Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense published its annual update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies (CMIC) list, adding 65 entities (17 new parent companies and 48 subsidiaries), bringing the total to approximately 188–200 designated entities. Major additions span EV and battery manufacturing (BYD, NIO, CATL), consumer internet (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent), semiconductors (SMIC, YMTC, CXMT), solar (JA Solar, Trina Solar), biotech (BGI Genomics, WuXi AppTec), drones/robotics (DJI, Unitree, RoboSense), and telecoms (TP-Link). Effective June 30, 2026, DoD is prohibited from procuring goods, services, or technology directly from listed entities; effective June 30, 2027, the ban extends to indirect supply-chain procurement through prime contractors and all sub-tiers.

President Trump signed an Executive Order on June 3, 2026 restructuring the entire US customs-entry compliance architecture for global importers. Key provisions impose heightened bonding minimums and domestic-asset requirements for foreign importers of record (IORs), require CAATSA-compliance and supply-chain-disclosure certifications, restrict foreign IORs to formal entry only (creating a de facto US-IOR monopoly on informal entry), establish a "good standing" requirement for IOR eligibility, and sharply curtail CBP's mitigation authority while setting enhanced penalty floors. DHS/CBP is directed to implement penalty-floor, export-documentation, and disposal provisions within 90 days (~September 2026) and the IOR structural reforms within 180 days (~November 2026). The EO is structurally distinct from tariff-rate instruments (Section 232 Proclamations 11021/11032), trade-remedy channels (USTR Section 301), statutory forced-labor enforcement (UFLPA), and targeted-sanctions channels (BIS/OFAC) — it reshapes the foundational compliance architecture through which all goods enter the US market.

On 13 May 2026, Entreprise Générale du Cobalt (EGC — the DRC state cobalt monopsony), Trafigura Pte Ltd, and EVelution Energy LLC signed a tripartite MOU in Madrid to establish a long-term supply framework for Congolese cobalt hydroxide to the United States. EGC will originate cobalt hydroxide from artisanal and small-scale mining; Trafigura will provide logistics and marketing services; EVelution will process the material into battery-grade cobalt sulfate and alloy-grade cobalt metal at a new first-of-kind commercial-scale refinery in Yuma County, Arizona (construction 2027, target completion 2029). The arrangement is designed to supply approximately 40% of projected US cobalt demand for aerospace, defence, and EV batteries. The MOU operationalises the December 2025 US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement at the commercial supply-chain level, creating a primary DRC→US cobalt flow that bypasses Chinese refiners.

President Trump issued five Presidential Determinations on 20 April 2026 under Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. § 4533), invoking the authority granted by Executive Order 14156 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency, signed 20 January 2025). The five determinations cover: (1) domestic petroleum production, refining, and logistics; (2) large-scale energy and energy-related infrastructure development, manufacturing, and deployment; (3) natural gas transmission, processing, storage, and LNG capacity; (4) coal supply chains and baseload power generation; (5) grid infrastructure, equipment, and supply chain. Each determination authorises the relevant Cabinet Secretary (primarily Energy) to use DPA §303 powers — direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase commitments, and equity investments — to expand domestic capacity in the named category.

India's Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved the Bharat Audyogik Vikas Yojna (BHAVYA) on 18 March 2026 with a ₹33,660 crore (~USD 4.0bn) outlay over six years (FY 2026-27 to FY 2031-32) to develop 100 plug-and-play industrial parks of 100-1,000 acres each across all states and Union Territories. Financial assistance of up to ₹1 crore per acre supports core infrastructure (internal roads, underground utilities, drainage, common treatment, ICT), value-added infrastructure (ready-built sheds, built-to-suit units, testing labs, warehousing), and social infrastructure (worker housing). The scheme is sector-agnostic and is implemented by the National Industrial Corridor Development Corporation (NICDC) under DPIIT, with states forming Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and committing to single-window clearances. The first phase will deliver 50 parks.

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq issued Royal Decree 39/2026 on 1 March 2026, published in the Sultanate of Oman Official Gazette Issue 1638 on 8 March 2026 (effective the following day), enacting a new Statute of the Public Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones (OPAZ) and consolidating the Public Establishment for Industrial Estates under the unified OPAZ regulatory umbrella. The Statute restructures OPAZ's institutional architecture for administering Oman's 23 special economic zones, free zones, and industrial cities, expands OPAZ's supervisory and oversight powers — including project registration, licensing, permits, approvals, certificates, regulation of municipal services within zones — and mandates a single-window platform consolidating the full suite of zone-related services for investors. The decree is the institutional-governance complement to the substantive SEZ/FZ framework established by Royal Decree 38/2025 and operationalises the Vision 2040 economic-diversification strategy at the binding regulatory-authority layer, covering RO 22.4 bn (~USD 58 bn) in cumulative committed investment across the OPAZ-administered zone network.

On 16 January 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 individuals and entities and identified one vessel for transferring oil products, procuring weapons and dual-use equipment, and providing financial services to Iran-backed Ansarallah (the Houthis). Designated parties — oil-trading and exchange companies, a shipping/logistics facilitator, and front-company operatives — are based in Yemen, Oman, and the UAE, and are accused of running an oil-sales and financial- facilitation network that Treasury says generates the Houthis over $2 billion in annual illicit revenue. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on a multi-year cadence of prior OFAC designations against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and weapons-procurement suppliers.

On 16 January 2026 the Saudi Council of Ministers, via Cabinet Decision No. 468/1447 (issued 30 December 2025 / 9 Rajab 1447H), published in the Umm Al-Qura Official Gazette four sets of implementing regulations governing the King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC), Ras Al-Khair, Jazan, and Cloud Computing & IT Special Economic Zones. The regulations entered into force on 16 April 2026 (90 days after gazette publication) and operationalise the SEZ framework first launched by ECZA in April 2023. Each zone has its own standalone framework but they share a common headline tax package: 5% corporate income tax for up to 20 years, zero VAT on intra-SEZ and SEZ-import flows, customs-duty suspension on qualifying imports, withholding-tax exemption on dividends and approved cross-border payments, and exemption from key provisions of the Saudi Companies Law, Commercial Register Law, and Trade Names Law. KAEC focuses on advanced manufacturing, automotive, consumer goods, ICT and pharmaceuticals; Ras Al-Khair targets shipbuilding, offshore rigs and MRO; Jazan covers food processing, metals conversion and logistics for Africa-bound trade; the Cloud Computing SEZ is a virtual zone (data centres can sit anywhere in KSA, headquarters must be in Riyadh) for cloud and AI-compute workloads. The package is the operational implementation layer for the 2024 Investment Law and a core Vision 2030 FDI-attraction instrument.

Presidential Decree No. 10813 (Resmî Gazete, 7 January 2026, issue 33130) amends Article 62 of Türkiye's Customs Law implementation decree (Decision 2009/15481) to abolish the simplified customs declaration regime for individual low-value imports arriving by post or express courier. Previously, shipments up to EUR 30 (inclusive of freight) qualified for a flat-rate, simplified declaration; from 6 February 2026 all such imports — regardless of value — must clear through standard customs procedures and the ordinary tariff schedule. Prescription medicines and medical supplements remain under the simplified regime up to EUR 1,500.

On 11 December 2025 the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit, held in Washington D.C. on 12 December 2025, at which the United States, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Israel signed the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration. The declaration commits signatories to coordinate "trusted" supply chains across the full technology stack — software, frontier foundation models, network infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transportation logistics, minerals refining and processing, and energy — explicitly to reduce "coercive dependencies." The coalition has since expanded to add the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Qatar, Sweden and India (signed 20 February 2026 at the India AI Impact Summit), and on 26 March 2026 State announced a USD 250 million Pax Silica Fund intended to catalyse trusted-capital co-investment in critical-minerals processing and semiconductor supply chains.

On 4 December 2025, the United States and the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement on Trade and Investment, executed at a White House trilateral ceremony alongside the parallel U.S.-Rwanda framework and witnessed by President Trump, President Tshisekedi (DRC), and President Kagame (Rwanda). The Agreement creates a Strategic Minerals Reserve (SMR) and a Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) under DRC sovereignty, gives U.S. persons preferential access to SAR assets, and commits DRC and its state-owned enterprises to route at least 30% of their commercialised cobalt volumes through the Sakania-Lobito Corridor within five years. A Joint Steering Committee (JSC) co-chaired by State and DRC's Ministry of Economy holds its inaugural meeting on 4-5 February 2026, designating the initial SAR asset list and launching implementation. The DFC announced a proposed equity investment in a Gécamines-Mercuria copper/cobalt joint venture as the first commercial vehicle under the framework.

The Chongqing Municipal Government General Office issued Notice 渝府办发〔2025〕58号 on 2025-11-22, promulgating "Several Policy Measures to Promote High-Quality Development of the Low-Altitude Economy," effective immediately through 2027-12-31. The package comprises eight capped-percentage subsidy tracks covering low-altitude public-service procurement, logistics route operating subsidies (up to RMB 150,000 per route), demonstration projects (up to RMB 20 million), test-flight infrastructure (20% of investment, capped at RMB 5 million), manufacturing R&D and first-of-kind equipment support (up to 30% of receipts, capped at RMB 5 million), national innovation/manufacturing centres (up to RMB 20 million), ground-station infrastructure (20% of investment, capped at RMB 10 million), private-equity fund-manager incentives (1% of invested capital, capped at RMB 10 million cumulative), and AI-compute subsidies (20% of service cost, up to RMB 1 million/year). Global Trade Alert classifies all eight interventions as state aid with a "certainly harmful" (Red) rating.

President Claudia Sheinbaum signed a comprehensive reform to Mexico's Customs Law (Ley Aduanera) published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 19 November 2025, entering into force 1 January 2026. The decree formally recognises the Agencia Nacional de Aduanas de México (ANAM) as the autonomous customs authority with expanded inspection and fiscalisation powers, creates a new inter-secretarial Consejo Aduanero with binding decisional authority over customs-agent licensing, and mandates real-time electronic traceability and video-surveillance at all recintos fiscales. The reform is Mexico's most comprehensive statutory overhaul of its customs-administration architecture in over a decade, directly conditioning USMCA-origin compliance infrastructure for approximately US$800 billion in annual MX-US trade and over 3,200 IMMEX-registered nearshoring operators.

China Development Bank announced a CNY 30 billion (~USD 4.2bn) special loan facility dedicated to the China-Europe Railway Express (中欧班列), financing construction of corridor, port and logistics-hub infrastructure plus working-capital support for enterprises operating the service. The scheme was unveiled at the Second China-Europe Railway Express International Cooperation Forum in Xi'an, alongside a matching CNY 30bn facility from the Export-Import Bank of China. CDB's Jiangsu, Henan and Shaanxi branches signed initial project-financing agreements with Lianyungang Port Holding Group, Henan International Logistics Hub Construction and Operation Co., and Xi'an International Port Group respectively.

Bangladesh's Council of Advisers, chaired by Chief Adviser Prof. Muhammad Yunus, approved the National Logistics Policy 2025 on 6 November 2025 at its 47th meeting, replacing the annulled 2024 Awami League-era logistics policy. The framework spans 11 chapters and establishes a technology-driven, integrated, sustainable logistics ecosystem aimed at positioning Bangladesh as a leading regional trade and logistics hub by 2050. Two-tier governance architecture: a National Logistics Council (led by the Chief Adviser) for top-level coordination, and a National Logistics Development and Coordination Committee (led by the Chief Adviser's Principal Secretary) for implementation oversight across multimodal hubs, economic zones, international corridors, airports, river ports, sea ports, and land ports.

On 30 October 2025, Brazil's National Monetary Council (CMN) approved a resolution regulating the use of up to BRL 4 billion (~USD 746 million) from the National Civil Aviation Fund (Fundo Nacional de Aviação Civil, FNAC) for below-market-rate loans to scheduled air-transport providers. The program comprises six credit lines — covering sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) purchases, aircraft and engine maintenance, aircraft acquisition and advance payment, and logistics infrastructure — at interest rates of 6.5-7.5% per year, with disbursement formalised via a BNDES contract in December 2025. Airlines drawing on the funds must accept counterpart obligations: an accelerated SAF blending trajectory (1 percentage point per year toward a 10% target, ahead of the legal mandate), a 30% increase in regional flights to the Legal Amazon and Northeast versus 2024 levels, and a freeze on shareholder dividend distributions during the loan grace period.

At the APEC Busan summit on 30 October 2025, Presidents Trump and Xi reached the "Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," subsequently implemented on the US side by the executive order "Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement" (issued 4 November 2025; effective 12:01 am EST on 10 November 2025; published in the Federal Register on 7 November 2025 as 90 FR 50729 / 2025-19826) and on the Chinese side by a series of MOFCOM and State Council Tariff Commission announcements (notably MOFCOM 2025 No. 90 of 8–9 November 2025). The arrangement is structurally parallel to the already-filed US-Japan, US-Korea and US-Taiwan framework deals but uniquely material because it freezes the highest-stakes bilateral tariff and export-control confrontation of the post-2024 reset. Core US commitments: (i) reciprocal-tariff "additional ad valorem rate of duty" on PRC-origin goods reduced from a prior 20% IEEPA-fentanyl + 10% IEEPA-reciprocal stack to a 10% rate (i.e., the prior 24% / 34% scheduled escalation is suspended), extended through 10 November 2026; (ii) US BIS suspends the so-called "affiliates rule" expanding entity-list controls to majority-owned subsidiaries of listed Chinese firms; (iii) USTR pauses Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding / logistics countermeasures against Chinese vessels for one year. Core PRC commitments: (i) MOFCOM suspends for one year (until 10 November 2026) the 9 October 2025 extraterritorial rare-earth export-control package — including controls on REE processing equipment, lithium-battery manufacturing equipment, and superhard materials; (ii) PRC suspends retaliatory tariffs on a broad swath of US agricultural products through 31 December 2026; (iii) commitment to purchase ≥25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans annually in 2026-2028 and to resume sorghum and log imports; (iv) suspension of MOFCOM antitrust and "unreliable-entity" probes against named US semiconductor and chip-equipment companies; (v) cooperation on fentanyl precursor enforcement. The arrangement does not repeal underlying authorities (IEEPA tariffs, MOFCOM export-control list, Entity List) — it is a calibrated mutual freeze with a one-year sunset and quarterly review checkpoints.

On 20 October 2025, President Donald J. Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed at the White House the "United States-Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths" — a non-binding common-policy instrument committing both governments to provide at least USD 1 billion each in financing within six months (USD 3bn+ joint commitment against an USD 8.5bn project pipeline and a stated USD 53bn recoverable-resource pipeline). The framework establishes a US-Australia Critical Minerals Supply Security Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Australian Minister for Resources, mandates streamlined permitting for mining/separation/processing projects, and explicitly couples the US demand-side architecture (DPA Title III + Defense Logistics Agency stockpile) to Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve. Concurrent with signing, EXIM issued seven Letters of Interest totalling USD 2.2bn (unlocking up to USD 5bn) to Arafura Rare Earths, Northern Minerals, Graphinex, La Trobe Magnesium, VHM, RZ Resources, and Sunrise Energy Metals; the US Department of War separately committed to a 100 metric-ton-per-year advanced gallium refinery in Western Australia, and Australia took USD 200m concessional equity in the Alcoa-Sojitz Wagerup gallium project and USD 100m equity in the Arafura Nolans rare-earths project.

On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 entities and 17 individuals across three procurement networks supplying Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and its subordinate weapons producers. The networks sourced ballistic-missile guidance components (accelerometers, gyroscopes, MEMS) for the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group and Shahid Hemmat Space Group, dual-use radar/missile-guidance electronics routed through Hong Kong and China for Shiraz Electronics Industries, and helicopter parts — including a US-origin helicopter — routed through Germany, Türkiye, Portugal and Uruguay for Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA). The action is Treasury's first nonproliferation-sanctions tranche following the 27 September 2025 UN Security Council "snapback" reimposing pre-JCPOA sanctions on Iran.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two Iranian financial facilitators — Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand — along with more than a dozen Hong Kong- and UAE-based individuals and entities for operating a shadow-banking network that laundered proceeds from Iranian oil sales through front companies and cryptocurrency. The designated addresses account for over $600 million in total inflows, including more than $100 million in cryptocurrency purchases tied to oil sales between 2023 and 2025. Proceeds are alleged to benefit the IRGC-Qods Force and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This is the second round of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran's shadow-banking infrastructure since National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) directed a maximum-pressure campaign on Iran in February 2025.

Turkish port authorities began requiring shipping agents to certify, from 21 August 2025, that vessels calling at Turkish ports have no Israeli ownership or agency ties and carry no military or hazardous cargo destined for Israel; Israeli-flagged or Israeli-linked ships were barred from Turkish ports outright, and Turkish-flagged vessels were barred from calling at Israeli ports. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed and formalised the measures — alongside a parallel closure of Turkish airspace to Israeli government/military flights — in an extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on 29 August 2025, stating Türkiye had "completely cut off trade with Israel." The measure operationalises and tightens enforcement of Türkiye's broader Israel trade suspension (in place since May 2024) by closing the maritime transshipment channel that had allowed indirect trade to continue.

The Henan Provincial People's Government issued Yuzheng [2025] No. 18 (豫政〔2025〕18号), "Several Policy Measures to Support Enterprises in Reducing Costs and Increasing Efficiency" (河南省支持企业降本增效若干政策 措施), on 2025-08-04, effective on issuance. The package is a horizontal, cross-sector cost-reduction bundle spanning ten cost categories: R&D subsidies of up to 30% of investment (capped at RMB 5-20 million per project depending on program), equipment-renewal loan interest subsidies and technical-transformation grants (15-20% of investment, capped at RMB 5-10 million), labor-cost relief (unemployment-insurance rate held at 1%, workers'-comp rate cut 20%, unemployment-insurance stabilization rebates of 30-60% through end-2025), financing-cost relief (RMB 160 billion 2025 lending target to tech enterprises, up to RMB 4 million in start-up guarantee loans), logistics-cost relief (toll exemptions for hydrogen trucks and 30% toll discounts for electric trucks through 2025-12-31, RMB 10,000-140,000 scrap-and-renew subsidies for aging trucks), and import/export-cost relief (tariff and quick-approval facilitation for integrated-circuit and advanced-equipment imports, up to 70% subsidy on overseas certification costs).

President Trump signed Executive Order 14324, "Suspending Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment for All Countries," on 30 July 2025 (published in the Federal Register on 5 August 2025 as FR doc 2025-14897, 90 FR 37775). The order eliminated the Section 321(a)(2)(C) administrative exemption that had allowed shipments valued at $800 or less to enter the United States duty-free, applying the suspension to all countries of origin rather than the China/Hong Kong-only carve-out imposed earlier in 2025. DHS/CBP published a Notice of Implementation on 2 September 2025 (FR doc 2025-16802) modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule so that covered low-value goods must be entered via formal or informal ACE entry types and pay applicable duties; goods shipped through the international postal network were instead made subject to a new flat ad valorem or specific per-item duty rate set by HTSUS annex. The suspension took effect for entries on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on 29 August 2025. A DHS/CBP rule published 24 June 2026 (FR doc 2026-12670) converted the non-postal suspension from time-limited to indefinite and closed the remaining international-postal-network exemption to formal/ informal entry procedures as well.

On 28 July 2025 the General Office of the Shanghai Municipal People's Government issued Hufubangui [2025] No. 6, the "Shanghai Embodied Intelligence Industry Development Implementation Plan" (上海市具身智能产业发展实施方案), a dedicated municipal state-aid package to build Shanghai into a global innovation hub for embodied intelligence (humanoid robotics / physical AI). The plan targets an industry scale of CNY 500 billion by 2027, alongside at least 20 core algorithm/technology breakthroughs, four or more high-quality incubators, and "100-100-100" targets for leading enterprises, applications and products. Support is disbursed as tiered direct subsidies capped at CNY 50 million (30% of project cost) for core-technology R&D, CNY 40 million per company per year for computing-power credits, CNY 20 million (50% of cost) for public-platform construction, CNY 10 million (20% of cost) for application-demonstration projects, CNY 5 million per company per year for language-corpus services, CNY 5 million (5% of contract value) for robot sales/rental incentives, CNY 5 million per open-source project, and CNY 1 million per leading enterprise for standards development. Target application sectors are logistics, industrial manufacturing, retail, healthcare/eldercare and domestic services.

Malaysia's Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry, acting through the Strategic Trade Controller, issued Directive No. 1/2025 on 14 July 2025 invoking Section 12 of the Strategic Trade Act 2010 to declare high-performance US-origin AI chips (GPUs, TPUs, neural processors, AI accelerators meeting the Annex I total-processing-performance and performance-density thresholds) as "unlisted controlled items". With effect from 14 July 2025, any export, transshipment, or transit of those chips through Malaysian territory requires a Strategic Trade Permit, a 30-day prior notification, an export-control classification from the manufacturer, and a re-export licence from the originating country. The directive is the formal Malaysian response to US scrutiny over alleged Nvidia AI-chip flows to China via Malaysian freight forwarders and data-centre operators, and it remains binding even after the US relaxes its own export rules.

On 22 May 2025, Mexico published a decree in the Diario Oficial de la Federación (DOF) granting fiscal incentives to companies that begin operations within newly designated "Polos de Desarrollo Económico para el Bienestar" (PODECOBI) — Economic Development Poles for Welfare. The decree grants a 100% immediate deduction of the original investment amount in new fixed assets, plus an additional 25% deduction for incremental training and innovation expenses, for taxpayers operating in the poles through fiscal year 2030. The Ministry of Economy designates and administers the poles, with a cross-secretarial promotion committee overseeing site selection; 14 zones spanning Campeche, Chihuahua, Durango, Estado de México, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala and Veracruz are active as of mid-2025. The measure operationalises the "Plan México" nearshoring strategy by concentrating incentives in specific geographic zones rather than applying them nationwide.

On 20 May 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated the UK Sanctions List, adding 82 entries (20 individuals and 62 entities) under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. OFSI's accompanying Financial Sanctions Notice confirms all 82 are now subject to an asset freeze and trust services sanctions. The package covers three clusters: further members of the Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency (SDA) disinformation network (first designated in 2024); Russian financial institutions including the St Petersburg Currency Exchange, the Petersburg Settlement Center, and the State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency; and individuals and companies supporting Russia's oil "shadow fleet" logistics, including a British national accused of ship procurement and two tanker captains. The measures were published in coordination with the EU's 17th sanctions package, announced the same day.

Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce issued Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) 750(I)/2025 on 4 May 2025 under Section 3(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950 (XXXIX of 1950), prohibiting (i) the import into Pakistan of goods of Indian origin by third countries via sea, land, and air; (ii) the transit through Pakistan of goods imported from India by third countries via sea and air; and (iii) exports from third countries to India via Pakistani sea, land, and air routes. The SRO was published in the Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary (Part I) and took effect immediately. A clarification memorandum issued by the Ministry of Commerce on 8 May 2025 confirmed exemptions for Reshipment-on- Board (RoB) cargo and for shipments where the bill of lading or letter of credit was issued before 4 May 2025. The 10 May 2025 India–Pakistan ceasefire did not lift the SRO; it remains in force.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14269 on 9 April 2025 (FR publication 15 April 2025), launching the first whole-of-government US shipbuilding and maritime industrial-policy instrument since the 1996 Maritime Security Program. The order directs development of an America's Maritime Action Plan (MAP) under APNSA leadership within 210 days (released 13 February 2026) and tasks DoD, DoT, DHS, Commerce, USTR, and OMB with a sequenced set of reviews covering deregulation of the domestic commercial maritime fleet, expansion of the Maritime Industrial Base, mariner workforce development, Maritime Prosperity Zones, and Office of Strategic Capital loan deployment to commercial shipyards. The EO is the cross-government industrial-policy umbrella; the simultaneously-developed USTR Section 301 China Maritime/Logistics/Shipbuilding action (filed 17 April 2025) is the China-specific tariff-track instrument.

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq issued Royal Decree 38/2025 on 7 April 2025, published in the Sultanate of Oman Official Gazette on 13 April 2025, enacting a unified statutory framework for Oman's special economic zones (SEZs) and free zones (FZs) under the Public Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones (OPAZ). The law consolidates the previously fragmented regimes governing Duqm SEZ, Salalah Free Zone, Sohar Free Zone, Al Mazunah Free Zone, and Knowledge Oasis Muscat into a single overarching statutory architecture, granting a 10-year corporate income tax exemption (renewable for high-value activities), 100% foreign ownership, full capital and profit repatriation, customs-duty exemptions on construction inputs and operational goods, and a statutory one-stop-shop through OPAZ. The law establishes OPAZ as the consolidated regulatory authority with ring-fenced powers over labour, immigration, customs, environment, and land-use within zone boundaries, and creates a new statutory basis for OPAZ to negotiate sector-specific concessions using usufruct, leasehold, and sub-concession instruments. Royal Decree 38/2025 is the principal Vision 2040 FDI-architecture instrument — the parent statute under which the GFCL Salalah LFP battery-materials usufruct, the Hyport Duqm green-ammonia project, and the Karwa Motors EV-assembly arrangement all operate.

Denmark's Forsvarsministeriet announced on 19 February 2025 a DKK 50 billion (~EUR 6.7 bn / USD 7.3 bn) Accelerationsfonden (Acceleration Fund) to be exhausted across 2025–2026, supplementing the existing 2024–2033 defence agreement (forsvarsforlig). A broad cross-party political agreement was formalised on 22 February 2025, confirming Danish defence spending will exceed 3% of GDP in both 2025 and 2026. The Fund operates as a fiscal procurement envelope granting enlarged direct-award authority to the Defence Procurement and Logistics Organisation (FMI), relying on the Article 346 TFEU essential-security-interest exemption to bypass standard EU competitive-tender rules for accelerated kit acquisition. Direct-award contracts already executed under the Fund include DKK 1.9 bn for 130 Patria 6×6 armoured personnel carriers and DKK 880m for ESSM Block 2 air-defence missiles.

Mauritania promulgated Loi n° 2025-006 on 19 February 2025, comprehensively replacing the 2012 Investment Code (Loi n° 2012-052) with a three-tier incentive architecture — a Base Regime (SME + intermediate categories), a Development Poles Regime (designated geographic zones), and a Structuring Investments Regime (large-scale strategic projects above 200M MRU). The law was drafted with IFC/World Bank technical assistance, codifies national-treatment equality between domestic and foreign investors, provides fiscal-customs stability guarantees of up to 20 years, and establishes APIM as a digital single-window authority with ICSID/UNCITRAL arbitration pathways. As of July 2025, 19 projects (≈USD 120M declared investment, 939 estimated direct jobs) had been approved under the new framework.

UAE Cabinet Decision No. 142 of 2024, announced 9 December 2024 and formally gazetted 11 February 2025, introduces a Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (DMTT) on UAE constituent entities of Multinational Enterprise (MNE) groups with consolidated annual revenues ≥ EUR 750 million in at least two of the four preceding fiscal years. The DMTT ensures a 15% minimum effective tax rate (ETR) on UAE-source profits, functioning as a Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) under the OECD/G20 Pillar Two GloBE framework, thereby giving the UAE first-priority taxing right before any IIR top-up by a parent-jurisdiction authority. The measure applies to fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2025. The UAE deliberately excluded the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Under-Taxed Profits Rule (UTPR) from this primary instrument, deferring those to subsequent Cabinet Decisions; the QDMTT-only architecture mirrors Singapore's MEMTA and Switzerland's MindStV as the first-mover design choice for established low-tax financial hubs.

The full Pleno of the Corte Suprema de Justicia of Honduras ruled unanimously on 20 September 2024 that Decree 236-2012 (constitutional amendments enabling the ZEDE regime) and Decree 120-2013 (Organic Law of the ZEDEs) violate the "stone-written" Articles 294, 303, and 329 of the Honduran Constitution, which govern territorial organisation, the justice system, and the economic regime respectively. The court applied a retroactive nullatory effect, treating the ZEDE framework as legally void ab initio (from origin). The ruling was published in La Gaceta No. 36,698 on 25 November 2024, conferring erga omnes legal force; the three operational ZEDEs — Próspera (Roatán), Orquídea (Choluteca), and Ciudad Morazán (Cortés) — are formally without statutory basis under Honduran law. The decision triggers a US$10.7 billion CAFTA-DR ICSID arbitration claim (Próspera v. Honduras; preliminary objections decided 26 February 2025) and sets a constitutional precedent for the cost of retroactive SEZ annulment globally.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

The National Assembly of the Lao PDR adopted the amended Law on Investment Promotion (No. 62/NA) on 28 June 2024; it entered into force on 16 December 2024, replacing the 2016 Investment Promotion Law and the 2019 Article-12 amendment. The statute spans 13 parts and 109 articles (62 amended, 32 new) and establishes the foundational legal architecture for domestic and foreign investment in Laos, setting out promotion categories, fiscal-incentive regimes, one-stop-service approval pathways, and investor-protection guarantees. Key reforms tighten the framework for large strategic-sector FDI in mining and hydropower — requiring partial state ownership — while expanding CIT/tax-holiday and customs-duty exemptions by SEZ category and sector-promotion zone. The law operationalises the Investment Promotion and Management Committee (IPMC) as the one-stop regulatory authority, enhancing alignment with the Lao-China Railway-driven Chinese-FDI surge and positioning Laos within the ASEAN horizontal investment-promotion reform wave.

On 20 March 2024 the German Federal Cabinet adopted the Nationale Hafenstrategie, the first comprehensive cross-modal sea-and-inland port strategy succeeding the 2015 Nationales Hafenkonzept. Developed jointly by the federal government, the coastal and inland-port Länder, port industry associations and the ver.di union under BMDV (now BMV) leadership, the strategy is structured around five fields of action and a "living document" measures part containing approximately 140 operative measures. It targets the competitiveness of German sea and inland ports against pressures from the energy transition, Russia's war on Ukraine, post-COVID supply-chain restructuring, Brexit and shifts in world trade.

Canada made SOR/2024-32, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered and effective 2024-02-21 on the second anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The regulations add 163 persons to Schedule 1 — 10 individuals and 153 entities, predominantly Russian organizations tied to military-industrial production, logistics, insurance and oil-sector support — triggering Canadian dealing/asset bans. A parallel amendment to Schedule 7 adds five new goods categories under the Harmonized System (explosives and pyrotechnics; data-processing units and components; ball and roller bearings; semiconductor manufacturing equipment; optical and navigational instruments), banning their export to Russia or Russian persons.

On 21 February 2024, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed Presidential Decree DP-37 approving the 2024 State Program for the Implementation of the "Uzbekistan-2030" Strategy under the slogan "Year of Support for Youth and Business". The decree converts the parent Uzbekistan-2030 doctrine (DP-158 of 11 September 2023) into binding annual execution targets covering SOE privatisation and IPO programmes (Navoi MMC, Almalyk MMC, Uzbekistan National Investment Fund), industrial localisation, sectoral investment lines, "green economy" and water-management benchmarks, and youth-business support measures. DP-37 functions as the master annual operationalisation instrument for Uzbekistan's 2024 industrial and investment policy stack, anchoring the downstream subsoil recodification (LRU-987, Oct 2024) and critical-minerals national programme (March 2025).

Tunisia's Finance Law for 2024 (Loi Nº 2023-52, promulgated 22 December 2023) introduces a 4-year full exemption from corporate income tax (IS) and personal income tax (IR) for newly created enterprises that obtain an investment declaration certificate during 2024 or 2025. Qualifying enterprises must commence effective operations within 2 years of the declaration date and maintain Tunisian-standard accounts; excluded sectors include financial services, conventional energy, mining, real-estate promotion, commerce, and telecoms operators. The measure is Tunisia's principal post-Loi 2016-71 targeted investment-attraction instrument and opens the IPTM register's first Tunisia-issuer action, closing a full-geographic blank in MENA/Maghreb coverage.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 28 entities under 32 entries to the Entity List effective April 12, 2023, targeting front companies and logistics networks attempting to evade US export controls to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military and defense industrial base. Twelve of the entities are Chinese electronics and semiconductor distributors operating as procurement intermediaries; ten are Russian logistics and trading firms; six are spread across Armenia, Malta, Singapore, Spain, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Uzbekistan as diversion facilitators. All listed entities are subject to a license review policy of denial for virtually all EAR-controlled items.

Angola's Ministry of Transport formalised a 30-year concession to Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR — Trafigura 49.5% / Mota-Engil 49.5% / Vecturis S.A. 1%) for the operation, management and maintenance of the Lobito Corridor — comprising the 1,300 km Benguela Railway from the Port of Lobito to Luau (Angola-DRC border) and the Lobito port mineral terminal. The international tender was won on 4 November 2022; the concession contract was signed on 4 July 2023 at a ceremony attended by the Presidents of Angola, the DRC and Zambia. LAR commenced operations in January 2024. The concession is paired with the trilateral Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency Agreement (LCTTFA), signed at Lobito Port on 27 January 2023 by the Transport ministers of Angola, the DRC and Zambia, which establishes the cross-border customs/transit framework for the corridor.

On 18 October 2022, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched Saudi Arabia's National Industrial Strategy (NIS) under the Vision 2030 umbrella, with delivery led by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources (MIM). The strategy prioritises 118 segments within 12 industrial sub-sectors (including downstream chemicals, automotive, aerospace, machinery, and metals), identifies more than 800 investment opportunities estimated at ~USD 266bn, and sets binding 2030/2035 targets: triple manufacturing GDP by 2030, raise industrial exports to SAR 557bn (~USD 148bn), bring cumulative additional investment to SAR 1.3 trillion, and grow factories from ~10,000 to ~36,000 by 2035. NIS sits alongside the National Industrial Development and Logistics Program (NIDLP, 2019) and the Public Investment Fund's strategic-sector mandates as the third leg of the Kingdom's non-oil-economy build-out.

On 16 October 2022, Jordan promulgated Investment Environment Law No. 21 of 2022, published in Official Gazette No. 5821, entering into force 90 days later on approximately 14 January 2023. The law replaces the 2014 Investment Law No. 30 and restructures Jordan's entire FDI-promotion architecture: it establishes the Ministry of Investment (MOIN) and the Investment Council as apex bodies, codifies Development Zones, Free Zones, and Special Economic Zones (including the Aqaba Special Economic Zone — gateway for Jordan's phosphate exports via JPMC, the world's second-largest phosphate producer), and enshrines national-treatment guarantees with customs exemptions, zero-rated sales tax incentives, and investor-state dispute-settlement provisions for qualifying protected FDI. The law is the foundational parent statute for Jordan's IMF Extended Fund Facility-conditioned reform agenda and positions the country within the IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Corridor) trade-investment integration architecture.

The Bahraini Council of Ministers, chaired by HRH Crown Prince and Prime Minister Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa and issued pursuant to directives of HM King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, launched the five-pillar Economic Recovery Plan on 31 October 2021 as the government's post-COVID-19 structural-adjustment and growth framework through 2024–2030. The plan catalyses a USD 30 billion strategic-projects pipeline, delivers six new priority-sector strategies (oil and gas, tourism, logistics, financial services, telecommunications/ICT, manufacturing), targets 20,000 new Bahraini jobs and 10,000 annual training slots, and mandates fiscal balance by 2024 including the doubling of VAT from 5% to 10% effective 1 January 2022 under Royal Decree 33/2021. It is the foundational parent framework for all subsequent Bahraini sectoral decrees and investment decisions through 2030, and is materially relevant to the global non-Chinese aluminium supply chain through Aluminium Bahrain (Alba), one of the world's largest non-Chinese primary aluminium smelters at approximately 1.5 million tonnes per annum.

Qatar's Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani promulgated Law No. (1) of 2019 on 7 January 2019, replacing Law No. 13 of 2000 and authorising non-Qatari investors to hold up to 100% equity in Qatari enterprises across all economic sectors, subject to executive regulations. The law provides national-treatment guarantees, protects against expropriation except for public purpose with fair compensation, and permits full repatriation of investment income and capital. Banking, insurance, and commercial agencies remain subject to sector-specific ownership caps unless exempted by the Council of Ministers.