Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2673 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On 13 May 2026, Entreprise Générale du Cobalt (EGC — the DRC state cobalt monopsony), Trafigura Pte Ltd, and EVelution Energy LLC signed a tripartite MOU in Madrid to establish a long-term supply framework for Congolese cobalt hydroxide to the United States. EGC will originate cobalt hydroxide from artisanal and small-scale mining; Trafigura will provide logistics and marketing services; EVelution will process the material into battery-grade cobalt sulfate and alloy-grade cobalt metal at a new first-of-kind commercial-scale refinery in Yuma County, Arizona (construction 2027, target completion 2029). The arrangement is designed to supply approximately 40% of projected US cobalt demand for aerospace, defence, and EV batteries. The MOU operationalises the December 2025 US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement at the commercial supply-chain level, creating a primary DRC→US cobalt flow that bypasses Chinese refiners.

The European Commission and the US announced on 24 April 2026 the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a strategic partnership on critical minerals, accompanied by an EU-US Critical Minerals Action Plan. The framework deepens cooperation on supply-chain security across the strategic raw-materials list shared between the two jurisdictions — joint financing, recycling, mutual recognition of strategic- project status under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (filed: 2024-05-23-eu-crma-entry-into-force) and US IRA §30D / §45X frameworks (filed: 2022-08-16-us-inflation-reduction-act). The agreement is positioned as a joint response to non-market practices in third-country supply chains for the named materials.

On 19 March 2026, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, METI, and Ministry of Finance jointly released the "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" — the operational follow-on to the 27 October 2025 US-Japan Framework. The Action Plan formally commits both governments to develop a plurilateral trade initiative in critical minerals "supported by price floors or other measures", to consult on embedding "border-adjusted price floors" in a binding plurilateral agreement, and to identify specific mining/processing/manufacturing projects in the US, Japan, or third countries for prioritised joint financing. It is the first formal US/Japan trade-policy commitment to administered floor-pricing as an instrument of critical-minerals trade governance, and explicitly invites third countries to join the contemplated plurilateral.

On 21 February 2026 in New Delhi, during the State Visit of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, India and Brazil signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Critical Minerals between India's Ministry of Mines and Brazil's Ministry of Mines and Energy. The MoU establishes a bilateral framework spanning the entire critical-minerals value chain — exploration, mining, processing, recycling, and refining — with explicit focus on rare-earth elements, lithium, nickel, cobalt, niobium, manganese, and other strategic minerals. It was issued alongside a broader Joint Statement targeting USD 30 billion in bilateral trade by 2030 and a ten-year strategic-partnership roadmap covering AI, defence, energy, agriculture, and digital transformation.

On 17 February 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney launched Canada's first standalone Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), introducing the "Build–Partner–Buy" framework as the central guiding principle of Canadian defence procurement. The strategy mobilises over half a trillion CAD across the next decade — including ~CAD 180 bn in defence procurement opportunities, ~CAD 290 bn in defence-related capital investment, and ~CAD 125 bn in anticipated downstream economic benefit by 2035 — and targets 125,000 new high-paying jobs. Operationally, the DIS introduces Canadian Content Value (CCV) requirements with a proposed Canadian Company Boost for firms meeting 70–100% domestic-content thresholds, sets a 10-year goal of awarding 70% of defence procurements to Canadian firms, and signals willingness to invoke the national security exception to set aside trade-agreement obligations and exclude foreign bidders for "sovereign capability" contracts. It is the first standalone industrial-strategy document covering the Canadian defence-industrial base, distinct from prior DPA-narrow filings.

On 10 February 2026 in Baku, US Vice President JD Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership — a foundational bilateral instrument covering five cooperation tracks: economy and trade, energy, connectivity and digital development (including AI), security and defense, and critical-minerals transit. The Charter commits both governments to facilitate the transit of critical minerals via the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor to global markets, and formally recognises the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) as the multi-modal connectivity link between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The instrument builds on the 8 August 2025 MoU signed in Washington during the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Summit that established the Strategic Working Group tasked with drafting the Charter, and marks the first US Vice-Presidential visit to Azerbaijan since Dick Cheney in 2008.

The United Kingdom and the United States signed a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals in Washington DC on 4 February 2026 at the 2026 US Critical Minerals Ministerial. The MOU commits both Participants to intensify cooperative efforts to accelerate the secure supply of critical minerals and rare earths for defence manufacturing and advanced technologies, mobilising government financial tools (guarantees, loans, equity investments, offtake arrangements, insurance) and streamlining permitting timelines. On the UK side, the Department for Business and Trade committed up to £50 million in new funding to support critical mineral projects following the 2025 Spending Review. The instrument also includes a commitment to cooperate on price-floor mechanisms — the first bilateral price-floor cooperation filing on the IPTM register — as part of a broader US-led plurilateral initiative to establish reference prices countering non-market overproduction.

On 4 February 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Mexican Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard announced a U.S.-Mexico Action Plan on Critical Minerals — a first-of-its-kind 60-day bilateral work programme to develop coordinated trade policies and supply-chain mechanisms for critical minerals. The Action Plan tasks both governments with identifying a priority mineral list, exploring border-adjusted price floors as a candidate trade instrument, and consulting on how price floors could be incorporated into a binding plurilateral agreement on trade in critical minerals. It is framed as a confidence- building measure ahead of the USMCA Joint Review (statutory deadline 1 July 2026) and as the Mexico-side template that parallels concurrent USTR engagements with the EU and Japan.

On 4 February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio launched the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) at the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, DC, attended by representatives from 54 countries and the European Commission. FORGE is the successor to the 2022 Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and is structured as a plurilateral coalition that creates a preferential trade-and-investment zone for critical minerals, including coordinated price-floor mechanisms designed to counter adversarial market manipulation — explicitly framed against Chinese mineral-supply dominance. The Republic of Korea chairs FORGE through June 2026. Eleven bilateral critical-minerals frameworks/MoUs were signed simultaneously (Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, UAE, UK, Uzbekistan), and FORGE is paired with Project Vault, an EXIM Bank direct loan facility of up to USD 10 billion to back FORGE-aligned critical-mineral projects.

On 2 February 2026 the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) Board approved a Direct Loan of up to USD 10 billion to an independently governed public-private partnership establishing the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve ("Project Vault"), alongside nearly USD 2 billion of private-sector investment for an envelope of approximately USD 12 billion. The reserve will physically stockpile the 60 minerals on the USGS 2025 Critical Minerals List across multiple US storage facilities, with participating original equipment manufacturers (Clarios, GE Vernova, Western Digital, Boeing) committing to specific volumes and grades and trading partners (Hartree Partners, Mercuria Americas, Traxys) handling sourcing. EXIM characterises the transaction as the largest single financing in its 92-year history and the first use of EXIM authority as the financing vehicle for a domestic strategic-minerals stockpile rather than for export-credit insurance abroad.

On 29 January 2026, European Council President António Costa and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính signed a Joint Statement in Hanoi upgrading EU-Vietnam bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) — the highest tier in Vietnam's diplomatic hierarchy, placing the EU on the same level as Vietnam's CSPs with China, Russia, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, France, and the United States. The CSP establishes a reinforced bilateral cooperation framework spanning critical raw materials, semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, trusted 5G infrastructure, climate and energy transition, security and defence (including cyber and maritime), and full implementation of the 2019 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) tariff-elimination schedule plus ratification of the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EVIPA). It is the EU's eleventh CSP globally and its second in Southeast Asia (after Singapore, 2024), and constitutes the foundational bilateral parent framework for all future EU-Vietnam cooperation under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) Article 13 third-country strategic-project designation pipeline, given Vietnam's approximately 22 Mt rare-earth reserves — the world's second-largest deposit after China.

On 14 January 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 titled "Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States". Unlike the parallel 14 January 2026 semiconductor proclamation and the subsequent April 2026 pharmaceutical proclamation, the PCMDP proclamation does NOT immediately impose tariffs. Instead it directs the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to jointly negotiate bilateral and plurilateral supply agreements with trading partners, with an initial 180-day status report due 13 July 2026. The proclamation reserves residual authority to impose tariffs if negotiations fail or prove ineffective, and explicitly contemplates "price floors" on PCMDP imports as a negotiated instrument.

The Government of Maharashtra, Industries Department, notified the Maharashtra Industry, Investment, and Services Policy-2025 on 31 December 2025, valid for five years and superseding the prior Maharashtra Industrial Policy 2019. The umbrella state-level instrument supports Maharashtra's "trillion-dollar economy by 2030" and "Developed Maharashtra 2047" vision with targets of ₹70.5 lakh crore (~USD 850 bn) cumulative investment, 50 lakh (5 million) jobs across manufacturing and services, and expansion of industry's share of Gross State Value Added to 30%. It is Maharashtra's first-ever combined industry + services + investment-promotion framework (prior policies were industry-only), establishes the unified "Invest Maharashtra" platform and revamped MAITRI 2.0 portal (125+ services, AI investor support, blockchain document verification), and empowers a Cabinet Sub-Committee under the Chief Minister to sanction bespoke customised-package incentives for Mega and Ultra-Mega Projects above the ₹500 crore threshold.

On 30 December 2025, the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (RKIK), an agency under the Ministry of Defence, signed framework agreements with four companies to build production facilities at the Ermistu Defence Industrial Park in Pärnumaa county. The state commits more than €50 million in core site infrastructure (access roads, electricity grid connections, water/wastewater, perimeter security); the four selected companies are expected to match that with comparable private investment in their own production buildings. Commercial production at all four facilities is scheduled to begin in 2027, establishing Estonia's first domestically-produced ammunition, explosive-charge, short-range air-defence missile, and plastic-explosives capacity in nearly a century.

On 16 December 2025, Public Services and Procurement Canada implemented the Buy Canadian Procurement Policy Framework, bringing into force (a) the Policy on Prioritizing Canadian Materials in Federal Procurement, which mandates use of Canadian steel, wood products and aluminum in federal defence and construction contracts valued at CAD 25 million or more that contain at least CAD 250,000 of those materials where Canadian supply exists, and (b) the Policy on Prioritizing Canadian Suppliers and Canadian Content in Strategic Federal Procurements, which applies a bid-price discount margin favouring Canadian suppliers in procurements tied to Canada's economic, industrial and innovation priorities. Complementary amendments to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Procurement Inquiry Regulations, effective 15 December 2025, remove CITT jurisdiction to review procurement measures that restrict participation to, or favour, Canadian suppliers, goods, services, materials or subcontractors. The framework applies immediately to procurements of CAD 25 million and above and is scheduled to expand to contracts of CAD 5 million and above by spring 2026. Budget 2025 allocates roughly CAD 186 million over five years to implement the framework, including CAD 79.9 million for a new Small and Medium Business Procurement Program.

On 8 December 2025 the Council of the EU gave final approval to Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), the first dedicated EU defence-industrial regulation. The regulation was signed on 17 December 2025 and entered into force on 30 December 2025 following publication in the Official Journal. EDIP provides EUR 1.5bn in grants for 2025-2027 plus an earmarked EUR 300m Ukraine Support Instrument, sets a statutory cap limiting non-EU/EEA components to 35% of estimated component cost in end-products procured with Union funding, and creates EU-level demand-aggregation, common procurement and security-of-supply frameworks for defence products.

The UK Ministry of Defence announced the Atlantic Bastion programme on 8 December 2025, establishing a hybrid naval force to defend UK and NATO subsea cable and pipeline infrastructure against Russian submarine threats. The programme integrates ships, submarines, aircraft, and autonomous uncrewed vessels through AI-powered acoustic detection and a digital targeting web, with £14 million in combined MOD/industry seedcorn investment already committed, 26 UK and European firms submitting anti-submarine sensor proposals, and capabilities due to be deployed in 2026. Atlantic Bastion implements the Strategic Defence Review 2025 undersea-warfare commitments and is coordinated through the Undersea Infrastructure Security (UIS) Oversight Board chaired by the Cabinet Office.

On 3 December 2025 the European Commission adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan (COM(2025) 945 final), a horizontal critical-raw-materials supply-security instrument complementing the 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act. The plan mobilises €3 billion in EU funds within twelve months for priority CRM projects, creates a European Critical Raw Materials Centre operational from 2026 (modelled on Japan's JOGMEC) acting as portfolio manager for diversified supply chains, joint purchasing and stockpiling, and activates the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act (IMERA) "vigilance" and "emergency" modes from May 2026 with mandatory information requests, priority deliveries and coordinated stockpile distribution. A targeted CRMA amendment expands product labelling for permanent-magnet recycling and adds export controls on permanent-magnet and aluminium scrap. Targets a 30-50% reduction by 2029 in single-country dependency for battery, rare-earth and defence raw-material value chains.

The Department for Business and Trade, with DSIT, published "Vision 2035: Critical Minerals Strategy" on 22 November 2025 — the UK's first dedicated critical-minerals strategy under the Starmer government, superseding the withdrawn 2022 strategy. DBT commits up to GBP 50 million for new critical mineral projects on top of GBP 165 million in existing support, with the National Wealth Fund providing equity backing (Cornish Lithium GBP 24m in 2023 plus a further GBP 31m commitment in 2025; Cornish Metals GBP 28.6m in 2025; South Crofty Tin GBP 26.8m). Sets 2035 targets of 10% of UK industrial demand from domestic production (extraction + processing + refining), 20% from recycling, and a hard floor of 50,000 tonnes lithium carbonate equivalent produced domestically. Strategy is consciously midstream-and-recycling-tilted rather than upstream-extraction race; pillars are (i) optimise domestic production, (ii) resilient global supply networks via partnerships with US, EU, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, India, Japan (plus Kazakhstan rhenium/vanadium and continued China engagement), (iii) circular economy / recycling, (iv) responsible supply chains.

ECOFIN on 12 December 2025 adopted a Council Implementing Decision approving the 4th amendment to Poland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (Krajowy Plan Odbudowy, KPO), following Commission proposal C(2025) 7998 final of 19 November 2025. The amendment modifies 80 measures within the plan while keeping Poland's total financial contribution under the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) unchanged at EUR 25,276,853,716 in grants, alongside an estimated EUR 20.6 bn REPowerEU chapter envelope. Adopted in parallel with amendments for Austria, Cyprus, Czechia, France, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia, this amendment continues the structural pivot — first opened by the May 2025 third amendment — that allows Poland to redirect post-COVID recovery funds toward defence-industrial and dual-use spending given the NATO eastern-flank context.

On 18 November 2025, during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's White House visit (17-19 November 2025), the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on Securing Uranium, Metals, Permanent Magnets, and Critical Minerals Supply Chains. The framework was signed by US Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and Saudi Minister of Energy H.R.H. Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, and positions Saudi Arabia (via Ma'aden + Public Investment Fund vehicles) as a regional hub for processing rare earths and producing permanent magnets, supports a US-backed rare-earths refinery in the Kingdom, and channels Saudi capital — alongside the broader USD ~1 trillion Saudi investment commitment in the US announced the same week — into US and allied critical-mineral projects. It is paired with a separate joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperation (Section 123 Agreement contemplated) and was operationalised one day later by the 19 November 2025 binding term sheet between MP Materials, the US Department of War, and Ma'aden to develop a rare-earth refinery in Saudi Arabia (Department of War financing the US side's 49% stake; Ma'aden retaining ≥51%).

Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia signed Peraturan Menteri ESDM Nomor 18 Tahun 2025 ("Permen ESDM 18/2025") on 14 November 2025, Indonesia's first comprehensive ministerial-level framework for the exploration, designation, allocation, and utilisation of rare-earth resources. The regulation operationalises Government Regulation PP 39/2025 (signed 11 September 2025), which inserted a dedicated rare-earths article (Article 18A) into PP 96/2021 on the implementation of mineral and coal mining business activities. It empowers the Minister to designate BUMN (state-owned enterprises) as preferred operators of rare-earth mining and processing, mandates that REE output prioritise domestic strategic industries (defence, electric vehicle batteries, advanced technology, permanent magnets), and routes inventarisation through the geological agency before WIUP (mining business permit areas) are awarded.

Canada's Budget 2025 (released 4 November 2025) expands the Critical Mineral Exploration Tax Credit (CMETC) to cover 12 additional minerals: bismuth, cesium, chromium, fluorspar, germanium, indium, manganese, molybdenum, niobium, tantalum, tin, and tungsten. The 30% flow-through share enhanced rate (double the standard 15% Mineral Exploration Tax Credit) is maintained and applies to agreements entered after November 4, 2025 and before March 31, 2027. This is the first scope expansion since CMETC's creation in 2022, bringing the total eligible mineral count to approximately 27 and aligning the credit with Canada's 2024 Critical Minerals List update.

On 31 October 2025, Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson announced — on the sidelines of the G7 Energy & Environment Ministers' Meeting in Toronto — that the federal government will leverage the Defence Production Act (DPA) to designate critical minerals as defence supplies and build a strategic stockpile, with the Crown acting as buyer of last resort and setting confidential minimum prices to insulate Canadian producers from Chinese price suppression. The announcement was paired with an initial round of 26 investments, partnerships and measures totalling C$6.4 billion in unlocked critical-mineral capital (~C$120m direct federal spend plus up to ~C$1.2 bn in offtake agreements, expressions of interest and export guarantees) and aligned with nine allied countries. It is the first time Canada has invoked DPA stockpiling and priority-procurement powers for non-traditional defence inputs (lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, rare earths, graphite, uranium) and repositions Canada as an allied-aligned strategic supplier parallel to US DPA Title III action under EO 14241.

On 27 October 2025, during the Trump-Takaichi Tokyo summit, the United States and Japan announced the "Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing", signed by President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on 28 October 2025. The non-binding framework establishes a US-Japan Critical Minerals Supply Security Rapid Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Japanese METI Minister; commits both governments to provide financial support to selected mining and processing projects within six months via grants, guarantees, loans, equity, offtake arrangements, and insurance — mobilising DFC + EXIM (US side) with JOGMEC + JBIC (Japan side); develops a "mutually complementary stockpiling arrangement" leveraging existing national systems; and schedules a Mining, Minerals and Metals Investment Ministerial within 180 days. The framework was subsequently operationalised through the 19 March 2026 "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" jointly issued by USTR and METI.

On 20 October 2025, President Donald J. Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed at the White House the "United States-Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths" — a non-binding common-policy instrument committing both governments to provide at least USD 1 billion each in financing within six months (USD 3bn+ joint commitment against an USD 8.5bn project pipeline and a stated USD 53bn recoverable-resource pipeline). The framework establishes a US-Australia Critical Minerals Supply Security Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Australian Minister for Resources, mandates streamlined permitting for mining/separation/processing projects, and explicitly couples the US demand-side architecture (DPA Title III + Defense Logistics Agency stockpile) to Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve. Concurrent with signing, EXIM issued seven Letters of Interest totalling USD 2.2bn (unlocking up to USD 5bn) to Arafura Rare Earths, Northern Minerals, Graphinex, La Trobe Magnesium, VHM, RZ Resources, and Sunrise Energy Metals; the US Department of War separately committed to a 100 metric-ton-per-year advanced gallium refinery in Western Australia, and Australia took USD 200m concessional equity in the Alcoa-Sojitz Wagerup gallium project and USD 100m equity in the Arafura Nolans rare-earths project.

On 18 October 2025 the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a package of amendments to the Defence and Security Industry Law (XIV-2647, originally adopted May 2024), the Law on Public Procurement in Security and Defence, the Law on Control of Weapons and Ammunition, and cross-cutting territorial-planning and construction laws. The central measure, proposed by the Ministry of Economy and Innovation (EIMIN), replaces the full construction-permit requirement for defence-production facilities with a notification-of-commencement procedure, compressing typical procurement-to-groundbreaking timelines from approximately 2–2.5 years to a few months. Complementary provisions reserve public-land investment plots for defence projects, enable defence-industry development outside designated military territories, and enshrine industrial cooperation as a procurement principle requiring foreign OEMs fulfilling Lithuanian defence contracts to source a defined share of obligations from Lithuanian-registered entities. The package directly enables inbound defence-industrial FDI from Rheinmetall (155 mm artillery-shell JV) and the Northrop Grumman / Nammo medium-calibre ammunition programme at the state-owned Giraitė Armament Factory.

India's Ministry of Defence signed a contract worth over Rs 62,370 crore (excluding taxes, ~USD 7.5 billion) with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) on 25 September 2025 for 97 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk1A — 68 single-seat fighters and 29 twin-seat trainers — for the Indian Air Force. The acquisition falls under the "Buy (India-IDDM)" (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured) category of the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 and carries an indigenous-content requirement of over 64%, incorporating 67 additional indigenous items compared with the prior January 2021 LCA Mk1A contract. Deliveries begin 2027-28 and run over six years, supported by a vendor base of roughly 105 Indian component manufacturers.

Denmark's Folketing enacted Lov nr. 1097 af 15 September 2025, introduced by the Forsvarsministeriet under the September 2025 defence agreement (forsvarsforlig), establishing a statutory fast-track framework that exempts building/construction projects and operational activities serving significant national-defence or civil-emergency-preparedness purposes from standard requirements including building permits and environmental approvals. The law enables a Forsvarsministeriet-issued administrative derogation from spatial-planning and environmental law where necessary to achieve the project's objectives, directly operationalising Denmark's 50 billion DKK Defence Acceleration Fund capacity build-out. A sunset clause causes the law to expire automatically at end-2028. First confirmed applications include a new national ammunition production facility in Elling (north Jutland) and a factory in Vojens (south Jutland) for solid-propellant rocket-motor production by Ukrainian company Fire Point — the latter representing cross-border defence-industrial FDI from a non-EU operator into a NATO member state for a strategically sensitive propellant category.

On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.

Turkey's Medium-Term Programme 2026-2028 (Orta Vadeli Program, OVP), published in the Resmi Gazete on 7 September 2025 by the Presidency Strategy and Budget Directorate, sets out a binding three-year macroeconomic and industrial framework that prioritises disinflation over near-term growth, targeting year-end CPI of 16% in 2026 narrowing to single digits by 2027–2028, while projecting GDP growth to accelerate from 3.3% in 2025 to 5.0% by 2028. Export revenues are targeted to rise from $273.8 billion in 2025 to $308.5 billion in 2028, with tourism receipts reaching $75 billion, and the central government deficit set to narrow from 3.6% to 2.8% of GDP. The programme is structured around three transformation pillars — green transformation, digital transition toward high-value-added industries, and alignment with Turkey's 12th National Development Plan (2024-2028) — making it the umbrella strategic framework within which sectoral instruments such as HIT-30, YEKA, and the 2026 import-regime decree operate.

South Korea's National Assembly passed an amendment to the Korea Development Bank (KDB) Act on 2025-08-27 (428th session, 3rd plenary sitting, 164-1 with 164 votes in favour of 165 cast), raising KDB's statutory capital ceiling from KRW 30 trillion to KRW 45 trillion and creating a new "Advanced Strategic Industry Fund" inside KDB. The fund is capitalised at KRW 50 trillion or more over five years via low-rate government-guaranteed bonds and is earmarked for the ten officially designated advanced strategic industries (AI, semiconductors, bio/vaccines, defense, robotics, hydrogen, secondary batteries, displays, future mobility) via cheap loans and equity investment. KDB intends to use the fund as seed capital for a wider "National Growth Fund" that blends in private and pension capital to reach KRW 100 trillion+ in total strategic-industry financing over five years.

Parliament of India passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2025 (Act No. 28 of 2025) — Lok Sabha on 12 August 2025, Rajya Sabha on 19 August 2025, Presidential assent on 21 August 2025, in force 1 September 2025 — amending the parent MMDR Act, 1957. The Act removes the prior 50% cap on captive-mine production eligible for open sale (allowing captive-block holders unrestricted third-party sale after meeting end-use requirements), widens the National Mineral Exploration Trust into the National Mineral Exploration and Development Trust (NMEDT) with mandate extended to mine development, offshore areas, and overseas acquisition operations, raises the NMEDT royalty contribution from 2% to 3%, waives the auction premium for the 24 critical and strategic minerals listed in Part D of the First Schedule (including lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel, REE, PGM, beryllium, and antimony), and establishes a statutory authority to register and regulate Mineral Exchanges as electronic commodity-trading platforms for minerals and metals.

Poland's Sejm adopted on 25 July 2025 — and the President signed on 5 August 2025 (Dz.U. 2025 poz. 1080, in force 7 September 2025) — a Special Act on Strategic Investments in the Field of National Defence and Public Security that creates an accelerated authorisation track for defence and public- security infrastructure projects: a single combined administrative decision issued within 90 days of application, simplified notification regime inside closed military zones, replacement of full environmental and water-law assessments with targeted mitigation, and an exemption from the Public Procurement Law for Ministry-of-National-Defence-cleared unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned weapon platforms and counter-drone systems. The statute is the procedural backbone for Poland's PLN 187bn 2025 defence budget (≈4.7% of GDP, the highest share in NATO) and dovetails with Poland's €43.7bn EU SAFE defence-loan allocation signed in May 2026.

On 14 July 2025, Public Services and Procurement Canada implemented the Interim Policy on Reciprocal Procurement, covering all new non-defence federal procurements valued at CAD 10,000 or above. Suppliers from countries that have no government- procurement trade obligations with Canada lose access to the federal procurement market; suppliers from countries with a relevant trade agreement retain access only to the extent their agreement provides. Procurements where at least 51% of estimated value is Defence Goods or Defence Services are excluded. Existing Supply Arrangements are grandfathered until their next renewal, with a hard deadline of 14 July 2026 for all such arrangements to comply. The policy was announced as a response to trading partners — chiefly the United States — that do not offer Canadian suppliers reciprocal access to their own procurement markets.

On 8 July 2025 the European Commission adopted Communication COM(2025) 530 final, the "European Chemicals Industry Action Plan", together with companion staff-working document SWD(2025) 191. The Plan launches a Critical Chemicals Alliance (CCA) of Member States and industry stakeholders to safeguard EU production of strategic base chemicals (ammonia, urea, ethylene, propylene, methanol, chlorine, silicon and other high-volume building blocks) against capacity closures driven by structurally high energy/feedstock costs and third-country oversupply. The package combines (i) accelerated trade-defence on imports of PVC, melamine, glyoxylic acid, ethanolamines and polyols plus extension of the Combined Safeguard Mechanism into chemicals; (ii) energy-cost relief through swift implementation of the Affordable Energy Action Plan and an indirect-CBAM offset for chemicals exposed to high-energy input costs; (iii) a 6th Omnibus simplification package overhauling REACH, CLP labelling, cosmetics and fertilising-product rules with claimed industry savings of at least €363m/year; (iv) a framework for a follow-on Critical Chemicals Act and PFAS restrictions preserving critical applications. The chemicals sector covers ~29,000 EU companies, 1.2m direct jobs, and ~19m dependent supply-chain jobs.

India's Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) on 3 July 2025 for 10 capital acquisition proposals worth approximately ₹1.05 lakh crore (~USD 12.3 billion), routed exclusively through the Buy (Indian-IDDM) category, which mandates that the platform be designed, developed and manufactured indigenously by an Indian vendor. The cleared items span Armoured Recovery Vehicles, an Electronic Warfare System, an Integrated Common Inventory Management System for the Tri-Services, Surface-to-Air Missiles, Moored Mines, Mine Counter Measure Vessels, a Super Rapid Gun Mount and Submersible Autonomous Vessels. AoN is the formal first-stage approval that authorises the Ministry to proceed to RFP and vendor selection; it is not itself a signed contract.

The UK Department for Business and Trade, with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, published "The UK's Modern Industrial Strategy" (Command Paper CP 1451) on 23 June 2025, laid before Parliament via Written Statement HCWS725. It is the first cross-economy industrial strategy under the Starmer Labour government and replaces the 2017 Industrial Strategy (withdrawn in 2021). It sets a ten-year horizon focused on business investment, productivity and resilience, designates eight priority growth sectors ("IS-8"), and packages instruments including British Business Bank capacity expansion, the National Wealth Fund's GBP 27.8bn envelope, a permanent statutory Industrial Strategy Advisory Council, planning and skills reforms, and sector-specific Sector Plans published alongside.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14307 on 6 June 2025 establishing the first whole-of-government Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) industrial-policy framework. The order (i) directs federal agencies to prioritise procurement and operation of US-manufactured UAS and to identify and rescind purchases of foreign-made drones where consistent with national security; (ii) tasks the FAA with proposing a Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) rule within 30 days and publishing a final BVLOS rule within 240 days; (iii) creates an eVTOL Integration Pilot Program (eIPP) with at least five projects selected within 180 days; and (iv) instructs the Federal Acquisition Security Council to publish a "Covered Foreign Entity List" within 30 days, operationalising the §1709 FY24 NDAA architecture that targets Chinese drone manufacturers (DJI, Autel and successor entities). Published in the Federal Register on 11 June 2025 (90 FR 24727).

On 27 May 2025 the Council of the EU adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument. Published in the Official Journal of the EU and entering into force on 29 May 2025, SAFE is the EU's flagship financial pillar of the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan: it provides up to EUR 150bn in competitively priced long-maturity loans — raised by the Commission on capital markets via NGEU-style EU borrowing — to Member States for joint procurement of defence capabilities. Funded equipment must meet a 65% EU/EEA/Ukraine local-content rule, and procurement must involve at least one SAFE-beneficiary Member State plus another Member State (Ukraine, EEA-EFTA members and SAFE-associated countries also eligible).

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve (CMSR) on 24 April 2025 as a A$1.2bn election commitment in the 2025-26 Budget. The Department of Industry, Science and Resources released the design package on 12 January 2026, prioritising antimony, gallium, and rare earth elements as the initial focus minerals (A$1bn for offtake transactions drawn from an expanded A$5bn Critical Minerals Facility, plus A$185m for physical stockpiling and implementation). The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Amendment (Strategic Reserve) Act 2026 passed Parliament on 31 March 2026 with effect 1 April 2026, giving Export Finance Australia (EFA) statutory power to enter offtake agreements, contracts for difference, forward contracts, and physical stockpiles for fuel and critical minerals. CMSR becomes operational in second half 2026.

On 25 March 2025 the European Commission adopted the first list of 47 Strategic Projects inside the EU under Article 7 of the Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252), followed on 4 June 2025 by 13 Strategic Projects located in third countries — 60 designations in total. The 47 EU projects span 13 Member States and 14 strategic raw materials, with an expected EUR 22.5bn capital-investment envelope; the 13 third-country projects require a further EUR 5.5bn. Designation triggers fast-track permitting (max 27 months for extraction, 15 months for processing/recycling), preferential access to EU/EIB/EBRD finance, and Member State priority status, operationalising the CRMA's 2030 benchmarks (≥10% extraction, ≥40% processing, ≥25% recycling, ≤65% single-country dependence).

On 19 March 2025 the European Commission adopted the European Steel and Metals Action Plan (COM(2025) 122 final, IP/25/805) — the first standalone sector-specific industrial-policy framework for the EU steel and base-metals industries (~2.6m direct + indirect jobs). The Plan bundles six work strands — affordable energy, trade defence and circularity (including announced replacement of the post-30 Jun 2026 steel safeguard with a "highly effective" successor measure and a melt-and-pour origin requirement), lead-market measures (Steel and Metals Industrial Decarbonisation Bank with a EUR 100bn target and a EUR 1bn pilot auction in 2025, "Made in EU" criteria in public and defence procurement), capacity and investment funding, scrap and critical-input circularity (including CBAM extension to downstream steel and aluminium products by end-2025), and skills / just transition.

Denmark's Forsvarsministeriet announced on 19 February 2025 a DKK 50 billion (~EUR 6.7 bn / USD 7.3 bn) Accelerationsfonden (Acceleration Fund) to be exhausted across 2025–2026, supplementing the existing 2024–2033 defence agreement (forsvarsforlig). A broad cross-party political agreement was formalised on 22 February 2025, confirming Danish defence spending will exceed 3% of GDP in both 2025 and 2026. The Fund operates as a fiscal procurement envelope granting enlarged direct-award authority to the Defence Procurement and Logistics Organisation (FMI), relying on the Article 346 TFEU essential-security-interest exemption to bypass standard EU competitive-tender rules for accelerated kit acquisition. Direct-award contracts already executed under the Fund include DKK 1.9 bn for 130 Patria 6×6 armoured personnel carriers and DKK 880m for ESSM Block 2 air-defence missiles.

The Government of Karnataka, Department of Industries and Commerce, notified the Karnataka Industrial Policy 2025-30 in the Karnataka Gazette on 11 February 2025, with the policy taking legal effect from 8 February 2025 and valid for five years (or until superseded). It supersedes the prior Karnataka Industrial Policy 2020-25. The umbrella state-level framework targets ₹7.5 lakh crore (~USD 90 bn) in fresh investment and 20 lakh (2 million) new jobs by 2030, positioning Karnataka as a top-Asia destination for high-technology manufacturing — semiconductors, EVs, aerospace, defence, biotech, medical devices, textiles and renewable energy. It introduces zone-based incentive categorisation (Zone 1/2/3 district classification), capital subsidies, stamp-duty exemption, electricity-tax exemption, interest subsidy, ESDM-specific top-up incentives that layer onto central PLI/ECMS/Semicon Mission schemes, and a Cabinet Sub-Committee under the Chief Minister to sanction bespoke "Anchor Investor" and "Mega/Ultra-Mega" customised incentive packages.

On 29 January 2025 the Union Cabinet of India approved the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), a seven-year programme running FY2024-25 through FY2030-31 with a headline financial envelope of ₹34,300 crore (≈USD 4.0 bn). The structure is split: ₹16,300 crore of direct government outlay administered by the Ministry of Mines, plus an expected ₹18,000 crore of investment by central public-sector undertakings (PSUs) and other stakeholders. The mission was first announced by the Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2024-25 (23 July 2024) and the Cabinet approval gave it formal sanction. The NCMM covers the full critical-minerals value chain: domestic exploration, mining, beneficiation, processing, recycling from end-of-life products, and acquisition of overseas mineral assets. The Geological Survey of India (GSI) is tasked with executing 1,200 exploration projects over the seven-year window (vs. 368 projects over the prior three years), expanded to offshore polymetallic-nodule provinces containing cobalt, REE, nickel and manganese. More than 100 critical-mineral blocks are slated for auction. Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) — the JV of NALCO, HCL and MECL — is the designated vehicle for overseas acquisitions, with active Argentina lithium (CAMYEN SE, 15,703 ha) and Australia lithium/cobalt off-take pipelines. India's official critical-minerals list contains 30 commodities, of which 24 are inscribed in Part D of Schedule I of the MMDR Act 1957 (after the 2023 amendment), reserving central-government auction authority over them. The NCMM sets an explicit recycling target of 15-20% of domestic critical-mineral demand met from secondary sources (e-waste, battery scrap, industrial waste) by 2035. The mission also funds a National Centre of Excellence for Critical Minerals and offers customs-duty waivers on 25 critical minerals (announced in the same FY24-25 budget) to lower import costs while domestic capacity scales. NCMM is India's pull-side complement to the US IRA, EU Critical Raw Materials Act, Canada Critical Minerals Strategy and Australia Critical Minerals Strategy — a coordinated allied response to Chinese dominance over refined cobalt, REE, graphite and gallium/germanium. For India specifically it is framed as the supply-chain underpinning for FAME-III (EV adoption), the Semicon India programme (gallium/germanium/silicon), and the National Solar Mission (silicon, indium, tellurium, gallium for thin-film PV).

Tanzania's Parliament passed the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Act, 2024 (Bill No. 15 of 2024, published in the Special Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania No. 34 Vol. 105 on 5 November 2024), which amends eight statutes including the Mining Act, Cap. 123. The mining-related provisions: (i) empower the Minister for Minerals, on recommendation from the Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST), to declare specific minerals as "critical" (essential to national economic, geopolitical, technology, or industrial use with limited or threatened supply) or "strategic" (mineral resources with diplomatic or defence importance) — the first Tanzanian statutory authority to do so; (ii) raise the minimum capital investment for a Mining Licence from USD 100,000 to USD 5,000,000 (a 50× hike pricing out junior explorers); (iii) authorise gemstone export following government-organised mineral auctions or international gem fairs while reaffirming the general beneficiation-in-Tanzania requirement on raw minerals and concentrates; (iv) require GST verification of mineral data on samples exported by mineral right holders; and (v) impose penalties for inaccurate or false mineral-data submissions. The Act establishes the gateway statutory authority for any future Tanzania critical- mineral export-control or stockpiling regime.

On 5 March 2024 the European Commission and EU High Representative jointly published the first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) via Joint Communication JOIN(2024) 10 final. EDIS sets binding benchmarks for EU member-state procurement: ≥40% of defence equipment acquired cooperatively by 2030, ≥35% of defence trade conducted intra-EU by 2030, and ≥50% of EU-member defence expenditure directed to European-origin products by 2030 rising to ≥60% by 2035. The strategy is the programmatic framework underpinning EDIP (Regulation (EU) 2025/2643), EDF, ASAP and EDIRPA, and marks the first comprehensive attempt to embed defence industrial objectives into EU single-market and budgetary architecture.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Decree No. 31/2024 on 26 January 2024, establishing the All-Ukrainian Economic Platform "Made in Ukraine" (Зроблено в Україні) as the foundational legal architecture for Ukraine's wartime domestic-industrial-development programme. The decree creates a coordinating body under the President — an advisory council convening the Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Economy, Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and State Property Fund — mandated to implement public-procurement preferential margins for Ukrainian-origin goods, administer the eRobota state-grants programme (~UAH 35 bn/year), and establish the National Cashback programme rewarding consumers for purchasing domestic goods via the Diia state-digital platform. The instrument is the statutory parent for the cluster of wartime localisation and industrial-preference measures operationalised through subsequent Cabinet Resolutions and Verkhovna Rada legislation.