiered direct subsidies rather than tax relief, with named ceilings up to CNY 30 million per proof-of-concept/R&D platform and CNY 20 million per high-quality incubator or first-product/batch innovation award.

On 8 September 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 19 targets — companies and individuals based in Burma (Myanmar) and Cambodia — for operating or supporting networks of scam compounds that defraud Americans through virtual-currency investment fraud ("pig butchering") schemes. Nine targets operate out of Shwe Kokko, Burma, a scam-compound hub under the protection of the OFAC-designated Karen National Army (KNA), and ten targets are based in Cambodia, including Heng He Bavet's casino-linked complex in Bavet. Designations were made pursuant to Executive Order 13581 (transnational criminal organizations) and, for the Burma-based Shwe Myint Thaung Yinn Industry & Manufacturing Company, also under Executive Order 14014 (Burma sanctions program) as an entity acting on behalf of designated individual Tin Win. Treasury cited a U.S. government estimate that Americans lost over $10 billion in 2024 to Southeast Asia-based scam operations, a 66% increase over the prior year. All U.S.-nexus property of designated persons is blocked and U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting with them.

On 2 September 2025 the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule (90 FR 42315; FR Doc 2025-16724) revising the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to substantially relax export and reexport controls on Syria, consistent with Executive Order 14312 ("Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions", 30 June 2025) and the parallel post-Assad sanctions architecture (PAARSS, OFAC, 25 Sep 2025). The rule (i) revises previously restrictive licence-application review policies for items subject to the EAR to be more favourable, (ii) extends the geographic eligibility of existing license exceptions to Syria, and (iii) adds new license exceptions for Syria including for EAR99 items. The rule is effective on publication; section 6 of EO 14312 had already waived application of section 5(a)(1) of the Syria Accountability Act with respect to items on the Commerce Control List, and section 7 waived CBW Act sections 307(a)(5) and 307(b)(2)(C) restrictions on EAR-subject exports to Syria.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 782 on 28 August 2025, published in the Diário Oficial da União on 29 August 2025, revoking six Ex-Tarifário reduced-duty exemptions across two tariff regimes. One capital-goods line (NCM 8479.89.99, Ex 919, under Annex I of Resolution 322/2022) and five IT/telecommunications-classified solar-module lines (NCM 8541.43.00, Ex 154, 996, 997, 998 and 999, covering heterojunction/HJT photovoltaic modules under Annex II of Resolution 323/2022) lose their duty relief and revert to Brazil's standard Mercosur Common External Tariff rate. The resolution took effect 60 days after publication (28 October 2025), earlier than the exemptions' original scheduled expiry of 31 December 2025. Global Trade Alert classifies the measure as a "Red" (trade-restrictive) import-tariff intervention.

Act L of 2025 (2025. évi L. törvény) is the Hungarian National Assembly statute that elevates a set of war-emergency government decrees — including the foreign-investment screening regime previously embedded in Government Decree 561/2022 — to permanent statutory level. Promulgated in Magyar Közlöny and entered into force on 19 August 2025, the Act preserves Hungary's "Second Regime" of FDI screening operating in parallel with the General Regime (which implements EU Reg 2019/452 since 2019). The Second Regime applies to a broad set of strategic sectors — energy, transport, communications, telecoms, pharmaceuticals, food processing, defence, financial services and healthcare — and requires approval from the Minister of National Economy for qualifying acquisitions (direct or indirect majority, ≥5% interest, ≥3% in listed companies, or ownership/operation of strategic infrastructure) where transaction value reaches HUF 350 million (~EUR 890,000). Notification is due within 10 days of signing; the MoE originally had 30 business days (extendable +15 calendar days). The Act also entrenches the Hungarian state right of first refusal on photovoltaic generation companies (NACE 35.11'08, excluding sub-50 kVA household installations), exercised through MNV Zrt. The Special Regime is structurally distinct from the General Regime and represents Hungary's peer to the German AWG §§55-62, French Décret 2014-479, Dutch Wet Vifo, and Italian Golden Power. Amended by Act XCIII of 2025 (in force 17 December 2025), which extended the MoE screening deadline to 45 business days and excluded bank-financing security arrangements from notification.

The FCC adopted a Report and Order (FCC 25-49) on 7 August 2025 — the first comprehensive overhaul of submarine cable landing license rules since 2001 — effective 26 November 2025. The order prohibits Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) agreements that would give entities from designated foreign adversary countries (China including Hong Kong and Macau, Cuba, Iran, DPRK, Russia, and Venezuela) control over Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) on US cable landings, and mandates new annual reporting plus certification/disclosure requirements covering ownership, cybersecurity and physical security plans, and FCC Covered List compliance. The order operationalises the FCC's bifurcated policy package: accelerating legitimate commercial cable buildout while hardening national-security review for foreign-adversary-connected infrastructure.

Czech Act No. 265/2025 Sb., promulgated in the Sbírka zákonů on 4 August 2025 and entering into force on 1 November 2025, is the first material amendment of the Czech Republic's foundational FDI screening statute (Act No. 34/2021 Sb.) since its enactment. The amendment broadens the perimeter of mandatory pre-closing FDI screening by cross-referencing the simultaneously-enacted Cybersecurity Act (Act No. 264/2025 Sb., transposing NIS2 Directive 2022/2555): entities designated as providers of "regulated services" under the Cybersecurity Act's "regime of higher obligation" automatically fall within mandatory FDI-screening scope, extending screening reach beyond the prior military-material / dual-use / critical-infrastructure perimeter to cover a broad sweep of digital, technology, healthcare, energy, and financial-services operators. The amendment also adds a confidentiality-sharing channel between MPO and NÚKIB, enabling coordinated supply-chain-security assessments for high-risk-vendor reviews under the new Cybersecurity Act.

The Polish Sejm passed the Act of 9 July 2025 amending the Act of 24 July 2015 on the Control of Certain Investments, signed by the President on 21 July 2025 and effective 24 July 2025. The amendment removes the time-limited "Specialised Rules" tier (introduced in 2020 under the Anti-COVID Shield) and makes Poland's FDI screening regime permanent. Review competence is transferred from the President of UOKiK (the competition authority) to the minister responsible for economic affairs (currently the Minister of Finance and Economy), and a new trigger covering "an international situation distorting the market or competition" is added alongside the existing public-order, security and health grounds.

The Beijing Economic-Technological Development Zone (BDA / Yizhuang) Management Committee issued Jingjiguanfa [2025] No. 14, "Several Measures on Accelerating 6G Technology and Industrial Innovation Development in the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Zone," dated 2025-07-08 and effective 2025-07-09. The package funds the 6G stack end to end: up to RMB 5,000,000 start-up funding for provincial/municipal-level 6G laboratories, matching funds up to RMB 30,000,000 for enterprises undertaking national/municipal 6G research tasks, up to RMB 2,000,000 in rewards for accepted 3GPP standard proposals, up to RMB 1,000,000 for standard implementation, up to RMB 30,000,000/year (three-year cap) for test and verification platforms, up to RMB 5,000,000 for "first-order" product support, and testing vouchers of up to RMB 5,000,000 covering 50% of actual testing costs. The zone targets 50+ breakthrough 6G core technologies and standards, 20+ prototype devices, 10+ leading enterprises, 200+ national/municipal high-tech enterprises, and an RMB 50,000,000,000-scale industry cluster by 2030.

On 2025-07-08 President Trump issued a Section 721 (Defense Production Act) order retroactively prohibiting Hong Kong-based Suirui International Co., Ltd.'s 2020 acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC, a US video-wall and audio-visual technology maker, from Foxconn. CFIUS found the transaction posed a national security risk because a Chinese military company holds an indirect interest in Suirui Group and can appoint one of its directors, creating a risk that Jupiter's products — used in military and critical- infrastructure environments — could be compromised. The order requires Suirui to fully divest all interests and rights in Jupiter within 120 days of the order (extendable at CFIUS's discretion) and bars Jupiter from holding interests in Suirui-linked Asian subsidiaries formed after the 2020 deal.

On 1 July 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Aeza Group, a St. Petersburg, Russia-based "bulletproof hosting" (BPH) provider, along with two affiliated companies and four Aeza Group leaders (Arsenii Penzev, Yuri Bozoyan, Vladimir Gast, Igor Knyazev), for supplying server infrastructure that shielded ransomware operators, infostealer groups, and darknet drug marketplaces from law-enforcement takedown. In coordination with the UK's National Crime Agency, OFAC also designated Aeza International Ltd., a UK front company Aeza used to lease IP addresses to cybercriminals. The action was taken under Executive Order 13694 (as amended by E.O. 14144 and E.O. 14306) and builds on OFAC's February 2025 designation of BPH provider ZServers.

Government Decree 163/2025 (VI. 23.) amends the emergency-era Decree 561/2022 (XII. 23.) on economic-protection deviations, making two operative changes to Hungary's FDI screening regime: it extends the review period from 30 to up to 135 working days (45-day base plus three 30-workday extensions) and introduces a state pre-emption right, exercisable within 90 calendar days of a prohibition decision, allowing MNV Zrt. (Hungarian National Asset Management Company) or a designated entity to acquire the blocked target on the same terms as the original parties. The decree applies retroactively to all notification procedures pending at the time of entry into force (24 June 2025) and expands the screening scope from a solar-sector focus to broad strategic sectors. It served as an interim bridge — in force from 24 June to 18 August 2025 — until superseded by the permanent statutory codification in Act L of 2025.