Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2666 actions· ✨ 90 recent

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-19132, 89 FR 68539, published 27 August 2024) expanding the Russia/Belarus-Military End User (MEU) Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) rule under the Export Administration Regulations so that it also applies to transactions involving Entity List entries posing a significant diversion risk to Russia's and Belarus's defense industry or intelligence services — the rule is renamed accordingly. The rule also imposes new export, reexport, and in-country transfer controls on software for the operation of computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools destined for Russia or Belarus, and makes corrections eliminating obsolete cross- references introduced by the BIS 25 January 2024 and 18 June 2024 Russia/Belarus final rules. Effective 27 August 2024, except amendatory instruction 11 effective 16 September 2024.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 33 of 2024 on 15 August 2024, imposing an export licensing regime on antimony ore, antimony metal, antimony oxides (purity ≥99.99%), organic antimony compounds, antimony hydride, indium antimonide, and gold-antimony smelting technology, effective 15 September 2024. The announcement also covers six-sided top-press equipment used in superhard-materials (diamond, cubic boron nitride) production. China accounts for approximately 47% of global antimony mine output and an estimated 75-80% of refined antimony supply; in the months following implementation, Chinese antimony export volumes fell by approximately 97% and global antimony trioxide spot prices roughly doubled.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule expanding the scope of the Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the "No Technology for Terror Act" (Public Law 118-50, Division N), signed by President Biden on April 24, 2024. The expanded rule extends EAR jurisdiction to additional foreign-produced items destined for Iran — including a broader set of items derived from U.S.-origin technology or software, or produced by plants/components that are themselves direct products of U.S.-origin technology — and requires a BIS license for their export, reexport, or in-country transfer to Iran. The rule also provides specified exclusions from the otherwise-applicable license requirements. The rule became effective on July 23, 2024 (publication July 26, 2024).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 55033; FR Doc 2024-14635) added six entries to the Entity List under the destinations of the People's Republic of China (2), South Africa (1), the United Arab Emirates (2), and the United Kingdom (1). The two PRC-based entries (Global Training Solutions Limited; Smartech Future Limited) were added for ties to an existing Entity List party and for training elements of the PRC military. The two UAE-based entries (Mega Fast Cargo LLC; Mega Technique General Trading) were added for repeated dilatory or evasive conduct during BIS end-use checks, including the provision of false, misleading, or incomplete information. The South Africa and United Kingdom entries were added for shipping or attempting to ship US export-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy of presumption of denial. The rule is effective on publication, 2024-07-03.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding three Kaspersky entities to the Entity List under End-User Review Committee (ERC) determinations — AO Kaspersky Lab (Moscow), OOO Kaspersky Group (Moscow), and Kaspersky Labs Limited (London). All three are designated for cooperation with Russian military and intelligence authorities in support of Russian government cyber-intelligence objectives. Exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of all items subject to the EAR to the three entities now require a BIS licence reviewed under a policy of presumption of denial, with no licence exceptions available. The action is paired with a same-week Commerce ICTS final determination prohibiting Kaspersky cybersecurity and anti-virus software transactions in the United States.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-13148, 89 FR 51644, RIN 0694-AJ87) expanding the Export Administration Regulations' Russia and Belarus sanctions architecture. Effective 12 June 2024 (most provisions) and 16 September 2024 (the EAR99 enterprise-software paragraph at §746.8(a)(8)), the rule introduces a new licence requirement for thirteen named categories of EAR99 enterprise software (ERP, CRM, BI, SCM, EDW, CMMS, project management, PLM, BIM, CAD, CAM, ETO) destined for Russia or Belarus; permits address-only Entity List designations to capture high-diversion addresses; adds eight Hong Kong addresses to the Entity List; and refines the Russia/Belarus Industry Sector Sanctions and Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule. Released the day before the G7 Italy summit alongside coordinated OFAC, State, and Treasury actions that together designated 300+ persons and entities.

Indonesia's Ministry of Trade promulgated Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan (Permendag) No. 10 of 2024 on 30 May 2024, amending Permendag 22/2023 on Goods Prohibited for Export. The regulation set 31 December 2024 as the final cutoff for copper-concentrate and anode-sludge exports — extending the original 1 June 2024 ban deadline by seven months — and enforced a full prohibition starting 1 January 2025. The measure is paired with ESDM Regulation No. 6 of 2024 covering the upstream mining-product side, completing the legal architecture of Indonesia's copper "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) mandate. The ban forces all domestically mined copper concentrate to be smelted and refined inside Indonesia. Two operators are directly affected: PT Freeport Indonesia (PTFI), majority-owned by state holding MIND ID with Freeport-McMoRan as minority partner, which operates the Grasberg mine in Papua and the new Manyar/Gresik smelter in JIIPE; and PT Amman Mineral Nusa Tenggara (subsidiary of PT Amman Mineral Internasional, IDX:AMMN), which operates the Batu Hijau mine in Sumbawa with a smelter under commissioning. A fire at Freeport's Gresik smelter in October 2024 disrupted ramp-up and forced the government to grant a discretionary export-permit extension into 2025 for PTFI, signalling that the ban — while now legally in force — is being enforced flexibly during smelter commissioning rather than as a hard stop. Permendag 10/2024 is the copper-sector equivalent of the 2020 nickel- ore export ban (ESDM 11/2019) and the planned bauxite-ore ban (effective June 2023). Together these three measures complete Indonesia's resource-nationalism package across its three highest-value mineral exports: nickel, bauxite, and copper. Combined domestic smelter capex commitments tied to the copper rule (Freeport Manyar + Amman Sumbawa) total ~USD 6 billion. Indonesia's Finance Ministry estimated forgone export revenue of ~Rp 10 trillion (~USD 640 million per year) from the copper-concentrate ban alone, which the government is treating as an acceptable downstream-policy cost. Severity is set at 4: the action is binding, durable, and reshapes a globally relevant supply chain (Indonesia is ~5% of global mined copper, rising), but discretionary export extensions during smelter commissioning soften near-term enforcement and limit the immediate market shock relative to the harder 2020 nickel rule.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 41706; FR Doc 2024-10485) added 37 entities under 37 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of the People's Republic of China. BIS designated these parties for one or more of three rationales: (i) shipping US-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls, (ii) attempting to acquire US-origin items to support China's military modernisation or quantum-technology capabilities, and (iii) ties to the PRC high-altitude balloon that overflew the United States in late January–early February 2023. The designations span PRC technology companies (predominantly quantum-computing firms), manufacturing companies, and research institutes. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy of presumption of denial and no license exceptions available. The rule is effective 2024-05-09, with publication in the Federal Register on 2024-05-14.

On 2 May 2024 Türkiye's Ministry of Trade announced that all export, import and transit transactions with Israel, covering all product groups, were halted, as the second phase after the 9 April 2024 restriction on 54 product groups. Customs declarations naming Israel as country of shipment, destination or origin are no longer registered. The ministry stated the halt stays in force until Israel declares a ceasefire in Gaza and allows uninterrupted humanitarian aid access.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), within the U.S. Department of Commerce, published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2024-08813) on April 30, 2024 amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to restructure export controls on firearms, ammunition, parts, accessories, and related technology and software (EAR Categories 0 and 1). The rule created new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) for semi-automatic firearms, added Crime Control / Detection (CC) license requirements, narrowed license-exception eligibility, introduced a presumption of denial for many non-government end-users, and imposed a default 1-year license validity for semi-automatic firearms. Effective May 30, 2024; later rescinded (except for the new ECCNs) by FR Doc 2025-18992 on September 30, 2025.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule (FR Doc 2024-08622; Docket 240417-0112; 89 FR 30119) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the product scope of two Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules — the Iran FDP rule and the Russia/Belarus/Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine FDP rule in 15 CFR 734.9(f) — to cover the entirety of the Common High Priority List (CHPL), an HTS-6 list developed jointly with the EU, Japan and the UK that identifies items used in Russian weapons production. The CHPL scope adds basic commercial-grade microelectronics (integrated circuits, RF transceiver modules), test/manufacturing equipment for electronic components, and CNC machine tools to the perimeter, requiring a BIS licence when these foreign-produced items are exported, reexported or transferred to Iran, Russia, Belarus or occupied Crimea. The rule was issued in response to Iran's 13 April 2024 attack on Israel and Iran's ongoing military support for the Russian war in Ukraine; it became effective 18 April 2024 (Federal Register publication 22 April 2024) with a transit grace period for in-flight shipments until 20 May 2024.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 25503; FR Doc 2024-07760) added 11 entries to the Entity List under China (6), Russia (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2), effective 2024-04-11. The primary rationale for the Russia and UAE tranches — and at least one China entity (Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology) — is procurement of US-controlled dual-use aerospace and UAV components for Iran's Shahed- series UAV programme via the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); those drones have been used against oil tankers in the Middle East and deployed by Russia in Ukraine. The remaining five China entities were designated for acquiring US-origin items to support China's military modernisation. The rule also adds one alias to the existing entry for Shanghai Biren Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. This action was the first Entity List final rule published after BIS implemented the 50 Percent Rule for controlling foreign subsidiaries of listed entities.

On 9 April 2024, Türkiye's Ministry of Trade restricted exports of 1,019 tariff lines across 54 product groups to Israel — including cement, marble, sulphur, aluminium wire, ceramics, varnishes and mineral fertilisers — in response to Israel's conduct of the Gaza war and its refusal of a Turkish request to participate in aid airdrops. The government stated the restriction would remain in force until Israel declared an immediate ceasefire and allowed unimpeded humanitarian aid into Gaza. The measure was superseded three weeks later, on 2 May 2024, when the Ministry halted all exports, imports and transit trade with Israel across every product category.

The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (C2024A00021) received Royal Assent on 8 April 2024 and created three new criminal offences in the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012: section 10A (supply of Defence and Strategic Goods List technology in Australia to a non-exempt foreign person); section 10B (secondary supply of DSGL Part 1 Munitions or Part 2 Dual-Use Sensitive/Very Sensitive goods or technology outside Australia when originally exported from Australia); and section 10C (provision of DSGL Part 1 services to foreign nationals outside Australia). All three offences carry maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment or 2,500 penalty units (~A$782,500), or both. The offence framework commenced 1 September 2024 with a six-month compliance-transition period; criminal liability attached from 1 March 2025. The Act also codifies AUKUS-partnership exemptions, carving out supplies to and from citizens and permanent residents of the United Kingdom and United States, underpinning the licence-free trilateral technology-transfer environment sought under AUKUS Pillar 2.

On 5 April 2024 Japan's Cabinet adopted an amendment to the Export Trade Control Order, following a 1 March 2024 Cabinet understanding, extending the export prohibition on goods that strengthen Russia's industrial base. The additional goods span parts of HS chapters 27 (mineral fuels and oils), 28 (inorganic chemicals), 39, 73, 81 (tungsten powder, molybdenum, cobalt, zirconium, rhenium), 82, 84, 85 (including lithium-ion and nickel-metal-hydride batteries), 89 and 90, with the specific goods fixed by ministerial ordinance and notices issued on 10 April. The export ban applies from 17 April 2024. A separate METI notice bans imports of non-industrial diamonds of Russian origin from 10 May 2024, regardless of port of shipment.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule (89 FR 20107) consolidating and expanding EAR end-user controls on persons listed on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. The rule rewrites EAR § 744.8 to impose a licence requirement covering ALL items subject to the EAR — replacing earlier controls limited to "luxury goods" — whenever an SDN designated under any of 14 specified OFAC sanctions programmes is a party to a transaction. A presumption of denial applies to all licence applications under the revised section, and no licence exception may overcome the restriction.

BIS amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on 15 March 2024 to apply more restrictive dual-use export, reexport, and in-country transfer controls on Nicaragua. The rule adds Nicaragua to Country Group D:5 (U.S. Arms-Embargoed Countries) and moves it from Country Group B to Country Group D:1 (national security concerns), effective the same day. The action aligns EAR country-group treatment with a concurrent State Department decision under ITAR §126.1, driven by the Nicaraguan government's human rights abuses and its deepening military and security cooperation with Russia.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 14385; FR Doc 2024-03969; Docket 240215-0050; RIN 0694-AJ54) added 93 entities under 95 entries to the Entity List, effective 23 February 2024, with destinations Russia (63), Turkey (16), China (8), UAE (4), Kyrgyzstan (2), India (1), and South Korea (1). The dominant rationale is enforcement of Russia-diversion controls: 46 Russian defense manufacturers are designated as military end users acquiring US-origin items for Russia's armed forces, five Chinese entities (including Dennex Enterprises Limited and Shenzhen Speed Industrial Materials Co.) are cited for facilitating diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia, and 16 Turkish firms are cited as procurement hubs obtaining US-origin items of importance to Russia's war effort. Four UAE entities are designated for transshipment networks serving both Russia and Iran. All entities are subject to a presumption of denial for EAR-controlled items; Russian military end users are additionally subject to the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (15 CFR 734.9(g)).

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 14403, Doc 2024-03674) adding two entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 27, 2024. Sandvine Incorporated, a Canadian deep packet inspection vendor, is listed across six destinations (Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, UAE) because it supplies DPI technology to the Government of Egypt where it is used for mass web-monitoring and censorship. Chengdu Beizhan Electronics Co., Ltd. is listed under China for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items on behalf of the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), a PLA-affiliated institution already on the Entity List. All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for both entities. The rule also revises entries for two existing Chinese entities and removes one UAE entry.

MOTIE brought the 33rd amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items into force on 24 February 2024 (announced 20 February 2024), adding 682 items to the Russia/Belarus situational-licence (상황허가) list, taking that list to 1,159 items. The added items span construction machinery, secondary batteries, machine tools and aircraft components judged to have high military-diversion potential. Situational- licence items are prohibited from export in principle from the effective date, with narrow exceptions such as pre-existing contracts and case-by- case review categories.

Ministerial order signed by the French Minister of Economy on 2 February 2024 and published in JORF n°0034 of 10 February 2024 establishing France's first national export-control list under Article 9 of EU Regulation 2021/821 on dual-use goods. The arrêté requires prior authorisation for exports to non-EU third countries of (i) quantum computers and their enabling technologies (qubit devices, control systems, measurement equipment) and (ii) equipment for the design, development, production, test and inspection of advanced electronic components, plus associated software and technology. The annex was substantively replaced by the Arrêté du 27 mars 2025 (explicit technical thresholds including ≥34-qubit systems with C-NOT error ≤10⁻⁴, HBM 6000+ processing performance, cryogenic cooling, dry-etch and EUV-mask tooling, and Si-28/Si-30/Ge isotopically-controlled materials) and is repealed by the Arrêté du 10 mars 2026 with entry into force 11 May 2026.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-01408, 89 FR 4804, effective 23 January 2024) strengthens the EAR sanctions architecture against Russia and Belarus by adding 94 HTS-6 entries to the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions (§746.5/§746.8) — covering hand tools, parachutes, aircraft training simulators, and airplane/helicopter components — and expands the de minimis threshold for foreign-made goods incorporating US-origin 600-series and 9×515 items destined for Russia or Belarus. A parallel provision targets Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia by adding HTS code 852910 (antennas and antenna reflectors) to the §746.7 Iran export-control list. The rule also refines Crimea licensing to permit exports supporting Ukrainian Armed Forces deployments in occupied territories.

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023 (SI 2023/1364) amend the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to prohibit UK persons from acquiring, importing, supplying or delivering listed Russian-origin metals and metal articles, delivering the Prime Minister's commitment to ban Russian copper, nickel and aluminium. Per law-firm summaries the list (a new Schedule 3BA) also covers lead, zinc, tin, tungsten, molybdenum, tantalum, magnesium, cobalt, antimony, manganese and further metals, and most provisions took effect on 15 December 2023 with a grace period for cargoes consigned before that date.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 42 entities under 44 entries to the Entity List, effective December 7, 2023. The majority — 28 entities in Russia — are sanctioned for procuring or contracting on behalf of Russia's defense sector, including avionics, military-grade drones, and military electronics. Fourteen additional entities across Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, China, and the UAE were added for operating diversion and transshipment networks that supply U.S.-origin items to Russian military end-users. All listed entities face a license requirement for all EAR-controlled items with a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding four entities under nine entries to the Entity List, effective November 21, 2023 (FR Doc. 2023-25684). Three entities — Aerofalcon S.L. (Spain), Novax Group S.A. (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Russia, Venezuela), and Zero Waste Global SA (Panama, Venezuela) — were listed for circumventing US sanctions by supplying Nicolás Maduro's government with US-origin aircraft parts using fraudulent export documentation. A fourth entity, Si2 Microsystems Private Limited (India), was listed for supplying Russian defense-sector consignees with US-origin integrated circuits in violation of Section 746.5(a)(1)(ii) Russia/Belarus export restrictions. All entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR items with a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added thirteen entities to the Entity List effective November 2, 2023 — twelve in Russia and one in Uzbekistan — for posing a significant risk of supporting Russia's war against Ukraine through the procurement, development, and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The designated group includes ZALA Aero Group, the Kalashnikov Concern-linked maker of the Lancet loitering munition and Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone. A license requirement now applies to all items subject to the EAR exported, reexported, or transferred to these parties, with a license review policy of denial for everything except food and medicine designated EAR99 (case-by-case), and the Russia/Belarus Military End User Foreign Direct Product rule applies.

On 25 October 2023 the Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule (88 FR 73424; FR Doc 2023-23055) making substantive revisions to the October 7 2022 advanced-computing IFR, incorporating 43 public comments covering 78 topics. The rule replaced the prior TOPS-based performance metric with a new "Total Processing Performance" (TPP) / performance-density dual-threshold structure for ECCN 3A090, splitting the control into tiers 3A090.a (full licence requirement for highest-capability datacenter AI chips) and 3A090.b (new License Exception NAC with 25-day prior notification for the intermediate tier). Geographic scope was expanded from China-and-Macau to Country Groups D:1/D:4/D:5 to block diversion via third-country intermediaries and offshore datacenters.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly announced (Announcement No. 33 of 2023) export-licensing controls on graphite products, effective 1 December 2023. The regime covers natural flake graphite and products thereof (including spherical graphite and graphite powder used in lithium-ion battery anodes) as well as high-purity, high-hardness, and high-strength synthetic graphite materials. Exporters must obtain dual-use-item licences from MOFCOM citing end-user and end-use; licences are granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The announcement came three days after the 17 October 2023 BIS advanced-chip-controls expansion, continuing the proportional-response pattern established with Ga/Ge in July.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued an interim final rule on 17 October 2023 that substantially expanded the advanced-computing and semiconductor manufacturing controls first imposed in October 2022. The rule closed the performance-threshold workaround that NVIDIA had used to ship China-specific A800/H800 GPUs, replacing it with a "performance density" metric and adding a new "Notified Advanced Computing" licence category. It expanded controls on chipmaking equipment (additional ECCNs covering deposition, etch, metrology), pulled 21 additional countries (mostly Middle East / Central Asia) into a regional licensing scheme to prevent transshipment, and added 13 Chinese entities to the Entity List including AI-chip designers.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List, effective October 11, 2023. The bulk of additions — 42 of 49 — are Chinese entities determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, predominantly for supplying US-origin integrated circuits to Russian defense-sector consignees after March 1, 2023 in violation of export controls. Remaining entities span Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Turkey, UAE, and the United Kingdom and were designated on similar Russia-diversion or end-use violation grounds. All listed parties face a license requirement for all EAR-subject items, reviewed under a presumption of denial.

BIS added 28 entities to the EAR Entity List across seven countries, targeting four distinct threat clusters: a Russia GRU/UAV diversion network spanning China, Finland, Germany, and Russia; an Iran Shahed-series UAV procurement chain operating through Chinese front companies (designated under the Russia/Belarus Military End User FDP Rule); Pakistan-linked suppliers procuring for unsafeguarded nuclear activities; and two Oman-based entities supporting Yemen's Houthi forces. Russia's dominant titanium producer VSMPO-AVISMA was also added as a military end user. One Chinese entity (Zhejiang Perfect New Material) was simultaneously removed from the Military End User List.

Effective August 11, 2023, BIS amended 15 CFR Parts 738 and 742 to add the People's Republic of China and Macau to Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP2) licensing requirements under the Export Administration Regulations. The rule inserts NP2 "X" column markings for China and Macau in the Commerce Country Chart, subjecting exports of eight ECCN families (1A290, 1C298, 2A290, 2A291, 2D290, 2E001, 2E002, 2E290) to a BIS licence requirement. The measure was motivated by China's military modernisation, military-civil fusion strategy, and nuclear force expansion; prior to this rule, neither China nor Macau was subject to NP2 controls in the EAR.

India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, issued Notification No. 20/2023 on 20 July 2023 amending the export policy of non-basmati white rice (semi-milled or wholly milled rice, whether or not polished or glazed; HS 1006 30 90) from "Free" to "Prohibited" with immediate effect. The stated objective was to stabilise domestic prices and ensure adequate availability after uneven monsoon onset and rising retail rice inflation. Limited carve-outs applied for cargo already loaded prior to the notification and for government-to-government supplies authorised on food-security grounds. The blanket ban was lifted by DGFT Notification 31/2024 on 28 September 2024, replaced first by a USD 490/tonne minimum export price (MEP) and then by free export after the MEP was withdrawn in late October 2024.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (88 FR 46071, Doc 2023-15343) adding four entities to the Entity List effective July 18, 2023. Intellexa S.A. (Greece) and Intellexa Limited (Ireland) — the corporate architecture behind the "Predator" commercial spyware platform — and Cytrox Holdings Zrt. (Hungary) and Cytrox AD (North Macedonia) — the developer of the underlying spyware technology — were listed for "trafficking in cyber exploits used to gain access to information systems, thereby threatening the privacy and security of individuals and organizations worldwide." All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for all four entities, effectively cutting off access to US-origin hardware, software, and technology.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly announced an export licensing regime covering eight gallium-related items (including gallium metal, gallium arsenide, gallium nitride wafers and ingots) and six germanium- related items (including germanium metal, germanium oxide, germanium tetrachloride). Effective 1 August 2023, exporters must obtain a dual-use-item licence from MOFCOM citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The measure was framed as protecting national security and interests, though the timing immediately followed the Dutch ASML DUV controls and US chip-equipment escalations.

The Dutch government announced on 30 June 2023 a new national export-licensing requirement covering specific advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, most prominently ASML's TWINSCAN NXT:2000i and subsequent DUV immersion lithography systems used at ≤14/16nm logic, advanced DRAM, and advanced 3D NAND production. Effective from 1 September 2023 via the national Strategic Goods Decree, the rule completes the trilateral US-Japan-Netherlands chip-equipment perimeter initiated by the January 2023 trilateral agreement. Although nominally country-neutral, the BIS Foreign Direct Product Rule means licences for shipments to "countries of concern" — read: China — face a presumption of denial. Subsequent guidance in 2024 expanded coverage to additional TWINSCAN NXT:1970Ci and 1980Di system variants.

BIS issued a correcting amendment to the EAR Entity List to add China Aviation Development Harbin Bearing Co., Ltd. — an AVIC subsidiary and specialist precision-bearing manufacturer — that was included in the preamble of the June 14, 2023 final rule (88 FR 38739) but inadvertently omitted from the regulatory text. The entity was designated for acquiring and attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of China's military modernization, including hypersonic weapons development, air-to-air missiles, and weapon lifecycle management using Western software. All EAR-subject items require a licence with a presumption of denial; retroactive effective date of June 16, 2023.

BIS published a final rule adding 43 entities under 50 entries to the EAR Entity List and removing one entity (Fiber Optic Solutions, Latvia), effective June 12, 2023. The additions span ten countries — China (31 entities), UAE (5), Pakistan (4), South Africa (3), UK (2), and one each in Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand — targeting four principal threat clusters: China's military modernization and hypersonic-weapons supply chain, an international network of flight-training academies (TFASA and affiliates) providing Western pilot training to Chinese military personnel, Pakistan-linked procurement for unsafeguarded ballistic-missile programs, and UAE/South Africa-based dual-use diversion networks. All listed entities require a BIS licence, with most subject to a presumption of denial.

At its 8th Decision-Making Meeting on 6 June 2023, Namibia's Cabinet approved a prohibition on the export of unprocessed critical minerals — specifically crushed lithium ore, cobalt, manganese, graphite, and rare earth elements — with only small quantities permitted for export upon written ministerial approval. The policy is operationalised through discretionary Ministerial authority under the Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act 33 of 1992, with no new statute enacted. The measure is designed to compel domestic beneficiation under Namibia's Mineral Beneficiation Strategy (MBS), capturing refining and processing margin that would otherwise accrue to consuming-country smelters.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule on 19 May 2023 strengthening existing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The rule expands the Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule — which applies EAR jurisdiction to foreign-made items produced with US technology or equipment — to cover the temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine. It also revises controls targeting Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, closing loopholes identified in prior rounds of Russia-Ukraine-related export-control rulemaking.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities to the Entity List effective May 19, 2023, as part of the continuing US export-control response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Of the 71 additions, 69 are Russian entities (aircraft repair plants, ammunition and gunpowder manufacturers, shipyards, tractor and automobile factories, and engineering centres), one is Armenian, and one is Kyrgyz — the latter two for facilitating diversion of controlled goods to Russia. The majority of Russian entities received "footnote 3" designations as Russian or Belarusian military end users, triggering the Russia/Belarus Military End-User FDP Rule and subjecting them to a license review policy of denial.

MOTIE finalised the 31st amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items on 24 April 2023, effective 28 April 2023, adding 741 items to the Russia/Belarus situational-licence (상황허가) list. The added items span industrial machinery, petroleum and gas refining equipment, steel, chemicals, automotive goods and quantum computers judged to have high military-diversion potential. MOTIE stated the amendment brings Korea's export-control coverage of Russia/Belarus closer to that of the US, EU and Japan, incorporating 2022 international export-control-regime agreements and reflecting the US's 2nd-6th Russia sanctions rounds and a substantial part of the EU's measures.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 28 entities under 32 entries to the Entity List effective April 12, 2023, targeting front companies and logistics networks attempting to evade US export controls to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military and defense industrial base. Twelve of the entities are Chinese electronics and semiconductor distributors operating as procurement intermediaries; ten are Russian logistics and trading firms; six are spread across Armenia, Malta, Singapore, Spain, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Uzbekistan as diversion facilitators. All listed entities are subject to a license review policy of denial for virtually all EAR-controlled items.

The Wa State Central Economic Planning Commission (the administrative authority of the United Wa State Army's Special Region No. 2, controlling the Man Maw and Mong Yaw tin zones) issued Notice "Wa Jing Zi No. 2023-06" on April 15, 2023, mandating a comprehensive suspension of all mining, excavation, and mineral processing in Wa State until "mature mining conditions" are in place. A follow-up implementation order on May 20, 2023 confirmed all mines and processing plants—regardless of scale—must cease operations by August 1, 2023. Man Maw alone supplied approximately 10% of global tin concentrate, and LME three-month tin prices rose ~9% in the weeks following the April announcement. The suspension remained in force until mid-2025 when a new three-year licensing regime replaced it (see 2025-02-01-myanmar-wa-state-man-maw-tin-restart-licensing).

Statutory Instrument 57 of 2023, the Base Minerals Export Control (Unbeneficiated Base Mineral Ores) (Amendment) Order, 2023 (No. 1), was issued by Zimbabwe's Minister of Mines and Mining Development (Hon. Winston Chitando) in April 2023 to amend the foundational SI 5 of 2023 ban on raw base-mineral ore exports. The amendment imposes lithium-specific permit conditions: exporters must either own an Approved Processing Plant (APP) or contractually commit to building one within two years of receiving an export permit, unbeneficiated lithium permits may only be granted to Zimbabwean citizens or wholly-Zimbabwean-owned entities, and any such permit further requires the President's concurrence. The order also requires that beneficiated lithium export prices not fall below the floor set by the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), and stipulates penalties of up to level 9 fines or twice the value of the mineral involved, plus up to two years' imprisonment, for non-compliance. SI 57 sits between the December 2022 lithium-bearing-ore ban (SI 213/2022) and the February 2026 ministerial directive that suspended all raw-mineral and lithium-concentrate exports outright — it is the foundational statutory architecture that the 2026 reset later operated on top of.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced on 31 March 2023 amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act adding 23 categories of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to the export-licensing list. The measure, effective from 23 July 2023, is the Japanese counterpart to the US October 2022 BIS rule (filed: 2022-10-07-us-bis-advanced-ai-chip-controls-china) and the Dutch DUV controls. Items covered span lithography (mostly ArF and KrF), deposition (CVD, ALD, sputtering), etch, and cleaning + advanced inspection — broadly the toolset used at ≤14/16nm logic, advanced DRAM, and advanced 3D NAND. The controls are formally non-discriminatory but in practice capture exports to China; non-China destinations get general licences.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eleven entities across Burma, China, Nicaragua, and Russia to the Entity List, effective March 28, 2023, under a human rights foreign policy rationale. Three Burmese trading companies and two Russian aviation-parts suppliers were designated for selling, procuring, and servicing military equipment enabling the Burmese military regime's attacks on civilians; five Xinjiang-based electronics manufacturers were added for activities contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests; and the Nicaraguan National Police was designated for serious human rights abuses. The rule simultaneously codified in the EAR that protection of human rights worldwide is an explicit basis for Entity List designations — a precedent-setting regulatory amendment extending the existing national-security and foreign-policy framework.