Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

Decision No. 190 of 2026 of Egypt's Minister of Investment and Foreign Trade Mohamed Farid, published in the Egyptian Official Gazette (الوقائع المصرية) issue No. 98 (annex / تابع) on 4 May 2026 and effective the following day, imposes a temporary US$90 per metric ton export duty on all nitrogen-based fertilizers (principally urea and ammonium nitrate) for a three-month window expiring early August 2026, with extension possible. The duty is paid in Egyptian pounds at the Central Bank of Egypt prevailing rate at the time of each transaction. Phosphatic fertilizers are excluded. The stated rationale is securing domestic supply availability during a global nitrogen-price surge driven by Russian/Ukrainian supply disruption, Iranian production losses, and seasonal demand. Egypt is the world's #7 nitrogen-fertilizer exporter (≈3.54 Mt exported in 2024); the measure quadruples the prior nominal export-tax level on the segment.

Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 431 of 17 April 2026, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, sets temporary export quotas on mineral fertilisers from Russia for the six-month period 1 June – 30 November 2026. The aggregate quota is approximately 20 million tonnes, comprising over 8.7 Mt for nitrogen fertilisers (urea, ammonium sulphate, UAN), over 4.2 Mt for ammonium nitrate (a separate sub-quota, suspended from 21 March – 21 April 2026 before this cycle opened), and over 7 Mt for complex fertilisers (NPK, NP, NPS, DAP, MAP). The measure continues the recurring six-month quota architecture in place since late 2021 and is the direct successor to the Dec 2024 – May 2025 cycle fixed under Resolution 1400 of October 2024 (and its subsequent extensions). Exemptions apply to EEU members, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, humanitarian-aid lots, and transit flows.

Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs International Trade Administration (MOEA-ITA) issued a pre-notice (17 November 2025, doc. 經授貿字第 11450120760號) proposing amendments to the "Dual-Use Goods and Technology Export Control List" and the "General Military Goods List" under the Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) regime, adding or reclassifying items in the basic-inorganic-chemicals, chemical-products, and engines/turbines categories to align with Wassenaar Arrangement list updates. Following the standard 60-day public-comment period, MOEA-ITA published the finalised amendment on 11 February 2026 (doc. 經貿字第 11550200140號), effective immediately, requiring exporters of the newly listed dual-use and military goods to obtain prior export licences regardless of destination.

On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.

India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) issued Notification No. 31/2025-26 on 23 September 2025, revising Appendix-3 of Schedule-II of the ITC(HS) Export Policy to add a new Category 7 — "Certain Emerging Technologies and related items" — to the SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) list. Category 7 brings under export-licence control: quantum-computing systems (≥34 qubits with controlled error rates), cryogenic CMOS integrated circuits, advanced lithography tools (≤45 nm minimum resolvable feature), additive-manufacturing equipment under vacuum, and related software/technology. The notification took effect 30 days from issuance, on 23 October 2025, and is the first new SCOMET category created since the list's last major restructure, aligning India's strategic-trade-control regime with parallel US BIS, Wassenaar Arrangement, and EU dual-use list updates.

On 23 December 2024 the US Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule (89 FR 104408; FR Doc 2024-30425; RIN 0694-AJ83) amending the Export Administration Regulations to implement decisions adopted at the Australia Group's 2023 and 2024 plenary meetings. The rule adds new ECCN 2B352.k controlling instruments for the automated chemical synthesis of peptides that are partly or entirely automated and capable of generating peptides at a system-synthesis scale of 1 mmol or greater, finalising the April 2023 BIS proposed rule. It also adds dipropylamine to ECCN 1C350.d.11, neosaxitoxin to ECCN 1C351.d.12, revises the 1C351.d.3 entry from "botulinum toxins" to "botulinum neurotoxins" to capture all serotypes, adds a "minimum detection limit" definition for toxic-gas monitors in 2B351.a, and explicitly captures single-use centrifugal separators in 2B352.c. License requirements (CB, AT, CW where applicable) apply for export to non-Australia-Group destinations; the rule is effective on publication.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 87261; FR Doc 2024-25411) added 40 entities under 42 entries plus four addresses to the Entity List under the destinations China (11), India (5), Malaysia (2), Russia (13), Singapore (1), and Turkey (14), and modified 52 existing entries across China, Estonia, Finland, India, Turkey, the UAE and the UK. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish, Indian, Malaysian and Singaporean entities listed for transshipping controlled US-origin items to Russian defense end users; the 13 Russia entries cover chemical and biological warfare R&D and defense procurement networks. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy/presumption of denial; four China addresses get the narrower "CCL + EAR99 supp. 7" scope. Effective on publication 2024-11-01.

On 31 October 2024, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced strengthened export controls in response to North Korea's long-range ballistic missile launch earlier that day. The measure designates 15 "North Korea-customized" watch-list items across the solid-fuel missile production chain — including ammonium perchlorate, sodium chloride, liquid thiokol, carbon fiber, glass fiber fabric, thermal batteries and inertial-guidance components — that North Korea finds difficult to produce domestically. It operates under Korea's existing Special Notice on Trade for Fulfilling International Peace and Security Obligations, building on the June 2016 Nuclear and Missile Surveillance Items framework and Korea's NSG/MTCR commitments.

Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1400 of 23 October 2024, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, sets temporary export quotas on mineral fertilisers from Russia for the six-month period 1 December 2024 – 31 May 2025. The aggregate cap is approximately 19.2 million tonnes, comprising about 11.2 Mt for nitrogen fertilisers and roughly 8 Mt for compound (NPK / NP / NPS) fertilisers. As with prior cycles, the quota is allocated across exporters by historical share and motivated by domestic-market supply stabilisation rather than revenue capture. Russia is the world's largest mineral-fertiliser exporter (~15-20% of global trade depending on segment), so the semi-annual quota is one of the principal global ag-input policy instruments.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

On 9 April 2024, Türkiye's Ministry of Trade restricted exports of 1,019 tariff lines across 54 product groups to Israel — including cement, marble, sulphur, aluminium wire, ceramics, varnishes and mineral fertilisers — in response to Israel's conduct of the Gaza war and its refusal of a Turkish request to participate in aid airdrops. The government stated the restriction would remain in force until Israel declared an immediate ceasefire and allowed unimpeded humanitarian aid into Gaza. The measure was superseded three weeks later, on 2 May 2024, when the Ministry halted all exports, imports and transit trade with Israel across every product category.

On 5 April 2024 Japan's Cabinet adopted an amendment to the Export Trade Control Order, following a 1 March 2024 Cabinet understanding, extending the export prohibition on goods that strengthen Russia's industrial base. The additional goods span parts of HS chapters 27 (mineral fuels and oils), 28 (inorganic chemicals), 39, 73, 81 (tungsten powder, molybdenum, cobalt, zirconium, rhenium), 82, 84, 85 (including lithium-ion and nickel-metal-hydride batteries), 89 and 90, with the specific goods fixed by ministerial ordinance and notices issued on 10 April. The export ban applies from 17 April 2024. A separate METI notice bans imports of non-industrial diamonds of Russian origin from 10 May 2024, regardless of port of shipment.

MOTIE finalised the 31st amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items on 24 April 2023, effective 28 April 2023, adding 741 items to the Russia/Belarus situational-licence (상황허가) list. The added items span industrial machinery, petroleum and gas refining equipment, steel, chemicals, automotive goods and quantum computers judged to have high military-diversion potential. MOTIE stated the amendment brings Korea's export-control coverage of Russia/Belarus closer to that of the US, EU and Japan, incorporating 2022 international export-control-regime agreements and reflecting the US's 2nd-6th Russia sanctions rounds and a substantial part of the EU's measures.

The Bureau of Industry and Security expanded EAR sanctions against Russia and Belarus effective 24 February 2023, adding 322 HTS-6 industrial items to Supplement No. 4 to Part 746 (oil-and-gas equipment, flat-rolled steel, pumps, turbines, marine and aviation engines) and 276 luxury goods to Supplement No. 5. Supplement No. 6 was amended to add biological and chemical-synthesis equipment including bioreactors, peptide synthesizers, and nucleotide reagents, targeting Russia's biodefence and dual-use procurement pathway. The rule also migrated Supplement No. 2 from Schedule B to HTS-6 identifiers to align with allied partner frameworks, added Taiwan to the list of countries excluded from licence requirements, and extended Section 744.7 end-use restrictions to cover in-country transfers inside Russia and Belarus.

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/66, adopted 21 October 2022 and published in the Official Journal on 11 January 2023 (OJ L 9), replaces Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (the EU Dual-Use Recast Regulation) with an updated control list implementing the 2022 multilateral decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Per GTA's tracking of the CN-code-level change, the update removed 7 six-digit CN codes and added 8 new ones. It entered into force on 12 January 2023, the day after publication.

The Bureau of Industry and Security expanded EAR sanctions against Russia and Belarus effective 15 September 2022, adding new export-control categories covering quantum computing equipment and related technology (new licensing requirements under a near-total policy of denial), discrete chemicals and biologics including fentanyl precursors and CBW-related production equipment (new Supplement No. 6 to Part 746), and 57 EAR99 industrial items added to the industry-sector sanctions list (Supplement No. 4). Six entities were concurrently designated as Russian Military End Users (MEU), and MEU/MIEU licensing restrictions were extended worldwide (previously limited to six countries). The rule also extended the Foreign Direct Product Rule to additional categories of foreign-made items.

The Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 91 entities (across 96 entries) to the Entity List under 15 CFR Part 744, in direct response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The listed entities span ten destinations — Belize, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malta, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom — and include Russian military research institutes, shipbuilding facilities, aerospace and electronics manufacturers, and suspected front companies in third countries used to circumvent EAR controls. A license is required for all items subject to the EAR; the review policy is denial for 86 entities and case-by-case (for US Government-supported space programs) for five.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding seven entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 14, 2022, on nuclear nonproliferation and national security grounds. Five Pakistani engineering and chemical companies, one Chinese metal-powder manufacturer (Jiangsu Tianyuan Metal Powder Co. Ltd.), and one UAE-based trading company (Odyssey General Trading FZC) were determined to be acting contrary to US foreign policy or national security interests. All seven entries impose a license requirement covering all EAR-jurisdiction items, with no license exceptions available; the license review policy is presumption of denial for the Chinese entity and per 15 CFR § 744.2(d) for the Pakistani and UAE entities.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on 8 February 2022 to add 33 persons — all based in China — to the Unverified List (UVL) under EAR §744.15(c), on the basis that BIS could not satisfactorily complete end-use checks for these entities for reasons outside US Government control. Placement on the UVL bars exporters from using any EAR license exception when shipping controlled items to listed parties and requires exporters to obtain a certified UVL Statement from the entity or secure a BIS export licence. Sectors represented include semiconductor manufacturing equipment, optoelectronics, UAVs, specialty chemicals, and biotechnology.

Turkey's Ministry of Trade amended the İhracı Kayda Bağlı Mallara İlişkin Tebliğ (İhracat: 2006/7) via two communiqués — Tebliğ İhracat 2021/8 (fertilizers, GTİP 3101–3105) and İhracat 2021/9 (sulphuric acid/oleum, GTİP 2807.00, and pure ammonia, GTİP 2814.10) — published in Official Gazette No. 31630 of 16 October 2021. The measure places these goods on the "goods whose export is subject to registration" list: exporters must register each shipment with the Istanbul Minerals and Metals Exporters' Association (İMMİB) before customs clearance, a monitoring/prioritisation gate intended to secure domestic fertilizer supply rather than an outright ban. Global Trade Alert logs the measure under its "export ban" category; the primary text is a registration requirement, not a prohibition, and this filing follows the primary text.

Regulation (EU) 2021/821, adopted 20 May 2021 and applied from 9 September 2021, establishes the Union regime for controlling exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, repealing Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Annex I lists controlled items implementing internationally agreed dual-use controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG, and Chemical Weapons Convention. The regulation introduces a new catch-all control on cyber-surveillance technologies that could facilitate human-rights violations (Art. 5 and Annex IV), and strengthens cooperation between Member States and the European Commission, placing specific obligations on exporters. It serves as the statutory anchor for all EU export licences, every multilateral-regime transposition into EU law, and coordination mechanisms with US BIS, UK ECJU, JP METI, and KR MOTIE export-control regimes.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security added 14 entities across Russia, Germany, and Switzerland to the Entity List under 15 CFR Part 744, effective March 4, 2021. Ten Russian entities — including the 27th Scientific Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense (associated with Russia's chemical weapons activities) and nine members of the Chimmed Group distribution network (Chimmed Group, Femteco, Interlab, LabInvest, OOO Analit Products, OOO Intertech Instruments, Pharmcontract GC, Rau Farm, Regionsnab) — were listed for proliferation activities supporting Russia's WMD programs. Three German entities (Chimconnect GmbH, Pharmcontract GmbH, Riol-Chemie) and one Swiss entity (Chimconnect AG) were simultaneously listed as foreign-front nodes in the same procurement network. A license is required for all EAR-subject items; no license exceptions apply. The rule also corrects six pre-existing entries (one Germany, five China).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule on January 15, 2021 substantially expanding the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Part 744 end-use and end-user control framework to cover military-intelligence entities in China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela. The rule created a new license requirement for exports of ANY EAR-subject item to named military-intelligence end-users — including EAR99-classified items — and separately imposed restrictions on U.S. persons worldwide providing "support" to military-intelligence end-uses or end-users without a BIS licence. It also broadened chemical and biological weapons controls from "will directly assist" to "will support," expanding the reach of §744.4 and §744.3 on WMD-delivery systems. A technical correction published March 17, 2021 (FR Doc 2021-05623) fixed a drafting error in Instruction 9 that would have inadvertently deleted §744.3(a)(3)(i)-(ii), the rocket systems and UAV provisions.